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ART. I.—PROFESSOR MIVART ON THE RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE.

Contemporary Evolution. By ST. GEORGE MIVART. London: H. S. King.

ON former occasions we have expressed our strong sense of Dr. Mivart's great merit and great power, as a champion of Catholic truth. In our last number in particular, we placed before our readers some of the admirable speculations contained in his "Lessons from Nature"; and we hope in October to occupy ourselves again with the very valuable contents of that work. Dr. Mivart's knowledge in one branch of physical science is unusually extensive and profound, while he has a good acquaintance with those others which have not formed his special study. At the same time it shows a singularly well-balanced mind, that one who pursues physical studies with such zest and ardour, so clearly and unfalteringly apprehends the superiority possessed by philosophy proper over physics, not only in dignity, but still more in practical importance. And even the study of science and philosophy—profound as is Dr. Mivart's interest in them for their own sake—is chiefly precious in his eyes, as ministrative to the defence of religion and morality. In every page, we may almost say, he displays his paramount zeal for that great end; and we hardly know any writer who so consistently bears in mind, how immeasurably nobler is one act of moral self-restraint and self-sacrifice, than the loftiest flight of intellectual speculation. See e.g. pp. 150–1 of the volume before us. Nor should we do justice to our subject, if we did not further draw attention to the singular dignity and moderation of the author's general tone. When his sense of duty requires him to speak most severely, one can never find in his words anything which ever so distantly resembles bitterness, sarcasm, contemptuousness, or personality.

The chapters in his present work on "scientific" and
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"philosophical evolution," display, to our mind, all his best characteristics. We do not speak of the chapter on "æsthetic evolution," because it first appeared in our own pages. But we would draw especial attention to the whole chapter on "philosophical evolution," as full of just and pregnant remarks. Indeed, one thing contained in it seems to us among the most important philosophical suggestions, which have been made in our time. We refer to the course of reasoning from p. 179 to p. 185; in which he points out, that the whole progress of modern scepticism and infidelity will more and more throw back the defenders of religion on that scholastic "philosophy, in the terms of which the various" Catholic "doctrines have been defined."

It will be readily understood then how keen is our regret, that we feel ourselves out of sympathy with the present volume taken as a whole. It is the chapters on "political evolution" and "three ideals," which give the work its general tendency and drift; and even those other chapters, with the intrinsic contents of which we substantially concur, are extrinsically (if we may so speak) used as part of an argument, with which we are fundamentally at variance. That argument is directed to the establishment of a certain theory, concerning the relations which should exist between religion and society under the circumstances of modern times. And this theme is one of such vital and critical importance at the present moment, that we cannot remain silent; however keen is our regret at coming into conflict with one whom we so sincerely respect. It would carry us a great deal too far indeed, if we attempted on the present occasion duly to exhibit what we regard as the true theory on the subject. But we will point out what seem to us the chief flaws in Dr. Mivart's reasoning; and we will suggest a few general principles in opposition to his, which (as we shall maintain) ought to direct the action of Catholics in this grave matter. We are sure we shall not have so much as the momentary temptation, to express our adverse comments in any tone inconsistent with the profound respect and gratitude due to the author from every Catholic. And he is himself the very last person to take umbrage, at a dispassionate argumentative criticism of his dispassionate argumentative exposition.

Dr. Mivart begins with drawing a vigorous and on the whole very accurate picture of that reaction against what he calls "mediævalism," which has been in progress for some centuries. He presently proceeds (p. 79) to describe briefly "three distinct socio-political systems" which, as he considers, are now striving against each other for mastery. The first of

these he calls "paganism": being "the mainly unconscious and partly conscious real pagan revival and revolt against God." The second of these systems is that embraced by himself, and called by him "civicism." It is based on a certain theory of his, concerning "the rights of conscience." It imports (if we at all rightly understand it) that no tenets concerning religion and morality can, without injustice, be permitted to entail any legally-imposed disqualification, on any one person who sincerely embraces them; any legally imposed inferiority in his position, as compared with that of other citizens. And since he has invented the term political "civicism" to express his own theory, we may be allowed on our side to invent a term for our own; which we will call therefore political "ethicism." According to our doctrine, not only is it consistent with justice, but it is essential to the well-being of a State, that a legislation shall exist, which imposes comparative disadvantage on those who sincerely hold this or that erroneous tenet on religion or morality. If we be asked indeed, what are those errors in particular which at any given time and place should involve their upholders in such comparative disadvantage,—we reply that this is a question of detail, on which we shall speak in the sequel. But we may give an obvious illustration of what we intend, by referring to the position in which any Englishman is now placed, who sincerely thinks that God permits divorce for the mere reason of incompatibility of temper; or again, who sincerely thinks that he is bound, under certain circumstances, to fight a duel.

Dr. Mivart calls that theory "mediævalism," which essentially conflicts with the two theories of "paganism" and "civicism." But we demur to this appellation, for more than one reason. In the first place, the mediæval period had two different characteristics. On one hand it is the epoch, no doubt, when (as we consider) the normal and divinely-appointed mutual relation of Church and State approached more nearly than at any other epoch, to being at least theoretically accepted. But on the other hand, it was an epoch of rude and savage lawlessness, of widely extended ignorance, of vehement and unrestrained passion: so that if we express preference for "mediævalism," we might be understood to express a preference for violence over gentleness, for rudeness over refinement, and for ignorance over knowledge. But we have a second and still stronger objection to our theory being called "mediæval." Whatever be its merits, at all events it is broader than any theory concerning Church and State; because (as we venture to

maintain) it would hold good, even though God (as He was of course free to do) had founded no Church at all. Our doctrine in fact requires no other assumption, than that mankind have the means of certainly knowing certain given verities concerning religion and morals. And the doctrine entirely holds good therefore as a principle in modern no less than in mediæval times, though its practical application of course must be widely different. As to that *further* doctrine, which concerns the due relation between Church and State,—it may be regarded, we maintain, as an inference from our own. The Catholic doctrine (we say) on Church and State, even though it had not been directly taught by the Church, would result nevertheless by necessary consequence, from combining "ethicism" on the one hand, with the revealed truth concerning the Church's spiritual privileges on the other.

The chief purpose of our present article however, as we have said, is not so much to vindicate our own position (though we hope to say much incidentally which shall tend to do so) as to oppose Dr. Mivart's. This course is indeed required by the very nature of the case; because he bases his theory on the ground, not of expediency, but of absolute and indefeasible right. He dwells emphatically on "individual freedom reposing upon conscience" (p. 119); or "liberty of conscience" (p. 133); as being "the most fundamental and sacred of all liberties" (p. 32), "the greatest and the noblest of the rights of man" (p. 34). In his view, the "rights of conscience" are "supreme and indefeasible," consisting as they do in men's "liberty to adhere with undeviating fidelity in speech and action to what they believe to be truth."* He lays down (p. 75) as an "indisputable" dictum of the Natural Law, that "no citizen has the right to deny to another a liberty which he, as a citizen, claims for himself"; by which Dr. Mivart evidently intends, the liberty of vigorously propagating what are his own sincere convictions on religion and morality. All believers in a Personal God, he adds (p. 77), "must assert that each man has a right freely to perform all such actions as God, through his conscience, has enjoined him to perform, provided" he does "not deprive other men of similar freedom to fulfil what they believe to be their duty." Moreover no Theist, he thinks (p. 78), "can logically deny to citizens freedom to declare their belief to those who ask them"; and "to exert such combined actions" for the propagation of that belief, "as do

* Dr. Mivart here adds the words, "revealed to them by their Creator"; but we omit those words, because his whole drift shows them to be pleonastic.

not interfere with the analogous rights of combination of other citizens."

We shall presently point out, that the apparently legitimate consequences of this theory would be vast and (we must add) startling; and we at once, therefore, set ourselves to examine the arguments by which our author supports it. On doing so, we find that his reasoning has (we may say) no other foundation whatever, except only the Catholic doctrine concerning the sacredness of each individual's conscience. Whatever else therefore we may be obliged from want of space to omit, at all events we must thoroughly examine the sufficiency of this one foundation. To such a task then we at once address ourselves.

Here our first business of course is with this Catholic doctrine concerning the sacredness of conscience, on which Dr. Mivart lays so emphatic stress. On some former occasions we have pointed out what seems to us a possible confusion, between two different significations of the word "conscience"; and in our last number (pp. 483-6) we had occasion again to touch on the subject. The sense, we think, in which the word "conscience" is nowadays more commonly used, is to express man's natural sense of right and wrong; to express that innate power of human nature, whereby each man is enabled personally to apprehend certain portions of the Natural Law. But when Catholic theologians say that it is always a sin for me to act against my "conscience," they are using the word in an importantly different sense. According to their sense of the word—so far from conscience being my primary informant on the Natural Law, it does not come into play *at all*, until I am *already* acquainted with certain doctrines and principles, whether of the Natural Law or of whatever other law may be in question. With Catholic theologians, the word "conscience" (in such a context) does not express any mental habit or power, but a mental *act*; an act of inference. In preparing to elicit such an act, I contemplate the various laws by which I consider myself to be bound, so far as I know them to bear on the circumstances of the moment; and then my act of conscience consists in my inference, as to what *hic et nunc* it is obligatory, or again morally permissible, to do.*

Dr. Mivart has not entirely escaped the equivocation to which we have been referring; for at the top of p. 75 he

* We a little overstated the matter however in April (p. 484), by implying that "conscience" has no more intimate relation with the Natural Law, than with any other law; because the obligation on me of any other law rests in last analysis (as is evident) on the dictates of the Natural Law.

evidently uses the word "conscience" to express men's power of apprehending right and wrong, as distinct from pleasurable and painful. But, so far as we can see, no part of his argument is vitiated by this confusion. Nor again, we think, is the force of his argument materially impaired, by another little oversight into which he has fallen. He cites (pp. 32-4) F. Newman's important theological citations, as to the obligation indefeasibly incumbent on all men of never transgressing the dictate of their conscience. But (if we rightly understand him) he has pressed the force of these citations a little too far. It is not quite universally permissible for me (p. 32) "to adhere with undeviating fidelity" to the dictate of my erroneous conscience; because the erroneousness of that conscience may possibly be "vincible." If such be the case, I cannot without sin act in *accordance* with my conscience, any more than I can without sin act in *opposition* to it. On the supposed hypothesis, my only way to avoid sin is to conquer that erroneousness of conscience, which, by hypothesis, is vincible; and to change my existent conscience for a truer one. But this exception to the universal truth of Dr. Mivart's statement is far from being as important as might appear at first blush; because theologians do not call the erroneousness of a conscience "vincible," unless it be vincible *hic et nunc*.

Our important difference from Dr. Mivart begins at a later stage of his argument. We heartily concede to him, that every one is always bound to do those acts which his conscience dictates as of obligation; whether that dictate be objectively true, or again invincibly and inculpably erroneous. But then Dr. Mivart proceeds to assume, that the State's obligation of not interfering with such acts is co-extensive with the individual's obligation of performing them. This is precisely what we deny, and what we hardly think that on reflection Dr. Mivart will maintain. In no other passage does he express himself so emphatically on the matter, as in the following; which we may fairly take as our starting-point in the whole discussion. Every believer in a Personal God, he says—

Must assert that all the citizens of a state combined together, save one, are morally incompetent, by their joint authority as citizens, to compel that one to perform an act against his conscience: such as would be an outward act of adoration to a Deity in whom he disbelieved, or of insult to Him whom he conceives to be his Creator and his Lord (p. 77).

Now we here desiderate greater clearness of expression. The supposition which Dr. Mivart makes, as he words it, is not less

than intrinsically repugnant; for no man, by metaphysical possibility, can "compel" any one "to perform an act against his conscience." I cannot, by metaphysical possibility, perform an act against my conscience, unless it be a *free* act; because my conscience condemns no other: and no external authority can, by metaphysical possibility, "compel" me to perform a free act.

What is it then exactly, which Dr. Mivart intends to lay down as the basis of his argument? Perhaps the most obvious interpretation which can be given to his words—putting aside that sense which (as we have said) is necessarily out of the question—would be, that no civil Government can, without tyranny, prohibit any citizen from doing what he conscientiously believes to be of obligation. But on this extreme theory, the British Government acted tyrannically, when in India it put down the practices of infanticide and Suttee.* Nay, the Thugs themselves acted under a sense of religious obligation. "I particularly remember," says Lord Macaulay, "an altercation which took place between two of these wretches. One Thug reproached the other for having been so irreligious as to spare the life of a traveller, when the omens indicated that their patroness required a victim. 'How could you let him go? how can you expect the goddess to protect us, if you disobey her commands?'" But there is no need of appealing for illustration to these hideous superstitions. Archbishop Whately was not thinking of India but of England, when he pointed out—in the midst of an energetic assault on "Romish" persecution—that "there is not necessarily anything of the character of persecution, in doing violence to a man's conscience."† "To admit at once and universally the plea of conscience," he adds, "would lead to the subversion of the whole fabric of society." I sincerely believe that a certain estate is my property; and my conscience dictates, that I am bound to expend a portion of it in giving my son a higher education than he could otherwise receive. A court of law however prohibits me from doing so, by deciding that the estate is not mine; though I am entirely unconvinced by the Judge's reasoning, and my conscience therefore remains unaltered. Some hundred law cases in every year involve such an element as this. Are all these judicial

* "It is lamentable to think," says Lord Macaulay in his speech of March 9th, 1843, "how long we suffered the practices of infanticide and Suttee to remain unchecked." These practices, he had premised, "were enjoined by the Hindoo superstition."

† "Errors of Romanism," p. 278.

decisions tyrannical and unjust? Or I am hastening on an errand of what I think urgent importance; and my conscience dictates, that I ought to take a short cut for the purpose over some one else's property: is the policeman bound to *respect* this conscience? Ten thousand analogous cases will present themselves to every one's mind; and it is no exaggeration to say with Dr. Whately, that the whole fabric of society would be subverted, if the legislature were insane enough to accept any such principle as is here suggested.

But there is a qualification, on which Dr. Mivart will certainly insist in meeting our criticism, and which is implied indeed in some of the passages already cited by us. He will say, that the State may most justly prohibit an act,—however strongly dictated by the individual conscience,—which would inflict serious injury on others. We do not see indeed at the moment, in what way the Hindoo widow's voluntary endurance of combustion need necessarily inflict injury on others; though on this we will not insist. But we would urge two objections against Dr. Mivart's doctrine, even as so qualified. Firstly, by this very large exception, he altogether takes away from his proposition that *quasi-axiomatic* character, with which he has sought to invest it. The individual is under a strict obligation of obeying his genuine conscience,* however great may be the injury to others involved in that obedience. On Dr. Mivart's own showing then, the proposition is very far indeed from universally true, that the State's obligation of permitting acts is co-extensive with the individual's obligation of performing them. And if the proposition be not *universally* true—if it be not a kind of axiom—we do not see what reason Dr. Mivart has given for thinking that it contains any truth *at all*. But secondly, by introducing this qualification, he takes from his argument its entire efficacy as against persecution. Every persecuting sovereign thinks that the acts which he prohibits are gravely injurious to the true interest of his people. And even if Dr. Mivart held (we are delighted to say we see no sign of his holding) that the civil ruler has no concern with the people's *spiritual* welfare, our objection is not affected. It is not the spiritual so much as the temporal welfare of Germany, which Prince Bismarck considers to be grievously injured by the submission of Catholics to Papal authority. It was not spiritual but temporal peril to the Roman Empire, which successive heathen Emperors dreaded from Christianity.

* We use of course the word "genuine" to express a dictate of conscience, which is either correct or invincibly erroneous.

We think however, that a far more plausible version of Dr. Mivart's principle than either of the preceding may be suggested, if we bear in mind a certain distinction, which is of fundamental importance in our present inquiry. In order to keep this distinction more emphatically before our readers' mind, we will use certain expressions in a somewhat technical sense. To those laws, which require some citizen to do what his conscience disapproves, we will give the name of "conscience-disregarding" laws, as regards that citizen. And we divide such laws into two classes: those which "acquit," and those which "militate against," his conscience.

By the latter term we designate those laws, which put serious pressure on me, towards my doing what my conscience under existent circumstances disapproves. For instance. I sincerely think that God prohibits all taking of oaths; and yet, some law threatens me with serious penalties, in the event of my refusing to take an oath as witness in this pending trial. And generally, not every law only, but every act or fact, "militates against my conscience," which presents to me a notable inducement, towards transgressing what my conscience dictates as obligatory under existent circumstances.

But there are many "conscience-disregarding" laws, which do not "militate against," but on the contrary "acquit" my conscience. To illustrate this, we will begin with a matter of every-day occurrence in England. Certain sectaries account all war sinful; and they account it therefore sinful voluntarily to pay taxes, the produce of which is partly devoted to the support of an army. Still, the tax-collector has no great trouble in the matter; for when he proceeds with what is theoretically called a distraintment of their goods, he makes his first visit to one particular portion of the premises, in which he well knows he shall find the money ready counted out for him. No one who gives the thing a thought will doubt, that these sectaries herein do all which their principle requires. Suppose I am entrusted by a friend with some precious deposit, and fall among brigands while it is in my possession. The deposit may be of such importance, that I ought to fight for it persistently so long as there remains even a faint hope of successful resistance: but if I am absolutely overpowered by numbers and the deposit will quite certainly be taken from me, I am not bound to give the ruffians my life into the bargain. Similarly with these sectaries. The secular arm is entirely irresistible: they have fulfilled everything which conscience reasonably requires of them under their circumstances, if (1) they decline to pay the tax voluntarily; and (2) make it

clear that they so decline. Can such a legal enactment then as that which offends them be said to "militate against" their conscience? Evidently not. They entirely satisfy their conscience, by openly refusing voluntary payment; and it cannot be said that the law threatens them with any kind of violence, in the event of their obeying that conscientious dictate.

The same thing may be said e.g. as to the law which prohibited Suttee. If that law had not been enacted, the Hindoo widow would doubtless have thought herself bound in conscience to endure combustion. But when that consummation became to her a matter of physical impossibility, she did not think herself conscientiously bound to exert her whole physical strength, for the purpose of pressing her way towards the funeral pile against the combined resistance of English officials. The law, which "disregarded" her conscience, at the same time "acquitted" it.

All this being understood, Dr. Mivart may probably say that, though the sovereign can justly enough enact laws which "disregard" conscience, he cannot justly enact laws which "militate against it"; laws which constitute a strong inducement to the individual, towards his transgressing what is a sincere dictate of his conscience under existent circumstances. And Dr. Mivart will add perhaps, that if this golden maxim were but carefully borne in mind, the days of persecution and spiritual tyranny would be at an end. But with his theory, even so limited, we cannot concur. We reply to it in the first place, that the civil ruler can easily, without any militation whatever against conscience, perpetrate the very extremity of spiritual tyranny. And in the second place we cannot admit as a universal principle, that a civil ruler is forbidden by justice to enforce enactments, which may militate against the conscience of some of his subjects.

Firstly then we maintain that, without any militation whatever against conscience, the very extremity of spiritual tyranny might be inflicted by a civil ruler. We will put our case thus. Some sovereign arises, more ferociously anti-Catholic than Bismarck himself. He shuts up every Catholic church and Catholic school, and expels from the country every Catholic priest, of which his officials can discover the existence: giving the latter however sufficient provision for comfortable subsistence in other countries. All the Catholic children, as soon as they arrive at a proper age, are carried off from their parents, and sent to schools where they are taught that the Pope is Anti-Christ and the Catholic Church a sink of iniquity. All Catholic meetings for the purpose of protest are prevented or brought to an end by the strong arm of the

law. The sovereign's officials keep vigilant watch along the frontier, that no Catholic priests enter: but at the same time, when any individual priest is found to have eluded this vigilance, no kind of punishment is inflicted on him, except that of being with perfect politeness conveyed back again. There could not easily be a more effective means for the gradual extirpation of Catholicity, than would be provided by such legislation: yet how can you say that any part of it "militates against conscience"? How can you say that any one of these enactments threatens any one Catholic with any kind of violence, in the event of his obeying what under the circumstances is the dictate of his conscience? The most plausible of negative replies to this question might be founded on the case of priests. It might be maintained, that their conscience obliges them to make every effort towards revisiting their flocks; and that the law nevertheless threatens them with penalties, in the event of their obeying that obligation. But the law does *not* so threaten them. "You are perfectly welcome to make such efforts," says the sovereign: "I shall never punish you for making them: all I shall do will be to thwart them."

This then is our first reply to Dr. Mivart. It is certainly not worth while, we say, to strain any point with the view of investing his theory with plausibility; because, even if that theory were universally admitted, it would be of no service whatever for the very purpose he wishes it put to. It would be of no service whatever, as a barrier against the State's spiritual tyranny. But now secondly we maintain, that the theory itself (whatever might have been its practical utility) is inadmissible. Take at once a most obvious case. No one will doubt, that the civil ruler should require his subjects to bear witness on due occasion in a court of justice. Yet no one on the other hand will doubt, that cases may easily arise, in which some summoned witness is under strict conscientious obligation of silence.* Here indeed is violent militation against conscience. It is *my* indefeasible duty to set the civil enactment at defiance; while on the other hand the civil authorities would fail grievously in *their* duty, if they did not punish me severely for my disobedience. Justice could not by possibility be administered to the people at large, if every individual were permitted to plead scruples of conscience, as exempting him

* We are not referring to the obligatory silence of priests on what they may know through Sacramental Confession; because we do not admit in that case the State has a right of requiring them to speak.

from the obligation to speak; and yet, in this or that particular case, many a man is under the indefeasible obligation of remaining silent. Nay, not the State alone, but the Church herself is bound to enact laws, which may militate against conscience with even fearful force. Take a case which we have cited of late more than once. Bertha knows facts within her own personal experience, which make it absolutely certain that, according to Catholic doctrine, she is not Titius's wife; but she is unable to convince the ecclesiastical court that these facts are true. She receives accordingly an ecclesiastical injunction, requiring her under heaviest spiritual penalties to place herself, in regard to Titius, under circumstances, under which it is mortally sinful for her to place herself, knowing that she is not his wife. Such ecclesiastical precept militates against her conscience (as we have said) with fearful force; and places her in a position, in which she needs almost heroic singleness of intention and fortitude, that she may remain faithful to her Creator. Yet Dr. Mivart will at once see that the Church—not having received the gift of judicial infallibility—is under a strict obligation of issuing precepts, which may possibly produce such a result. And the two instances we have given—one of civil, the other of ecclesiastical government—suggest such an indefinite number of others, that it would be merely wearisome to say more on this particular branch of the subject. And the strength of our case will become even more conspicuous, if our readers will remember that (as we have already said) a conscience, *hic et nunc* invincibly erroneous, has precisely the same claim as a true conscience, of indefeasible authority over the individual's action. Let it once be understood that the civil ruler will not enforce on the individual any law which militates against his conscience,—there is absolutely no limit to the wild vagaries, which he will sincerely persuade himself to regard as conscientious scruples.

One word more however, on militations against conscience. Dr. Mivart's tone would give an impression, that these are rare and exceptional facts in the visible order of things; and that they would hardly exist indeed, if human law treated conscience with due respect. But the fact is, that such militations assail man on every side during his whole career on earth. In truth what are "the world" and "the flesh," except one vast series of phenomena militating against conscience? Surely on a general view, the militations against conscience, introduced by the most ill-advised of human laws, cannot be compared for a moment in multitude or magnitude, with those which inevitably occur under the ordained course of God's Providence.

At the same time we entirely think that the civil ruler should abstain, as far as he possibly can in consistency with higher duties, from enacting any law, which can militate against the conscience of any citizen. And we are thus brought to consider the phrase "liberty of conscience": a phrase vaguely used in a hundred different senses; but of which we cannot understand any grammatical interpretation, except that apparently intended by Dr. Mivart. By "liberty of conscience" then, we understand exemption from militations against conscience. According to this sense of the term, I enjoy greater "freedom of conscience," in proportion as I am less assailed by militations against my conscience. I enjoy greater *political* "freedom of conscience," in proportion as those militations against my conscience, which are caused by the State's positive or negative action, are fewer and slighter. I enjoy greater *social* "freedom of conscience," in proportion as those militations against my conscience are fewer and slighter, which are caused by social influence and pressure. But then—if we use the phrase in this sense,—there can be no greater mistake than to allege, that freedom of conscience is necessarily promoted by the modern "liberties." And this is a further consideration, to which Dr. Mivart, we think, has not done justice.

For instance. It is frequently said that the substitution of Victor Emmanuel's Roman government for the Pope's—whatever its evils in other respects—at all events conferred greater freedom of conscience on foreign Protestants residing in the Roman States. We might urge in reply, that these Protestants constitute but an infinitesimal part of the residents. But our present point is, that such Protestants themselves, be they more or fewer, have (not more but) less liberty of conscience now, than they had under the Pope. What single dictate was there of such a Protestant's conscience, against which Papal legislation militated? It will be said perhaps, that he was not permitted to circulate anti-Catholic books, or make anti-Catholic speeches, among the native population. Now for all we are here saying and merely for argument's sake—let us concede that this prohibition was tyrannical and unjust: but at all events, we ask, in what possible way did it militate against the Protestant's *conscience*? Let objectors name if they can those definite acts, which on the one hand his conscience declared obligatory under the circumstances in which he was placed, while on the other hand the Papal law threatened him with grave injury in the event of his performing them.*

* Certainly if some Protestant residing in Rome considered it obligatory to study a vernacular Bible; and if the Papal government inflicted severe

There was no greater militation against his conscience, than there is in England against the conscience of those sectaries who, though disapproving war, were required to pay the Abyssinian penny. But look at the opposite side. A pious Protestant recognizes the Sermon on the Mount, as setting forth the true standard of Christian morality. Let it be observed then, that now for the first time, while he moves about through the streets of Rome, his eyes are assailed from shop-windows and other localities by licentious pictures and exhibitions, which the Papal police strictly prohibited. His political freedom of conscience, then, is indeed deplorably impaired: for the State's detestable laxity on such matters deplorably increases the temptation by which he is assailed, towards transgressing the dictate of his conscience.

Still more clear is it—indeed it is most clear on the surface—that a Catholic's freedom of conscience is grievously impaired by the civil tolerance of other religions. We need hardly indeed here repeat, what we have on former occasions so energetically pressed: viz. that in a country where a body of hereditary Protestants are found, no Catholic dreams of wishing for a violent restoration of religious unity. Assuredly it is not from the Catholics of any given country, however predominant in numbers, that any hereditary Protestant need fear any kind of encroachment on his full liberty of public worship and public speech. All we have to say on the other side is—which we have *also* on previous occasions energetically pressed—that the necessitated existence of these modern liberties is a deplorable social and political degradation. Even of this however, we are not speaking at the present moment. Here we are only pointing out, how grievously those liberties assail the Catholic's freedom of conscience. There is no more sacred and prominent dictate of the Catholic's conscience, than that it is mortally sinful to entertain so much as one fully-deliberate doubt on the truth of Catholicity. How grievous are the temptations to violating this dictate which attack him on every side, wherever the freedom is permitted of non-Catholic publications! We do not speak of grave controversy; in fact there is much less danger in this. But he cannot open a newspaper, or magazine, or novel, without encountering at every turn some flippant suggestion, or plausible sophism, or

penalties on all residents who were found with a vernacular Bible in their possession;—such a Protestant might have had his freedom of conscience seriously impaired: because he might consider himself bound to provide himself with a vernacular Bible, and incur the risk of detection; while the law would offer him a serious inducement, towards transgressing this dictate of conscience. But the Papal government imposed no such penalties.

ingeniously-distorted fact, which inevitably perhaps engenders a momentary indeliberate doubt as to the truth of his religion; and which tempts him to commit mortal sin of the gravest kind, by giving that doubt deliberate harbour. We are not for a moment denying, that on the other hand a sincere Protestant might have *his* freedom of conscience impaired, under an exclusively Catholic régime. Still less are we implying that the civil ruler acts otherwise than as he is actually bound to do, when he permits liberty of worship in a mixed population. We are only pointing out how profoundly fallacious it is, to identify the civil tolerance of religious error with that most different phenomenon, political freedom of conscience. Political freedom of conscience cannot largely exist, except so far as there is strict civil intolerance of religious diversity.

And this brings us to a further comment on Dr. Mivart: a comment which lands us much more nearly in the heart of our argument, than anything we have hitherto said. We think he most seriously underrates the unspeakable blessings involved in a State's Catholic unity. Let us look at the true issue on this matter. It is supremely certain, that the Church teaches infallibly on faith and morals; so certain, that (as we have just said) it is for a Catholic among the most grievous of sins, to admit one deliberate doubt of her divine authority. The only reasonable state of a Catholic's mind then, is to *realize* this vital truth; to estimate instinctively and spontaneously every fact, which bears directly or indirectly on human conduct, by the exclusive standard of her teaching; and to carry that teaching forward heartily and ungrudgingly into its fullest legitimate development. We are far from saying that, even in mediæval times, this result was adequately obtained; yet one may see on the surface, that there was an immeasurably greater approximation to it than there is now. M. Périn does not hesitate to declare, that the mediæval "peoples lived by the Catholic Faith as the body lives by the soul." Their moral convictions, it may be said without exaggeration, were penetrated to the very core by the great Gospel verities. This is what has now been so deplorably lost even among Catholic peoples. Of course it cannot be doubted, that the mass of professing Catholics elicit, under the Holy Ghost's agency, due acts of theological faith. But when one looks for instances where this belief in Catholic dogma is supernaturally woven (as one may say) into the very texture of men's nature and instinctive convictions, it is not so easy to light on such instances. They can hardly be found, except either in the few who lead unusually interior and

mortified lives; or else among large portions of Spain, or secluded hamlets of Italy or the Tyrol, where the inhabitants have been saved from that corruption and degradation of thought, which is engendered by habitually living in the midst of misbelievers.

Those who are more or less involved in this degradation, are in general, for obvious reasons, far from sufficiently alive to its extent and calamitousness. We will therefore give an illustration, by help of which we may be better able at least speculatively to appreciate (though we may still not practically realize) the true character of that calamitousness. Every one knows of those serious assaults against the sanctity of marriage, which, in the United States or elsewhere, have obtained some kind of countenance. "Free love," says our author (p. 44) "has not only its advocates, but its avowed votaries; and a hatred of marriage and the family is one of the sentiments common to those political enthusiasts, who claim for themselves *par excellence* the title of 'advanced.'" Now let us, merely by way of illustration, suppose the purely hypothetical case, that these doctrines came to obtain continually increased acceptance in Protestant England, till they possessed a great majority of the people. As such a process went on, many a Protestant (we may reasonably infer) would take refuge in the one ark of salvation: still Catholics (we will suppose) continue to constitute but a comparatively small part of the population; and mix with externs, and read non-Catholic newspapers or light literature, just as at present. Dr. Mivart will readily admit, how grievous is the calamity in which they would be thus involved. Consider for a moment the effect of freely mixing with and visiting at their homes those, whose family life reposes on some basis different from that of monogamy: consider the effect of this on Catholic maidens; on Catholic youths; in other words, on those who in due course will become parents and educators. Consider, again, the effect on Catholics of a whole abundant literature and circumambient social atmosphere, in which monogamy is not otherwise treated, than as a contemptible superstition of the past; condemned, derided, laughed at, just as men now laugh at the practice of taking the discipline, or at the various details of monastic life.

Under this heavy misfortune, we think Dr. Mivart would derive but small comfort from such topics of encouragement, as he adduces in p. 109 with a view of mitigating a Catholic's grief at the fall of "*mediævalism*." We might suggest to him, on his own principles, that under the new order there would be diffused among Catholics a far more "free, intel-

ligent and reasoned apprehension" than at present, of monogamistic truth; because Catholics would be blessed by "the stimulus of opposition," and thus braced to "greater efforts for the support and extension of" monogamy. We might urge, that under the previous régime a not inconsiderable number of Catholics accepted the Church's doctrine on marriage, in "an unenergetic, tepid, unintelligently apprehensive and morally inconsistent spirit." We might further add, that under the new circumstances many Catholics—who had always had a hankering after licentiousness and had more or less "diffused" their "spirit" "over the whole body"—will now probably apostatize; and thus "by becoming manifestly external to" the Church, "cease to disgrace her or to lower the moral tone of her community." We really think that Dr. Mivart would rather suppose these apologies to be intended as mockeries and insults, than adduced as grave arguments: though of course we are well aware with what thorough and hearty good faith he himself propounds such considerations, as drawbacks from the blessing of "theocratic" "mediævalism."*

* It is due to Dr. Mivart, that we quote the passage in full to which we refer in the text:—

"During the period in which the Church had full temporal support, and sheltered within its fold whole nations with hardly an avowed dissident, the following merely natural effects must have inclined to mar its efficiency:—

"1. Want of the stimulus of opposition, tending to diminish the vigour of efforts for its support and extension.

"2. A similarly diminished need for the diffusion of a keen, intelligent, and reasoned apprehension of its doctrines and teachings.

"3. A lowered moral tone from the influence of the indifferent majority—resulting in diminished efforts after a life in accordance with Christian precepts and counsels. This is owing to a diffusion over the whole body of the spirit governing the majority, which spirit in almost every large community is otiose and indifferent. In the days of the Church's temporal prosperity the indifferent were included within the Church, instead of being visibly external to it, and so tended to lower the tone of the whole.

"Thus an unenergetic, tepid, unintelligently apprehensive, and morally inconsistent spirit, may but too naturally tend to diffuse itself over a temporally supported, honoured, and wealthy Church, which has no declared dissidents in the area in which it exists.

"When such a theocratically organized Christian community becomes, by revolution, exposed to the free assaults of enemies the most varied, with disestablishment and disendowment as a result, the first effect must be the falling away from the Church of those who either morally or intellectually, or both, are out of harmony with her.

"Freedom of inquiry, with all other freedom, as it becomes more and more a settled institution, will more and more incline to diminish the effects of mere traditional adherence to family creed, and the passage to and fro will become more and more easy. Thus those with proclivities towards the Church, but who have been brought up from childhood external to her, will more readily find their true level, while those brought up within her pale,

Now we must avow our own humble opinion, that that social and political state of things which we have been just supposing, would (to say the very least) be no greater a corruption and degradation in comparison with what now exists, than what now exists is a corruption and degradation in comparison with what (under normal circumstances) must result from Catholic unity. We cannot perhaps more effectively set forth the true mediæval spirit, than by availing ourselves of a most masterly Essay, read before the Academia by Mr. Lilly, and published in the June number of the "Month." Mr. Lilly quotes (p. 169) Mr. Carlyle's words, that "religion lay over those times like an all-embracing heavenly canopy, like an atmosphere and life-element, a great high-heaven unquestionability, encompassing, interpenetrating the whole of life." "Deep down in every heart was the conviction," Mr. Carlyle continues, "that this earthly life, and its riches and possessions and good and evil hap are not intrinsically a reality at all, but are a shadow of realities eternal, infinite; that man's little life has duties that are great, that are alone great, and go up to heaven and down to hell." Mr. Lilly adds, that "this intense unquestioning belief was then the central idea of human existence, the source of its strength and soundness, of its rich exuberant vitality. It shaped legislation, it animated art, it informed literature, it reigned in social life." On the other hand—Mr. Lilly proceeds (p. 176)—"*decay* is the true description of that era" which commenced with the Reformation: "decay in the best characteristics of man and society, in happiness, nobility, wisdom." Throughout this era "is clearly traceable the fading away from the popular mind of those truths regarding the individual, the family and society, which were the life of the civilization of the earlier epoch."*

but who in spirit have revolted from her sway, will, by becoming manifestly external to her, cease to disgrace her, or to lower the moral tone of her community" (pp. 109, 110).

* We would draw especial attention to this admirable paper, as illustrating, from a somewhat different stand-point, the matter at issue between Dr. Mivart and ourselves. The author exhibits throughout heartiest loyalty to the teaching of the Holy See concerning modern errors; and his general course of argument is to our mind original and even profound. The knowledge of modern literature which he has pressed into his service is really remarkable, and is of eminent advantage in illustrating his theme. We have been especially struck with his quotations from Montalembert (pp. 170, 175, 191) concerning the middle ages; as showing what grievous injustice that illustrious Catholic did to his own permanent convictions, by the declamation in which he sometimes indulged about "dark ages," "ages of blood," and the like. Mr. Lilly may now be said to have fully inaugurated a literary career, which (we doubt not) will abound in signal service to the great cause which he has at heart.

These great truths had been preserved in the popular mind by the State's submission to the Church, and by its rigorous repression of heresy: they faded away from the popular mind, in proportion as the State changed its attitude. Take one alone, among the many sacred verities to which the State now gives no protection: the verity, that celibacy is a higher condition of life than marriage. It may well be doubted, whether the social degradation which results from the prevalent rejection of this one verity be not greater, than the *further* social degradation which would result, from a prevalent disbelief in the monogamistic doctrine.*

In order however that we may proceed more intelligibly with our criticism of Dr. Mivart's speculations, it will be better at this point to explain in greater detail than we have hitherto done—though still but briefly and concisely—what is the doctrine we would ourselves advocate in opposition to his. He calls his theory that of political "civicism." We have invented for our own, the name of political "ethicism"; and the meaning of that name will easily appear, when we proceed to explain our doctrine. As a preliminary we would point out, that no civil society can possibly exist, which does not rest on some "ethical basis," true or false, of one kind or another. And when we say that it rests on an ethical basis, we mean that there are certain tenets concerning religion or morality which it in such sense protects, that the legal position of him who holds them is importantly privileged, in comparison with the legal position of him who (however sincerely) dissents from them. Thus every State must by absolute necessity rest, either on the ethical basis of *right in property*, or on the ethical basis of *communism* in one or other shape. Let us suppose the former alternative. The sovereign (it does not here concern us whether the sovereignty reside in one individual or more) is convinced, that his people's highest interest is indissolubly bound up with the institution of property. Suddenly, from some accidental cause, the tenet of communism springs up to quite a new degree of vitality; it is found infecting men in all directions; certain citizens are beginning a most effective course of combined action, with the view of spreading the conviction that, as Proudhon tersely said, "property is robbery." Every

* In connection with what is said in the text, let this be considered. The arguments, commonly adduced by Protestants against clerical celibacy, would lead by irresistible consequence to a conclusion, that the purity of unmarried men is in most cases a virtue impossible of attainment. And we believe that in fact multitudes have *pressed* the argument to this conclusion.

moment, during which their machinations are allowed free scope, increases the danger. By multitudes already theft is accounted a sacred duty; just as many a "patriot" has accounted it a sacred duty to rise in insurrection against those whom he accounts oppressors of his country. And the time seems close at hand, when society will be convulsed from its very foundations. We suppose Dr. Mivart will admit, that communistic tenets may be held with perfect sincerity; yet he will surely agree with us, as to what under such circumstances as we have imagined the government is bound to do. All this communistic combination and public expression of communism must be summarily put down. Communistic meetings, the circulation of communistic tracts, the education of children in communistic principles, must be stringently prohibited; and if imprisonment and other penalties be necessary to enforce the prohibition,—the government would basely fail of its duty, did it omit to impose those penalties in the full extent demanded by the crisis. A far-seeing and energetic civil ruler will wage war against communism, in the very same spirit in which some pious mediæval sovereign waged war against the special heresy of his time.

On the other hand, suppose for argument's sake the impossible portent of some society aggregated on *communistic* principles. The case would not be different, in the particular respect we are now considering. The ruler of such State must needs have recourse to similar methods of repression, if an active combination were set on foot, for introducing the institution of property, and for propagating belief in the divine origin of that institution.

Now what we would humbly maintain is, that one momentous constituent of a nation's well-being is the extent of the *true ethical basis* on which its constitution rests. *Cæteris paribus*—so we are prepared to argue—every State is more healthily and happily circumstanced, in proportion as the number is greater of those ethical doctrines, which on the one hand are certainly true, while on the other hand they are effectively protected in that State by a civil legislation, which is in substantial harmony with the public sentiment. On the other hand, we quite admit—employing again the terms used by us in the early part of our article—that that repression of error, which is the civil ruler's duty, should be effected as far as possible by laws, which may "disregard" indeed the conscience of dissentients, but shall not "militate against" it.

We have no space for doing any kind of justice to our thesis; but among the various arguments adducible in its behalf, we would lay special stress on the following. An inestimable

blessing is conferred on the body of citizens, in proportion as they are trained to apprehend keenly the true standard of morality. It is always, alas! but a small minority, who act with reasonable consistency on their moral convictions; but to *possess* good moral convictions, is in itself an inestimable blessing. Let us suppose two men who unhappily are both living licentiously. One of them however is keenly alive to the nobleness and sacredness of Christian family life, though his weakness of purpose renders him a slave to lower impulses; but the other sees nothing detestable or despicable at all in his own habits. It is surely very clear, that the former is on a vastly higher moral platform (so to speak) than the latter; that his moral reason is indefinitely less clouded; that he possesses, in quite a different sense from the latter, a principle of moral recovery.*

This principle being laid down, we give two different reasons for the doctrine of ethicism. Firstly, among the methods for training citizens to apprehend the spirit of true morality, the one which immeasurably exceeds all others in potency, is that of saturating with that spirit the whole surrounding social atmosphere. Our recent supposition, of some society having lost its *monogamistic* spirit, sufficiently illustrates what we here intend. Then secondly, the enormous majority of mankind are entirely incapable of philosophical and ethical *argument*; though they have full means of arriving at the knowledge of essential truths on religion and morality, by means of implicit reasoning, which is superabundantly sufficient. Accordingly

* Dr. Mivart says (p. 113) that in the middle ages great numbers of men who led bad lives "accepted" the Church's "doctrines unhesitatingly, but unprofitably, since in them works did not accompany faith; and belief without charity, as Dr. Newman has so well shown, tends directly to superstition." We do not know from what work of F. Newman Dr. Mivart has derived this impression; but to us F. Newman's language seems different. Thus, "The firmest faith, so as to move mountains, may exist without love: that is, real faith; as really faith in the strict sense of the word, as the faith of a martyr or a doctor." A Catholic "may ever be falling; but his faith is a continual invitation and persuasive to repent." "He has within him almost a principle of recovery, certainly an instrument of it" ("Difficulties felt by Anglicans," pp. 236, 255, 257).

Dr. Mivart expresses his opinion quite episodically, and we cannot but think that on reflection he will be disposed to modify it. Let us take one instance of Catholic dogma. All Catholics know with full conviction, that saintliness is the one measure and ideal of true morality. Let us suppose then, that a large number of them not only believe this truth in the abstract, but keenly realize and apprehend it. Surely Dr. Mivart will admit, that even though their practice be (through their culpable infirmity) deplorably sinful, the existence of such realization and apprehension, and the resulting acute sense of sin, most importantly promote their moral elevation of character.

they are sure to receive most cruel injury, if exposed to the sophistical assaults of irreligious and immoral writers; and there is hardly any duty therefore of the civil ruler more august and sacred, than the preserving to them as far as possible their liberty of conscience, and protecting them from intellectual temptation. This great duty however, as is manifest, can only be attempted, co-extensively with that measure of true ethical basis on which any given society may rest; and is therefore (putting aside such a country as Spain) performed with deplorable inefficiency in modern Europe.

We might give several other reasons for our thesis; such, e.g. as those suggested by that passage of Mr. Stuart Mill's which we append.* But, as we have so often said, we cannot afford space for duly displaying our own doctrine.

Two inferences (to mention no other) are at once deducible, if this doctrine of political ethicism be admitted. We need not here consider the Church's direct teaching, on her own

* "Wherever the habitual submission to law and government has been firmly and durably established, and yet the vigour and manliness of character which resisted its establishment have been in any degree preserved, certain requisites have existed, certain conditions have been fulfilled, of which the following may be regarded as the principal.

"First:—There has existed, for all who were accounted citizens—for all who were not slaves, kept down by brute force—a system of *education*, beginning with infancy and continued through life, of which, whatever else it might include, one main and incessant ingredient was *restraining discipline*. To train the human being in the habit, and thence the power, of subordinating his personal impulses and aims, to what were considered the ends of society; of adhering, against all temptation, to the course of conduct which those ends prescribed; of controlling in himself all the feelings which were liable to militate against those ends, and encouraging all such as tended towards them; this was the purpose, to which every outward motive that the authority directing the system could command, and every inward power or principle which its knowledge of human nature enabled it to evoke, were endeavoured to be rendered instrumental. The entire civil and military policy of the ancient commonwealths was such a system of training; in modern nations, its place has been attempted to be supplied principally by religious teaching. And whenever, and in proportion as, the strictness of the restraining discipline was relaxed, the natural tendency of mankind to anarchy reasserted itself; the State became disorganized from within; mutual conflict for selfish ends neutralized the energies which were required to keep up the contest against natural causes of evil; and the nation, after a longer or briefer interval of progressive decline, became either the slave of a despotism or the prey of a foreign invader.

"The second condition of permanent political society has been found to be the existence, in some form or other, of the feeling of allegiance or loyalty. This feeling may vary in its objects, and is not confined to any particular form of government: but whether in a democracy or a monarchy, its essence is always the same; viz., that there be in the constitution of the State *something* which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right to be where

divinely-given authority over the State. Apart from this altogether it would still remain true, that any Catholic sovereign, who should clearly apprehend the true ideal of a State,

it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change. This feeling may attach itself, as among the Jews (and, indeed, in most of the commonwealths of antiquity) to a common God or gods, the protectors and guardians of their State. Or it may attach itself to certain persons, who are deemed to be, whether by Divine appointment, by long prescription, or by the general recognition of their superior capacity and worthiness, the rightful guides and guardians of the rest. Or, it may attach itself to laws, to ancient liberties or ordinances. Or, finally (and this is the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter) it may attach itself to the principles of individual freedom and political and social equality, as realized in institutions which as yet exist nowhere, or exist only in a rudimentary state. But in all political societies which have had a durable existence, there has been some fixed point; something which men agreed in holding sacred; which, wherever freedom of discussion was a recognized principle, it was of course lawful to contest in theory, but which no one could either fear or hope to see shaken in practice; which, in short (except, perhaps, during some temporary crisis), was in the common estimation placed beyond discussion. And the necessity of this may easily be made evident. A State never is, nor, until mankind are vastly improved, can hope to be, for any long time exempt from internal dissension; for there neither is, nor ever has been, any state of society in which collisions did not occur between the immediate interests and passions of powerful sections of the people. What, then, enables society to weather these storms, and pass through turbulent times, without any permanent weakening of the securities for peaceable existence? Precisely this—that however important the interests about which men fall out, the conflict did not affect the fundamental principles of the system of social union which happened to exist; nor threaten large portions of the community with the subversion of that on which they had built their calculations, and with which their hopes and aims had become identified. But when the questioning of these fundamental principles is (not the occasional disease, or salutary medicine, but) the habitual condition of the body politic, and when all the violent animosities are called forth which spring naturally from such a situation, the State is virtually in a position of civil war, and can never long remain free from it in act and fact.

“The third essential condition of stability in political society is a strong and active principle of cohesion among the members of the same community or State. We need scarcely say that we do not mean nationality in the vulgar sense of the term—a senseless antipathy to foreigners, an indifference to the general welfare of the human race, or an unjust preference of the supposed interests of our own country; a cherishing of bad peculiarities because they are national; or a refusal to adopt what has been found good by other countries. We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We mean, a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community do not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they set a value on their connection; feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves; and do not desire selfishly to free themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connection.”—“*Dissertations and Discussions*,” vol. i. pp. 416—420.

would quite as a matter of course constitute Catholicity as the ethical basis of his government. He would do this, we say, quite as a matter of course, unless there were some serious impediment in the way; such e.g. as the prevalence among his people of religious dissensions and distractions, and some hereditary non-Catholic sect. This is our first inference. Our second is, that in any given time or place, even where Catholicity is no longer the exclusive religion, it would be a grave calamity if any part of the existent true ethical basis were removed. We do not here speak of States in which the existent ethical basis is partially false; nor are we at all denying the abundant possibility, that—thanks to some disastrous movement of thought—the abandoning some portion of the true ethical basis may be *hic et nunc* a less evil than the retaining it. But it would always be a very grave calamity, we say, if any religious or moral errors known with certainty as such,—which are now, in full accordance with public sentiment, placed by law in a position of disadvantage,—were to receive fuller toleration. The civil toleration of any grave religious error, known certainly as such, is in itself and necessarily an evil, and a militation against the conscience of rightly-instructed citizens; even though, under deplorable circumstances, such toleration may be a less evil than any practicable alternative.

Now in regard to each one of these two inferences, we have some difficulty in understanding exactly where Dr. Mivart stands. We will begin with the former.

He says no doubt expressly in p. 118, that “a separation of Church and State cannot be good, save relatively through human perverseness.” “A union of Church and State,” he proceeds, “is the natural and true ideal; and will spontaneously reappear, when once the world has been re-converted, through common consent.” Ther in p. 30 he admits that “the Church asserts the legitimacy of the use of the sword”—not indeed for the *propagation* of the Faith—but for purposes of *defence*: i.e. for the purpose of defending existent Catholic unity. But he does not explain (so far as we can see) how he reconciles this statement with his general principle, that the State is under an obligation of permitting all men to follow without molestation the dictates of their conscience. In one or two places he speaks as though this obligation were removed, wherever some *divine revelation* is generally recognized. Thus in p. 77: “*in the absence or non-recognition of a divine Revelation limiting its exercise*, such personal freedom becomes God-given and absolute.” Again in p. 79 he says, that his principle of civicism “revolts against the domination of man (*merely*

as man) over his fellows." Here it is he who italicises the words "merely as man"; seeming to imply, that God may commission man to "dominate over his fellows." At p. 73 also he glances at a similar theory. Yet in p. 75 he apparently bases his principle of civicism on the Natural Law; and he certainly does not think, either that a Revelation could counter-vene the Natural Law, or that God could commission man to violate that Law. We repeat therefore, that he has left us in perplexity as to what he intends. We do not understand how he reconciles with his general principle his admission, that Catholic unity may legitimately be preserved by the sword.

But further (as we said a few pages back) neither does his general tone at all convey to us the impression, that he regards the loss of that unity with any keen regret. He regards indeed "the mediæval theocracy" as the "glorious dawn of Church supremacy" (p. 113). But then in the same breath he describes it as a calamity, that "vast numbers of the indifferent, the gross, the merely credulous, and the worldly were led within the Church's fold by circumstances"; though he admits that they in real truth "accepted her doctrines unhesitatingly." Now surely this is in effect to deny the desirableness of any Catholic unity, which can possibly exist on earth. Without here entering on deep theological and philosophical questions,—it is indubitably in some sense a universal law, that the multitude of men are very far indeed from living conscientiously on the principles of their religion; that they are "indifferent," or "gross," or "credulous," or "worldly," as the case may be. In our view, of course, it was an unspeakable blessing to such men, that the social atmosphere by which they were surrounded was preserved by the State's agency free from heretical intermixture; but Dr. Mivart holds, that their faith was "unprofitable" to them. If this were so, under what possible circumstances could the secular arm be used with propriety, for the purpose of preserving unity of the Faith?

So much on the mediæval period. But now secondly, we cannot precisely apprehend what course Dr. Mivart would have the State take, under *present* anxieties and miseries. No one feels more justly than he, the extent of those anxieties and miseries.

"The Christianity which yet remains diffused amongst us and the refinement of modern manners render the open practice of licentious and sanguinary rites as yet impossible; but the spirit which prompted them finds in this system [the system of contemporary antitheists] its complete and logical justification, as it has found in a contemporary poet its distinct lyrical

expression. The tendency of this movement is to approach little by little to this worst phase of paganism, as the corruption of morals gradually increases through the temporarily decreasing influence of Christianity upon the outer surface of society. Already we have openly advocated the murder of the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old, as well as self-murder. Free-love has not only its advocates, but its avowed votaries; and a hatred of marriage and the family is one of the sentiments common to those political enthusiasts, who claim for themselves par excellence the title of 'advanced'" (pp. 43, 44).

Mr. Lilly quotes Dean Church's words to a somewhat similar effect (p. 193):—

"The Christian idea of purity has still a hold on our society: imperfectly enough. Can we ask a more anxious question, than whether this hold will continue? No one can help seeing, I think, many ugly symptoms. The ideas of purity which we have inherited and thought sacred are boldly made the note and reproach of the 'Christian.'"^{*}

If Dr. Mivart's theory of civicism be understood in its more obvious sense, he would appear to take a very strange practical view of all this. His theory appears to imply that every one, who sincerely holds those flagitious and disgusting tenets just recited, is treated unjustly, if the laws place him on that account in an inferior position to that of his fellow-citizens. A number of men—let us suppose—choose to form themselves into an association of their own, based on that ethical principle, which regards as admirable the practice of free love, of suicide, of murdering the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old. Firmly persuaded of their principle, they use every effort to propagate it among their countrymen, and to obtain for it a hold over public opinion. The theory of civicism seems on the surface to require, not only that they should not be molested on that account,—which surely would be monstrous enough—but that they should be placed on a footing of perfect equality with their fellow-citizens. We suppose Dr. Mivart cannot intend this; but we wish we knew what he does intend.

He might no doubt allege, that the "conscience" of these scoundrels is not "*invincibly* erroneous"; and that no respect therefore is due to it. But we cannot suppose that this is his solution of the difficulty. He cannot really, under the name "liberty of conscience," propound the theory, that it is the business of civil rulers to determine in what respective cases a misbeliever's conscience is "*vincibly*"

* We may add, that even so grave a writer as Dr. Bain has published the passage, which we quoted from him in Jan., 1872, p. 64, note.

or "invincibly" erroneous; and that where the former is their judgment, they may legitimately refuse him toleration on that avowed ground. We shall assume therefore as a matter of course, that the distinction, between vincible and invincible erroneousness of conscience, is not at all one which Dr. Mivart accounts to fall within the civil ruler's cognizance.

At the same time the very supposition we have just mentioned suggests another difficulty, which needs elucidation. Civicism is based on certain alleged "rights of conscience." But what has it to say concerning that already large and constantly increasing number of thinkers, who openly profess to have no "conscience"? A large and constantly increasing number of thinkers openly profess, that *nothing whatever* is *hic et nunc* of moral obligation; that nothing whatever is *hic et nunc* morally preferable; that there is no such thing in *rerum naturâ* as moral obligation or moral preferableness; in the sense in which Dr. Mivart understands those respective terms. What does he hold concerning *these* persons? Having described a theory of large and liberal civil comprehension,—does he intend to exclude from its benefit the whole body of thinkers, who disbelieve the existence of any fundamental distinction between duty and pleasure? Or if not, *how* not?

The theory of ethicisism on the contrary is very clear, as to the *principle* on which such miscreants should be dealt with, as those who uphold free love, suicide, and occasional murder: though of course, on details, there is room for fair difference of opinion. Catholics, Christians of every denomination, right-minded Theists, should combine as one man to uphold the existent true ethical basis of society. They should account it their sacred duty, to stimulate and intensify by every legitimate means the detestation and abhorrence with which such tenets are now regarded. Then as to the State's corporate action. Children of every Government school should be carefully trained in such detestation and abhorrence of these tenets; and the law should visit any one who attempts to propagate them with precisely that degree of severity, which may be found most successful in discrediting and repressing them. A person, who approves and sympathizes with such practices, is not to be (so far) accounted a fellow-citizen, but a public enemy of the most dangerous kind. He should be visited by the law (as we have said) with just that amount of severity, which the public sentiment will bear. And the infliction should not be carried further than this—not because he does not richly deserve a much severer punishment—but because public morality would

be injured and not benefited, if he were made an object of compassion to the weak-minded and half-hearted.* Certainly, as Dr. Mivart points out, it is not legitimate to use force for

* The following very remarkable article appeared in the "Pall Mall Gazette" of May 26th. We gather from it, that the Chinese are addicted in domestic life to some immoralities of a peculiarly disgusting and horrible character :—

"A strife is being stirred up in San Francisco which is not without gravity in itself, but which is of far more moment as an illustration of the difficulties inherent in certain widely-vaunted principles of social action. The rush towards the gold diggings which has raised the population of California to some 800,000 souls, of whom 250,000 form the citizens of San Francisco, has included 200,000 Chinese, 75,000 of whom are now resident in the last-named city. Not only is this the case, but vessels are said to be chartered for the purpose of continuing the Mongol immigration at the rate of 4,000 or 5,000 a month. It is admitted that the yellow colonists are a race formed after the very likeness of the model man of a certain modern school of politics. In industry they are unremitting ; in skill they are apt for every kind of handiwork. In consumption of the necessities and of the luxuries of life they are thrifty and sparing to the last degree. Ready to turn a hand to anything, apt and adroit in the acquisition of any sort of craftsmanship, content with a remuneration which the unwilling "help" whom they supplant would indignantly refuse, they embody all those virtues which form the celestial band of the political economist. It is admitted, indeed, that in what old-fashioned people used to call the moral virtues, the practice of the Chinese is in some degree opposed to the preaching of Anglo-Saxon respectability. . . . It has been urged that the Chinese form a suburb or Ghetto of their own in San Francisco, and that the respectability of that city may draw a sanitary cordon around this suburb so as to protect their own homes from invasion. The reply is that fever laughs at sanitary cordons, and that fever is a natural result of the domestic arrangements of the Chinese. This, of course, is a matter with which the police may more readily interfere than in the case of mere moral pestilence. As to the latter, just as it is contrary to the gospel of political economy to attempt to drive away the Chinaman because he eats less, works more, and is generally a far more economical machine than the working American, so is it contrary to the express dogmas of a school that is very authoritative in some high places in England to interfere. . . . It is unquestionably the case that two schools of thought are in mortal conflict. The one, referring all things to numeric weight, tends to the establishment of the tyranny of numbers, and to the destruction of any of those checks which tend to paralyze that tyranny. The natural outcome of that school is to make public morality (or private either, for that matter) dependent on public opinion. The other assumes the existence of certain principles, possibly very ill understood, but which cannot be neglected without evil consequences, and with which the good pleasure of a majority has nothing whatever to do. The latter school, indeed, rather tends to distrust the cry of the mass, as being necessarily the most ignorant part of society, and the least fitted to act as rulers. If those people are wrong, and the believers in majority right, it will follow that when the 200,000 Chinese now in California have swollen the number to 600,001—the other inhabitants not having exceeded or having declined below 600,000—the moral laws of California will be ipso facto reversed, and the Chinese habits, which the people of that part of the world now so loudly reprobate, will become tolerable at least."

the purpose of promoting a return to Catholic unity; but it is most legitimate, and indeed the State's sacred duty, to use force for the purpose of upholding the existent true ethical basis of society.

For our own part—and speaking entirely under correction—we should be disposed to go a little further. It seems to us, that in various cases Catholics may reasonably wish the existent ethical basis—say in this country—to be conserved, even as regards this or that implied doctrine which they do not account entirely true. We will not indeed attempt to pronounce on individual instances; but merely cite them as illustrating the *kind* of thing which we mean. For instance, we can entirely understand a Catholic thinking that it would be an evil to relax the existing laws of Sunday observance, even though they in some degree rest on a non-Catholic doctrine. Again we can entirely understand him thinking, that abolition of the English Establishment would do more harm than good; as removing an important standing and public protest, not only against personal irreligion, but also against the odious notion that the State has no concern with the furtherance of religion. Or take such a question, as that of the laws which forbid marriage with a deceased wife's sister. We do not here consider, whether it would or would not be better for the interests of true religion that those laws should be modified: but we do strongly think, that their modification would be a grave evil as weakening the existent ethical basis of society; even if it were *also* true, that such evil would be overbalanced by predominating advantage. The "*Osservatore Romano*" has recently descanted on the blessings which have accrued to England, in comparison with Continental States, from the fact that, even in the midst of doctrinal error, she has carried on her politics in a more religious spirit than they have done. "When I was young," says F. Newman, "the State had a conscience; and the Chief Justice of the day pronounced as an energetic living truth that Christianity was the law of the land." F. O'Reilly, in quoting this passage with assent, adds that even now "there is a" certain "air of Christianity about the law of the land; and *so much the better*."* Dr. Mivart points out (p. 53) that "a multitude of" English "positive enactments . . . repose

* "*Irish Monthly*," Feb. 1876, p. 165. We have more than once expressed our humble opinion, that Cardinal Manning does very great service by acting on the same principle as that advocated in the text; by co-operating against irreligion and immorality with such a person as that excellent nobleman Lord Shaftesbury, on the basis of those Christian doctrines which are common to the two.

on a more or less distinct theocratic basis ; as also do " English " State ceremonies, from the coronation of the chief magistrate downwards." He regards however with evident complacency the prospect, that " these last relics will more or less gradually disappear." We should ourselves regard this as a grievous calamity. Nor do we see in the least why even now such disappearance is inevitable, if Christians of every denomination—instead of surrendering themselves to a quasi-fatalistic despair—will but pluck up courage, and set modern sophistries at defiance, and contend valiantly for the political status of their religion.

In truth—so far from admitting that the doctrine which we have called ethicisism is reasonably confined in its application to such times as the mediæval—we maintain confidently the very contrary. We maintain that the claims of that doctrine are more conspicuous and undeniable now than at almost any previous epoch, as being the one available conservative principle. More particularly we maintain, that by no other rationale of political action will Catholics really advance—or indeed do otherwise than grievously compromise—the Church's influence. In what little space remains to us, we can but briefly indicate the reasons for our opinion.

Those monstrous tenets recited by Dr. Mivart, which are now endeavouring to force themselves within the pale of social toleration, are based throughout on the assumption, that no such verities are cognizable as the existence of God and of duty. No one feels this more strongly or has set it forth more admirably, than Dr. Mivart himself. Our argument then is this. (1) If the theory of civicisim were carried into practice towards these tenets, the whole public opinion of the country would become infected with scepticism as to the existence of God and of duty. (2) If this calamity happened, we should speak quite inadequately by saying that immorality would frightfully increase ; for we ought rather to say, that the very abstract principle of immorality would be enthroned by public opinion. (3) Such a state of public opinion would oppose a barrier which may fairly be called tremendous, against the progress of true religion. We will at once proceed with some little elucidation of what we here intend, reserving however to a future article its full exposition and defence. It can hardly be necessary once more to explain, that we are throughout addressing Catholics.

Morality from its very first elements is based on that truth, which Dr. Mivart has so powerfully set forth in his " Lessons from Nature": the essential distinction between duty and pleasure. He who does not recognize that distinction, is

incapable of so much as one properly moral act. Man finds himself on earth, surrounded by attractions and inducements to action; and he fulfils the end of his creation, precisely so far as he exercises the freewill which God has given him, by placing the pursuit of virtue in absolute pre-eminence over those various other attractions and inducements. But in him who does not accept as certain the existence of duty, the very possibility of virtue is paralyzed: he is rendered incapable of advancing ever so slightly towards the true end of his creation.

So much on the sceptical philosophers themselves; and we now take a second step. Consider a case, by no means alas! infrequent in the England of this day. Some given person has not received, or has not duly corresponded with, those educational influences, which would have secured in him the speculative knowledge that God and morality exist, while they would have more or less trained him in the practical habit of obeying God as against antagonistic impulses. Nor again is he one of those indefinitely few men, who can resist surrounding agencies by his own power of philosophical investigation. On the other hand circumstances of whatever kind have placed him within the sphere of the existent irreligious contagion. Such being his position, his better nature, or the voice of God within him, summons him to some act of self-sacrifice—of what we called in a former article “anti-impulsive effort”—in obedience to God’s Law. Quick as lightning the devil-suggested thought arises: “But *is* there a God? *is* there a Natural Law? am I *capable* of anti-impulsive effort? The able thinkers by whom I am surrounded assure me, that these various questions cannot, without manifest unreason, be confidently answered in the affirmative. Why am I to sacrifice a gratification which is certain, in favour of an obligation which (to say the least) is hopelessly doubtful?” Thus his divinely-sent opportunity passes away unused, and his virtuous aspirations are suppressed at the source.

But now—we proceed to ask—what will be the result, if this fearful scepticism spread from the victims of an irreligious clique—victims (we admit) most unhappily numerous already, but as yet few *in comparison*—until it extends over the whole nation? What we would urge is this. The very abstract principle of immorality will be nationally enthroned,—and the Church’s prospects thus most disastrously clouded,—if the people at large ever come to account doubtful the existence of God and of morality; if the people at large ever come to regard these great central verities otherwise, than as certain, and fundamental, and established beyond the pos-

sibility of question. But if Englishmen do so regard them—
—if Englishmen continue to account belief in these verities
the very foundation of healthy national existence—it is
involved in this very statement, that they place under a
kind of social ban any one who is known to impugn them. If
the religious instinct and feeling now prevalent in England be
unhappily extinguished, the Church must lose (we submit)
the one hopeful basis of her operations. But such extinction
would become a mere matter of time,—and of no very long
time either,—if social and political toleration were extended
to any sect manifestly resting on an atheistic basis, which
might start up in vigour and attempt proselytism. It is the
proper course therefore for every Catholic Englishman, utterly
to repudiate civicism. It is his proper course to stimulate
and inflame the existent national hatred of atheism; to foster
purposely in his countrymen those views and principles, which
would lead them—in the event of such a sect making vigorous
aggression—to clamour loudly for its forcible repression, and
to sympathize intensely with what penal laws might be enacted
for its chastisement.

Such is substantially that view of the case, which we hope
to develop at greater length in an early number; our present
article having of necessity been mainly occupied with a
criticism of Dr. Mivart's. Even as regards Dr. Mivart's own
theory, there is another particular on which we wish we
had space to enlarge. When the Count de Beaulieu wrote
his reply to Montalembert, the Holy Father commanded a
Letter of congratulation to be sent him, which will be found
in our number for April, 1865; pp. 479, 480. In the course
of that Letter the Pope lays down, that "if the rights of truth
and error be placed on a level, it must necessarily follow from
men's proclivity [to evil], that the latter will grow strong and
the former be oppressed." The whole scope of Dr. Mivart's
argument is in the direction opposed to this; whereas for our
own part,—as a mere matter of ethical psychology and apart
altogether from the question of authority—we are confident
that the thesis, understood with its legitimate explanations,
is most entirely true. We hope on a future occasion to give
our reasons for so thinking.

We have pursued our criticism throughout, entirely on
Dr. Mivart's own ground of reason and experience; but we
must at the same time express our regret, that he has not
entered on the question of *authority*. His opinions have
certainly (to say the very least) much superficial resemblance
to that "*Liberal Catholicism*," against which the Holy Father
has of late been speaking with such singular energy. We

should have been better able therefore to understand their exact bearing, if he had directly explained how he harmonizes them with the teaching of such Acts as the "*Mirari vos*," the "*Quantâ curâ*," the Syllabus. If our readers will look at the Papal utterances which we inserted in our last number from pp. 487 to 493, they will see how intense is the Holy Father's earnestness against the errors of "*Liberal Catholicism*." And this earnestness is the more remarkable, because on a superficial glance it would appear, that at this moment the Church's imminent perils come from quite an opposite direction. Prince Bismarck's persecution would have been reprobated by Montalembert, with fully as great severity as by F. Ramière himself: and yet this is the time chosen by Pius IX. for expressing with special emphasis his sense of the danger involved in the "*Liberal Catholic*" tenets. We do not see what other inference can be drawn from this circumstance, except that there is some special venom latent in those tenets: some special venom, which even in these days of Cæsarism retains its virus, but which the pressure of Cæsarism may possibly tempt Catholics to under-estimate.

It may be objected perhaps to our general line of argument, that we have not shown what sufficient ground of opposition to Cæsarism is afforded by our own doctrine. We quite admit that this is so; and we hope in our next article on the subject amply to supply the omission. But in our present paper (as we have so often said) our main business has been to comment on Dr. Mivart; and we think we have shown, that *his* theory at all events sets forth no basis whatever of opposition to Cæsarism. In the first place (so we have argued) Dr. Mivart himself cannot consistently maintain, that the State may in no case enact laws which shall militate against the conscience of individuals. But in the second place, even *were* this never permissible—nevertheless, without putting forth any militation whatever against conscience, an enemy of Catholicity might (as we pointed out) exercise a more detestable and crushing tyranny over the Church, even than that now rampant in Germany.

It so happens however, that one particular form, which might be assumed by the objection to which we refer, has been treated quite recently by F. O'Reilly in the "*Irish Monthly*"; and it may be serviceable to reprint his reply. English Catholics for the most part keenly sympathize with the efforts made by the Holy Father, that Spain shall be permitted to retain the inestimable blessing of Catholic unity. But how is it consistent, asks an objector, that Catholics shall wish a Catholic government to forbid the freedom of Protestant

worship, while they complain energetically if a Protestant government forbid the freedom of Catholic worship? F. O'Reilly, without mentioning the particular case of Spain, thus replies to the general objection: the italics throughout being his own (February, 1876, pp. 170-172):—

The position of a Catholic Government of a Catholic country with reference to the Catholic religion is totally different from that of a Protestant Government even of a Protestant country, with reference to the Protestant religion; or rather[to] any phase of Protestantism; for there is in reality no such *Religion*, true or false, as the Protestant Religion, any more than there is such a *Religion* as common Christianity. There may be Protestant Religions, in the plural number, there is not *one* in the singular. But this by the way. The great reason of this difference of positions of Catholic and Protestant Governments with reference to the Catholic Religion and any Protestant Religion is, that the Catholic Religion is presented as a Divinely revealed Religion committed to the care of a Divinely instituted and Infallible Church, which Church definitely declares the details of belief and practice contained in the Revelation, superadding her own laws and ordinances in virtue of her own Divinely revealed commission; while each particular form of Protestantism is confessedly a digest of dogmas and practices said to be contained in the Christian revelation, but made by fallible men according to their lights, with the addition of laws and ordinances enacted by themselves without the semblance of any such Divine commission as is claimed by the Catholic Church. If any of them do pretend to a Divine commission, they do not pretend to be infallible in claiming it, nor to have the guarantee of any infallible person or body for their possession of it.

A Catholic Government recognizes the Divine Revelation of the Catholic Religion and the Divine institution and commission of the Catholic Church, both of which are likewise recognized by the Catholic people. A Protestant Government embraces a particular set of *theological opinions*—to give them the most respectable name that I can—and charters, in some shape, the body of divines who hold those opinions. The Protestant Government does not any more than the Catholic attribute infallibility to itself. The Protestant Government does not acknowledge infallibility in the pastors who propound those particular doctrines which distinguish the sect. The whole *status* of the religion comes from the divines and the Government, a great deal of it from the latter, and the Government exercises a very effectual supervision over doctrines and discipline. In the one case the Government accepts a religion presented as divine and divinely provided with all religious appliances, and absolutely repudiating all subordination to the State—the *Religion*, I say, and its professors too, *as such*—in the other the State sets its seal on a Religion which, as to its particular form, is unmistakably a human institution. As I remarked in a preceding paper, Anglicans do not pretend to believe with *Divine Faith* that Anglicanism—which is, after all, among the best of the sects called Protestant—is as to its particular doctrines and form the *true Religion*.

It comes to this, then, that each particular form of Protestantism, and the

whole of Protestantism as contra-distinguished to Catholicity, is but a set of opinions. Whatever may be the actual adhesion of kings or people to them, their outward *status* is that of opinions, as they are avowedly fallible explanations of, or deductions from, the Christian Revelation. Now, surely there is the greatest difference between exclusively protecting and maintaining a Religion presented as revealed by God, and as proposed in detail by an Infallible Church, and similarly protecting and maintaining a Religion which in its distinctive shape is the work of those who hold it or of some among them.

Add to this that all Protestants admit in effect the right of private judgment, not perhaps always under that name, nor in the same extravagant way as some of the first Reformers, but in reality and in substance. For they all deny a permanent infallible authority, and all take their respective systems of belief from a comprehensive, complicated mass of revelation, obscure in many parts, and open to discussion about its real meaning in many others ; all, I say, take their system of belief from this revelation *as they understand it*. If controversies arise, these are left unsettled, or are settled either by each man for himself or at the best by an accommodating assent to the decision of some conventional tribunal for the sake of outward concord. Here we have private judgment without any mistake. Now, I say, once private judgment is admitted in the formation of systems of belief, the attempt to deny to Catholics the right of understanding revelation otherwise than Protestants understand it, and of professing and preaching conformably to their system, is arbitrary and inconsistent. In the same revelation which Protestants claim to explain according to their respective lights, Catholics see the institution of an Infallible Church from which the details of doctrine are to be accepted, and from this Church they do accept their doctrines. In this what business have Protestants to stop them ? Certainly none.

It is with keen regret that we have found ourselves, throughout the preceding pages, in sustained opposition to one, for whom we feel such very great respect and gratitude as Dr. Mivart. But his very eminence, and the extent of his services to Catholicity, will be sure to invest with special authority whatever he may say ; and on this question we have the misfortune to differ from him, not in this or that incidental particular, but on a fundamental doctrine which few can exceed in practical importance. We trust we have not spoken in a tone of undue confidence. We feel strongly indeed, and have from time to time said, that we are far from clear we may not have importantly misunderstood him. Even if this has not been so—we should still express our criticism with much diffidence, if the question were merely between the accuracy of *his* reasoning or observation and the accuracy of our own. But our conviction is, that the teaching of the Holy See is fundamentally opposed to the theory which we understand

Dr. Mivart to uphold. And our dissent from that theory therefore rests on very far stronger ground, than on any confidence we could feel in the correctness of our own private speculation on the grave matters at issue.

Since the preceding went to press, we have seen an article in the "*Fraser*" of June, bearing Mr. Froude's initials, from which it is well worth our while to make an extract. It powerfully illustrates what has been said by Mr. Lilly and other Catholics, as regards the contrast which this age presents to earlier times, in its prevalent political and personal ideal. In mediæval times, says M. Périn, the ideal was self-sacrifice: now the ideal is self-enjoyment. So Mr. Froude; whose words are the more remarkable, because no one will suspect him of Catholic proclivities.

In other ages the human race was contented with less ambitious aspirations; the present world was considered at its best to be a scene of disappointments. The noblest efforts were often doomed to failure; the noblest life was not to be rewarded with happiness. At the hearts of all men of high and sensitive nature there was an impassioned longing after things which the world did not contain and could not give them. They had set before themselves as the supreme object of desire something else than material prosperity. Life to them was not enjoyment, but sacrifice. They moved about in an atmosphere of existence unrealized, yet more real to their imagination than the most palpable objects of their senses. They looked out on nature to perceive in it a something far more deeply interfused than what they could see or handle. They looked beyond them for some other more sure abiding-place. They were contented with poverty. They despised the pleasures and dreaded the temptations of overmuch prosperity. The bank notes which a man was able to accumulate were no indications that his life had been profitably spent. They were satisfied to do their very best in such department of duty as had fallen to them, looking for their reward rather in the work which they accomplished than in the payment which the world assigned to them. Hence arose martyrs of religion, martyrs of science, martyrs of patriotism, martyrs of love, martyrs of destiny. Their victory was most complete when it was won at the sacrifice of themselves.

We have changed all that. It has been discovered that the ancient theories of life were unproductive. Society, before the days of enlightenment, continued stationary. The children walked in the ways of their fathers. They consecrated their fathers' errors by mistaken reverence. They forgot that each generation, as the inheritor of the accumulated knowledge of the past, was necessarily wiser than the generations which preceded it. We prefer realities to dreams; we limit our aspirations to what is practical; and, abandoning the phantoms which deluded our fathers, attending

to the real nature of our situation and manfully endeavouring to make the best of it, we advance where before we stood still ; we work for earthly reward ; and nature is kind, and if we are punctual in attention to facts she never fails to honour the bills which we draw upon her. Our fathers imagined themselves a little lower than the angels. We are contented to be ignorant whether our descent be celestial or common to us and the beasts that perish. We are creatures of a day. The earth is the only home of which we have real knowledge ; but we can make it a very comfortable place if we duly attend to the conditions of it, and to the limits of our own powers. Religion thus becomes vague. It is divorced from our practice, and becomes an opinion. Poetry grows languid, and Art grows commonplace ; and though we would gladly preserve both art and poetry as materials of amusement, the splendid rewards which society is ready to furnish still fail to prevent creative genius from withering. On the other hand, we have steam-ships and telegraphs ; our merchant fleets cover the seas ; our great continents are reticulated with railways, and the products of all climes and countries are distributed for the enjoyment of each (pp. 692-3).

ART. II.—CREMATION.

Julian the Apostate, Letter to Arsaces, Satrap of Armenia. (Op. Ep. xlix.)

Muratori, de Ant. Christianor. Sepulchris, in the Anecd. Græca. Disq. iii. Naples. 1776.

Ueber das Verbrennen der Leichen, Abhandl. der Berlin, Akad. d. Wiss. Jahrgang. 1849.

Cremation. By Sir HENRY THOMPSON.

Cremation of the Dead. By W. EASSIE. London. 1875.

WE suppose that every one who watches the movements of his own mind must have noticed, not without some humiliation, to what extraordinary fluctuations we are subject in all senses, but in none more than in the varying estimates we make of the relative importance of ideas or topics of thought. And similarly, or rather by consequence, we have only to take up the newspapers, which contain a faithful transcript of the ephemeral ideas of society, to perceive the same characteristic in the common mind of the public. At one time there is what is called a "run" upon social questions, at another politics, literature, art, science, commerce, theology, in short, any conceivable subject, from "Shakespeare" to the "musical glasses," spirit-rapping to skating-

rinks, take the lead, and are each by turn discussed and fought over, affirmed, denied, till one becomes quite sick of the very phraseology in which the great topic is wrapped. And, precisely as this process goes on from month to month under our eyes and in our ears, so it seems to have gone on from age to age in the history of mankind. Waves of fussy talk seem to roll up at intervals on a scale greater or smaller according to the subject-matter, and, after a period, culminate and break, and fall back whence they came, to lie, it may be for years, even for centuries, in comparative obscurity, till a new combination brings them up again. When every soul having the power of speech in this vast metropolis had asked his fellow, "Have you seen the Shah?" that potentate subsided and disappeared from talk for an indefinite time, but not till then. And so, in some measure, has it happened to cremation. The cremation talk has certainly passed its apogee, and it may be fairly said that it is now possible to dine out without hearing any explicit reference to what the French call the *cinders* of one's forefathers. It would, perhaps, appear therefore gratuitous to entertain our readers with any remarks on a subject for the present, it may be hoped, in spite of *ardent* advocacy, not to be ranked among the *questions brûlantes* of the hour, were it not that it is one which seems to have a special history and a special significance regarding the Catholic belief and practice on the disposal of the dead. "There is nothing new under the sun," and neither the fact nor the theory of cremation is new. Let us, then, attempt to trace the order of causes which gave rise to them, and after (it may be said) a total abolition of both the theory and practice in civilized lands, have in these latter times made some not entirely unsuccessful attempt to revive the practice, and rehabilitate the theory on which it rests.

1. What is the history of cremation, or the burning of the dead bodies of men? There can be little doubt that the primeval custom of all mankind was to bury the bodies of the dead in that earth from which, as we Christians know, the Creator compacted them when He made our first parent from the slime of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life and the reasonable soul, which is man's difference from all other created beings on this earth. In the Old Testament there is no trace of any other mode of sepulture, whether among God's people under the primeval, the patriarchal, or the Mosaic dispensation. The burning of the bones of the dead occurs once and again, indeed,* but it is as exhumed, in

* 3 Kings xiii. 24; Kings xxiii. 6; Ezek. xxiv. 10.

order to defile and degrade the schismatical altar of Jeroboam, by the express word of prophecy, and the fulfilment of it by the righteous king Josias. And so in the oldest secular records which we have, inhumation figures as the universal practice. Egypt knew of no other method. Assyria and Persia the same. Meshech and Tubal, the present Muscovy and Siberia, Edom and the Sidonians, every monument of all races from Egypt to the extreme Scandinavians, from Hindustan to Mexico, testify to the truth which we may sum up in the words of Isaías. When contrasting the repose of all other great ones in the quiet of their stately tombs with the unburied remains of the king of Babylon, who had exalted himself, and claimed to raise his throne above the dominion of the Most High, he says, "All the kings of the nations, all of them, lie in glory; every one in his own sepulchre; but thou art cast out of thy grave, like to an abominable branch; like the raiment of the slain thrust through with a sword, that go down to the stones of the pit. As a carcase that is trodden under feet, thou shalt not be joined with them in burial."*

The extreme reverence with which the Jews regarded their dead, and the jealous care, degenerating into a motive of superstition and a mark of hypocrisy, as our Lord more than once intimates, with which they adorned and watched over their sepulchres, is notorious, and as it was not the subject of positive precepts in the law of Moses except indirectly in the prescriptions to bury without the camp or dwelling-place of the people, and for the purification of the living after they had touched the bodies of the dead, we must be certain that their practice was an exact representation of the primeval traditions of our race in this regard. But if proof is required of this evident truth, it may be found in the corroborative testimony of the most conservative races. The Chinese, says Amyot, from earliest times have buried their dead. And Robertson says that the Peruvians and other primeval races of Central America from the earliest times buried and embalmed their rulers and chief people. Similarly Cicero (*"De Legibus,"* bk. xi. par. 23 and 25) says, "*ut mihi quidem antiquissimum sepulturæ genus videtur quo apud Xenophontem Cyrus utitur. Redditur enim corpus terræ,*" &c.; and of the Greeks, "*Nam et Athenis jam ille nos a Cecrope, ut aiunt, permansit, hoc jus terra humandi.*" So also the Etruscans, Dempster, (*"De Etruria Regali,"* Flor. 1723, in the addition by Bonarota, par. 26,) "*antiquissimis temporibus Etruscis in usu fuit, more vetustissimo et apud plerasque gentes recepto, integra corpora*

* Isaías xiv. 18.

mortuorum in cryptis tumulandi." The Egyptians surrounded the burial of the dead with every circumstance of solemnity and affectionate reverence. After the embalming, the body was placed in a kind of open chest, which was preserved within their houses, or in the sepulchres which still cover so large a portion of that wondrous land. But before they were "quietly inurned" in the tomb they underwent a solemn pronouncement of judgment, of which Diodorus Siculus gives the following most singular account in the first book of his history—a compilation, as all know, from works of a far higher antiquity. Those who prepare to bury a deceased friend give notice of the day intended for the ceremony to the judges and to all the friends of the deceased, who assemble on the further side of the lake nearest to the abode of the deceased. The vessel (managed by a pilot, called in Egyptian Charon, which means the *fierce-eyed*) being launched, before the coffin is embarked the law permits all who are so inclined to make an accusation against the dead. If any one appears and proves that the deceased has led an evil life, the judges pronounce sentence, and the body is precluded from burial; but if the accuser is convicted of a false charge he falls himself under a heavy penalty. The kings themselves were subject to this ordeal, and Diodorus says that many had failed, and been deprived of burial by the indignation of the people; and that the fear of such a result had a salutary effect on the conduct of their sovereigns. The Greeks had the custom of placing a piece of money in the mouth of the dead, as Charon's fare for helping the soul across the sad and dismal Styx, and by his side the cake to appease the watchful Cerberus; and whilst the body remained unburied a bowl of water stood ready, that those who touched the dead might wash off the pollution contracted by the contact. After the mourning and the interment, the *περιδείπνον*, or *νεκροδείπνον* (feast of the dead), took place, at which his friends appeared, crowned as at festivals. The Athenians buried their soldiers with special honours. Three days they lay in state in their tents; on the fourth a coffin was sent from every tribe for the bodies of each of their kin, and after these in the funeral procession came an empty covered hearse representing those whose bodies could not be found. All, accompanied by a concourse of people, were carried forth to the cemetery, called *Cerameicos*, and there interred with an oration and the usual rites. This was the ancient, and remained the usual practice in Greece. The burning of the dead on a funeral pyre, which was lit by the nearest of kin, while the bystanders called on the dead and poured out libations of wine, was, as a general practice,

more recent, and never universal. The Romans had very many and significant funeral rites. Those of wealthy and eminent persons were protracted for seven days, during which the body lay in state, washed and anointed. Three times at intervals the *conclamations* took place, the relatives and friends shouting in order to rouse him, in case the departed should be merely in a trance. Then took place the interment. The usual practice for the rich was cremation on a funeral pyre, but the burials, whether by burning or inhumation, were expressly forbidden to be within the walls by a law of the twelve tables. Exceptions were made, however, in favour of public men. Plutarch says those who had had triumphs decreed to them were entitled to this distinction. Valerius Publicola and Caius Fabricius had tombs in the Forum; and Cicero adds, that Tubertus had the same honour. Besides the motive of health (which would indicate rather the practice of inhumation than that of cremation), we are told that extramural interment was practised by the ancients, because of the general belief that the touch, sight, or even near neighbourhood, of a corpse polluted a man: whence the rule mentioned by Aulus Gellius that the *flamen dialis* might not enter a place where there was a grave: an extraordinary trace of the traditions of the Jewish law, as it seems to us. It was customary with the Romans when they saw a corpse not yet interred, to cast three handfuls of earth on the body, of which one at least on the head. It is to this custom that Horace alludes in that beautiful ode on the death of Archytas (the xxviii. of the 1st Book), in which he bids the mariner who finds his body cast up by the cruel waves on the Tarentine shore not omit—

“arenæ

Ossibus et capiti inhumato

Particulam dare”;

and again—

“Quamquam festinas, non est mora longa, licebit

Injecto ter pulvere curras.”

The “caput inhumatum” of the philosopher requires the scattering of the earth, as the whole context shows, to satisfy the requirements of that belief, which in the minds of all unsophisticated men conceives that the immortal spirit, now set free from the flesh, can surely hardly rest until its frail sometime companion has mingled once more with the mother earth from which it took its origin, and so fulfilled the stadium of this mortal life, as in like manner the soul can rest alone by returning to the God who gave it. In Horace’s time the

simplicity of the commonwealth, so often praised by him, had receded in the matter of funeral rites as well as in every other particular of domestic and public life; and the law had striven in vain, by sumptuary enactments, to check the wanton pomp which heaped up the funeral pyres of the great with every kind of rich offering—a homage more often rendered by living vanity to itself than by affection or reverence to the departed worth of those whom they thus professed to honour. If the old traditions of Rome in its great days of strength and virtue kept positively to practices denoting primeval beliefs regarding the dead, they were little less marked by the stern refusal to inter the bodies of certain categories of persons whom they considered reprobate, with those sacred and expiatory rites, which the Romans would have considered profaned by such a use. The traitor, the fraudulent debtor, and some say the suicide, had no right to the funeral rites, and, on the other hand, it was considered impious to burn those struck by lightning, whom our coroners' verdicts still (with ancestral piety) describe as dying "by the visitation of God." Such were always interred, and the bidental altar marked and hallowed the spot. So again, when the little child died in its innocence, the pyre and the libation were unneeded, and were deemed profane. No doubt here will occur to most minds the frequent funeral pyres of Homer, of Virgil, and of so many more. We will not go the length of saying that these were altogether "poetry," and that we might as well take them for historic evidence of the prevalence of cremation as the torches and vases which decorate so many gorgeous (and hideous) monuments of the last and present century in our own churches, and which, whatever other significance they may have, certainly do *not* mean that the respectable noble lords, ladies, squires, and squireses, who sleep beneath their ponderous protection were burnt, and their ashes potted for posterity. But at least it is evident that the function of the poet, and especially of the epic poet, is not so well discharged by the quiet grave-side as amidst the striking incidents of the flaming pyre, heaped with the spoils of vanquished foes, or glittering with the wealth of the surviving heir who mounts with faltering step and averted face to set his torch to the beloved remains. Our posterity would scarcely be warranted in believing that the weddings at St. George's, Hanover Square, recorded so glowingly in the columns of the "*Morning Post*," were really celebrated by a heathen flamen, accompanied by a young and sentimental pig, although the poetic author of these true narratives declares persistently that Lord Tom really did lead Lady Jane to the altar of Hymen on each

such glad occasion. In fact, it is the province of poetry to select its themes, and not to describe the prosaic and every day, but, on the contrary, the exceptional and picturesque, as we now phrase it. We cannot quote poets as if they were statisticians, or rely on their descriptions as (with a view to contingent practices) we rely on the agent's inventory when we let our house furnished for the season to a foreign family from South America with a large family of small children. If, for instance, one should take Virgil's thrilling narrative of the hapless Dido's funeral pyre *au pied de la lettre*, he would find himself beset with difficulties to which all the arithmetical objections to the Pentateuch of all possible Colensos are hardly comparable. No doubt there are traces of the practice of cremation in both East and West, and some of an early date; but these, such as the funeral rites of some tribes in the far East, and, in the West, of the Heruli, the Getæ, the Thracians, Sarmatians, &c., are mentioned as noteworthy exceptions to the general practice of mankind; and the circumstances accompanying them were usually such as denote races abnormally savage and degenerate.

Exceptional forms of disposing of the dead are to be found here and there in all ages; and our contention is that cremation, though a more obvious and less barbarous custom, is still to be classed with these. Thus the Parsees dispose of their dead by exposing them on lofty towers, protected by gratings from the birds of prey. The Scythians kept their dead affixed to lofty trees; the aborigines of Australia still hang them up in baskets. The Oriacocs suspend them in running water till the flesh is consumed by fishes, and then inter the bones. The heathen tribes of Jakutsk dry and decorate the skeletons of their dead and keep them in their huts, says Le Bruyn. The Tapayas and some Mexa tribes grind the bones of the dead and mix them with their food. Perhaps a further advance in what some people call "civilization" may revive some of these practices. We shall see, further on, that some modern advocates of cremation advocate the utilization of dead men's bones. The process is condemned in Holy Scripture by the mouth of Amos the Prophet (ii. 1), but that is to such theorizers a matter of no moment. The influences of barbarism and those of an extreme but merely material civilization on the belief of mankind are not so dissimilar as a superficial observation of them might lead us to suppose; and in their results at least they not unfrequently illustrate in no small measure the saying that "extremes meet." Cremation is still practised by some Hindûs and by one of the Tartar

tribes, at least as regards their princes. Whether or not the practice is commanded in the Védas, the cremation of widows on the funeral pyre of their husbands is not yet entirely extinct in British India, and the custom of immolating horses and slaves on the pyre of Tartar princes yet lingers in Central Asia. Thus, as regards the actuality of the situation (as the French say), it would seem, from recent pamphlets published in London, that the modern cremationist would at present mount his funeral pile with a Suttee on one side and a Kalmuck on the other: but we are anticipating. Let thus much suffice as a sketch of the early antecedents of cremation in general. If it is at all accurate, it would indicate that, whereas a general and most ancient consent of mankind to return their dead with reverend and religious care to the bosom of the earth was in possession for ages, as the rock tombs, barrows, pyramids, and other such sepulchral monuments, which are to be found in all lands, testify, a very partial, fitful, and obscure thread of exception to this rule appears in some countries and at some times; and those countries and times, moreover, appear as more or less conscious innovators on what went before. The last phase of the history of sepulture is the Christian era, and it would be no doubt at the present time a mere parade of unnecessary erudition were we to attempt to sketch that which all who care to know can and do know, and not even the most ardent cremationists affect to deny: viz., that with Christianity set in a complete rejection and a growing horror of cremation, so that by the fourth century of the Christian era it had as completely disappeared as it has ever since. It would, indeed, have been astonishing if the practice of burning the dead had been otherwise than utterly abhorrent and repugnant to the mind of Christians. We know from the mouth of S. Peter,* speaking in the name of the whole Apostolic College, and of S. Paul,† his co-apostle to the Gentiles, that the whole Christian scheme of the redemption of man rests on the belief of the resurrection of the Incarnate Son of God in the identical body in which He died on the cross for man, and on the consequent doctrine of the general resurrection of all men in their self-same bodies in which they lived and sinned, or merited, through Christ, the awards of God's final and most just judgment. That those who would come to God must believe "that He is, and that He is the rewarder of those who seek Him,"‡ earnestly, is a truth contained within the verge of that natural religion on which is based the whole revealed truth of the Gospel of

* Acts i. 22.

† 1 Cor. xv. 17.

‡ Heb. xi. 6.

Christ; and the rite of inhumation, and the various significant ceremonies with which the natural piety of different races accompanied that act, was a testimony of even the natural man to his natural belief in God, his first beginning and his final cause, in his own indestructible individuality, and in the doom of an eternity to come beyond the grave, of whose character his own conscience was at once the witness and the presage. Whatever of these momentous truths lingered upon earth even in Gentile lands, was not obscurely signified at those solemn vesper services of each expiring life of mortal man, and it was not likely only, but absolutely certain, that the unerring mind of the Spouse of Christ should prefer a practice still redolent of its primeval origin to one which had to plead for its existence and its sanction, at best some transient emergency, more often the sensual and spectacular tendencies of corrupting civilization, or the cruel pride of this world's princes, rejecting as beneath their dignity the common lowly lot of the dead, and immolating human victims on the funeral-pyre, if haply the terrors and the death-agony of slaves might supply the absence of a true compassion and the plaints of that affectionate regret of which they were so often unworthy.

But what rendered, and always will render, inhumation and not cremation, the Christian form of disposing of the dead is something more definite than this; it is, as we have said, the precise doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh. And here we may note, that it is in the mouth of Job,* according to that interpretation of his words which we ourselves follow, that we find the most explicit declaration of all the Scriptures on the subject of the resurrection of the flesh. Whether we hold the received opinion that Jobab, who appears in the list of the kings of Edom and descendants of Esau,† is the same person as Job or not, it is certain that he was a Gentile in this sense at least, that he was not one of that immediate chosen line to whom alone God made Himself known from time to time in a supernatural way. So that whatever you take from Job's authority as a direct witness of supernatural truth, you must give to him as an authentic witness of primeval natural tradition.

Our good friends and wellwishers, the cremationists, have not been slow to assert that Christians are averse to cremation because it brings before the very eyes of the vulgar a scientific truth, viz., that our material frames are reducible (and as a fact are reduced after death, sooner or later) into impalpable gases, which in their turn become the constituents of other

* Job xix. 25.

† Gen. xxxvi. 33.

bodies, and so on to a practical infinity: and this truth, they are never tired of reiterating, is utterly irreconcilable with the Christian doctrine, that we shall rise again with the identical bodies which are now ours. We speak under correction, but we doubt whether any authority for such an idea as this Christian horror of scientific truth can be adduced. We quite think that uneducated minds might receive some kind of shock to their faith if the gas theory were thrust before them by this unnatural practice; nor do we the least doubt that it is in the hope of shaking popular belief in this article of the Christian creed that cremation has often been put forward. We have, however, never yet met with an ordinarily catechized Catholic Christian to whom this theory gave any more trouble than the other shallow objections of Protestants or Rationalists to such doctrines as that of Transubstantiation or the Real Presence. The faith teaches us that we rise again in our own (and only) bodies, as identical as our own personality itself, but so completely changed in all conditions of being, that no ratio of conflict, or of contact even, is conceivable between the laws of matter which regulate their condition in this world, and that spiritualized condition to which they will be admitted hereafter. S. Paul tells us, that there is an analogy between the relation of our body's temporary condition to its future and eternal condition, and that relation which exists of the seed of grain sown to the crop which springs again from it into new life; but he says also that he speaks of "a mystery," and everyone knows that, in the Christian phraseology, a "mystery" is that which cannot be *explained* in human language, or *solved* by human reason, because it transcends the one and the other. The four gifts which distinguish the state of the risen body from the same body before its resurrection abundantly testify that its conditions of being are totally different, and neither sense nor reason, without faith, can ever arrive at a conception of it. To the mind of a believer the fact that the object of belief is not clear to him, forms only an argument of his own ignorance, because the principle on which his belief rests is not the antecedent and subjective probability of each thing proposed to his acceptance, but the sufficient credibility of the witness who attests, that the object so to be received is a part of the revealed truth of God. The fact is, that the attempt to represent Catholics as averse to cremation on such religious grounds is part of the system of imputing to us a stupid materialism, which has been one of our adversaries' devices from the earliest times. The Pagans made it a subject of reproof to the early Christians: "*execrantur rogos, et damnant ignium sepulturam*"; but Minutius Felix, who wrote

in the beginning of the third century of our era, answered them, that it was from no foolish idea that the earth preserved the material remains of men better than any other mode of tumulation, but merely because it was the more ancient and the more advantageous system, that the Christians buried their dead. Incidentally he shows also that the practice of cremation was one introduced by military discipline: "Cremabitur," he asks (in his dialogue of Octavius, ch. xi.), "*ex castrensi disciplina*, Christianus cui cremari non licuit, cui Christus merita ignis indulsit? . . . non, ut creditis, ullum damnum sepulturæ timemus, sed et veterem et meliorem consuetudinem humandi frequentamus." Tertullian (de Anima, et de Resurrectione Carnis) assigns further the reason of affection and reverence for the dead, which is so natural and so Christian also, that Julian the Apostate (in his 49th letter) places it among the other causes to which he assigns the spread of Christianity. Certainly the doctrine that the very body of the Christian becomes the temple of the Holy Ghost, and is thus rendered sacred and consecrate to God, prompts to a reverent treatment of the dead; and no method of tumulation is so simply and practically respectful as that which consists in laying it to rest undisturbed and un mutilated by man in the bosom of that earth whence it was formed. S. Jerome incidentally mentions, that burial in the earth was the common practice in his age: "Fossam in humum lapidibus construentes, *ex more* tumulum parant," he says (Ep. xlix. ad Innoc.); and S. Ambrose (Ep. xxxix. ad Theodosium) says that it was not Christians only who thus buried, for that Diocletian "*ita humatus est*," which must have been a notorious fact.

It must, however, be noticed, that while inhumation is the general practice of the Christian Church, she has never followed the narrow-minded example of the "liberal" cremationists who wish to burn every body. The objectors to inhumation have laid great stress on the hygienic view of the matter. We believe that in exceptional cases only is cremation to be preferred to inhumation. Such a case would be the battle-field, in which thousands of bodies lie festering in their corruption at one time; or the plague-stricken city, decimated by the sudden onslaught of a fell epidemic. In these cases, as at Milan and elsewhere, the Church never hesitated to allow, and even to enjoin, whatever the exigency of the moment required in derogation of her ordinary rule, and to sanction the *castrensis disciplina* of which we have just heard. Nor have individual Christians shrunk, in the interests of religion, or even of science, from surrendering their bodies to any treat-

ment which might promote those ends. How should *we*, indeed, think otherwise? *We*, who are the children of the martyrs, of those who gave their bodies "to be burnt, to be stoned, to be cut asunder, put to death by the sword," devoured by wild beasts, suffocated, drowned, tortured, that their spirit might be saved in the Day of the Lord? S. Francis of Sales was not alone among good Catholics in leaving, as he desired to do, his body to the medical faculty, that they might do what they would with it to subserve the interests of science, and so learn to relieve more efficaciously some of the ills our flesh is heir to. But, indeed, it requires but little knowledge of hygienics to see that the earth is at once the most obvious, the most expedite, and the most enduring depurative; and that if cremation could ever be practised on a great scale, the miasma, which cremationists dread so much when it rises from the graves of buried men, might prove to the full as deleterious if it floated in the heavy air over the perpetual fires of some great city's funeral pyres. London buries nearly 200 (191 and a fraction) dead every day on the average. Those who have been in India can testify to the sickening exhalations which the burning of the dead gives rise to even in that fervid climate, where such persistent fogs as those which bring down upon us such plentiful showers of "blacks" from a thousand chimneys, are unknown. The truth is, that the hygienic objections to inhumation are all based on abuses which the Church has ever been the first to reprobate. Tomassinus ("*Vetus et Nova Ecclesiæ Disciplina*") gives at length the various prescriptions of the Church regarding burial at different times and places. Her discipline in this, as in all other particulars, is always based on principles, of the application of which she is herself the only judge. The abuse alone of any practice is never in her judgment a valid reason for its total abolition in principle, as we see in many familiar instances; and instead of laying down immutable laws, and violating them when convenient, she has ever been sparing in her legislation on the subject of such disciplinary provisions as those for the burial of the dead. The broad principle of inhumation is clearly susceptible of modified application—as to time and place, &c.—as when the rank of the dead renders a special place and mode of sepulture fitting and becoming. Intramural sepulture, once carried to excess, and nowhere more so than in this Protestant London, was not abolished, but restricted by the Church in most countries long before the cry about it was raised here; and if the abuses of leaden coffins and other such hindrances to the antiseptic action of the earth were as rife in Catholic countries as they are here, no

doubt they would receive her attention, and be duly moderated where she has the power to do so. On the other hand, there are two kinds of objection to cremation, which, to the mind of any thinking person not besotted with the dreams which are attempted to be palmed upon us under the much-abused names of social and scientific progress, greatly exceed in importance the alleged hygienic objections to inhumation. These are the legal, or juridical, and the theological objections. Experience, saddening but only too convincing, shows that everywhere, but especially in the huge centres of population, which in so many ways produce results akin to those arising from the remotest solitudes, cases occur too frequently of deaths brought about, not only by violence, but by administration of subtle poisons, whose operation, if at all to be traced in the bodies of the victims, can only be so detected by a chemical analysis. Cremation would at once and for ever shield those murderers whose guilt has often thus, and thus only, been detected. Signor Burci, who, though a senator of the new Italian kingdom, seems neither to be a rogue nor a fool, is related in the official acts of that body (p. 1,600) to have spoken as follows on the proposed sanitary law introduced by the Government in 1873 :—

“Cremation,” he said, “from the juridical point of view, would not be advisable, for it is not always sure, as soon as a man dies, that his remains may not be a necessary or a useful factor for the ends of justice. It often happens that bodies buried for one or more years even have been dug up and the traces of a crime detected in them. And here I may be allowed to relate a fact well known to me. A certain doctor had occasion to speak to a mayor of a town in France, who was at the moment watching the translation of some human bones from one cemetery to another. While speaking to him, he noticed a skull which was unearthened. He exclaimed directly, ‘Why, that man has had a severe blow on the head.’ As in France the bodies in cemeteries are all numbered, it was easy to refer to the books and see what cause was assigned for the death of the person in question. The statement was that this person had died of apoplexy. Suspicion thus aroused, further inquiries were instituted; and after the lapse of ten years the murderer was traced, arrested, and convicted by the aid of this circumstantial evidence.”

The theological, or ecclesiastical objection, which would be less than none at all to modern thought, as people call the impertinences of the hour, lies in the supernatural facts, also juridically proved in the Church’s tribunals when canonical processes require it, connected with the mortal remains of God’s saints. No historical facts are better avouched than the preternatural preservation for many years, sometimes for

many centuries, of the bodies of saints in whole or in part. When bodies like those of S. Theresa, S. Catherine of Bologna, or S. Charles, remain so long exempt from that utter dissolution into impalpable powder to which the course of nature subjects the remains of ordinary men, we, as Catholics, feel more loath than others who might desire their preservation as curiosities and subjects for scientific talk, that such relics should be systematically destroyed by the universal practice of cremation; and when particular members of the bodies of saints, which have served them to glorify God more heroically or signally, are singled out for such supernatural preservation, as is the tongue of S. John Nepomucene, the martyr to the sacred and inviolable seal of sacramental confession, or the hands of S. Nicholas of Myra, and S. Stephen, king of Hungary,—“open,” ever, “as day to melting charity,”—we cherish those sacred relics as monuments of the Divine strength and goodness to which they witness, and would certainly resent being deprived of the very hope of such evidences. The same we say of all relics; and of all these the thousands and tens of thousands of the holy martyrs whose blood was the seed of the Church, of the virginal bodies of hermits, angelic citizens of the sacred deserts, the wasted forms of holy monks and nuns, “of whom the world was not worthy,” of the body of a S. Francis bearing in the very flesh the marks of His Lord’s passion, or a S. Rose of Lima transfigured even in this life into the living likeness of His sacred and glorified humanity, of saintly Kings and Pontiffs or humble and poor men,—of all these, venerated on the million altars of the Church on which the sun never sets, and in all ages, the instruments of God’s miraculous agencies for man’s good, both temporal and eternal,—of all these, we say, the practice of cremation would have deprived the Church in the past, as it would now fain deprive her in the future. To us the destruction of these sacred relics, past, present, and to come, would be an act in comparison to which the burning of all the great libraries, museums, picture-galleries, record-offices, public and private monuments of every kind, would be a small matter, because all those things belong to an order as inferior to that to which the relics of the saints refer, as earth is to heaven, or flesh and blood to soul and spirit; for they were the living Temples of the Holy Ghost on earth, and they will be so again for all eternity in Heaven.

Let thus much suffice by way of an historic view of the two methods of disposing of the dead, and of estimate as to their intrinsic merits. We will now briefly consider the extrinsic light thrown on the question by the advocacy which cremation

has met with since first it was, as we had hoped, finally discredited and supplanted by Christian burial.

The line of its advocates commences with the name of the Apostate Julian. As a hater of Christianity, he strove to trace (as we have seen already) in the piety of the Christian burial rites, one of the potent but purely human causes of the spread of Christianity.* As Cæsar, he brought to bear the strong arm of the law, to back his opinions. In an edict directed to the people of Antioch, that great Christian centre in the hither East, he forbids the Christian funeral rites during the day, not without the parade of various specious reasons, such as liberals are wont to allege in like cases at the present day.† With the triumph of Christianity over the revived paganism of Julian, cremation received a blow which one might have deemed a final quietus. Certainly more than a thousand years elapsed before this ugly monster raised its head again. The Venerable Bellarmine (*De Purgatorio*, l. ii. c. xix., *de Funere*) notes the rise of certain preliminary notions in the early heretics of the so-called Reformation. Like another and more ancient "reformer," they "quoted Scripture," and the fathers, and even the canon law, against the Church's practice in regard to funeral solemnities, requiems, anniversaries, trentals, and the like. The happy thought of cremation does not appear to have struck them as yet, but their aim was to eliminate from the Christian burial rites, and from the cemetery, their religious aspect and character. The dead were to be buried without rites, and the cemetery was to be kept tidy, but, like the church or chapel, it was not to be regarded as in any sense a consecrated place. Such also was the legislation of the puritan powers that were in this realm in the year 1645 in their "directory." In Catholic countries, of course, the old customs continued, the campo santos, or God's-acres, of South or North Europe remained as before hallowed spots, not merely by the natural piety, which is so innate in man, that it takes a very long course of "culture" and "civilization" to rob him of that birthright, but far more by the Church's blessing, and by the visible signs of her faith and power. No wonder that those who could not abide the consecration of churches for the living should reject the sacredness of the Christian grave. The first step towards this profanation was to attack the practice of burying in or near the church. A succession of pamphlets, memoirs, disquisitions, and treatises by various, chiefly French, authors, appeared in

* See his letter (Ep. xlix.) to Arsaces, Satrap of Armenia.

† ix. Cod. Theodos. Tit. xvii.

1728, '45, '48, '73, appealing to the interests of the public health, the decorum of the churches, and so forth, and urging a return to the alleged primitive usages of the Church. Muratori and Muzzarelli answered these attacks with a solid and learned completeness, which silenced the adversaries, at least for a time. However, if logic failed them, they were still able to allege that which a late disastrous Cæsar called the logic of facts; for the liberal Joseph the Second (his brother the sacristan, as Frederick the Great used to call him) provided by an edict issued to his Low Country dominions, that all town burying-places should thenceforth be disused for sepulture, forthwith sold by public auction, and as far as possible profaned by being turned into public places, gardens, or streets. No sooner, however, were the new cemeteries opened, than the liberal cry was raised against them as being still dangerous to the public health. One Dr. Trusen upon this broke new ground, and in a pamphlet inscribed, "*Salus Populi suprema Lex*," blew the first note on the new trumpet of cremation. Of course, the French Republic was not to be charged with neglect of so grave a subject as the final bestowal of citizens' remains. In the year 5 of the Republic Legrand d'Aussy published a memoir on national sepulture, proposing cremation, instead of inhumation. One fool, they say, makes many, and the council of 500 immediately took cognizance of the matter, and named a committee to consider and report on it. Most appropriately this committee issued its report on the 23rd of Foggy,* year V, in which it recommended that either practice should be optional to citizens. The Institute of France, not to be behind in the race, offered a prize of 1,500 francs for the best essay on the subject from a scientific point of view. A fine crop of treatises was the result, but meanwhile one General Bonaparte turned up and gave the 500 plenty of other occupation. It is curious to read in O'Meara's "*Voice from St. Helena*," that Napoleon the First wished his own remains to be burnt. What amount of authenticity those conversations may claim will, no doubt, always be disputed. That they were published by O'Meara with a view to the praise of Napoleon, is certain, and among the intrinsic notes of authenticity one cannot but reckon opinions like this, and those on civil marriage and the other abominations, in which the exile of St. Helena had been brought up. They read like a prophecy of the Falk laws. The cemeteries, funerals, and even the burial fees to sextons and to clergy, were regulated by the State in a decree of the 23rd of Bowery (June), year XII, which declared them "*national*."

* Brumaire, November.

Thus, as in so many other things, the revolution showed its origin and its sympathies, and gave practical effect to that civil interment to which the Reformation had theoretically opened the door. Civil interment and cremation thus started hand-in-hand, but the reaction against the revolution apparently kept them back for nearly the first half of this century. It was in 1849 and at Berlin, while the whole of Europe was heaving with the throes of a new instalment of revolution, that Grimm lighted the funeral pyres once more in a dissertation read before the Academy of Science, and published in their Proceedings. This was partly a *réchauffé* of Böttiger's pamphlet, published in 1794 in Wieland's "New Mercury." Molescott, however, in 1852, may claim the honour, such as it is, of fairly setting the hitherto motionless stone rolling again. In his book, called the "Circulation of Life," he ventures on a prediction, not yet verified at any rate, and which we quote chiefly because of the unblushing declaration of a false first principle with which he accompanies it: "We may confidently predict that the need of man, which is *the supreme reason of rights*, and the *most sacred source of customs*, will one day make us look on cemeteries with the same eye with which we now look on a peasant burying his dollars in the ground instead of putting out at interest, in some form or other, his hard-earned money."* The author, we suppose, hints at turning our deceased friends into chemicals, or utilizing the phosphates of human bones for agricultural purposes. Whatever the idea may have been, the hint did not remain without fruit. The book in which it occurred was puffed as a wonder of sagacity and erudition, and though the cremational literature of the years from '52 to '68 was slender, it increased during the next decade, and from 1870 to the present the fire of pamphlets has been pretty constant, while in '73 and '74 it reached its apparent climax. Every paper, magazine, and periodical of any pretensions gave us a dose of cremation, and mankind—that is, the self-appointed representations of modern thought, or the three tailors of our scientific Tooley Street, pointed their lucubrations at our breasts, and summoned us to make our election for or against the old-new hobby, "under which king, Bezonian? Speak or die," while all the talk of clubs and drawing-rooms was tinged with funeral pyres and noxious exhalations just as now it is tintured with skating-rinks and spelling-bees. Molescott's first imitator was M. Bonneau, in a series of letters and articles in *La Presse* in 1856. Georges Sand came next, and

* De Pietra Santa, "La Crémation," etc., ch. ii.

then a Dr. Cuffe in 1857. The Radical press was charmed, and struck up a general hymn in praise of Columbaria and ancient Roman virtue. On the 31st of May one worthy, stirred up by filial veneration, no doubt, declared his wish to dig up his father and burn him, a holocaust in honour of the revived pagan practice. The law did not allow it, but he reaped the well-earned praises of the liberal press in many lands for his good intentions.* In Italy, Professor Coletti, of Padua; in England, Mr. Cobbe; and in Germany Dr. Trusen followed suite. After a lull Dr. Giro appeared, in 1866,† with a treatise, in which he says that, after meditating profoundly on the subject, he has come to the conclusion that inhumation is opposed to the natural instincts of man, to health, and to civilized life; and that, therefore, there is nothing for it but cremation. This reminds one of the story of the man of science who demonstrated to an old Frenchman that coffee was an active and virulent, though slow, poison. The old gentleman said he was quite of that opinion, for having used it copiously for the last seventy years it had not killed him yet. Next year appeared in Italy Dr. Jardin, and in Germany Dr. Liebhall in 1868, and a little later Professor Castiglione; while in England Dr. Lord distinguished himself by a series of reports on the health of the northern part of London, in which he advocated cremation as the panacea for our ills, in '57, '58, '64, '67, '73, '74.‡ In 1870 Paris took up the running, apropos of the melancholy events of that fatal year upon so many battlefields. Lapégrère, Dechambre, and Latour—all three medical men—advocated it, the first as the only refuge. Laveran, inspector-general, brought the subject forward in the public council on health. Baron Larrey, however, in opposition to some of his colleagues, thought that the subject should be referred to the Academy of Medicine and Science, as being a "complex one on which the faculty was divided, whereas it was moreover opposed to religious and moral ideas of a higher order."§ This opinion seems to have stayed the torrent for the moment, but in 1874, as we all remember, on occasion of the establishment of a new cemetery for Paris at Mery-sur-Oise, a knot of cremationists in the Special Committee appointed by the municipality perseveringly urged the practice on the Committee and on the whole municipal body, till at last they obtained once more an order that the subject should be studied and reported on. Pietra Santa, in the

* *Revue Cath. de Louvain*, April, 1875.

† *Gazetta Medica delle Provincie Venete*.

‡ W. Eassie, "Cremation of the Dead," p. 85.

§ *Pietra Santa*, "Cremation," ch. ii.

Union Médicale, and in the *Annales d'Hygiène publique et de Médecine légale*, published two works on the subject which attracted much notice.

The same year appeared, in London, Mr. Eassie and Sir Henry Thompson's works on the same subject, and set us all talking and discussing. Belgium contributed its share of writers in newspapers and reviews—all of one colour, be it observed. One Dr. Pring got up a public conference on cremation at Brussels, and that pious print, the *Indépendance Belge*, took on itself the task of publishing it to the world. Germany, of course, was up and doing in this new phase of the matter, and meetings were held at Berlin, Vienna, Leipsic, Dresden, Munich, Augsburg, Frankfort, &c. How many pipes were smoked, and how many mugs of beer swallowed over the subject in that land of learned speculation and musing, not to say muzzy, metaphysics, will probably never be ascertained. While Trusen, Kückenmeister, Reklam, and others, fought the battle of cremation in Germany, Switzerland produced Wegmann-Ercolani on the reasonableness of cremation, and Lang, Weith, and Kinkle followed suite. But Italy gave the greatest cloud of authors on the subject at this time. Golfarelli, Borgiotti, Valerani, Pini, L'Ayr, Fornari, Musatti, L'Anelli, Giacchi, Gorini, Bonnetti, Biondelli, and Dall' Acque. The last was the Professor Polli, whose return to the faith in his last illness has raised such a storm of derision and bigotry in our press as well as in Italy.* The last circumstance of the burning fever is the invention of proper apparatus for the process of consuming the dead. Polli, Gorini, and Bonnetti gave us the benefit of their several devices in this kind, and the last of these sent his invention to be exhibited at the Vienna Exhibition. Teruzzi, Betti, Musatti, Calucci, Frank, and Stadler have also illustrated this part of their Sparta; and Sir Henry Thompson invents one of his own. Siemens's apparatus, however, is considered to carry off the palm. Withal, not many people have as yet had the, we will not say what, to carry out the theory in practice. There has been talk here in England of one and another eccentric wishing to burn his wife or child, and keep the cinders in some artistic vase on the sideboard or mantelpiece of dining or drawing room; and abroad, two cases at least, at Dresden and at Milan, of this carrying on the masque of sham heathendom even after death, have been permitted by the police, to the scandal or distress of decent Christian people; for though cremation has had its public meetings at Milan, at

* Even *Punch* had a scoff worthy of an infidel at this poor man's return to God.

Geneva, and at Zurich, and elsewhere, as yet there is no sign of popular goodwill to the cause. It would be invidious (not to say libellous) were we to go through the list of those whom we have cited, and to show how all, from Julian the Apostate downward, who have tried to resuscitate the burning of the dead, have been persons more or less overtly opposed to the Christian religion. Is it national vanity or a sense of justice which inclines us to say, that we believe our own cremationists are, at least in one instance, not so to be described. Our strong point (or weak, shall we say?) seems to be that we hold infidel conclusions, or advocate infidel practices, without realizing the source from whence they come, or really believing the premisses on which they repose. Let us hope this is the case with many of our English cremationists. On the whole, *exceptis excipiendis*, we must say that this succession of advocates reflects no pleasant light on the cause of cremation. Certainly no Catholic, and probably no other genuine and sincere believer in dogmatic and historic Christianity, can be found in the slender series of the advocates of men-burning; for if the nineteenth-century cremationist cannot bend him o'er the dead, to say with the Catholic Church, "*Proficiscere anima Christiana*," as the departing spirit hovers over its deserted tenement, so certainly neither is he likely to say with the Jew, "Go in peace," nor even with the Romans, "*Vale, vale, vale, nos te ordine quo natura permiserit cuncti sequemur*." Rather he will watch the ascending smoke melting into air, and liken it to that merging of the spirit in the azure of the unknown and unknowable immensity of space of which we have lately heard as the euthanasia of modern philosophers, with what consolation and what hope we may. And now to conclude. Our list of cremationists begins with Julian, apostate, but philosopher and imperator; the latest addition to it is in the person of a modern hero, fit type of the age in which we live,—Garibaldi, pirate and charlatan. In a recent paper we read:—

"Signor Cuneo, a very old friend of Garibaldi, and his companion in South America, having lately died without receiving extreme unction, the Church refuses Christian burial, and the corpse is still above ground in Florence. Garibaldi has written a letter advising the burning of the body, which system he desires to be applied to his own remains, and he offers to receive Cuneo's ashes at Caprera in his family vault."

On this we remark that this hero would seem a less fitting subject for cremation than his fillibustering friend the unanointed, and we fear also "unannealed," Cuneo, for since history records little of third-rate scoundrels, it is just possible

that Cuneo may have been no coward; whereas of the "General," whatever he may wish after death, it is sufficiently recorded that in life, at Mantua and in Tyrol, he was more than once decidedly averse to standing fire. Our series of cremationists thus comes emphatically down from Julian the Apostate to Garibaldi the impostor, awaiting his old unanointed friend Cuneo's ashes in the family fault at Caprera. If an inscription for the cinerary urn of Cuneo were wanting, it could be supplied from an antiphon of the ancient office of SS. John and Paul, in which they are represented as saying to Terentianus, Julian's prefect of the Prætorian Guard: "Situus Dominus est Julianus, habeto pacem cum illo; nobis alius non est nisi Dominus Jesus Christus."

ART. III.—MR. MILL ON CAUSATION.

A System of Logic. By JOHN STUART MILL. Eighth Edition. London: Longmans.

An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL. Fourth Edition. London: Longmans.

CIRCUMSTANCES have obliged us to delay, for a much longer period than we would have wished, the continuance of our articles on Mr. Mill's philosophy. This being so, and considering also the point at which our argument has now arrived, it will be perhaps conducive to clearness if, before proceeding further, we address a few preliminary words of recapitulation and explanation to our Catholic readers.

The articles in question form part of a projected series—as yet far from being concluded—the purpose of which is to establish securely on argumentative ground, against the antitheists of this day, the existence of that Personal and Infinitely Perfect Being, whom Christians designate by the name "God." This is a task peculiarly needed at the present moment, when the whole stream of speculative irreligion tends vigorously to denial of a Personal God. We trust that our arguments, as far as they have gone, will hold their own against all gainsayers; but the particular thinkers whom we have kept specially in mind, are those called "phenomenists."

It is the characteristic tenet of these persons (and hence their name) that the knowledge possessed by any human being is

confined to his apprehension of phenomena—whether physical or psychical—exclusively *as* phenomena; that any given intellectual avouchment is cognized by him as a phenomenon, and as nothing more; or (in other words) that no intellectual avouchment can give him any reliable information, except of its own existence and characteristics.* For various reasons, we selected Mr. Stuart Mill as the special representative of this school; and there is no doubt that, when we began our series, he held far the highest place among them in the world's judgment. His "Autobiography," in fact, and his "Essays on Religion," have had so damaging an effect on his reputation, that it is now difficult to realize how "facile princeps" of irreligious speculators he was accounted in 1871. But for our own part we still think that his former eminence was well deserved, as regards any intellectual comparison between himself and his brother phenomenists. His death (as we have more than once said) was to us a matter of severe controversial disappointment; because we were full of confidence that a signal triumph must have accrued to the cause of truth, had we succeeded in inducing him to put forth his utmost strength against us. At the same time, though we cannot now obtain that great advantage, we shall still take him as direct representative of the school which we are directly assailing; while we shall from time to time illustrate his position by citations from others who agree with him.

As we call Mr. Mill's school "phenomenists," we may with equal propriety call their opponents "intuitionists." An "intuition" (as we use the term) is simply "an intellectual avouchment, reliably declaring as immediately evident some truth, other than the mere existence and characteristics of such avouchment." A "phenomenist" then, precisely as such, denies that there are such mental facts as "intuitions"; and any one therefore who denies phenomenism, ipso facto upholds the existence of certain "intuitions."

Now it is most easy for an intuitionist to show by a stroke of the pen, that phenomenism cannot be accepted with full consistency. For (as we have repeatedly asked) what is an act of *memory*, except an intellectual avouchment? On phenomenist principles then, an act of memory gives me no reliable information, except of its own existence and characteristics; and consequently it gives me no ground whatever

* "The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions."—Mr. Stuart Mill's "Autobiography," p. 225. See also p. 273.

for knowing, nay even for reasonably guessing, what have been my past impressions and thoughts. I have very often that present *impression*, which I call an act of most clear and articulate memory; but (according to phenomenism) I cannot know—I cannot legitimately even guess—that this present impression corresponds to a past *fact*. It is some years since we first urged prominently this objection against phenomenism; and (as far as we know) no phenomenist whosoever, looking that objection in the face, has attempted to answer it. Mr. Mill certainly *noticed* our argument and *professed* to meet it: but (as we pointed out in July 1873, p. 14,) “the question to which he replied was not less than fundamentally different from the question which we had asked.”

But though an argumentum ad hominem against the phenomenists is so very easily effected, it seemed to us of vital importance that the conflict with phenomenism should be carried very much further than this. Even as regards the phenomenists themselves—no one can suppose that their power of doing mischief is neutralized by a demonstration of their inconsistency. The most reasonable thinker in the world—even while entirely seeing that their system as a whole is self-contradictory—might attach great weight to this or that individual objection alleged by them against Theism, and might desire its refutation. Moreover the present profoundly disorganized state of thought renders it (in our humble judgment) the one pressing philosophical need of our time, that that very course of argument be pursued, which controversy with phenomenists implies. They admit (it may be said) no first principle whatever. If then we are to defend Theism in controversy against *them*, we must take nothing whatever for granted; we must set forth link by link the whole chain of argument, by which (as we contend) our conclusion is conclusively established. But the careful performance of this task, as we just now said, is (to our mind) on other grounds also the one philosophical necessity of our time; and phenomenists therefore have unintentionally conferred a very important service on philosophy, by compelling their opponents to its execution. We wish we could ourselves more competently satisfy this pressing philosophical necessity; but at all events we may be of service in suggesting a track, which others hereafter shall more successfully pursue.

Now there is a distinction between that order of arrangement which such a purpose requires, and that order of arrangement which is commonly adopted by Catholic philosophers: and we wish our Catholic readers to bear in mind the nature of this distinction. We have on former occasions (see Jan.

1874, pp. 202, 3; Oct. 1874, pp. 447—452) dwelt on a vitally important doctrine, inculcated by Catholic philosophers. The Catholic holds, not only (of course) that reason is the gift of God, but also that every single adult is (except for his own grave sin) led by his reason, energizing at least implicitly, to the sure and certain knowledge of various truths, which are of vital importance to his well-being here and hereafter. So momentous is this doctrine, that (as we said in Oct. 1874, p. 452) we think the issue of the fundamental conflict between religion and unbelief will turn practically on the alternative, whether the said doctrine be accepted or rejected. We would refer our Catholic readers to our last-mentioned article, as setting forth both our precise meaning in this statement, and also our ground for making it.*

The purpose then, at which a Catholic philosopher commonly aims in his treatises, is not entirely the same with that which our own controversy with phenomenists obliges us to pursue. He desires to place before his reader a map and exhibition of the various verities, which reason suffices to establish; and the order in which he exhibits those verities, is that which he judges most appropriate for impressing them on the student's intelligence. As regards the most fundamental of their number, it is not his business to *convince* the learner of their truth, because the learner is known to be already convinced; but rather to give him the power of contemplating and exhibiting to himself that knowledge, which he already possesses. And although of course the teacher adduces arguments for each successive conclusion,—he is content to derive such arguments from those various other philosophical doctrines, which he knows to be common ground between the student and himself.

* Dr. Mivart, in his admirable "Lessons from Nature," has the following remark (p. 5):—"When any man has become a victim to doubt, he has no rational choice, as he has no duty, but to reason out his doubts to the end: to seek to escape them by diverting his attention, or to obscure them by calling up a cloud of emotion, is not only useless but blameworthy." We are quite sure the excellent author does not intend to say, what his words nevertheless may be misunderstood to mean. Suppose a person of ordinary or less than ordinary intellectual education has permitted himself to be carried away for a period by the stream of antitheism, and has become a "victim to doubt" or to worse than doubt. What means has God given him of recovery? We have indicated what seems to us the true reply, in the article mentioned in the text. But it is surely an undeniable fact of human nature, that none except a very small minority are intellectually competent to philosophical inquiries. With the great mass of men it would be the most grotesque child's play, if they gravely professed to explore and mutually balance the arguments adducible for and against God's Existence, with a view to discovering for themselves the truth by argumentative investigation.

Now, though this method is probably more suitable than any other to the end at which he aims, our readers will at once see that, unless great care be taken, it may here and there involve an argumentative "*petitio principii*." It may possibly happen, that when doctrine A is in question, doctrine B shall be alleged as a proof thereof; and that when (a volume later perhaps) doctrine B comes to be considered, doctrine A in turn shall occupy the place of premiss. But in controversial philosophy—as distinct from the philosophy set forth by a Catholic addressing Catholics—a "*petitio principii*" is the one most fatal of flaws. And the philosophical series in which we are engaged is precisely controversial; for it is intended as offering humble suggestions to Catholics, as to the arguments available against the desolating scepticism now so widely prevalent. *Here* it is comparatively of minor importance, whether the truths on which we insist be arranged in the order best suited for their full apprehension; while on the other hand it is the most urgent of necessities, that every step be thoroughly made good before proceeding to another.

Of the successive steps which are thus to be made good, the first, on which all else depends, consists in refuting the characteristic tenet of phenomenism. As we have so often pointed out, if this tenet were true—if it were true that no intellectual avouchment reliably declares as immediately evident aught except its own existence—it would follow that no man has the power of knowing, nay or of even reasonably guessing, what has been any one of his past experiences; he has no power of knowing, or even reasonably guessing, any fact in the present or the past, excepting the phenomena of his momentarily present consciousness. We began our series then (July 1871) by laying down—in opposition to this desolating scepticism—what we regard as the true "*rule and motive of certitude*." We maintained that whatever a man's existent cognitive faculties, if rightly interrogated and interpreted, avouch as certain, is thereby known to him as certain. This proposition we call "*the principle of certitude*"; and it is the *first* principle of all possible knowledge.

Here, however, it may be useful to subjoin an explanation. The principle of certitude is not a "*logical*," but what may be called an "*implicit and concomitant*," first principle. Take the case which we have often supposed. I am at this moment comfortably warm, but have the clearest memory that a very few minutes ago I was out in the cold. My absolutely certain knowledge that a very short time ago I experienced the sensation of cold,—this knowledge is not an inference from

premisses. No syllogism e. g. of the following type has passed through my mind. "Whatever my cognitive faculties declare as certain, is really certain: but they declare as certain that I was recently cold; therefore, &c." Such a syllogism, we say, does not in the least represent the ground of my conviction. On the contrary, I am far more immediately certain of the particular proposition that I was recently cold, than of the general proposition that whatever my cognitive faculties avouch as certain is really so. The present act of memory is immediately known by me, with keenest certitude, to correspond with a fact truly past; and I infer the general principle of certitude, by means of reflecting on this and a thousand similar data. We make in passing this obvious remark, because we think it tends to harmonize mutually certain dicta of different Catholic philosophers, which on the surface present an appearance of discrepancy.

This principle of certitude then is the most fundamental of those truths, which it is requisite to make good against phenomenists. But there is a second, almost equally fundamental. Theists regard Theism as a *necessary* verity; and we have therefore to maintain, as the final conclusion of our argument, that God necessarily exists. But if the idea "necessary" be contained in the conclusion, it is indispensable for the validity of the reasoning, that the same idea be contained in one or more of the premisses. Nor indeed is it sufficient, that one or more of the premisses be a *necessary* truth: it is further requisite, that one or more of the premisses be a *necessary ampliative* truth. By an "ampliative" proposition—as we have often explained—we mean one which expresses, what is neither explicitly nor implicitly expressed in the subject. Any merely "explicative" proposition—as soon as the sense of the terms is fully understood—at once assumes the shape "A is A." Now, though the proposition "A is A" be indubitably a necessary truth, no combination of such propositions as "A is A," "B is B," "C is C"—though they went through all the letters of a thousand alphabets—could issue argumentatively in any conclusion beyond themselves. See our number for July 1873, p. 31. In order therefore to establish the conclusion that "God necessarily exists," one or more of our premisses must be a necessary ampliative proposition. Here therefore we are again brought into conflict with a fundamental tenet of the phenomenists; for they deny that any ampliative proposition whatever is cognizable as necessary.*

* It is not easy to find out, whether they admit the proposition "A is A"

The second then of our two fundamental propositions is, that the human mind has a power on occasion of certainly and immediately cognizing necessary, ampliative truths as such. Phenomenists deny this proposition, and intuitionists maintain it. On no field can this battle be so decisively fought out, as on the field of *mathematical* axioms. There are several reasons why we think this; and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen has incidentally mentioned a strong one. "The words which relate to time, space, and number," he says, "are perfectly simple and adequate to what they describe; whereas the words which relate to common objects are nearly in every case complex, often to the highest degree." On the other hand, there is no part of his case which Mr. Mill more carefully elaborated, than that which concerns mathematical axioms. He accounted "the chief strength" of the intuitionist philosophy "in morals, politics, and religion," to lie in "its appeal to the evidence of mathematics." To expel it thence, he adds, "is to drive it from its stronghold" ("Autobiography" p. 226); and he put forth accordingly his very utmost strength, for the accomplishment of this task. This was one special reason, which led us to encounter him hand to hand on this particular ground. Mr. Mill, feeling the vital importance of the issue, replied promptly to our arguments; and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen at a later period assailed us from a somewhat different point of view. On our side we thought it indispensable to reply; so that (as it happened) this particular constituent of our argument was swelled to a somewhat disproportionate size.

We here then assume ourselves to have been successful in showing, that the human mind has a power of cognizing immediately certain necessary ampliative truths as such. Now further no one will doubt, that if any such truths *be* cognizable, the validity of the syllogistic process is among their number. In proposing then to establish Theism argumentatively against phenomenists, what we propose is this. We are first to lay down certain ampliative truths, which we shall maintain to be immediately cognizable as necessary; drawing out such an appeal to the phenomena of man's intellectual nature, as shall show

to be necessary: we doubt indeed whether they have looked the question in the face.

We may be allowed here to repeat a suggestion, which we have made in former articles. It seems to us, that what have been called "the fundamental laws of thought" are in fact but different exhibitions of the principle of identity. Thus the principle of contradiction; "anything which is not-B is not-B": the principle of excluded middle; "anything which is not B is not-B." Neither of these propositions seems to go beyond "A is A."

us to be well warranted in so maintaining. Then, combining these truths with the facts of experience, we are to infer, as legitimately resulting from this assemblage of self-evident truths and experienced facts, that God certainly exists.

As we apprehend our position, the chief premisses needed for our argument are divisible into three classes: we need (1) certain truths in regard to morality; (2) certain truths in regard to causation; and (3) certain truths in regard to human free-will. Immediately after our article on necessary truths, —and before Mr. Mill had replied to that article—we entered (January 1872) on the first of these classes; and we proved (we trust) so much as this, viz. that certain moral verities are cognizable as necessary. There are further doctrines concerning morality, which it will be important to point out and elucidate; but before approaching these, it was desirable to consider free-will. The establishment of this truth against phenomenists required the establishment of two conclusions, one psychological and the other metaphysical. Phenomenists allege as a matter of experience (to use Mr. Mill's words) that "volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity and the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical cause." This is the tenet of determinism.* We argued against it in April 1874; and supplemented our reasoning by some further remarks in our following number. We called our own adverse position by the name "indeterminism"; being the purely negative position, that volitions are *not* certainly determined by psychical antecedents. But free-will includes another doctrine, besides that of indeterminism; it includes the doctrine, that man is a self-determining cause of volition. And this proposition of course cannot be treated, until we have considered the question of causation. The principle of causation then is to occupy us in our present article.

Now at starting we must refer to one among the most signal proofs Mr. Mill has ever given, of his deficiency in philosophical discernment. The sense in which he uses the word "cause" is as simply different from that in which intuitionists use it, as is the word "box," when signifying a "shooting-box" or an "opera-box."† We do not say that

* All phenomenists are determinists; but the converse by no means holds, that all determinists are phenomenists.

† We do not at all forget that every one, in writing on political or social subjects, uses the word "cause" in Mr. Mill's sense: as e.g. when it is asked "what were the causes of the French Revolution?" or "what are the causes of high wages?" But in philosophical discussions the case is quite otherwise.

he is entirely unaware of this fact; but we do say that he constantly fails to bear it in mind, on occasions when, for want of his doing so, his whole argument becomes simply unmeaning.* This obstacle then against a mutual understanding must at once be removed; and our first undertaking shall be therefore to make as clear as we can, what Mr. Mill means by a "cause." With him, the idea of "cause" is essentially based on that doctrine, which is called "the uniformity of nature"; and if nature—that is, visible and phenomenal nature physical or psychical—did not proceed uniformly, there would be no such thing as a "cause" at all. This is so undeniably his terminology, that the very same truth, which is sometimes called by him "the uniformity of nature," is elsewhere called by him "the law of universal causation." We must begin then by considering (1) what phenomenists mean, when they affirm that nature proceeds uniformly; and (2) how far we can ourselves concur with the proposition which they thus intend to express.

The phenomenist doctrine, on the uniformity of nature, may easily be expressed with sufficient precision for our present purpose. "Between the phenomena which exist at any instant," says Mr. Mill ("Logic," i. 377), "and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession." His whole theory indeed of inductive logic (ii. 95) "depends on the assumption, that every event, or the beginning of every phenomenon, must have some antecedent, on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent." Similarly in a later work. "When we say that an ordinary physical fact always takes place according to some invariable law, we mean that it is connected by uniform sequence or co-existence with some definite set of physical antecedents; that whenever that set is exactly reproduced, the same phenomenon will take place, unless counteracted by the similar laws of some other physical antecedent; and that whenever it does take place, it would always be found that its special set of antecedents (or one of its sets, if it has more than one), has pre-existed." ("Essays on Religion," p. 224.) In other words, according to Mr. Mill, no phenomenon ever shows itself—be it physical or psychical—without a corresponding phenomenal antecedent; and the same phenomenal antecedent is invariably followed by the same phenomenal consequent. This intensely complex fact—the uniformity of nature—consists (he would add) of certain

* See, as a signal instance of this, the whole argument in his "Essays on Religion," from p. 142 to p. 145.

less complex groups of facts, called "the laws of nature." It is a "law of nature" e. g. that if wheat seed be duly sown, and there be no adverse phenomena, wheat plant will in due time grow up: and so in a million of other cases, physical or psychical. He would hold that this existent uniformity of nature may imaginably be brought to a close in two different ways. On one hand, the existent laws of nature might be changed for different laws: as e. g. it might become a law of nature that, if wheat seed is sown, the *barley* plant shall duly follow. On the other hand the existent laws of nature might come to an end, without being succeeded by any others whatever; so that, in his own words, "a chaos should succeed, in the which there was no fixed succession of events, and the past gave no assurance of the future."

We need hardly say, that we substantially accept this statement: but we do so, subject to two important exceptions. We regard it as generally true, but by no means as *universally* true, that visible and phenomenal nature proceeds uniformly. In the first place, we hold that this uniformity of nature is interrupted with indefinite frequency by miracles and other prodigies. In the second place we maintain, that one most important class of psychical phenomena—viz. human volitions—are largely external to the common law of uniformity.

We are now able to understand what Mr. Mill means by "cause." "We may define the 'cause' of a phenomenon," he says, "to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it invariably and unconditionally follows." ("Logic," i. 392.) And he implies in this statement what he has already stated in p. 376. "When I speak of the cause of a phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon. The causes with which I concern myself are not efficient but physical causes." It is his deliberate profession, that by the term "cause" he always intends to express a certain phenomenon, more or less complex; a phenomenon which, according to the existent laws of nature, is invariably and unconditionally followed by *another* phenomenon more or less complex, which he calls the *effect* of such cause.

As it is of some practical importance that our readers shall be sufficiently familiar with Mr. Mill's view of causation, we will enter on one or two further details, which are not strictly necessary to our subsequent argument. We will consider briefly then a criticism which has sometimes been made on his view; viz. that, according to that view, day is the "cause" of night, and night of day. For our own part, we think he has sufficiently disproved this allegation. These are his words:—

It is necessary to our using the word cause, that we should believe not only that the antecedent always *has* been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of things endures, it always *will* be so. And this would not be true of day and night. We do not believe that night will be followed by day under all imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so *provided* the sun rises above the horizon. If the sun ceased to rise, which, for aught we know, may be perfectly compatible with the general laws of matter, night would be, or might be, eternal. On the other hand, if the sun is above the horizon, his light not extinct, and no opaque body between us and him, we believe firmly that unless a change takes place in the properties of matter, this combination of antecedents will be followed by the consequent, day; that if the combination of antecedents could be indefinitely prolonged, it would be always day; and that if the same combination had always existed, it would always have been day, quite independently of night as a previous condition. Therefore is it that we do not call night the cause, nor even a condition, of day. The existence of the sun (or some such luminous body), and there being no opaque medium in a straight line between that body and the part of the earth where we are situated, are the sole conditions, and the union of these, without the addition of any superfluous circumstance, constitutes the cause.—("Logic," i. 391.)

The considerations here set forth by Mr. Mill bear on another question, on which (as it seems to us) he has not quite done justice to his own theory. He says (i. 380) that there is no "scientific ground for the distinction between the *cause* of a phenomenon and its *conditions*." This certainly holds good (on his theory of causation) in regard to any such condition as intuitionists call a "condition sine qua non"; but we doubt whether it holds good in regard to conditions in general. No instance is more commonly given as illustrating the distinction between a "condition" and "cause," than the distinction between ploughing and sowing. Every intuitionist says as a matter of course, that there is a real relation of *causality* indeed, between due contact of seed with earth on one hand and the plant's growth on the other; but that the ploughing is a mere *condition*, and does not causally inflow into the effect. But it seems to us (though we by no means speak confidently and the matter is of no practical importance whatever), that on Mr. Mill's own theory also, the ploughing is not legitimately accounted part of the "cause." Let it be supposed that hitherto the joint presence of A, B, and C has been the invariable antecedent to M. It does not nevertheless therefore follow (on Mr. Mill's theory) that A is a partial cause of M, unless it be also true that, so long as the present laws of nature endure, the union of B and C will never be followed by M unless they are accompanied by A. Now it is included in the

existent laws of nature, that whenever the seed is duly deposited in the earth, the plant (except for accidental impediments) will in course of time grow up; and conversely also, that the plant will never grow up, *unless* seed has first been duly deposited in the earth. But there is no ground that we know of for accounting it inconsistent with the existent laws of nature, that some other method be discovered, entirely different from ploughing, whereby earth and seed shall be brought into due contact.

Our two last remarks have been made by us (as we said) with no other purpose, than that of more familiarizing the inquirer's mind with Mr. Mill's interpretation of the word "cause." And if our readers think that our attempted vindication of him has been unsuccessful—that he *is* obliged in consistency to account night the cause of day, and to deny all distinction between cause and condition,—they are perfectly welcome to think so: they will in no way, by so thinking, be placed out of harmony with our own general argument. We will now however without further episode pursue that argument. The sense then in which intuitionists use the word "cause" is so fundamentally different from Mr. Mill's, that it would be impossible to contend against phenomenists without inextricable confusion, unless we first close this inexhaustible inlet of misapprehension. Indeed we are confident—as we shall presently argue—that the phenomenistic tenet on causation could never have been persistently held by men even of average intelligence, had they not veiled from themselves the true nature of their tenet by their equivocal terminology. For this reason we entirely decline, in argument with Mr. Mill, to use the word "cause" in his sense; and we must at once therefore look about for some term, which shall sufficiently express his idea. On reflection we think it will be satisfactory, if we use the word "prevenant" to denote what he calls "cause"; "postvenant" to denote what he calls "effect"; "prevenance" to denote what he calls "causation." We think it not only no inconvenience but on the contrary a very great advantage, that these words, being invented by ourselves for the occasion, can have no other than a technical sense. It is becoming a more and more common complaint, that so much confusion of thought finds entrance into philosophical discussion, through words of ordinary use being employed to express important philosophical ideas: it is becoming more and more commonly felt, that no word can endure the rough handling of every-day colloquialism, without acquiring considerable ambiguity of sense. On our own side we must explain to our Catholic readers, that the "cause," with which our reasoning

concerns itself throughout, is what Catholic philosophical works call "the efficient cause."*

These verbal preliminaries having been laid down, we are now to maintain, that "the principle of causation" is self-evidently cognizable, as a necessary ampliative truth. The "principle of causation," or (as we shall sometimes call it) "the causation doctrine," is expressed in the statement, that "whatever has a commencement has a cause"; or (which is equivalent) that "every new existence or new mode of existence has a cause."† Our readers will of course ask for some explanation, as to the sense in which we on our side use this word "cause." We at once admit, that such explanation is most reasonably required at our hands; and this explanation indeed will occupy a prominent place in the course of our argument. But before entering on our argument at all, we wish to avow frankly that we base our conclusion, not on grounds of experience, but of intuition; that we shall appeal to experience, only as testifying the universality of a certain intuition. And if phenomenists promptly exclaim, as they are sure to do, that "intuition" means only "my private persuasion,"—and that my own private persuasion can be no evidence of objective

* Catholic philosophers indeed usually include "moral" cause under the head of "efficient." But this sense is here excluded. A moment's consideration will show, that when these philosophers enounce "the principle of causation," they do not at all include "moral" causation.

† Some Catholics may possibly doubt, whether we have laid a sufficiently broad foundation for the Theistic argument in our way of stating the principle of causation. Thus Dr. Mivart, whose authority on such a question is very great, supplements the principle of causation as expressed in the text by another, which he accounts "equally evident": viz. that "everything must be either absolute or caused"; that is, that every contingent thing is caused ("Lessons from Nature," p. 356). He adds this supplement, because of his holding, with S. Thomas, that reason cannot by itself disprove with certitude the eternity of matter. It will be desirable therefore that we briefly place before our Catholic readers the position on this subject, which we are ourselves prepared in due course to sustain.

Now Liberatore, who himself also holds S. Thomas's doctrine, admits nevertheless that some scholastics and "almost all modern philosophers" are against him ("Cosmologia," n. 30). Petavius (de Deo, l. iii. c. 6, n. 1) declares it to be the universal patristic doctrine, used constantly in controversy with the Arians, that the notion of an eternal creature is cognizable by reason as intrinsically repugnant. It may be worth while further to add, that Liberatore himself ("Logie," n. 230) defines an "effect" as "that which advances from the state of possibility to the state of existence"; or in other words, which has a commencement.

With sincere deference then to those eminent Catholics who on this matter follow S. Thomas, we cannot do so ourselves. Nay, we regard the thesis that "all contingent things have a commencement" as more obtrusively (if we may so speak) axiomatic, than the thesis that "all contingent things have a cause."

truth,*—our answer to this objection has been stated again and again. It is only through *intuition*, that either phenomenists or any one else can possess experience of *phenomena*. Those particular intuitions, which are called acts of *memory*, are literally the only basis they can allege, for any one experience which they cite. In truth each man's act of memory may be called his own "private persuasion" or "internal feeling," in a much more simple and literal sense than can those intuitions of causality to which we shall now appeal. For each man's memory of his past experience is strictly peculiar to himself; whereas the intuitions, which we shall here allege, are common (as we maintain) to all mankind.

Now as to what is the genuine positive sense of that word "cause" which is the centre of our argument,—this is a question which we are presently to consider, with as much accuracy and completeness as we can. But the first fact to which we would draw attention, should be noted anteriorly to this consideration. It is most evident on even a superficial examination of facts, that a certain idea of causation which is at all events fundamentally different from the idea of *prevenance*—and a belief in the widely-spread *existence* of causation as so apprehended—that this idea and belief (we say) prevail generally among mankind. Indeed we are able to call Mr. Mill himself into court, as a signal example of the thoroughly false intellectual position in which any one is placed, who attempts to identify causation with *prevenance*. His professed theory is of course most intelligible. In no case of causation, he says ("On Hamilton," p. 377), "have we evidence of anything more than what experience informs us of: and it informs us of nothing except immediate, invariable, and unconditional sequence." And the context shows, even if it could be otherwise doubtful, that by "sequence" he here means sequence of *phenomena*. Yet in his work on "Logic" the following remarks are to be found; remarks which, as coming from Mr. Mill, may be characterized as not less than astounding. He is speaking about the question of miracles; and we italicize a word or two:

In order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of the alleged miracle, the assertion is

* Certain persons, says Mr. Mill, "addict themselves with intolerant zeal to those forms of philosophy, in which intuition usurps the place of evidence, and internal feeling is made the test of objective truth."—"Essays on Religion," p. 72.

the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence but in consequence of a *counteracting cause*; namely, a direct interposition of *an act of the will* of some being who has power over nature. A miracle is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect: it is a new effect supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause (ii. 167, 8). }

In the eighth edition of his "Logic," when answering a criticism of ours, Mr. Mill introduced a similar remark into an earlier page:

I admit *no other uniformity in the laws of nature*, than the law of causation; and a miracle is *no exception to that law*. In every case of alleged miracle a new antecedent is affirmed to exist, a counteracting cause: viz., *the volition of a supernatural being* (p. 110).

But his professed theory is, that "between the *phenomena* which exist at any instant and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant there is an invariable order of succession." Mr. Mill cannot surely mean to call a volition of the Invisible God by the name of a *phenomenon*: and we must account then for this extraordinary logical collapse, by the impossibility which Mr. Mill himself experienced, of expelling from his mind that idea which so clamorously presents itself to all men—the idea of true causation.

And this collapse is the more significant, if we consider what absolute havoc it makes of those very philosophical principles, which he accounted more essential than any other. Mr. Mill did not admit the existence of any science except experimental; and no one felt more strongly than he, that the uniformity of nature is a doctrine absolutely indispensable to the very existence of experimental science, whether physical or psychological. Take any one of the million truths firmly established by such science: say e. g. the truth, that "all diamonds are combustible." How is it possible for me to acquire reasonable proof of this truth? I know by experience, that those diamonds are combustible on which I have made the experiment; and I know by the testimony of others, that those diamonds are combustible on which *they* have made the experiment. But I have not the shadow of ground for extending my proposition to *all* diamonds, unless I have sufficient proof that nature proceeds uniformly.* So keenly indeed did Mr. Mill feel the justice of this remark, that he elaborated with great care a proof of what he called "the law of universal causation," as being

* It may most fairly be asked, how belief in the *Catholic miracles* is consistent with belief in the certainty of physical science. We answered this question directly and expressly in April, 1867, pp. 291-294.

the one corner-stone of his whole philosophical edifice. Yet suddenly it appears, that he held no doctrine *at all* of "universal" phenomenal "causation." Suddenly it appears, that he held no doctrine on the uniformity of nature inconsistent with his supposing, that there may be as many deities on Olympus as Homer himself believed in, and that each one of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the course of nature every minute of every day. In every one such case, "the volition of a supernatural being" would count with him as "a new antecedent," as a "counteracting cause": so that every arbitrary and irregular phenomenon so brought about would be, in his view, "a case of the law of universal causation," "and not a *deviation* from it." If we could trust what he says in the two passages we have quoted,—he never intended to defend "the law of universal causation" in any such sense whatever, as to imply that nature proceeds uniformly; or in any such sense whatever, as would represent that law to be a sufficient foundation for experimental science. How, it may be asked, do we account for this amazing bewilderment of thought? We reply, that even in the case of Mr. Mill his intuitional element is too strong for him. "*Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret.*" The existence of a causality, entirely distinct from prevenience, is so clamorous a dictate of human intelligence, that even Mr. Mill cannot be always shutting his ears to it.*

And this lands us in a further comment. It is a favourite topic of the phenomenistic controversialist, that intuitionists are self-condemned, by the very fact of their admitting the *existence* of an opposite party. "How can you say," he asks,

* Mr. Mill speaks with very far greater reflection on this matter, in his posthumously published "*Essays on Religion*," pp. 224-6.

As to the passages cited in the text,—our main comment on them there expressed is simply undeniable. By admitting the possibility of a miracle, Mr. Mill really admits—in opposition to the one fundamental principle of his philosophy—that what he calls "the law of universal causation" is not proved; and yet he entirely fails to see that such is his virtual admission. For ourselves, we have no doubt at all that the true explanation of this amazing oversight is what we have given in the text; viz. that, in spite of his theoretical disclaimer, Mr. Mill could not practically rid himself of the idea of true causation. And accordingly he speaks of "some being who has *power over nature*": evidently meaning (we should say) what intuitionists would call "*causative*" power. At the same time we admit, that our own theory of what was in his mind is not rigorously demonstrable from his words. It is possible in the abstract (though we are confident no such refinement ever crossed his mind) that he may not have had in his mind the idea of true causation, when he wrote those passages; that he may have intended to describe divine volitions, not as "*causative of*" (in our sense), but only as "*invariably and unconditionally antecedent to*" what follows them.

"that the intuitions to which you appeal are universal, when the very next moment you say that they are *not* universal? when the very next moment you say, that a large and dangerous school of philosophy declares itself unconscious of their existence?" We reply in the first place, that Mr. Mill often confesses that those intellectual avouchments to which we appeal *are* universal; and only contends, that they cannot in reason be accepted as evidences of objective truth. But further—and it is to this we are here specially drawing attention—again and again, when he is not thinking of his theory, he *himself* accepts them as evidences of objective truth. Consider e. g. his dealing with the idea of "morally good." It is the very foundation of his moral system, that the term cannot reasonably be used, except as signifying "beneficial to mankind." And yet there is hardly any writer of the day who so abounds with appeals to "virtue," "moral elevation," and the like, which are pure and simple nonsense if you try the experiment of substituting for those terms what he maintains to be their equivalent. Of course we think this fact most honourable to his moral nature; but his moral nature is thus advantageously exhibited, to the sacrifice of his philosophical intelligence. The passages to which we refer are as simply inconsistent with the theory professed by him on *morals*, as those which we have been just now citing are inconsistent with the theory professed by him on *causation*.

In this spontaneous and unconscious admission of a causation entirely distinct from prevenience, Mr. Mill does but represent the rest of mankind. Not only all mankind have an *idea* of causation as distinct from prevenience,—but they have an irresistible and deep conviction, that causation *exists* over and above mere prevenience. Had they not this conviction, how would they regard the stream of phenomena? No such thing could be supposed by them to be in rerum naturâ, as "influx" or "dependence." The visible world would be to them a mere phantasmagoria or external picture. They would recognize no closer nexus between the wheat seed and the wheat plant—or between the sun and the sensation of warmth—or between human volitions and human bodily movements—than between the first letter of the alphabet and the second; or the boy who always stands first in class and the boy who always stands next him; or the moment of time which we call "eleven o'clock" and the moment of time which we call "five minutes past eleven."* But

* It might be said with much plausibility, that in Mr. Mill's vocabulary "eleven o'clock" ought to be called a *cause* of "five minutes after eleven :"

every person of ordinary intelligence, who is not thinking of a gratuitously assumed theory, would peremptorily repudiate such a view of things, as repugnant to his deep and sure conviction.

We have argued then, that mankind not only have an *idea* of causality, distinct from the idea of prevenience; but that they have a conviction that causality *exists* among phenomena, and not mere prevenience. Our second step will be to consider more precisely, what is this idea of causality. We consider on one hand, that the idea "cause" is a simple idea, not composed of any others; and on the other hand, that it is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy of anything experienced by the senses. In the course of our articles we have already mentioned two such simple and purely intellectual ideas; viz. "necessary" and "moral good": and to these we here add that of "cause." Now of course there is a certain difficulty in explaining an idea of this kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we could content ourselves with referring to such sensation. Were it composed of simpler ideas, we could explain it by reciting those simpler ideas. But neither of these methods being (by hypothesis) available,—we can only suggest the occasions on which an inquirer may unmistakably recognize, what is beyond doubt a very prominent part of his mental furniture. Now the instance, most commonly given by philosophers of a "cause," seems to us most happily chosen for our purpose; as being one in which that idea is exhibited with especial distinctness and prominence: we refer to the influx of a man's mental volitions into his bodily acts. I am urgently in need of some article, contained in a closet of which I cannot find the key, and accordingly I break open the closet with my fist. Certainly my idea of the relation which exists between my volition and my blow, is something indefinitely beyond that of mere prevenience. If on the one hand that idea is incapable of being analyzed, on the other hand it is to the full as incapable of being explained away or misapprehended. The idea is as characteristic and as clamorously distinguished from every other, as is that of "sweet," or "melodious," or "white." Phenomenists may deny that it corresponds with any objective reality: but they cannot deny that it is in fact conceived by the human mind, without exposing themselves to the intellectual contempt of every one, who possesses the most ordinary intelligence and introspective facility. The

for most certainly the later moment "invariably and unconditionally succeeds" the earlier. We suppose Mr. Mill would reply, that a moment of time is not a *phenomenon*. But such reply would put in still stronger light the amazing inconsistency of his calling *God's agency* a "cause."

words "force," "power," "influx," "agency,"—or, on the other hand, "dependence,"—may more or less suggest the idea "cause"; their respective significations being (as we hold) more or less founded on that idea. But at last the most efficacious way for each man to apprehend it, is to imagine some such instance as we have named.

It will perhaps be serviceable if we give a second illustration. I am bent on acquiring a knowledge of Euclid; and I apply my mind therefore vigorously, to mastering the demonstration given by him of some theorem. Consider the relation which exists, between my volition on one hand, and my intellectual process on the other. Here is an instance, differing widely in circumstances and detail from that just now given: and yet this identical notion of "cause" is no less unmistakably present to my mind when I consider this case, than it was when I considered the former.

And now we come lastly to the third and crowning step of our argument. The "principle of causation" or the "causation doctrine" is, that "whatever has a commencement has a cause." We maintain, that this proposition is cognized by the human mind, as self-evidently certain and necessary.

This psychological allegation can of course only be established by means of psychological trial. But on whom shall we make the trial? We will not exactly say "*fiat experimentum in animâ vili*": but at all events it will not be fair to make the experiment on a *philosopher*, be he intuitionist or phenomenist. If a landlord and farmer disagree, they will not choose for arbitrator some landlord or some farmer, but perhaps some lawyer. In like manner disputing psychologists will not be satisfied with the award of one who has already espoused his theory. And we indeed on our side (as has been seen) have especial reason for distrusting the verdict of phenomenists: because again and again, when expressly confronting some philosophical theory, they persuade themselves to disbelieve their own possession of this or that conviction; whereas, when they allow themselves free play, that very conviction proves its existence in their mind by the most undeniable energy. We will not then appeal to the arbitration of philosophers. But (as is clear) neither can we satisfactorily appeal to the verdict of rough and uneducated minds, which may be wholly incapable of introspection. It is manifest indeed (we maintain) to impartial observers, that a conviction of the causation doctrine energizes in them quite as powerfully and constantly as in their more cultivated neighbours: but we cannot expect them to *depose* to its existence. The fair arbitrator then will be some person, on the one hand of

sufficiently cultivated faculties, but on the other hand who has not given his attention to philosophical inquiries. To obtain from such a man his genuine avouchment, you may deal with him in some such way as the following.

You draw his attention to the fact, that here is some wheat on the ground ripe for the sickle. You place intelligibly before his mind the doctrine, that what caused the wheat to grow has been partly certain properties or forces of the seed, and partly certain properties or forces of the earth with which that seed has been brought into contact. He entirely assents. "I should never have dreamed," he says, "of any other notion." You point out to him however the possibility, that God or some supernatural being has miraculously there placed the wheat, without any seed having been previously sown. "Well," he replies, "it stands to reason that if there be a God, He *can* do this: but I need very strong proof indeed before I accept the supposition of a miracle." Lastly you suggest to him, that perhaps neither was seed sown, nor did any preternatural being interfere; but that the wheat came there without any agency at all. As soon as he understands what you mean—which probably he does not find very easy—he is angry at his common sense being insulted by so self-evidently absurd a supposition. You rejoin, that he believes *God* to exist without any cause; and you ask him why therefore he cannot believe, that *wheat* may exist without any cause. The obvious unfairness (as he will account it) of such a suggestion increases his wrath. In his own unscientific language he gives you to understand, that God never *began* to exist; nay that Existence is involved in his very Essence. "The monstrous allegation," he will add, "against which I am exclaiming consists in your statement, that a thing can *begin* to exist—can come from nothingness into being—except through the agency of some cause or other." If you then proceed to cross-question him on this word "cause"—if you suggest that he means by it no more than "*prevenant*"—his wrath is still greater than before; so completely have you denaturalized his meaning. And he will account it just as self-evidently absurd to say that any thing can commence without a cause, as it would be to say that a trilateral figure can be quadrangular, or that two straight lines proceeding in the same mutual direction can finally intersect.

We have imagined this little scene, for the purpose of exhibiting those phenomena of human nature which (as we maintain) make it so absolutely certain, that men instinctively regard the principle of causation as a self-evidently necessary

truth. We need not spend many words in repeating what we have so often urged before; viz. that if this psychological fact be admitted, the corresponding ontological truth rests on an absolutely impregnable basis. If the principle of causation be *avouched by the human mind* as a necessary truth, it *is* a necessary truth. I should be thought not less than insane, if I doubted the veraciousness of my memory as to what I experienced two minutes ago: but I have in some sense even stronger reason for accepting, what—not my own private intuition alone—but the intuition of all mankind avouches as certain.

We may take this opportunity however, for considering a particular instance of objection often adduced by phenomenists: an objection, to which we have virtually replied indeed again and again, but which we have not on earlier occasions expressly encountered. "Is there any one of your so-called intuitions," asks the phenomenist, "which the human mind more spontaneously and irresistibly avouches, than for many centuries it avouched as self-evident that the sun moves round the earth? Yet you admit that this latter avouchment was a pure delusion; and why therefore may not its avouchment of the causation doctrine—granting for argument's sake that that avouchment exists—be equally delusive?"

We begin our reply by a remark, which is no part indeed of our argument, but which is required for the purpose of clearness. Take any time and place, in which men never dreamed of Copernicanism. In that time and place, their acceptance of geocentricism has nevertheless not been an *immediate* judgment; it has been one of those numerous instances, in which an inference is made so rapidly, inevitably, and imperceptibly, as to be easily *mistaken* for an immediate judgment. The syllogism, of which the geocentric judgment is the conclusion, may be thus stated: "That which is incompatible with undoubted phenomena is false: but any theory other than geocentricism is thus incompatible, and is therefore false." It may be worth while also to add, that the major premiss of this syllogism is undeniable. On the other hand my assent to the causation doctrine is not the mere conclusion of a syllogism, but is an immediate judgment. For the only syllogism, which could possibly issue in that doctrine as in its conclusion, would be reducible to the following form: "Every X must have a cause: but whatever has a commencement is an X; ergo, &c.": where X must represent some class, larger than that of "things which have a commencement." But most certainly no syllogism of this type

passes through my mind, as my motive of assent to the principle of causation.*

We proceed then to answer the objection before us. And, reverting to the geocentric syllogism as just now drawn out, we answer the objection by simply denying that men ever gave an absolute assent, either to the minor premiss or to the conclusion of that syllogism. We shall be better able to explain what we here mean, if we cite with a few verbal changes a course of remark contained in a former article.

"Phenomenists are very fond of adducing this or that instance, in which they allege that our faculties declare as certain what is not really so. I see a straight stick in the water, and my faculties (they urge) pronounce as certain that the stick is crooked; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed fingers, my faculties pronounce as certain that my hand is touched by *two* substances. All these superficial difficulties are readily solved, by resorting to a philosophical consideration, which is familiar to Catholics, though (strangely enough) we do not remember to have seen it in non-Catholic works. We refer to the distinction, between what may be called 'undoubting' and what may be called 'absolute' assent.

"By 'absolute' assent we understand an assent so firm, as to be *incompatible* with the co-existence of doubt: but by 'undoubting' assent we mean no more, than that with which *in fact* doubt does not co-exist. Now the mere undoubtingness of an assent does not at all imply any particular *firmness*; but arises from mere accident. For instance. A friend, coming down to me in the country, tells me that he has caught a sight of the telegrams as he passed through London, and that the Versailles government has possession of Paris.† I had long expected this, and I assent to the fact without any admixture of doubt. In an hour or two however the morning paper comes in; and I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, for that the army has only arrived *close up* to Paris. The extreme facility, with which I dismiss my former 'undoubting' assent, shows how very far it was from being 'absolute.' Its true analysis in fact was no more than this: 'there is an *a priori* presumption that Paris is taken.' But as no particular motive for doubt happened to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect on the true character of the assent which I yielded.

"Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly true, unless they yield to that proposition 'absolute' assent. But a moment's consideration will show, that my assent to the crookedness of the stick or the duplicity of the cherry—may accidentally indeed have been undoubting—but was extremely far from

* The only possible "class X" would be "contingent things." But even Dr. Mivart does not say—nor could any one say on reflection—that the proposition "all contingent things are caused" is *more* immediately evident to the human mind, than the proposition "all commencing things are caused."

† This was of course written in 1871.

being absolute. Its true analysis was : 'there is an *à priori* presumption, that the stick is crooked or that there are two objects touched by my fingers.' The matter may be brought to a crucial experiment, by some such supposition as the following :

"I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of thought ; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in whose moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect confidence. I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel two touching objects ; but he explains to me the physical laws which explain my delusion, and I surrender it with the most perfect facility. He proceeds however—let us suppose, for the purpose of probing the depth of my convictions—to tell me, that I have no reason whatever for knowing that I ever experienced a certain sensation, which my memory most distinctly declares me to have experienced a very short time ago : or again, that as to the particular trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have no reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he believes it to have five angles. Well—first of all I take for granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I find that I have rightly understood him, either I suspect him (as the truth indeed is) to be simulating ; or else I pluck up courage and rebel against his teaching ; or else (if I am too great an intellectual coward for this) I am reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high road to idiocy. There is one thing at all events which I cannot do. I cannot compel myself to doubt that, which my existent faculties testify as certain. So great is the distinction between merely 'undoubting' and 'absolute' assent ; between my faculties testifying that there is an *à priori* presumption for some proposition, and their testifying that it is *certainly true*."

The contrast, contained in this latter paragraph, can be applied with its full force to our present theme. I have never heard of Copernicanism, and hold with "undoubting" assent the geocentric theory. But a venerable friend and mentor explains to me, that heliocentrism is in no respect incompatible with phenomena ; and indeed that, on the heliocentric supposition, the familiar phenomena of daily life would be precisely the same as on the geocentric. So soon as I understand this, I have not so much as the faintest difficulty in surrendering my geocentrism. My belief in that theory may have accidentally been "undoubting," but it was extremely removed from being "absolute." Now the very contrary of this holds as to the principle of causation. If I were called on to believe that something came into existence without a cause, and if accordingly I made an effort to do so,—I should be "reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high road to idiocy." I could not possibly compel myself to believe it, precisely because my existent faculties declare it to be self-evidently false.

So much on this particular objection. As regards our

general argument, it may be worth while briefly to note one thing further, which is evident as soon as stated. The idea of causation in no way whatever depends—whereas the idea of prevenience entirely depends—on the uniformity of nature. To take our old instance, let us suppose that the wheat plant had no prevenient whatever; that the very same phenomena, which in one time or place precede its appearance, when found in combination at another time and place usher in some *completely different* phenomenon from that of the wheat plant. Such a circumstance would not give me the slightest difficulty in understanding what is meant by a cause, nor would it in the slightest degree affect my certain knowledge that the wheat plant *has* a cause. If secondary causes lost all power of acting—as God (in the Catholic's belief) is indubitably free to deprive them of that power—such cessation of their power would not ever so remotely tend to weaken that argument for God's Existence, which is derived from the principle of causation.

On looking through Mr. Mill's chapter on causation in his reply to Hamilton (pp. 359–379), we find but one small portion of it which (as far as we can see) requires any further notice, than is contained in the preceding pages. Both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill himself (p. 371) repudiate the theory of “Wolfe and the Leibnitzians,” that to deny the principle of causation would be to violate the principle of *contradiction*. We do not know whether we have made it sufficiently clear, that we are ourselves at one both with Hamilton and his critic, in heartily repudiating that theory; though we have been told by a learned friend who seems to know, that “Wolfe and the Leibnitzians” are as far from holding it as we are. Perhaps it will conduce to more precise apprehension of what we have throughout intended, if we notice expressly this possible philosophical position.

We regard then that proposition which expresses the causality doctrine, not as an “*explicative*,” but as an “*ampliative*” proposition. In fact, as we have already said, if it were only “*explicative*,” it could not possibly have any philosophical importance; whereas, in truth, there is hardly a more important principle throughout the whole range of philosophy. “Whatever has a commencement has a cause.” We are as far as Mr. Mill himself from alleging, that by any possible *analysis* of the idea “having a commencement,” we can find therein included the idea “having a cause.” What we do allege as regards the above-named proposition is, that (in F. Kleutgen's words) “by merely considering the idea of the subject and the predicate, I come to see that there exists

between them that relation which the proposition expresses."* I consider on one hand the idea of "having a commencement." I consider on the other hand the totally distinct idea of "having a cause." And by considering the two ideas, I come to see that there exists between them that relation, which is expressed in the principle of causation. My power of cognizing the principle of causation—just as my power of cognizing other self-evident truths—arises from that most precious property of the human mind, whereby it is enabled to cognize with certainty as self-evident a large number of ampliative truths. It is precisely in virtue of possessing this property, that the human mind is capable of knowledge properly so called.

But now to deny the truth of an ampliative proposition—however obtrusively self-evident such proposition may be—is not in itself to violate the principle of contradiction. If I say e. g. that some trilateral figure is quadrangular,—I say what is self-evidently absurd, and I say what leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction, but not what is itself self-contradictory. We need not however add more on this head; because we treated it sufficiently last July, in answer to an opponent. See particularly pp. 57, 8.

Here we bring to a close our treatment of causation. We need hardly say, that there are many questions concerning it on which we have not touched. In particular we may mention Mr. Martineau's theory—a theory hardly differing from what is called "occasionalism"—that no substance can be a cause (even a secondary one) unless it possess intelligence. We feel great respect and gratitude to Mr. Martineau, for his very valuable labours in the cause of true philosophy; but on this particular tenet we are obliged to dissent from him with much confidence. At the same time we shall not enter into controversy on the subject; because our purpose only requires us to deal with those truths, which are necessary for the argumentative establishment of Theism.

In the next article of our series we hope to conclude what we have to say on freewill. Since we last wrote on that theme, Dr. Bain has brought out the third edition of his volume on "The Emotions and the Will," in which he has inserted (pp. 498—500) a few pages of reply to our former

* F. Kleutgen says that it is such a proposition as this, which Catholic philosophers intend to denote by the term "analytical." On the other hand non-Catholic philosophers, whether intuitionist or phenomenist, use the word "analytical" as synonymous with what we call "explicative." We have before said, that for this reason we think it better to avoid the term "analytical" altogether.

article. Our first business then will be to recapitulate the arguments which we adduced against determinism, with special reference to Dr. Bain's objections. Secondly we hope—by help of the causation doctrine—to establish as certain, that every human adult is to himself a self-determining cause of volition. Lastly we have to answer two particular objections—one of them extremely momentous—which we named in April, 1874 (pp. 360, 1), and left unsolved for want of space. We are in great hope that we shall now be able to continue the course much less intermittently than has hitherto been the case; and that our articles will succeed each other at least not less rapidly, than in alternate numbers of our REVIEW.

ART. IV.—THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Les Etats-Unis Contemporains. Par CLAUDIO JANNET.
Paris: E. Plon & Cie. 1876.

THE calamities of nations have always been more instructive to those who witness than to those who endure them. This singular fact, which admits in every case of the same explanation, is almost as old as our race. Examples occur as soon as nations were formed. The great empires of antiquity, drunk with furious impiety and enervated by shameless sensuality, collapsed one after another in sudden ruin, and nobody learned anything from their downfall. They knew not who smote them. They did not so much as care to inquire. Perhaps they thought it idle to speculate after the event, or did not think about the matter at all. The hand of God was invisible to men to whom, as Menander impiously said and even Plato sorrowfully thought, God was unknowable. Yet in every case the judgment which fell on them had not only been announced by prophetic lips, but recorded in imperishable words. "I will make Rabbath a stable for camels, and the children of Ammon a couching-place for flocks." "I will execute judgments in Moab." "Behold, I come against thee, O Tyre, I will bring thee to nothing." "The sword shall come upon Egypt, and there shall be dread in Ethiopia." "I have cast the Assyrian out according to his wickedness." "He shall stir up all against the kingdom of Greece." "The Romans shall come upon him."† The ministers of vengeance

* Ezekiel xxv.—xxxii.

† Daniel xi.

came in their appointed hour, but no one knew who sent them. Night comes after the day, but only because the day is ended. The most cunning soothsayer can make no mystery out of that. It is all in the order of nature. Why inquire further? Darius saw no sign of a Divine judgment in the resistless might of Alexander, and Porus still less. Both found a complete explanation of their own prodigious misadventures in the solidity of the Macedonian phalanx. Why should they seek for it elsewhere? Why suspect a supernatural cause of events for which a natural one seemed to them so manifestly adequate? Baltassar would have been astonished to hear that Cyrus was the "servant" of the Most High, though there was one in his court who could have told him so, and did vainly warn him of his coming fate. When Greece fell, in spite of her temples, her poets, and her heroes, the human majesty of imperial Rome was perhaps enlarged, but nothing else. Neither Greek nor Roman gave a thought to the tremendous majesty of God. When Rome, the conqueror of all, fell in her turn, it was only because the Danube was too weak a barrier to stay the rush of hordes from without, and a degenerate soldiery too impotent to provide a defence from within. If more than one of the triumphant barbarians who trampled her under foot called himself "the scourge of God," perhaps he did not know what he was saying.

What was true of the Pagan nations, who knew not God, was true also—alas! that it should be said—of His own people. Persians, Assyrians, and Egyptians understood His judgments as well as they did, and interpreted them as wisely. The Chaldean king, whose profane banquet was adorned with "the golden and silver vessels brought away out of the temple that was in Jerusalem," and who the same night expiated his sacrilege by death, was not more heedless of his approaching doom than the elect people to whom the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had been, for long ages, a tender Father and a gracious King. He had smitten them for their good, less in anger than in love, and they knew not that His judgments in the past were only a rehearsal of that final catastrophe which was reserved for the future. If the captive children of Israel refused to sing the songs of Zion "in a strange land," they did not sing them to much purpose when they were restored to their own. As soon as their sufferings were over they forgot them. When at last their King came, not to lead them to an unprofitable victory over Rome or Egypt, but as the "Prince of Peace," of whom Moses, David, and Isaias were the heralds, surpassing all imaginable guilt

they cried: "His blood be upon us and upon our children." The malediction which they invoked has overwhelmed them. Yet the people of Tyre and Sidon were not more unconscious in the day of wrath by whose sentence they were crushed than they who had once been the people of God. Centuries of union with Him had taught them nothing. If their unexampled fate is a proverb in all the world, it is none to themselves. Are they scattered among all the nations, bearing the brand of Cain on their brow, without a home, without a head, of all nationalities yet of none; it is probably an accident. Why should people point the finger at them in all lands, and say, "Behold the judgment of God"? Not so do they read their own doom. Why should they? Are they not prosperous, according to their own measure of prosperity? Do they not lend money to Christians? Do they not even, in most of the capitals of Europe, supply instruction to them, by means of the foul literature of newspapers, most of which treat the Christian Church and religion as if they were inspired by Jews, and had nothing so much at heart as to justify Herod, absolve Pilate, and build a monument to Caiaphas? What sign is there here of the curse of God? The Jews see none. To hold their own, and exert at the same time no fugitive or ephemeral influence over the fortune of others, contents their ambition. They could do no more if they still ruled in Zion, and controlled the stock-market from the city of David. If in the judgment of Christians they lie under the anathema of God, in their own nothing seems more unlikely.

No doubt this is the most astonishing example of insensibility to a Divine judgment which the world has ever seen, or ever will see; but if it can never be reproduced in all its features, there are not wanting contemporary instances in which some of them may be easily recognized. Men can never repeat the unapproachable crime of the Jews, but they can imitate it. If it is impossible to represent a second time the awful scene of Calvary, it is quite possible, an Apostle tells us, "to crucify the Son of God afresh." Multitudes do it every day. It is done many times, between the rising and the setting of the sun, in all lands. Even in this nineteenth century, in which revolt is permanent and lawlessness a virtue, no man can rival the Jew; but there are many who would if they could. They do what they can, and they are as stupidly indifferent as he is to the calamities which chastise their guilt. There is not at this hour a nation, either of the Old or New World, in which God is not ignored or defied by at least a fraction of its population. The Mede and the Babylonian were not more unconscious of His presence, nor more in-

different to His love, than thousands who live under our own eyes, as if there were no God, in Germany, France, and Italy. In some countries it is not only a fraction, but a majority, of whom this is true. In England, we have been lately informed by an Anglican newspaper, as if the fact were beyond dispute, "the rapid descent of the great mass of the people to a state of practical irreligiousness not greatly differing from open Atheism" proves that "the danger of a *national apostasy* is even now imminent."* Yet the paganized English, like the Moabites, the Tyrians, and the Jews, are as unconscious of their own deplorable state as this Anglican writer is of its true cause. That cause, as we hope to show in what follows, is everywhere the same. It is not to be found in peculiarities of national temper, for it is identical in all nations; nor in defective political or social institutions, for it is independent of them all; nor even in eccentric or ill-adjusted forms of government, for its action is equally visible in monarchical and democratic communities, in an empire, an oligarchy, or a republic. The miseries which afflict human society, now as in all former ages, have the same root in all lands. They spring from revolt against God, and contempt for the authority by which, in the plenitude of His royal supremacy, He has decreed to rule the world, and to test to the end of time the obedience of His creatures. Whether He speaks by Prophet, Apostle, or Pontiff, man's only wisdom is to hear and obey. It is hard to fight against God. When the senseless king of Juda shut up Jeremias in prison, because he prophesied, "Thou shalt be delivered into the hands of the king of Babylon,"† he did not avert his own ruin, though, as the sacred narrative adds, "Jeremias remained in prison until the day that Jerusalem was taken." Modern kings have learned, and others will yet learn, the same lesson. If the first Napoleon, dazzled by his own transient glory, laid sacrilegious hands on Pius VII., his puny Piedmontese rival imagines in our day that God will not do for Pius IX. what He did for his predecessor. The spirit of revolt, whether in kings or people, shrouds the soul in a preternatural darkness; and the only thing in which the creature imitates the unchangeableness of the Creator is in renewing in every age the stupid and unprofitable impiety which in every age provokes the same sure and irresistible judgment. The world is sick, with a mortal sickness, not because the voice of the prophet is silent in its streets, nor its appointed teacher dumb, but because, in spite of all the

* "The Church Review," March 18.

† Jeremias xxxvii. 16.

unheeded lessons of the past, it lives in brutish forgetfulness of God, and voluntary alienation from His Church.

If we propose to illustrate this thesis chiefly by the example of the youngest of nations, we hasten to admit that the oldest would serve our purpose equally well. No doubt the "spirit of the age," with all its shams and delusions, works in the vast American continent like other disruptive forces, including waterspouts and hurricanes, on a colossal scale, and with the more impetuosity because there are no lingering traditions from past ages to create a counter current, and check the force of the storm; but the American people possess, by the favour of God, certain qualities and dispositions which encourage the hope that they may, by a happy exception, detect the danger, common to them and to us, which menaces their peace, as it has already destroyed that of older communities. Considering the part which, by the force of circumstances, they are evidently destined to bear in the later history of our race, the choice which they may ultimately make in their submission to God and His Church on the one hand, and their attitude towards the anarchic principles of "modern thought" on the other, will inevitably affect the issue of the strife between good and evil in other lands besides their own. We cherish the earnest hope that they may choose wisely, and comprehend, with a deeper sagacity than Assyrians, Jews, or apostate Christians, that there is no strength nor joy but in union with God, and with the Church which He created in the munificence of paternal love, not to lead men astray, but to keep them for ever from bondage to a lie, and assure to them the glorious liberty of soul and mind of which every substitute which the world or the devil can offer is only a spurious counterfeit. That is the question for them as for us. Their whole future depends, like ours, upon the answer which they give to it. God with us, or God against us, is the sole fact which determines the life or death of every community as of every individual. It has the same tremendous gravity on one side of the ocean as on the other. Is there any reason to believe that Americans will consider it with the wistful attention which it deserves? We think there is, for reasons which we shall find an opportunity of stating; but this at least is certain, that to contribute to that result, by counsel or admonition, is the truest service which love can offer them, and of more priceless and enduring efficacy than any of the delusive chimeras which Washington called, in his farewell address to the nation which he founded, "the impostures of pretended patriotism."*

* Washington's "Monuments of Patriotism," p. 288. Philadelphia, 1850.

It is pleasant to us to share the responsibility of what we are going to say, as the author of the French work named at the head of our essay does, with that eminent man, and to shelter it under his authority. However vague his dogmatic perceptions may have been, as indeed he frankly avowed, his recognition of the supreme authority of God as the Lord and Governor of human States is clear and emphatic. Washington did not scruple to tell the House of Representatives in 1796 that, in the government of their country, they were all "the instruments of Divine Providence";* which is not exactly the view which most of them take of their functions in the present day. He thought it a sacred duty to impress this truth on his contemporaries, and used the more frankness in reiterating it, because he knew the respectful attention with which his words would be received. "Of all the dispositions and habits," he told them, "which lead to political prosperity"—by which he seems to have meant national and material well-being,—“Religion and Morality are indispensable supports.”† If this upright and distinguished man did not so much as suspect that revealed dogma is the only substantial basis of either, as the experience of all nations, including his own, has too copiously demonstrated, that was a calamity which he shared with all the men of his age and sect. He may have been in advance of his generation in political sagacity, but as a moral and religious lawgiver he had no more light than others, because he had no authorized teacher, and never knew the need of one. He felt, with reason, as all his co-religionists feel at this day, that he was at least as capable of teaching his so-called Church as it was of teaching him. But he was far from tolerating in civil the chaos which he cheerfully approved in spiritual government. He wisely claimed the right to control the citizen, though he left the Christian to follow without restraint his own caprice. There was nothing in this inconsistency to give a shock to his mental tranquillity. He did not even notice it. It was quite enough, he thought, to have order in the things of man, without making any provision for it in the things of God. And because he took no account of the latter, he left only a precarious basis of the former. He did not know that the one will never exist long without the other. He did not consider that if men may rebel without sin against the Church, which is the work of God, much more may they rebel against the State, which is only the work of man. If he had lived in our day, the fatal logic of the so-called Reformer

* *Ibid.*, p. 251.

† P. 278.

mation, which quickly transferred to the social and political the lawlessness which it inaugurated in the religious sphere, might perhaps have suggested to him reflections which he never made. If he had seen revolution become a permanent factor in modern societies, it is just possible that civic and sectarian license would have seemed to him to spring from the same root, and to have a common principle of life. He might even have discovered, if such meditations had ever found a place in his mind, that both come from the impious denial of the authority of God, and of the Church to which, by His decree, it has been delegated. One-half of this truth he saw, but not the other. Schisms in the body politic were intolerable to him, and he loathed the suppression of order and liberty which flows from them; but he was more jealous about the unity of the commonwealth than that of the Kingdom of Christ, and more solicitous for the rights of the Republic than for those of God. "Let me warn you," he said, "in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party," which, he truly added, "*is itself a frightful despotism.*"* If he could have exorcised the same spirit in the ranks of fierce and self-willed sectaries, who long denied to others in his own country the false liberty of conscience which they claimed for themselves, the despotism of triumphant political factions would never have suppressed in that country the rights of minorities, nor substituted the coarse and imperious domination of an unscrupulous *party* for that respect for the common interests of the whole community, and especially of its weaker members, of which the Church of God has always furnished the only example.

A French preacher once announced in a city which had a large military population that he would deliver a course of sermons on Napoleon, and prove, by the facts of his life and death, that the great Captain had attested by his personal example all the truths of the Catholic religion. This venial artifice filled his church with the hearers whom he desired to attract, and who learned that Napoleon had received six out of the seven Sacraments, including Penance and Extreme Unction. Washington only received one, if indeed he received that, but he has left many a text which might be expounded with greater profit than some which are more popular in American pulpits. If he saw no harm in sects, because the unity which exists only in the Catholic Church, and which is the mark of all the works of God, seemed to his erring human judgment equally superfluous and unattainable, he at all

* *Ubi supra*, p. 274.

events insisted that they had no right to insult the Church against which they had chosen to revolt. He happened to be in Boston, when a rumour reached him of an intended Puritan and No-popery celebration of the 5th of November. He resolved that at least no man under his command should lend any countenance to it, and announced that resolve in the following "order of the day" addressed to the American army. "As the Commander-in-chief has been apprised of a design formed for the observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there should be officers and soldiers in this army *so void of common sense* as not to see the impropriety of such a step." And the special reason which he gave for this emphatic prohibition deserves particular notice in a day when, as in England, a reckless and impudent press, which aims only at reflecting all which is least manly or truthful in popular prejudice, habitually outrages the most sacred convictions of other nations, even those with which it is most essential to preserve relations of amity and mutual confidence. The American army, allied with French and Canadian Catholics, was in constant intercourse with both, and "to be insulting their religion,"* Washington added in the same remarkable document, "*is so monstrous* as not to be suffered or excused." Three quarters of a century later, General Scott, another American commander-in-chief, leading his army into Catholic Mexico, warned his troops, in equally explicit terms, to respect the religious convictions of the people whose capital they were about to enter. It is this habitual manifestation of good feeling and common sense, contrasted with the mean and fretful bigotry of the average Englishman, which fortifies our hope that thoughtful Americans may yet unlearn the delusions of their age, and range themselves in a not remote future on the side of God and His Church.

However indulgent Washington may have been to the divisions in the religious which he deprecated so strenuously in the civil order, if he could have obtained a glimpse in some magic mirror of the unutterable confusion which they were finally to create in the country which he loved so well, it is possible that endless varieties of creed might have seemed to him as little worthy of praise as conflicting theories of government. He might even have understood that social stability is not sensibly promoted by spiritual chaos, and that the spirit of revolt acts with the same energy and with equal inde-

* "Words of Washington," selected by James Parton, p. 49. Boston 1872.

pendence in both spheres. Men who will obey no authority in questions of the soul will submit to that which governs the body only as long as they are *compelled* to do so. Teach them to-day that they are at liberty to reject the one, and they will discover to-morrow that they are free to conspire against the other. Are they not everywhere acting on that conviction? It is evident to the most blunted apprehension, that if it is innocent to violate a Divine law, *à fortiori* it cannot be criminal to despise a human one. The Communistic theory, with all its devilish applications, is only *the doctrine of the Reformers* applied to social and political questions. That doctrine will lend itself to many a new assault on the life of nations before its capacities of evil are finally exhausted, and its ultimate harvest, the last Reformer of all, is revealed in the person of Antichrist. We cannot but think that if Washington had lived in our day, his calm and robust good sense, rarely obscured by passion or clouded by the mists of prejudice, would have rightly interpreted its phenomena. Principles which lead everywhere to shameful anarchy, and make the Christian religion only a source of ignominious and unappeasable strife,—so that it contrasts unfavourably, as an instrument for promoting unity, with Buddhism or Islamism,—would have seemed, perhaps, to the gentle philosopher of Mount Vernon, destructive both of Christian faith and social order. They make Christianity little better than a jest. They reverse its maxims, repudiate its spirit, and counteract its aims. By making the individual conscience, however darkened by ignorance and self-will, its only foundation, instead of the august and unfailing *authority* upon which God willed it to repose securely, they substitute the pretended rights of error for those of truth, and degrade a Divine revelation into a senseless and contradictory record of all the delusions which human fancy can beget, or human imbecility adopt. We should like, for example, to have heard Washington's opinion of the following catalogue of religions in a single state of the American Union, in the year 1854. No intelligent Hindu or Japanese could read it without a burst of laughter, nor without being confirmed in the conviction, to which his acquaintance with the products of the Reformation always leads him, that the Christian is the most absurd and irrational of all human religions. If it were really what the catalogue in question would seem to imply, we should cordially agree with him. Here, then, is a picture of what a nominal Christianity had become in the State of Missouri—and it is precisely the same in every other—twenty-two years ago.

First on the list before us come the *Baptists*, whose pecu-

liarity it is to postpone, at the risk of never receiving, a sacrament which they do not consider necessary till the soul has famished for a good many years without it, and which Mr. Bright lately told the House of Commons, "in my sect we do not consider necessary at all." The illustrious tribune seems to us more logical than the Baptist; for if man can safely live unregenerate during one half of his life, his risk is only partially increased by spending the other half in the same state. Number two on the Missouri list is the *Christian Church*, which has probably very little claim to the first title, and certainly none at all to the second. The *Free Church* follows next; and if Christian liberty consists in a cheerful emancipation from the yoke of faith, the bond of unity, and the obligation of obedience—a proposition which we should dispute if we had leisure,—its members have no doubt chosen an appropriate name, which fairly indicates their condition. *Episcopalians* tread on the heels of the "Free Church," which they resemble in this, that while the latter reject bishops altogether, the former are humbly content to have the name without the thing. Their sect has unconsecrated rulers who do not rule, whom it would not obey if they did, and could not if it would, because they all contradict one another. *Lutherans* assume the name of an individual who has urgent reason to regret that he ever had a name, and whose malediction is probably not alleviated by the fact that there are still human beings foolish enough to bear it. When they meet him face to face, if that should be their sorrowful destiny, they will wish they had borne any other. It is not well for Christians to be called after a man, and least of all such a man. *Methodists* and *Presbyterians* come next, and they have as good a right to make a religion for themselves as anybody else; that is, no right at all. It is only God who can make a religion. Having made *one*, which was not theirs, He will never make any other. The *Union Church* is another ornament of the happy State of Missouri. If it counts only a single member, we can believe in its union; if it has more, we doubt if they are in union with themselves, and are sure they are not with anybody else. The *Boatmen's Church* does not suggest to us any remark, except that we should not like to navigate any stream, however shallow, in the boat which carries its flag. The *Church of Christ* is the tenth on the list; but as it is quite certain, beyond all controversy, that He founded another and a different one, which was built on Peter, the Missourian counterfeit can only deceive those who wish to be deceived. *Evangelists*, who come next, are comparatively modest. If they claim kindred with Apostles, they

at all events do not usurp the name of their Master. *German Protestants* is the title of another sect, which expresses so little, that there is perhaps an exact proportion between the tenuity of its positive belief and the vagueness of its indefinite name. The *German Evangelical Church* differs, we presume, though we cannot say in what, both from the *Lutherans* and the *German Protestants*; but if these three varieties grow in three separate gardens, with a high wall between them, a moderately skilful horticulturist would no doubt refer them all to the same botanical genus. *Independents* find their place in the same list, and their name suffices to condemn them. They may be, or at least wish to be, "independent" of every Divine authority, but for that very reason they are all the more shamefully subject to a human one. People who refuse submission to the ruler whom God has appointed over His Church, are fitly chastised by becoming the parasites and sycophants of some "independent" spouter, more or less *eloquio suavis*, as S. Augustine said of the Manichæan Faustus. The *Jews* come next, and after them the *Mennonites*, who might as well be Jews for any interest they have in Christianity. The *Mormons*, who have adopted one feature of the Pindaric mythology, and converted obscenity into a religion, follow the Mennonites, and are followed in turn by the *Republicans*, a name which can hardly be said to indicate very clearly the theological opinions of their sect. We have heard of a gentleman who proposed to substitute "celestial republic" for kingdom of heaven, and to offer to the "President of presidents" the prayers which he declined to address to the King of kings. We incline to suppose that he must have been the founder of the interesting church of Republicans. *Rationalists* occupy the next place in the spiritual almanac of Missouri, and are probably a different species from their European kindred, who have too little esteem for the churches of other people to think it necessary to have one of their own. *Unitarians*, who congregate in the same State, differ from other Protestants only in this, that while the latter assume the Christian religion to be purely human, by undertaking to "reform" it, each after his own plan, the former, with greater consistency, contend that the Founder of a religion so multiform and unstable must have been human also; an argument which seems to us to admit of no reply. Lastly, the list closes with the *Universalists*, who generously offer to *everybody* the salvation which they have not yet secured for themselves.*

* See "Gazetteer of the United States," by Baldwin and Thomas; art. Missouri, 1854.

How many new varieties have been added to the twenty-one enumerated above since 1854, we are unable to say. As the inventive faculty of religious "reformers" is incapable of exhaustion, and "grows by what it feeds on," we should not be surprised to hear that the number has doubled in Missouri, as it has elsewhere. We may safely take it for granted that this spectacle of shameful riot and confusion has also doubled the number of those who profess no religion at all, and regard all these rival sects as a decisive proof that a religion which produces everywhere such results is more likely to separate the soul from God, to whom division is supremely hateful, than to unite it to Him, and is therefore unworthy of notice. If we may trust the concurring reports of those who ought to know, a great majority of the American people are unbaptized, and do not even affect to belong to any sect whatever. They find it hard to choose among so many, and being occupied with more engrossing cares, seldom find leisure to choose at all. Where all is equally human, the practical conclusion of popular logic is that judgment may safely be postponed. One faggot, the American woodman knows, is the same as another, and it is not of the least importance which is flung into the fire first. But when men hesitate to decide in questions of the soul, in most cases, without knowing it, they have already decided. That is the one living controversy in which delay is ruin, and suspense destruction. The world does not cease to revolve while we are making up our minds, and to-day, in the field of truth as well as of space, we are thousands of leagues away from the position which we occupied yesterday. The joint action of the will and the understanding, though prolonged only during the twinkling of an eye, may decide our eternal destiny. There is a moment in every man's life in which Truth is proposed to his intelligence as the sovereign good; if he hesitates, there is a motion in the air as of an angel passing by, but the messenger is gone, and who can tell if he will ever return? And for this reason in nothing has the so-called Reformation been a more appalling calamity to the human race than in the new motive which it has furnished to millions for abstaining from all religious profession, and in the contemptuous indifference which its jarring sects have inspired and justified towards the fickle and inconstant creeds which even the world perceives to be false, since they refute one another, and cannot unite a single household in a common faith. But if it has lent to impiety a plausible excuse, it has extended the right of revolt against *every* form of authority, and throughout the whole range of human action. It has made men as impatient of subjection in the

civil as in the spiritual order, and while its fatal maxims have enthroned the individual above the Church, and human caprice above Divine law, they have destroyed the throne as well as the altar, subverted the foundations of all government, and delivered the destinies of nations to the selfish arbitrament of of an irresponsible power or the rude control of an unreflecting mob. That is the work of the Reformation; and though the United States do not present the only, nor even the worst example of its ruinous effects, they do perhaps display the combination of religious and social confusion which results from its leading principles, and the intimate relation between the two, more clearly than any other nation. For this reason we propose to examine, with the help of the French writer from whom we shall borrow some of our illustrations, the evidences of that fatal relation, not to find in them any ground of reproach against a kindred people who have so many claims to our sympathy and goodwill, but only to establish a new basis of an old argument which we confidently submit to the searching investigation of American candour and intelligence.

We have no protest to make, nor does Catholic theology allow us to make any, against the form of government which the people of the United States, in the exercise of their undoubted rights, have thought proper to adopt. There is probably no section of their community which accepts it with a more cheerful and cordial spirit than that which professes the Catholic faith. The Church of God is charged with no message to mankind as to the *form*, but only as to the *spirit* of human governments. As long as they recognize the supreme authority of God, her children are equally bound to honour and obey them, whether they are monarchical or republican. But, as one of her profoundest theologians has said, "When a State is founded," no matter on what basis, "its government should be modelled on that of God Himself." And the reason is evident. "To govern, is to guide the governed to their true destiny," which is, "to attain by virtue a union with God."* And for this the temporal power requires the help of the Church, which was founded to aid men in securing that union, by means which she alone can place at their disposal. When, therefore, certain modern States, monarchical as well as republican, acting on the principles of the Reformation, renounce alliance with the Church, and govern with a sort of ostentation in complete indepen-

* S. Thomas, "De Regimine Principum," lib. i. cap. 14. Cf. Suarez, "De Bello," § 8.

dence of her laws and precepts, they proclaim at the same moment that the true aim of government has no place in their programme, and that they have neither the will nor the power to "guide the governed to their true destiny." In other words, they abdicate the function of every lawful government, and deprive justice and liberty, as well as religion, of their only stable foundation. This result of the divorce between the Church and the State, between God and society, is so clearly proved by the facts of modern history, that, as Montalembert observes in the introduction to the "Monks of the West," "the unanimous testimony of all the democratic writers of our own day who have profoundly studied the past, and, above all, of M. Augustin Thierry," attests the loss of true liberty, and the savage domination of unscrupulous majorities, which, in spite of its boasts, is the degrading characteristic of our generation. Such writers admit, with Montalembert, that in the Middle Ages, when the union between Church and State was closest, "the world *was* bristling with liberty. The spirit of resistance, the sentiment of individual right, penetrated it entirely; and it is this which always and everywhere constitutes the essence of freedom." In those times, the great French orator adds,—and the statement is confirmed by a multitude of eminent writers of our day who hardly profess to be Christians,—the principles which everywhere governed society, and which were those of the Gospel applied by the Church, "rendered all prolonged despotism absolutely impossible." The Popes, who were the appointed guardians of Christian liberty, took care of that. "Everything there," continues Montalembert, "breathes freedom, health, and life. . . In public life as in private, in the world as in the cloister, strong and magnanimous souls everywhere break forth—illustrious characters and great individuals abounded." The contrast has been pithily summarized by a living English rationalist, who says: "Those times produced *great men*, ours produce *great inventions*."

Our objection, then, to modern States, which pretend to govern without God and the Church, applies equally to monarchies and republics, so far as they are influenced by the destructive principles of the Reformation. We are not enamoured of any form of government for its own sake, and however favourable our judgment may be of that which exists in England, which has been truly described as a republic with a monarch for its chief magistrate, we cannot deny that what Washington called "the baneful effects of the spirit of party" are constantly seen in the substitution of personal for national interests, and in a hindrance to wholesome legislation so in-

veterate that, as an acute critic has lately remarked, "if some remedy is not devised, the whole British system of legislation will be discredited."* But while we admit that forms of government are rightly determined by the choice of those who accept them, we contend that the choice should be limited to those who are capable of exercising it. What Cicero called the "*infinitus forensium rerum labor*" is a burden with which dwarfs, of whom mankind is chiefly composed, cannot be safely charged. Government belongs only to the wise and strong, as we learn both from sacred and profane history. And for this reason, "the false dogma of the sovereignty of the people," as the French writer whom we shall presently quote styles it, is a reversal of all the rules and maxims which have given to the world such peace and order as it has hitherto enjoyed. When fools govern, States decline; and as Holy Scripture tells us that "the number of fools is infinite," it follows that the sovereignty of the masses is only another name for the supremacy of fools. But this "false dogma" is the inevitable corollary of that which was first proclaimed by the so-called Reformers; for if every individual is qualified to teach the Church, much more is he able to instruct the State. Hallam says, in spite of his own prejudices, that "the Reformation appealed to the ignorant"; and one of the agreeable consequences of that fatal sedition has been, that, in too many countries, the few who are wise are now subject to the merciless domination of the many who are ignorant. The statesmen and philosophers of other ages held the opinion, which they supported by cogent arguments, that the lot of the multitude is, not to govern, but to be governed. Washington and the other prudent founders of the American Union shared that conviction, and made no secret of it; but "the sovereignty of the people" has cast down the feeble barriers which they opposed to it, and the only men who are now definitively banished from all share in the government of the Republic are precisely those, as its wisest citizens proclaim, who are best qualified, by dignity of character and elevation of mind, to fill the offices from which their wisdom and virtue exclude them. But whatever reproach is involved in this fact attaches not so much to the American people as to human nature, and to that "doctrine of devils" inaugurated by the Reformation, that the individual conscience is the only supreme judge, and therefore the rights of error are as sacred as those of truth; that there is no *universal* tribunal to which every conscience is subject, and therefore God is a pure

* "Pall Mall Gazette," May 4.

abstraction, without any representative in this lower world; that obedience has ceased to be a Christian duty, because there is no authority which has a right to claim it; and that, in the affairs of the State as in those of the Church, folly has the same constructive power as wisdom, or rather a great deal more, because wherever the masses reign, the fools are to the wise as millions to one.

One object of government, men of every political school will admit, is to secure his own lawful rights to every member of the community, and the largest measure of liberty consistent with public order which is possible to the creature. But tyranny is an instinct of human nature, and is displayed even by children; and as there is a larger amount of it in many than there can be in a few, the surest way to make it universal is to introduce the "sovereignty of the people," and multiply in every society the agents of oppression by all the units which compose it. And this is the experience of mankind in all ages and in all lands. When Augustus became emperor, Gibbon remarks, "the provinces, weary of the oppressive ministers of the republic, were willing to submit to the authority of a single master."* "All republics," says a learned English writer of the liberal school, "rule selfishly and oppressively. There is no exception to this in either ancient or modern times. Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, Holland, and Republican France, all tyrannized over every province and subject state where they gained authority." The most famous republic of all, that of intellectual Athens, "*avowed that its empire was a tyranny.*"† Aristotle taught the doctrine that Greeks had no obligations towards those whom they called barbarians, and most of them recognized as little responsibility towards one another. And the spirit of the people when they had power in their hands was the same in modern England as in ancient Attica. During the Commonwealth, as Lingard proves by many notable examples, the sole thought of each contending party was to put down its rivals *by force*. Never were the rights of minorities or of individuals less respected than in an age when every man had the word "liberty" in his mouth. "The fanatics," Lingard remarks, "not satisfied with the death of the king, demanded, with the Bible in their hands, additional victims"; and they were not particular to what class they belonged. When Lilburne appealed on his trial "to Magna Charta and the liberties of Englishmen," and two years later charged his

* Ch. ii.

† "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," by Sir Edward Creasy, p. 60, tenth edition.

democratic judges "with injustice and tyranny," "the offender was condemned in a fine of £7,000, with banishment for life. Probably the court of Star-chamber never pronounced a judgment in which the punishment was more disproportionate to the offence." But, as the same writer observes, the pretended English republic was, in fact, an oligarchy. "A few individuals, under the cover of a nominal parliament, ruled the kingdom with the power of the sword."* This is the use which demagogues and usurpers always make, and always have made, of the "sovereignty of the people." There is no such unscrupulous and systematic oppression as that which has its source in the vindictive passions of the unreasoning *plebs*. We have seen examples of it in our own day, and may expect to see more, wherever the representatives of popular sovereignty succeed in suppressing the beneficent rule of God and the Church, and in substituting their own for it. When were the dignity and the conscience of the free citizen more impudently ignored, the expression of opinion more cynically prohibited, unfriendly journals more arrogantly suppressed, than by such loquacious dictators as a Gambetta in France and a Castelar in Spain, who professed to govern in the name of the people, and whose most intolerant acts were precisely those to which what *they* called the people gave their sympathy and applause? When somebody remonstrated with the execrable Raoul Rigault, the Procureur of the Paris Commune, and suggested that the atrocious tyranny of his associates was worse than any autocrat would dare to practise, the sensual demagogue replied with a sneer, that "*une petite terreur*" was the only effective weapon of his abominable faction, the only adequate support of its brutal and coercive rule.

There are no men of our time who have a deeper horror of such criminal excesses, nor a more intelligent apprehension of what "the false dogma of the sovereignty of the people" really means, than are to be found in every city of the American Union. They may not all see with the same clearness the relation which exists between the doctrine of popular sovereignty and that of the so-called Reformation, that every individual is independent in the sphere of conscience; they may not detect the logical connection between the right of schism and the right of revolt; their habits of thought may confuse or hinder their perception of the truth that the denial of the spiritual authority involves the ruin of the temporal, which rests on the same foundation; delivers kingdoms, whatever their government may be, to inevitable chaos, and sub-

* Vol. x. ch. vi.

stitutes the strife of human passions and the suggestions of human caprice for the fixed principles and unalterable code of a Divine polity; but they perfectly comprehend that the irruption of unchristianized masses into the council-chamber of nations is fatal to liberty and public order, and that their destiny will be compromised exactly in proportion to the influence which those turbulent and incoherent masses are permitted to exert. We need not fear, therefore, to wound their susceptibilities by the expression of convictions which are theirs as well as ours, and which many of them know how to proclaim with a power which we cannot command. They agree with us that folly has no right to usurp the prophetic office of wisdom, and are not surprised if its unhallowed reign is as disastrous in their own land as it has been in others. There is no mortification, they wisely feel, in confessions which have been made on our side of the ocean before they were made on theirs, and which record the experience of men in the oldest of monarchies as well as in the newest of republics. If the experiment of popular sovereignty has not been a success in America, it has been at least as ruinous a catastrophe in Europe. Democracy is not more formidable in the new world than in the old. Perhaps we may even say that its evils have been tempered in the former, not only because all explosions are more harmless in a vast than in a confined area, but on account of a certain innate reverence for law, a repugnance to the grosser forms of audacious blasphemy, and a mildness and cordiality of disposition, which are honourable characteristics of the American people. But they must not endeavour to persuade either themselves or us that institutions which, in spite of the wise intentions of the founders of their republic, tend more and more to lodge all power in the uncultivated masses,—of whom large sections are still rather aliens than citizens, and have no power, even if they had the will, to contribute anything to the welfare and stability of their adopted country,—are the supreme invention of human wisdom, or the all-sufficient remedy of human evils. That is a delusion unworthy of their sagacity. Forms of government—and this, as we have said, is the only aspect of the question which we care to examine—are purely human, especially when they borrow nothing from a higher source, and share the impotence of all the works of man. We oppose none which the deliberate choice of an enlightened people has consecrated; but we do oppose the foolish notion that they represent anything more venerable than the human traditions upon which they were founded, or can do for the peace of nations what only God and the Church have the power to do. We must

also be permitted to add, with the hearty concurrence of the wisest members of the American Union, that the government which gives freest play to the absurd doctrine of popular sovereignty is radically unsound and defective, opposed to the spirit of order and obedience which Christianity was designed to foster; and that if its maintenance, where it exists, is a necessity, because it is the least of two evils, the obligation suggests gloomy rather than jubilant reflections. The only safe form of democracy the world has ever known, or ever will know, is that which is found in the Catholic Church; because there only freedom is not license, nor submission bondage; authority and liberty confirm and support each other, equality springs from a common union with God, who alone is great; and fraternity consists in the secure possession of the same gifts, the same rights, the same immunity from error, and the same inheritance of truth.

There was a time when the spurious liberty, fictitious equality, and sham fraternity which the Evil One offered to mankind at the so-called Reformation, and which many were persuaded to accept in place of the realities of which they were only dismal counterfeits, were supposed to be, in an eminent degree, the appanage of our American kinsmen. Yet it is certain that in adopting the delusions of the Reformation they have not deceived themselves more egregiously than other people. They have only made the same mistake about the true nature of liberty. The only liberty possible to the creature is that which springs from obedience, and the only obedience which does not degrade him is that which is paid to God, or to an authority recognized by Him. Even Dr. Döllinger, though himself a reformer, and the founder of the newest of human sects, says: "Nothing is more untrue than the assertion that the Reformation was a movement in favour of liberty of conscience; *it was quite the contrary.*"* It was nothing else, says Hallam, but "*a change of masters*";† substituting, in fact, the coarse and capricious tyranny of absolute princes, or still more absolute preachers, for the mild rule to which the wisdom of God had subjected the human conscience, and that vigilant protection by the Church of the weak against the strong in which despots of every shape and colour, whether princes or preachers, always saw their only invincible antagonist. And for this reason any form of human government which is based in its essential principles on the doctrine of the Reformation, and admits in practice the senseless idea that

* Quoted by Hergenröther, "Church and State," vol. ii. p. 334, English edition.

† "Introduction to the Literature of Europe," vol. i. ch. vi. p. 382.

every man is his own Church, and *à fortiori* his own State, and that the only permanent and indestructible authority is the individual conscience, leads inevitably to a partial or total paralysis of true Christian liberty. Men easily detect this fact in other communities, even when they fail to see it in their own. Grote, Carlyle, and Dickens, in spite of their democratic sympathies, changed their opinion about American institutions and the dogma of popular sovereignty, without perceiving that the evils to which the latter has led are at least as visible in France and Italy as they are in the United States, and owe their devastating power not to any special form of government, except in so far as it lends itself more readily to the domination of the unthinking masses, but to the *spirit* of revolt against God and the Church which is often as active in monarchical as in democratic communities. "Voyez la France," exclaims the great Christian philosopher M. de Bonald; "*elle n'est plus*"! He contends, indeed, as he had a right to do, and with a vast array of historical evidence, that there is more power of self-recovery in empires than in republics, because, in his judgment, what he calls the "Theory of Power" is in the former more consonant with Christian philosophy, and therefore less Protestant, than in the latter. "The Christian religion," says this eminent man, "is a monarchical society, in which the representative of power, the *ministry*, and the *subject*, are persons distinct from one another,"* as they have always been in every government founded by the Most High. He adds that while "the Catholic religion adapts itself to *every* form of government, not every form of government adapts itself to the Catholic religion"; because there are some which are founded on a principle which lodges all power with those who are incapable of exercising it, and recognizes that monstrous fiction of the sovereignty of the people which, *outside the Church*, means the sovereignty of evil, and of which one result is, as we see by the example of those who maintain it in Europe, that "everything is God," in the words of Bossuet, "except God Himself."

We hope we have made it sufficiently clear that we are not contending, and have no wish to contend, against any form of government *in itself*, but only against that, whatever name it may bear, which lodges power in the wrong hands, and makes what it calls "the rights of the people" the equivalent of "the rights of error." Rousseau, who refutes and contradicts himself in every page, says, in his "Contrat Social,"

* "Principe Constitutif de la Société," ch. xix.

"the people of a republic have always the right to change their laws, even the best of them; for, if they wish to injure themselves, who has a right to hinder them?" Who indeed! since all power resides in them. It was perhaps this consideration which made Montesquieu say, "Old institutions are generally *corrections*, and new ones *abuses*."* The same writer observes, in one of those acute and brilliant summaries which are found so often in his pages,—and which we cite with the more satisfaction because it expresses our own conviction, that the spirit of a people is of incomparably greater importance than the form of their government,—that the true force of nations consists in their religious traditions, and in their willingness to correct abuses which conflict with those traditions. He considers that it was the principles of Epicurus, which many would fain revive in our age, which corrupted Rome, as they had corrupted Greece, and notes the patriotic saying of Fabricius, that "he wished all the enemies of Rome would adopt them." Rome lasted so long, according to Montesquieu, "because the spirit of the people was always disposed to accept the correction of abuses. Carthage fell because it would not tolerate even the changes recommended by Hannibal. Athens because it took its own errors and corruptions for advantages. If the Italian republics boasted of their perpetuity, it was only a perpetuity of abuses. The strength of England," he adds, with partial truth, "consists in this, that she has always an eye on her defects, and is always striving to correct them."† She would have more success in doing so, if her political sagacity were not too often neutralized by her religious chaos, and by the false doctrine of the independence of the individual conscience which makes that chaos permanent. It is this doctrine, which underlies the whole philosophy of revolt, and not special forms of government, with which it seems to be in closest alliance, that we desire to combat. If, indeed, it could be proved that such forms are incapable of offering any effective resistance to it, they would be self-condemned; but the only criticism which we make at present on democratic communities, which it is our purpose to estimate solely as to their ability to "guide the governed to their true destiny," is this: that they have established no claim to be regarded as models for other and differently constituted societies, and that they have more urgent need to *prove* their own fancied superiority, than to insist that all the world should take it for granted. "Demo-

* "De l'Esprit des Loix," liv. v. ch. vii.

† "Grandeur et Décadence des Romains," tome i. ch. viii.

cracy," says De Bonald, "is the government of the weak, because it is the government of popular passions."* Diodorus Siculus, he remarks, informs us that "atheism began at Athens with democracy"; and he argues that as "equal submission to a common authority on the part of all constitutes social equality, and the independence of the will (in all which lawful authority has not determined) constitutes social liberty, monarchy assures both."† There is a close analogy, in other words, between the liberty and equality which exist in their perfection only in the Catholic Church, and the combination of freedom and submission in the civil order which, during so many ages, has been the undeniable characteristic of monarchical States. There is no possible liberty without authority, and it is only a spurious authority, such as that of human preachers or of the "sovereign people," which degenerates into tyranny, except in the case of arbitrary princes, upon whose selfish policy the precepts of the Church of God exert no action. Has the recent experience of the great and intelligent people of the United States suggested, either to themselves or to others, any valid reason for supposing that democracy has changed its character, or that Cicero erred when he said, "*Mihi nihil unquam popolare placuit*"? There seems to be little ground for answering this question in the affirmative, if it is to be decided by the testimony of men, of all nations, who once hoped for an alleviation of human miseries from the growth of democratic institutions, but afterwards discerned in them, on a closer inspection, only the source of new and greater evils.

"I have outlived my faith," said the late Mr. Grote, who never concealed his distaste for monarchical and aristocratic institutions, "in the efficacy of Republican government regarded as a check upon the vulgar passions of a majority in a nation, and I recognize the fact that supreme power lodged in their hands may be exercised quite as mischievously as by a despotic ruler like the first Napoleon."‡ He might have added that Washington was of the same opinion, and thought that a republic, like a monarchy, should be governed only by those who were qualified for the task. Mr. Carlyle, whom nobody will suspect either of narrow Anglicism or of unreasoning antipathy to other nations, is more emphatic. We should hesitate to quote his words if we did not know, by sure evidence, that they express a conviction common to cultivated

* "Principe Constitutif de la Société," ch. xii.

† "Théorie du Pouvoir," ch. viii.

‡ "Life of George Grote," by Mrs. Grote, ch. xxxviii. p. 314.

Americans. "As to a Model Republic," he says, "or a model anything, the wise among themselves know too well that there is nothing to be said. . . . Deduct what they carried with them from England ready-made, there is still next to nothing more. Cease to brag to me of America, and its model institutions and constitutions." We suppress certain phrases which follow, because they might give pain to sensitive Americans, for whom Carlyle is a kind of prophet, and only record his conclusion: "We cannot predict the success of Democracy, on this side of the Atlantic, from their example."* Dickens, who learned to love Americans, as most Englishmen do who have lived among them, considered that "the heaviest blow ever dealt at liberty will be dealt by this country (America), in the failure of its example to the earth." He added, "there is no country on the face of the earth where there is less freedom of opinion on any subject in reference to which there is a broad difference of opinion, than in this."† We fancy Americans would tell him, and with reason, that this is because they are swamped in their own country by an inundation of virtually alien hordes, to whom the wise founders of the Union would have declined to concede any share in its government till they had proved that they were worthy to possess it. Lastly, an illustrious American, of rare intellectual gifts, whose earlier views were singularly modified by an experimental knowledge of the results of the "sovereignty of the people," and who was not afraid to speak of "accursed Liberalism," thus confirms the unfavourable sentence of the English writers whom we have quoted. "Democracy," said the late Dr. Brownson, whose irreparable loss we all deplore, "is the best of all possible governments to make the many tax themselves for the benefit of the few."‡

Whatever truth there may be in these concurring judgments of capable and friendly arbiters, it is sometimes said that, as far as America is concerned, they all require a certain qualification. The evils to which they point, we are told, are not the legitimate product of the principles upon which the Republic was originally founded, but of an unwise departure from them. Whether that departure could by any skill have been prevented, or it is now possible to revert to the maxims of government which American statesmen proclaimed at the close of the last century, are questions of great interest and importance upon which we shall offer no

* "Latter Day Pamphlets."

† Forster's "Life of Charles Dickens," vol. i. ch. xx. pp. 299, 309.

‡ Brownson's "Quarterly Review," Jan. 1873, p. 103.

opinion ; but this, we conceive, is certain, that men like Washington, Hamilton, and Clinton would have laughed to scorn the notion that masses of peasants from Germany, England, Ireland, or Scandinavia, supplemented by masses of negroes incapable for the most part of forming a judgment on any issue proposed to them, and therefore mere tools in the hands of heartless and designing adventurers, should usurp the function of the true American people, outvote them by the force of numbers, and pretend to control the destinies of a mighty nation while they have neither skill nor wisdom to direct their own. When the "sovereignty of the people" comes to this, we should prefer, for our part, the political institutions of a Tartar or Mongolian horde, and expect less mischief from them. Apparently the ablest guides of American opinion agree with us. The English journals have lately quoted from the "New York Times" the programme of a new Reform party, of which the avowed aim is "to bring the government back and up to the principles of the founders of the Republic." Can it be done ? That is a question for those who are going to make the attempt. They understand what it involves ; and if they are right in assuming, as they announce, that "the majority of the people love virtue and desire good government," it ought not to be impossible. If the true American population, unencumbered by an intractable foreign element, had to deal with the problem, it would, perhaps, be quickly solved. Meanwhile, the fact that such an effort is to be made proves at least that the welfare of the nation demands it. "The public heart is sickened," we are told, "with the spectacle of betrayed trusts and corruption in office ; of high places sought and held solely for private gain, or as a means to advance private interests ; with a class who trade in politics and manage the political machinery of parties solely in the interest of office-holders or office-seekers ; with the great mass of good citizens, in disgust or despair, holding aloof from public affairs ; with the low tone and selfishness that seem to pervade and dominate all political life." It is not an enemy who thus describes the results of the "sovereignty of the people,"—which means everywhere, in Europe as in America, the enslavement of the people to those who "trade in politics,"—but honourable citizens, who record only to condemn them. The evils which call for a prompt and efficacious remedy, they add, "are fast sapping the foundations of the Republic." The weak point of their programme, we venture to think, lurks in the admission that the desired restoration can only be effected by an "appeal to the people." There are countries in Europe in which such an appeal, as we

have lately seen in France, would only tend to confirm the ruinous domination of selfish and profane demagogues. It is no special reproach to the United States if it should produce exactly the same effect there. In the early days of the Republic, it is truly said, "the men most conspicuous for wisdom and virtue were placed in charge of public affairs," and such men abound in America at this hour; but if "the people" have deliberately replaced them, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, by other and inferior men, how does this encourage the hope that an appeal to the same people, acted upon by the same influences, will lead them to a tardy comprehension of their true interests, and induce them to declare war against a system of corruption which could never have been established without their active concurrence?

Nations who accept the sovereignty of the people must accept its consequences. It was no doctrine of the founders of the Republic. Even Jefferson, who was perhaps the true author of American democracy, is a witness against one of its most noxious products. He would tell the new school of civic reformers that, unless they wish to be assailed in flank and rear while they imagine they have to contend only with an enemy in their front, they must take into account, not only the resistance of popular passions, but the formidable literature of popular *journalism* in which they are reflected. "Nothing can now be believed," he said as early as 1807, "which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle. . . . The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehood and error."* It is true that the detestable literature of newspapers, which Jefferson appreciated so accurately, and which feeds the delusions and perpetuates the mental *incuria* of modern society, is not an evil peculiar to the United States. There is not a country in Europe in which it is not sapping the foundations both of religious truth and social order. It is everywhere the echo of all human errors, the mirror of all human infirmities. Its highest philosophy is a sneer, its nearest approach to reason a calumny. When the so-called Reformation gave every man the right to *think* what he chooses, though it inconsistently punished him for doing so, it could not long refuse him the kindred right to *say* what he chooses. From that hour the world, refusing any longer to be taught by God and the Church, has been delivered to the scourge of

* Quoted in Parton's "Life of Aaron Burr," ch. xiii. p. 224.

human teachers, and chiefly of the tribe of journalists, who, as Mr. Froude pleasantly told them, "sit on the bench before they are called to the bar"; and while "in other professions men learn their business first," with these self-appointed oracles of modern thought "the practice is just reversed." They are the true shepherd-dogs of the "sovereign people," and we incline to think that reformers in America, as in other lands, will have to muzzle *them* before they can guide their flock to wholesome pastures.

It has been our sole purpose, in what has been already said, to suggest to our American friends that the calamities which they deplore, and to which they are wisely resolved to apply a remedy, have their true origin, not so much in a particular form of government, as in the imperfect recognition or deliberate reversal of principles which are the life both of monarchies and republics, and of which the oblivion is equally fatal to both. The special value of the book named at the head of our article, and upon which we must now offer some remarks, consists in this; that while its facts are chiefly derived from American writers, known and respected on both sides of the ocean, and the able and temperate author traces under their guidance the progressive steps by which the original Constitution has been modified in a democratic sense, he proves that it is, in fact, the adoption of the subversive maxims of the Reformation which lies at the root of the whole matter; that the true constitutive principles of society have been lost sight of in the lurid glare of "modern ideas"; that in political as in religious communities the suppression of authority, or its diffusion among the masses to whom God has not entrusted it, produces the same disastrous results; and that, according to the profound observation of De Bonald, "the power which cannot exact obedience is always weaker than the power which is able to refuse it." The space at our command does not permit us to do justice to the solid merits of this thoughtful and instructive work, in which the writer displays both a calm and judicial spirit and an exact knowledge of the subject which he treats. We cannot doubt that it will appear before long in an English translation, and are persuaded that whoever presents it to the American public in that form will be deemed a benefactor, who has largely contributed to the revival of forgotten truths, to which the mind of America is already disposed to offer a cordial reception.

M. Jannet observes that the America of to-day no more resembles that which was described by De Tocqueville, than what *he* saw resembled the work of Washington and his colleagues. "Washington and the authors of the Federal

Constitution," he truly says, "were far from approving the principle of the sovereignty of the people."* Even the Puritans of New England restricted the suffrage to "*communicants*," and allowed no share in the governing function to any other class. They were far from admitting the preposterous notion that power should be lodged in the masses, or the senseless democratic hypothesis that every man is born a statesman. It may, indeed, be said with truth, that Washington and his able associates had nothing more at heart than to "take precautions *against* popular influences."† In his whole administration, M. Jannet adds, "Washington laboured to secure the preponderance of conservative principles, and to maintain the ascendancy of the true social authorities. We may judge what his sentiments were by what he said in a letter on the rules which, in his opinion, ought to determine the choice of officers." That opinion was expressed in these words: "What is by all means to be secured," (we translate the passage from the French version of M. Cornélis de Witt,) "is that the officers and soldiers should not belong to ranks too closely allied. The hierarchy of rank often passes from the civil to the military life. When ancient services do not require to be taken into account, the rule should be to inquire whether the candidate can, with good reason, pass for a *gentleman*, whether he has a true feeling of honour, and a reputation to lose." His constant solicitude about his own personal dignity, and the refinement of dress and manners which he estimated as highly as any prince in Europe, and the neglect of which in others awakened in him instinctive repugnance, attested his conviction that social distinctions are as important in a republic as in a monarchy, and that their arbitrary obliteration has no connection with the maintenance of rational liberty or true Christian equality. Hamilton, who was an accomplished gentleman, did not fear to address these words to the Convention of the State of New York: "It is an incontestable truth that the mass of the people in every country sincerely desire its prosperity; but it is equally beyond all dispute that they possess neither the intelligence nor the stability necessary to govern after a reasonable manner."‡ This judgment was announced with equal emphasis by all the eminent men of the school of Washington and Hamilton. "The word *democracy*," said John Adams, in 1792, who was afterwards president, "signifies in reality only the absence of every kind of govern-

* "Les Etats Unis Contemporains," ch. i. § 2, p. 33.

† P. 33.

‡ Jannet, p. 43.

ment ; and to counsel Americans to adopt such a government is to invite them to abandon their country to disorder, anarchy, and destruction." It was these wholesome maxims which the rude energy of Jefferson imputed as a *reproach* to the founders of the Republic, and for which he strove, with fatal success, to substitute his own dangerous theories. In the early and glorious days of his nation, he contended "we had not embraced the essential idea that governments are republican only by reason of the exactness with which they express and execute *the wishes of their people*. And therefore our first constitutions were regulated by no principle." Since his day, M. Jannet remarks, "Americans have only too faithfully accepted the deplorable theory of Jefferson, 'that the people could only bind themselves for the space of a single generation, and that every nineteen years they had the right to *change their constitution* and to become bankrupt.'"^{*} Such a statement reads like a satire on human government, but is quite consistent with the teaching of the Reformation ; for why should political be more stable than religious polity, or men who have the right to make any number of sects forfeit the privilege of fabricating any number of governments ?

It is the inevitable reaction from this monstrous conception of the sovereignty of the people which has led, as M. Michel Chevalier noticed in 1830, to the "centralizing tendency" manifested in the great State of New York, and "which gave the signal," as M. Jannet observes forty-six years later, "to the movement of Cæsarian despotism which begins to develop itself in the United States." In other words, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people becomes sooner or later so intolerable in its practical results, that as in ancient Rome the absolutism of Augustus was deemed preferable to democratic oppression, and in modern France the irresponsible rule of Napoleon was hailed as a welcome improvement on the diabolical injustice of the Revolution ; so in the country of Jefferson and Van Buren, whose noblest and most gifted citizens are reduced to enforced and involuntary silence by the rude clamour of the gross and undiscerning populace, the first encroachments of an arbitrary power not recognized by the Constitution pass almost unperceived, or awaken only a faint and feeble remonstrance. Anything is more tolerable than the state of society which the theory of government proclaimed by Jefferson creates and which is found by actual experience, in ancient France as in modern America, to be the enthronement of chaos, the ruin of order, the suppression of

^{*} P. 54.

liberty, and the impure domination of a political faction. Human societies cannot with impunity found themselves on a basis which has no more solidity than a quicksand, and no power to support any durable structure. The inconstant will of the people, who have a right, according to Jefferson, to destroy themselves and their country once in every generation, is such a foundation. Nothing stable can be built on water. In 1777, as M. Jannet observes, the first constitution of the State of New York conceded the right of suffrage only to freeholders possessing an estate of the value of twenty pounds sterling, and to householders paying an annual rent of at least forty shillings. The Senate, the Governor, and the Lieutenant-Governor were elected solely by freeholders having property to the value of one hundred pounds; while no administrative officer, and no one holding the function of judge, was chosen by popular election. In 1801 a constitutional modification of the powers of the Governor was carried by Jefferson, and in 1821 the fatal principle of universal suffrage, embracing even the magistracy and the judicial office, gained its first victory,* though it was not till 1840 that its definitive triumph was secured. From that hour, "the men most conspicuous for wisdom and virtue" were banished, with rare exceptions, from public affairs, and the people showed their capacity for self-government by substituting for them, as the programme of the new Reform party sorrowfully declares, "a class who trade in politics," and to whose obnoxious ascendancy is due "the low tone and selfishness that seem to pervade and dominate all political life," and which, in their inevitable results, "are fast sapping the foundations of the Republic."

Once more, let it be noted that these deplorable fruits of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people are not peculiar to the United States. Wherever that doctrine has obtained even a partial recognition, in the oldest as in the newest communities, it works the same havoc. In its presence wisdom is paralyzed, and even patriotism extinguished. Loyalty expires in contact with it, because the government which it creates deserves no esteem, and can inspire no love. It is equally fatal to liberty and good sense, and all who value either have a right to fling in its face the reproach which Montalembert addressed in one of his brilliant orations to the Radicals of the French Chamber, "*You have made liberty hateful.*" The only possible reform of such a theory of government is its suppression. The longer it lasts the more hopeless is the application of any radical remedy; not only because liberty of thought

* P. 56.

and action is constantly diminished where it prevails, but because the intemperate rule of a fluctuating majority insensibly confounds all distinction between right and wrong, banishes equity and justice, and obliterates a reverential respect for the common rights of all from the national code. M. de Tocqueville has pointed out in one of the most remarkable sections of his work, and especially in the chapters of *l'Omnipotence de la majorité et de ses effets*, and *Influence de la démocratie sur le mouvement intellectuel*,* the progressive character of its destructive results; and M. Jannet quotes, in illustration of his statement, that "the idea of the sovereignty of the people, and the power exerted by the majority in the United States, has destroyed true liberty of thought," American publicists, during a long succession of years, who express the same opinion with an energy of conviction which seems to us more impressive than the most emphatic language of non-American writers. "The foolish vanity of our journals," says one of these witnesses, "repeats incessantly that we are pre-eminently a free people, and that with us liberty of thought and opinion are complete. Well, I defy any observer to name a single one of our provinces in which thought and opinion are free. It is, on the contrary, a deplorable fact, that in no region of the world is intelligence more enslaved than here. Nowhere has a more rigid and crushing despotism been seen than that which public opinion exerts among us. . . . Become a charlatan, get popular prejudice for a moment on your side, and you will force the wise to fly and hide themselves till the fatal moment when some new impostor will arise to dethrone you; such is the moral and intellectual condition of America, the least free, in reality, of all the countries of the world."†

If this is a true statement,—and it is confirmed by a host of competent native witnesses,—the doctrine of popular sovereignty is as odious to the thinking portion of the American public in our day as it was to Washington and Hamilton. But men of prudence and reflection are, in the United States as in every other land, a *minority*. The oldest of European monarchies would be quickly brought to the same subjection to popular errors, if their destinies were committed to a majority composed, as all national majorities must be, of the inconstant and unreflecting masses. In no country of the world is the minority endowed with higher gifts of sagacity

* "De la Démocratie en Amérique," t. ii. ch. vii., and the first part of t. iii.

† "Sober Thoughts on the State of the Times," p. 27; Boston, 1835, ap. Jannet, p. 66.

and penetration than in America. In none is there a more intelligent apprehension of the true end and aim of government. But the wisdom of the few, wherever power is lodged in the wrong hands, is impotent against the folly of the many. Two things are fatal to the order of human societies—departure from the principles which God has established for their peace, and revolt against the only authority to which He has entrusted the power to secure it. Man cannot reign without God. He cannot snatch happiness in defiance of Him. And what is true of the individual is equally true of States. This is the lesson which we may all learn, English and Americans alike, from the considerations set forth in the work of M. Jannet. We refer our readers especially to the eighteenth chapter, *Catholicisme et Protestantisme*, pp. 334—369. In the previous chapter he proclaims the indisputable truth, that “under all political and social problems is hidden the question of religion,” and that “the United States are no exception to this law.”* In 1811, the Supreme Court of the United States formally decided that “blasphemy is an offence against the *common law*”; and Judge Kent, in pronouncing sentence upon one who had been guilty of that crime, said, “the people of this State, as well as the whole nation, regard the fundamental doctrines of Christianity as the rule of their faith and conduct.” He added, that to permit an outrage against the name of our divine Lord, of which the accused had been guilty, “would be to confound all distinction between what is sacred and what is profane.” A few years later, Judge Story announced the same truth in these memorable words: “If Christianity is the religion of liberty, Republican States ought, above all others, to regard it as the essential basis of their existence.” This eminent man added, with allusion to the period when the American Constitution was first framed, “Americans would, I believe, at that date, have scouted the idea of placing all religions on the same level, or of adopting the political maxim that the State should observe a complete indifference towards them. As to the question, whether a free government has any chance of durability which keeps itself aloof from questions of religion, that is a problem of which the solution must be left to the future. After the various experiments to which the theory of the government of nations has been exposed, this has still to be tried, and in this respect the United States of America incur a great responsibility.”† They are not wholly unconscious of it. Even at this day American jurisprudence is in practice favour-

* P. 303.

† Jannet, p. 307.

able to the independence of spiritual and ecclesiastical authority, and recent decisions might be quoted, including cases of excommunication, in which the courts, more rational than those of Germany, have peremptorily declined to admit appeals from such censures, on the ground that "whoever becomes a member of a church spontaneously accepts its authority, and that no earthly tribunal can control the ecclesiastical jurisdiction."* But while these facts reflect credit on the administration of justice in spiritual matters by American officials, it may be doubted whether, even in the Supreme Court, the noble sentiments of Kent and Story would at this day find an echo. The experiment to which Story alluded may not be yet complete, but if that distinguished man were among us now, he would hardly predict for it a happy issue. The government which boasts that it has nothing to do with religion proclaims at the same moment that it reigns without God, and has no need of His succour. When such a government *does* interfere in religious matters, as it is sure to do sooner or later with political objects—we have seen a recent example of it in the United States,—its whole influence will be exerted, as in Prussia, on the side of evil, and against the rights of conscience. And the practical atheism of the administration will be reflected in all who find in its indifference to positive truth a justification of their own. If, indeed, a vigorous understanding sufficed to keep men from fatal errors in questions of the soul, or a kindly and amiable disposition were an adequate substitute for supernatural faith and charity, we might anticipate the future of the United States without any uneasiness. But these natural qualities, as the whole history of our race proves, may co-exist, in spite of the attractive character which they tend to form, with principles which are fatal to the life of nations. Rome and Greece both recognized the obligation of worship in their earlier career, and both advanced by degrees to a virtual denial of it. There was nothing in their weak religious convictions to resist the action of a more potent influence, or sustain the continual shock of human passions. Thucydides notes with animadversion, as Mr. Grote remarks, the carelessness and inaccuracy with which the Athenian public of his day retained the history of Peisistratus, "only one century past," while the adventures of gods and heroes "were the theme of general talk, and any man unacquainted with them would have found himself partially excluded from the sympathy of his neighbours." Thucydides, like Tacitus, considered this

* See the case, cited at p. 317.

a false estimate of the relative importance of the natural and supernatural; and the revived paganism of our own day, less religious than that extinguished folly of which it reproduces only the worst features, tends more and more to substitute the low maxims of human policy, with its poor shifts and feeble expedients, for the eternal principles of truth and justice which the Catholic Church still proclaims to a heedless world, by which alone it can heal its abuses, reform its corruptions, and cease to be the sport either of sordid rulers who have no will to guide it to its true destiny, or of that chaotic fiction which hides its incurable incapacity under the braggart name of "the sovereignty of the people."

If, then, the people of the United States, for whom God has provided in the natural order a vast and imperial domain, whom He has endowed with gifts which may aid them to avoid the destructive follies of older communities, and to whom He proposes the supreme glory of co-operating with His Church in the victorious defence of truth, justice, and liberty, desire to attain the religious and political equilibrium which will defy the force of every disturbing current, in whatever direction it may act, they must cease to ask from mere secular wisdom the meagre palliatives which alone it is able to supply, and still more to seek in the bald projects and lame devices of empirical politicians the unhelpful remedies which such ill-equipped artists are able to dispense. Not so will they effect the reforms which their patriotism meditates. In the new world as in the old, society must be constituted on its true basis, or cease to aspire vainly after the concord, purity, freedom, and strength which spring only from alliance with God and His Church. No man can lay any other foundation than that which He has laid. It would be as futile to attempt to rear a monumental column in mid-ocean, or suspend a granite pyramid in mid-air, as to erect any durable fabric of which He is not the builder. It is because this truth has died out of the hearts of princes and statesmen, that, as Carlyle says, "in baleful oscillation, afloat as amid raging bottomless eddies and conflicting sea-currents, not steadfast as on fixed foundations, must European society continue swaying; now disastrously tumbling, then painfully re-adjusting itself, at ever shorter intervals." The end of such oscillation is death. That is the penalty which communities incur, as surely as individuals, by affecting an impossible independence of God, and by imprudent revolt against the Church which is His appointed instrument for the healing of the nations, and the only efficient defence against injustice and oppression, because the only secure home of rational

liberty. If God has decreed to govern the world in one way, it will only invite perdition by attempting to govern itself in another. A mild and equitable authority, inspired only by the maxims of the Gospel, will be everywhere replaced by one which is cruel, unjust, and capricious. The supreme authority of the Holy See, to which, as even Rationalists admit, the world owes all that it has hitherto possessed of liberty and true civilization, "has had no rival," says one of them, "and can have no successor." Already in our Europe, since it became the prey of selfish princes, or of what Carlyle calls "unmeasurable Democracy, monstrous, loud, blatant, inarticulate as the voice of Chaos," the nations have become an armed camp, watching each other with jealous suspicion and mutual distrust, consuming their revenues in the restless prevision of impending war, and united only in a common hostility to the sole power which can teach them wisdom, or give them peace. They have despoiled the arbiter of Christendom, in whom for long ages kings saw the surest support of their just authority, and peoples the invincible defence of their sacred rights; and the only alternative which they have been able to devise for his wise and beneficent intervention in the affairs of States is the intolerant omnipotence of a majority, the coarse domination of an autocrat, or the more oppressive tyranny of a mob. We desire for the United States a better fate. Let them profit by our example. It is not without grave instruction for a people who have still time to choose between good and evil, and who may put us to shame, if they will, by avoiding the faults which have dissipated our inheritance, and brought us to the verge of ruin. They have neither our legacy of religious conflicts, nor the bitter malice of which it has been the fatal source. They have, in a far greater measure than Englishmen, a calm spirit of candour, which is of potent efficacy in the investigation of truth. But already the selfish schemes of political faction begin to confuse their perception of right and wrong, and to neutralize the influence of the better qualities—amiability of temper, quick sense of justice, and mutual forbearance—which distinguish them. "A concurrence of serious facts," says M. Jannet, "which present themselves to our observation since 1870, seems to indicate that the United States will not long continue to enjoy the religious peace which they owed to the generosity and the wisdom of the generation which founded the American nationality. Without any provocation on the part of Catholics, and in spite of the blood which many of them shed during the war for the profit of the North, a notable fraction of the Republican party has declared open war against Catholicism,

and what they call its social and political influence. . . Two journals, which are the special organs of President Grant, "Harper's Weekly" and the "New York Times," subordinating national to party and sectarian interests, "distinguish themselves in this disloyal war, and secret anti-Catholic associations have been recently founded under the same influences."* If this spirit, which Washington reproved with so much energy, should prevail, Americans will drift on the current of ignoble passions, as we have done in Europe, till they are swallowed up in the same whirlpool of "raging bottomless eddies," and the United States may bid a long farewell to projects of reform and to national unity, and will only make political corruption more inveterate by making moral and religious harmony more impossible.

The sum of the whole matter is this. Nations can recover the life which their sins have put in danger, and the prosperity which their faults have compromised, only by the same process which the individual soul adopts in the like case. They must put themselves in contact with God. The means of doing so exist in the Church, which He has made for all time the porch of heaven. In the worst Catholic, however low he may have fallen, there are latent powers and dormant energies which make resurrection always possible. God has put Himself in his power. Rising up from the healing Sacrament of Penance, with faith rekindled, stains washed out, and all the power of lost graces recovered, he can say to God, as Jacob said to the Angel with whom he had wrestled:—"I will not let thee go, except thou bless me."† Let nations dare to speak as the Patriarch did. They will receive the same answer. Our heart's desire for the people of the United States, to whom a greater than the Angel of Jacob is saying, "Choose this day whom you will serve," is this; that they may become more and more, as they are already in part, the glory and consolation of the Church, and thus deserve the countless benedictions which all who serve her will surely obtain from the compassionate justice of her Divine Founder.

* Ch. xviii. p. 367.

† Gen. xxxii. 26.

ART. V.—THE WITNESS OF S. IRENÆUS TO CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.

- S. Irenæi Episcopi Lugdunensis et Martyris detectionis et eversionis falso cognominatæ Agnitionis; seu, contra Hæreses Libri quinque.* Studio ac labore D. RENATI MASSUET, Presbyteri et Monachi Benedictini ex Congregatione S. Mauri. Parisiis. 1712.
- S. Irenæi Episcopi Lugdunensis contra omnes Hæreses Libri quinque.* Textum Græcum et Latinum nova Codicum collatione recognovit et annotationibus aliorum et suis illustravit ADOLPHUS STIEREN, in Universitate literarum Jenensi antehac Theol. Professor. Lipsiæ. 1853.
- S. Irenæi Libros quinque adversus Hæreses, necnon Fragmenta, Græce, Syriace, Armeniace,* edidit W. WIGAN HARVEY, S.T.B., Collegii Regalis olim Socius. Cantabrigiæ. 1857.
- An Account of the Life and Writings of S. Irenæus.* By JAMES BEAVEN. London. 1847.
- Des H. Irenæus Christologie, dargestellt von L. DUNCKER.* (The Doctrine of S. Irenæus on Christ, exhibited by L. DUNCKER.) Göttingen. 1843.
- S. Irenæus de Eucharistia.* Dissertatio inauguralis quam scripsit L. HOPGENMÜLLER, Archidiœceseos Bambergensis Presbyter. Bambergæ. 1867.
- Irenæus der Bischof von Lyon.* Von H. ZIEGLER. Berlin. 1871.

MORE than a year ago we gave some account of the evidence which S. Irenæus bears to the Catholic rule of faith, or, in other words, to the authority of Scripture and tradition, of the Catholic Church and of the Holy See. This manifestly is the most important part of his teaching. If he held that revealed truth is contained in Scripture and tradition, and, again, that the Catholic bishops in union with and in subjection to the Roman See, are the infallible exponents of the truth so contained; then he was committed to every decision of the Church down to the present day, and it is plain that, while all who wish to establish their Christian belief on an historical basis, must appeal to his testimony, it is Catholics, and Catholics alone, who can do so with justice and consistency. In the present article, however, we shall carry our examination further, and complete, so far as may be within the limits of an article, our account of his doctrine. Incidentally, of course, what we have to say will have its bearing upon controversy with Pro-

testants; for an attentive and an impartial study of S. Irenæus yields sufficient proof that the Church of his day was one in the main features of its doctrine, as well as in the authority by which it claimed to teach, with the Church of our own time. It is enough to convince us that the Catholic Church of to-day is the one Church of Christ and of His Apostles, the Church of the early fathers and of the martyrs, the Church which overcame the world. It is enough to convince us that history, even if we put the Church's title to infallibility aside, confirms the Catholic belief on the most important points, and at least tends to confirm it upon others. Still, our main purpose at present is historical, rather than controversial. Nothing tends so much to promote a real acquaintance with the general history of doctrine in the early Church, as the investigation of the writings left us by particular fathers. Now, in our own language, we have books of name on the doctrine of S. Justin, of Clement of Alexandria, of Tertullian. But on S. Irenæus, in many respects the most important of them all, nothing worth notice has been written; * and even the imperfect sketch of his doctrine which we can give here may not be without interest and importance.

We have hinted already, that we shall have to content ourselves with selecting certain points of his doctrine, and we begin, for the sake of clearness, by stating the points on which we propose to draw out the teaching of S. Irenæus, and the conclusions which we hope to reach. We shall set out from the doctrine of the Trinity, and show that while many fathers of the first three centuries speak ambiguously or even erroneously on the coeternity of the Son with the Father, S. Irenæus, the only father, of all who discuss the subject, closely connected with the Apostles, speaks as clearly and as explicitly as Athanasius himself for the doctrine which the Church ultimately defined upon this head. Next we shall pass by a natural transition to the doctrine of the Incarnation; and here we shall find that the more carefully we look at the doctrine of Irenæus on the Incarnation, the more force we shall discover in the testimony which has been so often alleged from his writings, in favour of the Immaculate Conception. Finally, we shall add his testimony to the chain of evidence which can be produced

* No one who has any acquaintance with it will think this a hard judgment on Mr. Beaven's book. A very learned edition of S. Irenæus has been published by Mr. Harvey, and a very beautiful and accurate translation by Mr. Keble; but neither of these works discusses the doctrine of S. Irenæus except in the most incidental way.

from the earliest ages, for the Church's perpetual belief in the sacrifice of the Mass, and the Real Presence of our Lord's body and blood in the sacrament of the Altar.

We have however a preliminary remark to make, and it is this : The direct object of the work which S. Irenæus wrote, is to refute the Gnostics rather than to make a formal exposition of his own doctrine. It is for this reason that it needs labour and research to understand his teaching. We have to collect statements which lie scattered through the five books in which he attacks the Gnostic errors, and before we can tell what these statements mean, and what weight they carry, we must keep in mind the nature of the error against which they are directed. In some cases this precaution will enable us to see the full force of the words which S. Irenæus employs, and keep us from explaining them away till their logical force as arguments is gone ; in other cases it will save us from expecting of him doctrinal statements more full and more explicit than he had any occasion to give. The reader will find this principle illustrated best when we come to the doctrine of the Eucharist ; but we shall have to apply it throughout, and we must begin our account of the statements which S. Irenæus makes on the doctrine of the Trinity, with a word or two on the heresy which called these statements forth. A word or two will be enough, for we gave a detailed account in our former article ; and when, through this process of comparison, we have ascertained the exact tenets of the father about whom we are writing, we shall add something which may serve to fix his relation to the other fathers, and to the general tradition of the Church.

The Gnostics then, or rather the Valentinian Gnostics with whom S. Irenæus was in immediate conflict, believed in a long series of æons or spiritual beings, which had emanated from the supreme God. The ground of their belief was this. They had to explain the origin of the material world, and they could not refer it to the supreme God, because they considered everything material, to be impure, and the very notion of contact with it degrading to the supreme and absolute God. Hence they were led to invent their long series of æons, each more and more imperfect, as it was further and further removed from the original and perfect Spirit, till at last the lowest point was reached in this descending scale, and the Demiurge came into existence. He was blind and ignorant in comparison with the higher powers, and therefore he was, according to the ideas of the Gnostics, fit for contact with matter, the principle of imperfection, and for the task of moulding and fashioning it into the world which we see around us.

Now, it is just at this point that S. Irenæus joins issue with his antagonists. In his first book he states with little or no criticism what the theories of the Gnostics were. At the very opening of the second, when he begins his attack upon them, "It is well," he says, "to start with the first and the chief point, with God the Creator, . . . and to show that there is nothing above Him, nothing after Him; that He, without impulse from another, of His own will and freely, made all, since He is the sole God, the sole Lord, the sole Creator, the sole Father." * Elsewhere, he repeats his assertion with increased emphasis. "Justin was right," he tells us, "when he declared in his book against Marcion, 'I would not even have believed the Lord Himself, had He announced any other God beside the Creator of the world.'" † Moreover, he lets us see the principle which drew from him these vehement utterances. Among all the arguments which may be adduced for the existence of God, there is only one on which Irenæus lays any special stress, and that the familiar argument which is drawn from the existence and order of the visible world. ‡ Nor does Irenæus stop here. It is not merely that he proves the existence of God from creatures. He avails himself of the Gnostic hypothesis that the Demiurge made the world; and he argues, if he made the world, it follows that he is, not, as the Gnostics maintained, an inferior being, limited in power and intelligence, but the absolute and supreme God. The first mark, he urges, of God's superiority to man, lies in the fact that He made all out of nothing. § Again, in another argument, he takes for granted that a creature, as such, cannot create, anticipating, in fact, the thesis of the scholastic theologians, that creative action on the part of a creature is an absolute impossibility. || Finally, he sums up his whole position against the Gnostics in the words, "Unus Deus Conditor"—"There is one God, viz. the Creator." ¶

This should suffice to show that to the mind of S. Irenæus the work of creation belongs exclusively to God; and if he speaks of the Son as creator of the world, we may conclude with safety, that he confessed His absolute divinity, and believed that the Son with the Father, (including of course

* Iren., ii. 1, 1.

† Iren., iv. 6, 2.

‡ He states it in ii. 9, 1. "Ipsa enim conditio ostendit eum qui condidit eam; et ipsa factura suggerit eum, qui fecit; et mundus manifestat eum qui se disposuit." This is indeed the only argument for God's existence to which he has recourse, unless we regard the appeal to the general belief of the human race in the same passage as an independent argument.

§ Iren., ii. 10, 4.

|| Iren., iv. 41, 1.

¶ Iren., ii. præf. 1.

the Holy Ghost, as will appear further on,) is the one supreme God. His very point against the Gnostics was the unity of God, and the fact that the one God is the creator of all; and the vital importance of this matter which was, indeed, the hinge upon which the whole controversy turned, must have compelled him to be careful and precise in the terms which he employed. We have an instance of the precision which was thus forced upon him, in the pains he takes to show that Scripture never applies the word "God" to any being except the one true God, unless with the addition of some modifying clause to point out that this sacred name is used in a loose or improper sense.* Yet without qualification or reserve he calls the Word "the creator, the Demiurge, the maker of all things,"† and he describes Him in words taken from the book of Deuteronomy, "as the Lord, who possessed us, and made us, and created us."‡ In short, the Gnostics held that the Demiurge or Creator was an inferior God. Irenæus took this language out of their own mouths. He chose the formula, the Demiurge § is the one God, and therefore he uses the strongest mode of expression open to him, when he calls the Son Demiurge, or artificer of all.

We have done our best to make this point clear. It throws light upon the doctrine of the Trinity as S. Irenæus received it from the disciples of the Apostles. Nor is this all. It helps us to understand the place S. Irenæus holds among the ante-Nicene fathers. Even within the pale of the Church, we find in fathers more remote than S. Irenæus from the fountain-head of Apostolic tradition, a doctrine less pronounced and less consistent than his, on the Godhead of the Son. It is well known, for example, that Origen held clearer views than many of his contemporaries on the divinity of the Word. Yet even Origen denied distinctly that all things were made by the Word. "If," he says, in his commentary on S. John, "if all things were made *through* the Word" (i.e., as he thought, through the instrumentality of the Word), "they were not made *by* the Word, but by Him who is mightier and greater than the Word," i.e., as he proceeds to explain, by the Father.|| S. Athanasius

* Iren., iii. 6, 3.

† Iren., i. 15, 5.

‡ Iren., iv. 31, 2.

§ *Δημιουργός* never occurs in the New Testament as a name of God. Indeed, the sacred writers nowhere use it at all, except in a single passage; viz. Heb. xi. 10.

|| In Joann., tom. ii. 6. See also Petav. de Trinitate, vii. 17, 6. We do not forget that in Hebrews i. 10 creation is attributed directly to the Son. But the authority of this epistle was not recognized throughout the Church till the close of the fourth century.

and the other fathers who contended for the definition of the Nicene Council, use the language of S. Irenæus; and we may note this as one among many instances of the way in which history supports the Catholic, and refutes the infidel views on the origin of dogma. The belief in the full Divinity of Christ did not grow, as it passed from the hands of one father to those of another, till at last it was defined by the Church in its fullest and most explicit form. On the contrary, she proclaimed the doctrine of the Trinity as it had been delivered by the Apostles, and defined a truth which needed definition, because it had been obscured by the lapse of time and by the course of speculation.

To return, however, to S. Irenæus. After the quotations we have made already, it is not worth while to quote passages in which he calls the Son, God, because this is a title which all Catholics have notoriously given Him from the beginning, and which is not, taken by itself, a test of Catholic orthodoxy, since even the Arians did not venture to withhold it. It is worth noting, however, that Irenæus speaks of the "Father, with His Word," as "the only Lord and God";* thus implying the unity of their essence, and the consequence which results from it; viz., that the Son is God as fully and as truly as the Father. Moreover, in asserting the divinity of the Son, Irenæus holds language which anticipates the controversies of a later day, and forbids us to doubt which side he would have chosen in the strife between Catholics and Arians, or even between Catholics and Semi-Arians. When the Arians wanted to express the inferiority of the Son to the Father, they insisted that the Father, as the absolute God, was incomprehensible in His own nature, and therefore incomprehensible even to the Son. Such was the language which the Arian Maximinus held in his controversy with S. Augustine,† and Arius himself laid down the same cardinal principle in the words, "the Son can endure to look upon the Father only so far as the *measure* of His own being permits."‡ Now, long before the rise of Arianism, the Gnostics had put forth a similar error. The first God, according to their theory, was incomprehensible, even to the æons who emanated from Him.§ Irenæus, of course, admitted with them, that God, as God, is incomprehensible, and he could not have differed from them on this head, unless he had forgotten one of the most familiar parts of Christian teaching.|| He is very far, notwithstanding

* Iren., iii. 8, 3.

† Petav. de Trin., viii. 2, 10.

‡ Petav. de Trin., i. 10, 1.

§ Iren., ii. 12, 2.

|| It was one of most familiar ways of describing God's perfections to speak of Him as a Being who was immeasurable, and who could not be

ing, from the idea, that the Father is incomprehensible to the Son. He tells us, that "the Father Himself, immeasurable though He be, is measured in the Son: for the Son is the measure of the Father, since He (the Son) contains Him."* We cannot forbear adding to these words of S. Irenæus the comment of Petavius upon them; and those who know how candid and how fearless this great theologian is in his criticism of the ante-Nicene fathers will understand our motive in doing so. "There is," he writes, "a majesty and a dignity in these words (of Irenæus), which make them worth a great volume, in favour of the absolute equality between the Father and the Son. For if, though the Father be immeasurable and infinite, still the Son contains and measures Him, the Son must be equal to the Father; He must be infinite and immeasurable like Him; and since there is nothing outside the infinite, nothing whatever can be wanting to Him who is the measure of the infinite."†

It will be seen that Irenæus, in the very statements which he makes on the co-equality of the Father and the Son, implies the distinctness of these two Divine Persons; and evidence might easily be multiplied on this latter point.‡ There is no occasion to dwell upon it, but there is a question obviously suggested by his teaching, so far as we have explained it. How, it may be asked, does he stand with regard to the ordinary phraseology of the Church, according to which the Father made all things through the Word? Every one knows that the Arians perverted this scriptural doctrine into an argument against the full divinity of the Son, that they represented the Son as a natural mediator between God and creatures, standing midway between the one and the other. As a matter of fact, Irenæus speaks repeatedly on this head. He could scarcely have failed to do so. The language of S. Paul and S. John was, of course, familiar to him, and he had to reconcile it with his doctrine that the Word was the Creator, not the instrument of creation. And besides the necessities of the controversy in which he was engaged forced him to speak out, and that for the following reason.

The Gnostics, like the Arians, held that intermediate beings were necessary before God could communicate with the world

comprehended; see for example, the fragment of the *Κήρυγμα Πέτρον* in Clem. Al. Strom., vi. 5; Hermas, lib. ii. Mandat. 1; and Iren. himself, ii. 30, 9; iv. 19, 2; iv. 20, 5.

* Iren., iv. 4, 2. Observe that the words are older than S. Irenæus. He introduces them as a quotation. "Bene qui dixit."

† Petav. de Trin., Præf. 3, 2.

‡ Iren., ii. 2, 4. See also, iv. 7, 4.

of creatures, and when Irenæus argued that the supreme God was the immediate Creator, they had a plausible reply ready to their hand; they might have retorted that, even on Catholic principles, the supreme God was not the direct and immediate cause of the world, but made all things through the Word. But S. Irenæus knew well how to secure his doctrine against misinterpretation and attack from this side, and how to manifest the consistency of the Catholic doctrine with itself. Again and again he repeats, God was sufficient in Himself for the creation of the world: He did not stand in need of angels or æons, such as the Gnostics invented, before He could reach the material world. On the other hand, he maintains as strenuously the Catholic and scriptural formula, that God made all through His Word. What is the reconciliation between two propositions which might seem at first sight to clash? Simply this. While the Gnostics held that the world was made through the instrumentality of the Demiurge, because he was different in nature from the supreme God, and fitted by virtue of that difference to serve as a link between God and the world, S. Irenæus, on the contrary, maintained that all things were made through or by the Word, precisely because the Word is of the same nature as the Father, and is with Him the one God, by whom the world was made. The words of the saint himself will serve to put the contrast between his doctrine and that of the Gnostics in its true light, and to show that we have not overstated the accuracy with which he defines the relation between the three Persons of the blessed Trinity. "God," he says, "framed and made all things by His Word, standing in no need, either of angels to help Him in His work,* or of any power far inferior to Him, and ignorant of the Father, . . . but He *in Himself* in a manner surpassing all that we can say or think, pre-ordaining all things, made them as He willed. . . All that was made, *he made by His Word*, who cannot be wearied";* that is to say, while the Gnostics held that the Father created through the agency of spirits outside of Himself, and so inferior to Him, S. Irenæus believed that He created through the Word, who is not without, but within Him, because He is one God with the Father. He puts the same truth in another form, when in establishing the principle that God, because He has no beginning, therefore needed no external assistance for the work of creation, he anticipates the objection that, after all, even on the Catholic hypothesis, God made the world through the Word, by the statement that the Word

* See e.g., Iren., iii. 6, 1.

with the Father is the one self-sufficient God.* Again, following the terminology of his time, he describes the Son and the Holy Ghost as "the hands of God, to whom the Father speaks and says, Let us make man to our own image and likeness."† The passages we have given already explain the sense in which he calls the Son and the Holy Ghost the hands, not the instruments; for a hand belongs to the nature of man, an instrument is something external and heterogeneous. Lastly, S. Irenæus is so firm in his conviction that the Son and the Holy Ghost are one God with the Father, that he considers it all one to say, God created by Himself, or the Father created through the Son and the Holy Ghost. "He is the Father," we read, "He is God, He it is who created, made, and fashioned things through Himself, that is, through the Word, and through His Wisdom" (i.e. the Holy Ghost).‡ It is difficult to conceive a profession of faith in the one Godhead of the Holy Trinity more clear and more explicit.

Besides, we must not forget that the force of the evidence which we have given does not lie in single expressions, however strong, nor again in striking coincidences with the language of later times. Indeed, these coincidences of terminology are wanting altogether, or nearly altogether,§ in Irenæus, and he is as inferior to Tertullian§ in happy anticipation of the terms which the Church afterwards adopted in her definitions, as he is superior in the general tenour and consistency of his teaching on the Godhead of the Son. Indeed, he is superior in this respect, not only to Tertullian, but also to most of the ante-Nicene fathers. And we may attribute this to two causes. First, his close connection with S. Polycarp and other disciples of the Apostles gave him special opportunities of knowing the faith once delivered in its integrity and fulness. Next, falling short as he does, of Tertullian and Origen in gifts of mind and learning, he exhibits that consistent tenacity

* Iren., v. 1, 3; and so Θεοῦ Χεῖρ, v. 5, 2.

† Iren., ii. 30, 9. Wisdom in Irenæus signifies the Holy Ghost. See iv. 7, 4; and Theoph. ad Autol., ii. 15.

‡ There is only one instance which occurs to us of such an anticipation, viz. the words τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ἐνώσει, τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν φύσει, ἐνωθέντος τῇ σαρκί in the 28th of Massuet's Fragments. But Massuet took the supposed fragment of Irenæus from a MS. catena, and it would need a great deal more than the authority of a catena to convince us that it really belongs to a lost work of S. Irenæus.

§ Compare, for instance, unam substantiam in tribus coherentibus, and the use of the word "Persona" in Tertull. adv. Prax., 12, and the remarkable passage, "Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum, sed conjunctum, in una persona, deum et hominem, Jesum . . . Substantiæ ambæ in statu suo quæque, distincte agebant."—Ib. 27.

in preserving the tradition of the faith, which fits a man better than any natural gift to rank as a doctor of the Church. Indeed, we may fitly consider him as, above all others, the doctor of the Church in the ante-Nicene age. And we proceed to make a brief comparison between his teaching and that of the other ante-Nicene fathers on the doctrine, because this is the only reasonable way of testing the value of his doctrinal statements and the greatness of his position.

To some extent, indeed, we have done so already, but it has been by the way, for up to this point we have been occupied chiefly in drawing out his own doctrine on the Trinity, and contrasting it with that of his heretical opponents. Now that we have finished this part of our task, we may dismiss the subject of the Gnostics for a little, and try to measure S. Irenæus directly and immediately by the standard of the other fathers who lived before the Nicene Council. The method which we shall follow is a very simple one, and it is better fitted perhaps than any other for enabling us to form an accurate judgment. We propose to examine his position with regard to two cardinal difficulties, which were the fruitful sources of error and confusion on the doctrine of the Trinity within the ante-Nicene Church.

Of these the former concerns the Eternal Word in His relation to creatures. It was the general doctrine of the fathers down to S. Augustine, that whenever we read in the Old Testament of God appearing to the patriarchs or prophets, we must attribute the apparition, not to God the Father, nor to the Three Persons in common, but to God the Son. "Even then, even from the beginning," in the beautiful words of Tertullian, the Son "was learning to be man."* S. Irenæus fully accepts this premise, or, as we ought rather to say, he takes it for granted. It is one of his favourite arguments for the unity of the two Testaments that the same God who was incarnate of the Blessed Virgin had appeared long before to the patriarchs, had conversed with Abraham and Moses, and "assuming from the first the likeness of His creatures," had revealed the Father to them.† So far Irenæus is at one with the rest of the early fathers. The contrast between him and many among them, however, begins the moment we turn from this opinion on the apparition of God the Word, to the consequences which were deduced from it. We should expect

* Adv. Marc., ii. 27.

† Iren., iv. 6, 7; iv. 9, 1; iv. 10, 1; Frag. 23. As to the doctrine of the fathers generally on this point, see a note in the Oxford translation of Tertullian, *Præscr.* 13.

to find a theory of this sort perverted and abused. It was natural that even those who believed, (as all the fathers believed, and must have believed, from the mere fact that they were Catholics,) in the Divinity of the Son, should be led into doubtful or erroneous language by the evident contrast between the Father, "whom no man has seen or can see," and the Son, who appeared again and again to the chosen people. It was natural that they should fall into some inconsistency and speak without seeing all that their language involved, as if God the Son was inferior and subordinate to God the Father. They had, too, a further and stronger inducement to place the Son, even before His incarnation, in subordination to the Father, from the fact that in doing so they were able to recommend the Christian faith to Jews of the Alexandrian school, or again to heathens seeking after the truth, and inclined to accept the Church's creed if it could be put in philosophical form. This is what we should expect a priori, and the facts of history abundantly confirm the expectation. Justin, for instance, in his Dialogue with the Jew Trypho, reminds him of the divine apparitions mentioned in the Pentateuch. He begins by distinguishing between "the God who was seen by Abraham" and the God who ever "remains above the heavens and has been seen by no man." Then, returning to the same subject, he tries to convince his opponent that "this God, who, as the Scriptures say, appeared to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, is different from the God who made all,"* or, to quote another of his expressions, "a God *under* the Maker of the Universe,"† and he supports his thesis by the argument that "the Maker and Father of all" could not have "left the region above the sky, and have appeared in a little corner of the earth."‡ Tertullian makes the same distinction between the visible God, and he gives explicitly the reason for the visibility of the Son which Justin implies. "He who was seen," he writes in his book against Praxeas, "must be different (from Him who was not seen). For we cannot define Him who was seen as invisible, and we come to the conclusion that we must understand the Father to be invisible, as befits the fulness of His Majesty, and recognize a Son visible, *according to the measure of His derivation*" (from the Father).§ Novatian and Origen, as Petavius shows, committed themselves to the same erroneous language, and thus supplied the Semi-Arians with an argument against the co-equal Majesty of the Son,—an argument of which they did not fail to take advantage.||

* Justin, Dial., c. 56.
§ Adv. Prax., 14.

† Justin, Dial., ib. ‡ Ib., 60.
|| Petav. de Trin., viii. 2, 4, seq.

But we have done enough to indicate how easily speculation opened the way to error on this point, and how dangerous the error was. We proceed to prove that it was error in which Irenæus had no part, nay, that it was an error condemned in terms by the Apostolic tradition as he had received it. We will let the Saint speak for himself, for his words are too clear and too direct to stand in need of much comment. "He who was invisible" (it is thus that he describes the Incarnation), "He who was invisible became visible; He who was incomprehensible, comprehensible; He who was impassible became passible; the Word became man."* "The Word, being invisible by nature, became subject to the touch and to the sight of men."† Let the reader observe that Irenæus makes the Son *invisible by nature*, and regards His appearance in visible form as an effect which flowed not from the limited extent of His Majesty, but from the greatness of His condescension. Then let him mark the contrast between the language of Irenæus and that of Tertullian, remembering that on this point Tertullian represents a large number of early fathers.

The second great difficulty which perplexed the fathers of the ante-Nicene age and was the occasion of errors within the Church which afterwards contributed to the spread of Arianism, turns upon the eternal generation of God the Son. We use the word Son of set purpose, because, while the eternity of the Word was held and taught by the Catholic fathers, as with one mouth, the title of Son, which Scripture and tradition assigned to the Word, involved conceptions hard to reconcile with His eternity. If He was Son, then He must have been begotten or generated by the Father. And before the term "Son" could be understood and explained in a system of philosophical Christianity, it was necessary to define "generation." It was natural, especially for Christians who were labouring to win educated heathens, to turn for the definition to the Greek philosophers; and, apart from this, the opinions of the philosophers on such points represented the general opinions of educated and reflecting men, the opinions which minds like those of Justin or Theophilus would employ instinctively, the moment they began to reason on the things of faith. Let us see, then, what Aristotle, the great master of definition, has to say on the meaning of "generation." It is, he says, a change from non-existence to existence.‡ Thus "an eternal generation," or an eternal Son,

* Iren., iii. 16, 6.

† Iren., iv. 24, 2.

‡ Apud Petav. de Trin., v. 6, 10. "The change from not being a subject to being a subject according to contradiction, is generation."

seemed to involve a contradiction in terms. Because "the Son" was a Son, there must have been an epoch in which, as yet, He was not Son, and another in which He began to be the Son of God.

The Arians were able to avail themselves of this principle to its full extent, and to argue "the Word of God was begotten; therefore there was a time when, as yet, He was not." We do not, of course, accuse the holy Fathers, or any one among them, of holding such a portent of heresy as this. But we do maintain that many of them unconsciously sacrificed the integrity and purity of their faith upon this point to intellectual difficulties which pressed hard upon them. Removed from them as we are by the interval of fifteen centuries, it needs an effort of historical imagination to realize the work they had to do and the circumstances under which they had to do it. They had Scripture and tradition and the teaching Church to guide them, no doubt; but neither Scripture nor tradition gave the truth in a systematic or philosophical form, while the time had not come when the Church employed philosophical formulas in her teaching, and so pronounced directly on the intellectual controversies which were before them. They had to attempt the reconciliation of faith and reason, to correct the errors of philosophy, and to invent a new set of terms to express the new ideas which they wished to convey to others.

The point with which we are dealing just now is an instance of the incidental failures with which they accomplished their task. They believed and confessed the eternity of the Word, but then they had to face the seeming contradiction, that this Word was also Son, and as Son must have had a beginning. Accordingly they had recourse to a distinction which was inconsistent with an adequate belief in the unchangeable simplicity of the Divine nature. They admitted that the Second Person of the blessed Trinity was eternal, that the Word had been with the Father before all ages, but they denied that this Word had always been Son. The very title of λόγος seemed to lend itself to this distinction, and helped them to render it intelligible. Λόγος, they said, may mean, first, the conception which lies hidden in the mind (the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), and next the spoken Word (the λόγος προφορικός), which leaps forth from the mind, and is the outward expression of the conception within the mind. This, as it seemed, was the key to the apparent contradiction. From all eternity the Word had been hidden in the bosom of the Father, as His λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, till He came forth from the Father as the λόγος προφορικός, and by this procession or generation began

to be the Son. Moreover, Scripture, as they thought, supplied a notice of the object with which, nay of the time at which, this change occurred. S. Paul calls the Son, "the first-begotten of all creation"; and many similar expressions in the Old Testament, as well as in the New, in which the generation of the Son is connected with the creation of the world, will readily suggest themselves to the reader. It was for the work of creation, then, that the "hidden Word" came forth from the Father. He became the Son, and as Son the beginning of the creation of God; He became the uttered or spoken Word, and as the word of man manifests the thoughts which lie within his heart, so it became His office to manifest the mind of the Father to creatures.

We have abstained from giving quotations and references to prove the widespread existence of this theory. It is unnecessary to do so, because we suppose that every one, of the small number who are interested in the subject, has read and re-read the masterly essay which F. Newman has lately published on the "Causes of the Success of Arianism." In that dissertation, short as it is, F. Newman has examined with a close and accurate scrutiny, of which, so far as we are aware, there has been no previous example, the doctrine of each among the ante-Nicene fathers on the generation of the Son. He has shown, and he has shown to demonstration, that, except in the Alexandrian* school, all the ante-Nicene fathers, with the single exception of Irenæus, held that the generation of the Son was temporal and not eternal. Moreover, Father Newman accounts for the full Catholic doctrine which Irenæus puts forth on this question by the fact that he belonged to "what may be called the Apostolic family," and we think that we may appeal to his great authority for the view which we have been trying to enforce in this and in a previous essay, viz., that the teaching of the earlier fathers coincides with the subsequent definitions of the Church on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, just so far as these fathers confined themselves to the office of handing down the apostolic tradition intact, and diverges from them just so far as these fathers brought speculations of their own to bear on the original deposit of the faith.

And now to come to the actual doctrine of S. Irenæus on

* But F. Newman excepts the Councils at Antioch, A.D. 264-272. And he adds, "There is also one great exception in the West And it is where it ought to be, in the See of S. Peter" (p. 252). We hope, at some future time, to say something on the doctrine of the Trinity in the third century, with special reference to the Roman tradition on this subject. What we have said in the text may suffice to illustrate the position of S. Irenæus.

the eternal generation of the Son. It is a striking and important fact that he should reiterate this great mystery in unambiguous language, but it is still more important to notice the way in which he does so, because it brings into relief the place as an historical witness for tradition, which we have been claiming for him throughout. The fathers who flourished after the Nicene Council, and defended the creed which it imposed against Arian blasphemy, were never weary of repeating that we must accept the eternal generation because it was part of the faith, and beware of measuring the truths of revelation by the standard of human reason.* S. Irenæus takes exactly the same ground, and, partly from natural temperament, partly because he saw the mischief which Gnostic speculation had done already, he is shy of explaining and adapting to the ideas of philosophy the mysterious belief which he had inherited from the tradition of the Apostles. "If any one," he says, "fails to find the reason for all the things which he examines, let him consider that man is infinitely inferior to God. . . . For thou, O man, art not uncreated nor wert thou always with God, as was His proper Word."† Following the same train, he rejects all distinction between the Word hidden in the bosom of the Father (the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), and the Word spoken or uttered and born to be a Son (λόγος προφορικός), and this on the ground that such a distinction is repugnant to the simplicity of God, and is grounded upon human conceptions, which we cannot on our own authority transfer to the Divine essence. It is true, he admits, that we first form an idea within the mind, and then give it external utterance in the spoken word, but we have no right to apply notions borrowed from our own imperfect nature to the generation of the Word, that generation which, as the prophet says, none can describe.‡ And the same principle which preserved him from error led him to enunciate fearlessly the eternity of the "Son." We must draw attention again to the form in which his statement is made, because it shows how far he was from that false distinction between the eternity of the Word and the eternity of the Son, so familiar, as F. Newman tells us, to the greater number of the ante-Nicene fathers. "We have given many proofs," such is the language of S. Irenæus, "that the Word, *that is the Son*, was ever with the Father."§ He goes on in the same section to prove by Scripture that the same eternal existence belongs to the Holy

* See Petav. de Trin., v. 6, ad init.

† Iren., ii. 25, 3.

‡ Iren., ii. 28, 5, where Is. liii. 8 is quoted, according to the LXX. For a perfect contrast to this passage, see Tertull. adv. Prax., 5.

§ Iren., iv. 20, 3.

Ghost, and thus completes the confession of his faith in the mystery of the Trinity.

We cannot, however, pass from the consideration of the saint's doctrine on the Holy Trinity without noticing objections which may be drawn from his writings and advanced against the account which we have been giving. The discussion of them need not detain us long, for they reduce themselves to two heads, and it will give us the opportunity of adding a remark which will prevent a possible misconstruction of our meaning. We have claimed for S. Irenæus a fulness and clearness of view on the mystery of the Trinity which justifies us in placing him far above the mass of the ante-Nicene fathers, and on a level with S. Athanasius and S. Basil. We have spoken of him as a witness to the entire tradition of the Apostles on the Godhead of the Son. Now we have to append a remark which qualifies, though it does not in any way contradict, what we have said above. We do not pretend, that it is possible to find in S. Irenæus the perfect accuracy and consistency of theological thought and language, with which we meet in the scholastic divines. He escaped the dangers of speculation: he stood where S. Athanasius stood after him. Still, when once the traditional belief was fixed and secured, then philosophy could be employed with safety and with advantage in the service of faith; reflection and methodical statement had their work to do; inconsistencies of language had to be cleared away; principles had to be carried out to their logical consequences; and we do not imagine for a moment that all this was done by S. Irenæus. True, his inconsistencies are few in number; they are of small importance if we compare them with those of most among the ante-Nicene fathers: they are common to great fathers like S. Athanasius, who lived later, and are usually accepted as the champions of the orthodox faith with regard to the Holy Trinity. Still, as it seems to us, they are inconsistencies none the less, and ought to be recognized as such; and the fact that they have been grossly exaggerated in the interest of heresy will not justify us in ignoring them or explaining them away. But the passages themselves which call for explanation, will give our readers the best idea on the amount of explanation which it is possible to give.

First, then, S. Irenæus appears to hold, on the authority of Mark xiii. 32, that God the Son did not know when the day of judgment was to be, and to support his thesis by interpreting the words of our Lord in S. John xiv. 28, "the Father is greater than I," as if they meant that the Person of God the Father was greater than that of God the Son. He is reproach-

ing the Gnostics with their irrational pretence of knowing everything, however mysterious, and he does so in the following words:—"You have the courage to declare that you know the ineffable mysteries of God: but what is this except unreasonable presumption? Since even the Lord, the very Son of God, granted that the Father alone knew the day and the hour of judgment, and plainly declared of that day and hour none knoweth (nay not the Son) save the Father alone. If, then, the Son was not ashamed to *refer the knowledge of that day to the Father*, but spoke the truth, neither let us be ashamed to reserve for God questions above our capacity."* If, he continues, we are questioned about the generation of the Son, we must answer in a like spirit, that it is an unutterable mystery. Shortly after, returning to the Son's ignorance about the day of judgment, he says, "If any one asks why it is that the Father, though He imparts all that is His (communicans in omnibus) to the Son, is alone *manifested by our Lord as knowing the hour and the day*, he will find in the present life no other answer more fit and becoming, no other answer free from peril except this. . . . It was to make us learn through Him (i.e. through the Son) that the Father is above all. For the Father, so He speaks, is greater than I. Even in point of knowledge, then, our Lord declares that the Father is *placed first* (præpositus) in order that we, so far as we are in the figure of this world, may leave perfect knowledge and questions such as these to God."†

These passages have been alleged naturally enough by Socinian writers, and various answers have been attempted on the other side. Bull ‡ interprets them as referring to our Lord in His human nature, and he speaks with positive contempt and impatience of those who have understood them of the Son as God. Yet we feel convinced that this is the only natural, perhaps the only possible interpretation. Irenæus distinctly speaks of our Lord, not as man, but as "the very Son of God." In the immediate context he alludes to the divine generation, and throughout he is contrasting the two Persons of the Trinity, not the two natures of our Lord. On the other hand, it is a thousand times more inconceivable that he should have attributed a real and literal ignorance to the Son in His divine nature. In doing so, he would have fallen into the grossest contradiction with himself. In this very context, he tells the Gnostics that the "spirit of the Saviour . . . searches all things, even the depths of God"; that the Father "communicates in all things with the Son"; and just as he had said

* Iren., ii. 28, 6.

† Ib., 8.

‡ Def. Fid. Nicen., ii. 5, 8.

that we must leave questions too deep for us to God, so, as if it were the same thing, he says we must "leave them to God and to His Word."

We believe the real meaning of S. Irenæus to be this. The Son is God, and therefore knows all things, the day and hour of judgment included. But first His divine nature and knowledge come to Him from the Father, who is the fountain-head of the Godhead, and so greater than the Son. Next, in receiving the divine nature and omniscience, the Son receives the divine will which is one with them. Hence, although He has received the knowledge of the day of judgment, He has not received the will to reveal it. To us, it is as if He did not know it. He "refers" it back to the Father. He does not "manifest" His own knowledge of it. We have italicised these words in quoting the passages from S. Irenæus because they mark the studied caution with which he was speaking, and they prompt us to look for a meaning which lies below the surface. Any one who cares to examine the subject thoroughly, will find in Petavius a passage very similar from a father so late and of such undoubted orthodoxy as Epiphanius.*

In one respect this solution may seem forced and arbitrary, because the Father as well as the Son did not know the day of judgment, so as to reveal it. No one, however, who has read Irenæus with care will raise this difficulty. To S. Irenæus the Son is the "*visibile Patris*,"† the visible manifestation of the Father and Son, even before He took our flesh. He was constantly appearing in the world which had been made through Him, and manifesting the Father. Revelation was the special office of the Son, and not of the Father. It would have been forced and unnatural, if Irenæus had said that the Father did not know the day of judgment, and had meant only that He did not know it, so as to reveal it to us. But the case is different when he uses the same words with the same meaning of the Son, because the very name of Son called up the idea of revelation to man. And those to whom this idea was present and familiar could not be perplexed when S. Irenæus taught in the same breath that the Son knew all things, and that the "Father alone was *manifested* as knowing the day of judgment."

So far we have adopted the explanation given by Massuet‡ and Maranus§ against the Socinians on the one hand and Bull upon the other. We venture however to differ from the two first writers on one point, because we think there is a

* Epiphanius, Hæc., 69, 29, apud Petav. de Trin., vii. 15, 4.

† Iren., iv. 6, 6.

‡ Diss. iii. no. 61.

§ De Divinitate Jesu Christi, iv. 9, 6.

defect in the teaching of Irenæus even as explained by them. He does not, so far as we are aware, show any clear sense of the doctrine enforced and proved in the scholastic theology, that the Person of the Father is constituted by His relation to the Son, no less than the Person of the Son by His relation to the Father;* and again as a consequence of this, that the dignity of the Father is no way greater than the dignity of the Son; that Father and Son are equal in personal dignity as well as one in essence. Nay, in the course of his argument we can trace his failure to perceive this when he interprets the text "The Father is greater than I" of our Lord in His divine nature. The vast majority even of the later fathers take the words in the same way, and Socinians might appeal to them with as much right as to Irenæus. But when the interpretation implied in the Athanasian Creed, "equal to the Father in His divinity, inferior to the Father in His humanity," once obtained general acceptance, it was a clear gain to Catholic theology. We may add that the words of our Lord, "the Father is greater than I," as they stand in S. John, suggest this interpretation; but this is a point which does not concern us here.

The second defect in the language S. Irenæus holds on the doctrine of the Trinity is closely allied to that which we have just considered, for both the one and the other are connected with the relation of the Divine Persons to creatures. Catholic theology teaches that it is only in His human nature that the Word is subject or subordinate to the Father. Yet Irenæus habitually speaks of the Word, even before He took our flesh, as "ministering" to the Father, as "assisting" Him in the government of the world, and of the Father as "giving a command" to the Word. He is commenting, for example, on the verse of the psalm, "He commanded, and they were created: He spoke, and they were made." Then he puts the question, "To whom did He give the command? To the Word, no doubt, by whom the heavens were established, and all the strength of them by the spirit of His mouth."† Had this language been used of the Word only, we might have reverted to the fact that S. Irenæus regarded the apparitions of the Word as preludes to His incarnation, and might have suggested, that he transformed, by a figure of speech, language which fitted the Word incarnate to that same Word when He was, as it were, on the way to His incarnation, and already appearing to bear the bodily figure which He bore afterwards

* This is well put by Kuhn, *Trinitätslehre*, p. 169.

† Iren., iii. 8, 3. Similar language will be found in iv. 7, 4; v. 5, 2.

in reality. But this solution is excluded by the fact that he speaks in exactly the same terms of the Holy Spirit. He represents the Third as well as the Second Person of the Trinity as "ministering" to the Father.*

Here, as in regard to the former difficulty, Massuet's explanation is quite just, in the main. He reminds us, and with justice, that the "ministration" of the Son, as Irenæus understands it, is by no means the service rendered by an inferior to a superior being, but, on the contrary, of one person who is God, to another person who is God, and he quotes words of Irenæus himself which are strictly in point. "These things the Son, who is the Word of God, contrived from the first, since the Father did not need angels to make the universe . . . but had an abundant and unspeakable ministration. For in all things His own offspring and His own image minister to Him, that is the Word and the Holy Spirit."† Massuet might have added that S. Athanasius† himself applied the same expression "minister" to the Son in His divine nature. But again we are obliged to differ from Massuet when he professes to justify S. Irenæus completely, and argues as if it were equally accurate to speak of the Son's "ministration" and the Son's "mission." It is right to insist that S. Irenæus represents the Persons of the Trinity as the one God. But surely it is right also to acknowledge that he represents the Second and Third Persons as taking upon Themselves, in the creation and government of the world, an inferior office to the Father, and so "ministering." It follows no doubt as a logical consequence from the doctrine of the Trinity, that action of the Three Persons in the world without is one and indivisible; so that, apart from the Incarnation, there can be no question of one Person ministering to another. But, till some proof is forthcoming that S. Irenæus was aware of this, we must be allowed to take his words in their obvious sense, and to view them as inaccuracies of language, which betray inaccuracies of thought.

Only such inaccuracies, after full allowance has been made for them, count for very little in a general estimate of this father's doctrine in the Trinity. He teaches that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are the one eternal God who created the world; that the Son and the Holy Ghost are consubstantial with the Father. With regard to the Son, in particular, he holds that He was Son from all eternity, begotten by an ineffable generation, and is in His divine nature invisible and incom-

* Iren., iv. 7, 4.

† Loc. cit.

‡ Athanas. Orat., ii. 22; but see F. Newman's notes in his translation of S. Athanas., p. 15, note d; p. 118, note n; p. 311, note i.

prehensible, no less than the Father who begot Him. In fine, S. Irenæus teaches, on the mystery of the Trinity, all that S. Athanasius taught a century and a half later; and with this amount of evidence for the Apostolic origin of the Church's teaching on this central truth, we can afford to be content.

When the equality of the Father and Son has once been firmly established, the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, to those at least who accept the Scriptures of the New Testament, follows almost as a matter of course; and, besides, it is a much easier matter to confute the heresies of Apollinaris, or Nestorius, or Eutyches, from the tradition of the first three centuries, than it is to prove the novelty of Semi-Arianism by the same means. For this reason, we shall state very briefly the theology of S. Irenæus on the Incarnate Word, and pass on as quickly as may be to the purpose and results of the Incarnation as viewed by him.

S. Irenæus then affirms against the Ebionites, who made Christ a mere man, that in the Incarnation there was "a union of God and man";* and we need not repeat the passages already quoted, in which he asserts the pre-existence and divinity of Jesus Christ. Against the Gnostics he affirms the reality of the flesh which the Word took; and in his attack upon them he contradicts by anticipation the heresy of Apollinaris, that the Word supplied the place of a rational soul. For he holds not only that the Word "was made flesh," but also that He "was made man";† and this is not merely an incidental expression, for he states explicitly that the Word took all that belongs to the nature of man. Christ, he says, "gave His soul for our souls, His own flesh for our flesh";‡ and it is plain that, under the word "soul," he includes the rational as well as the animal principle; for elsewhere he writes, "All will allow that we are composed of a body taken from the earth, and of a soul, which receives the spirit from God. This, therefore, the Word of God became, gathering up the work of His own hands into Himself, and therefore he confesses Himself the Son of Man."§ Again, we can deduce from the language of S. Irenæus his belief that God and man were united in one Divine Person, and the *communicatio idiomatum*, the truth that is of propositions, such as "God died," "The man Christ Jesus is God over all," which results from this union. Nothing, for instance, could prove this better than the fol-

* Iren., v. 1, 3.

† Iren., v. 1, 1.

† Iren., iii. 18, 7.

§ Iren., iii. 22, 1.

lowing words, which occur in his fifth book: "The Incarnate Word of God hung upon the wood";* "The Word of God is in truth the maker of the world; now He is our Lord; who . . . was made flesh and hung upon the wood."† Lastly, as Irenæus teaches the perfect humanity of Christ, unlike Apollinaris, the unity of His Person, unlike Nestorius, so he teaches the distinctness of His two natures, unlike Eutyches. Thus, after asserting that "the Word of God . . . was anointed by the Father with the Spirit," he adds, "Inasmuch as the Word of God was a man from the root of Jesse, and a son of Abraham, in respect to this (i.e. because of His human nature), the Spirit of God rested upon Him, and He was anointed, that He might preach the gospel to the lowly. But inasmuch as He was God (*secundum quod Deus*, i.e. in His Divine nature) He did not judge according to reputation, nor reprove men (merely) according to speech, for He had no need that any one should give testimony of man, since He knew what was in man."‡

We will not dwell longer on the doctrine of the Incarnation considered in itself. But we are anxious to draw out the meaning and the purpose of the Incarnation as S. Irenæus understood them; and this we wish to do with special reference to the Immaculate Conception of the blessed Virgin, and to the high place which she holds in the economy of our redemption. Father Newman has shown how lofty a conception Irenæus had of the dignity which belongs to the Mother of the Word made flesh. S. Irenæus represents her as taking in the Incarnation the place which Eve held in Paradise. He describes her as being "to herself and the whole human race the cause of salvation"; as the Virgin who conquered the serpent, who by her obedience made up for Eve's disobedience, and untied the knots with which sin had bound us; and extending her influence back to the beginning of our race, became the "advocate of Eve," the first cause of our ruin. Moreover, Father Newman has shown that Irenæus is not singular in the parallel which he draws between Mary and Eve. It appears from the earliest times, and in the most distant quarters of the Church, in Justin, in the epistle to Diognetus, and in Tertullian. And thus we have strong grounds for supposing that it descended to the early fathers from the original teaching of the Apostles. It is not, however, with them, but with Irenæus, that we are concerned here. We have to consider what he says about the blessed Virgin in connection with his view of the Incarnation as a

* Iren., v. 18, 1.

† *Ib.*, 3.

‡ Iren., iii. 9, 3.

whole. And we cannot but hope that his words on Mary's place as Eve the second will gain in force and weight when we have fitted them, as it were, into their proper place. One thing is certain. When he drew the parallel between Mary and Eve, he was not led away by devotional feeling, he did not use a simile which suggested itself at the moment without caring to weigh his words. On the contrary, to him the doctrine that Mary is the second Eve formed an integral part of the theology of the Incarnation. Had she not been what she was, in her dignity and her prerogative, then the work of Christ, as Irenæus conceived it, would have been incomplete.

Now it has been the common practice among a large school of Protestants to fix the attention almost exclusively upon the death of Christ, and to speak as if He took our nature simply that He might offer His blood in atonement for our sins. This is not an adequate account of the New Testament teaching on this central mystery, and it is not, as we proceed to show, the point of view taken by S. Irenæus. Indeed, he says far less upon the death of our blessed Lord than is to be found in the later fathers, or in any modern book of Catholic theology. He contents himself with repeating, almost in the exact words of Scripture, that our Lord "ransomed us with His own blood; that He gave His soul for our souls, His own flesh for our flesh."* But he does not work out the truth which these words contain in any theory of his own. Nay, from the beginning to the end of his work, he never once tells us to whom Christ paid the price of His blood; and we cannot be sure that he ever entertained a question which seems an obvious one, and which was discussed shortly after the time of S. Irenæus by Origen.† He held, however, a very distinct theory on the purpose of the Incarnation, and this theory he puts in one word, "*recapitulatio*," or *ἀνακεφαλαιώσις*, i.e. summing or gathering up. This word is the key to his whole theory. It occurs some twenty times with reference to the Incarnation, and always in the same sense. It signifies that Christ, as the second Adam, became all that the first Adam was, or rather ought to have been. "The Word who was to save us," Irenæus says, "became that which the man who perished had been"; ‡ our Lord summed or gathered up in

* Iren., v. 1, 1.

† Origen, Hom. in Matt., tom. xvi. 8, ad fin., where he argues that Christ gave His *πνεῦμα* to the Father, but his *ψυχή* to the devil, as a ransom for our souls, which the devil held in bondage. Attempts have been made by Baur and others to impose this theory on S. Irenæus, but without solid grounds. Indeed, it would be easy to show that Baur's statement (*Dogmengeschichte*, p. 131) is directly contrary to fact.

‡ Iren., v. 14, 2; and so iii. 18, 7, "*hominis antiquam plasmationem in se recapitulans*" (v. 21, 1), and in many other places.

Himself all that which man had been while still in Paradise. And now let us see how it comes that this "recapitulation" or "summing up" holds so important a place in the plan of redemption, as S. Irenæus understood it.

We have pointed out already how strenuously he contends for the initial truth, that the world and mankind were made by the hand of God. He admits, of course, the existence of evil and the dominion of the devil within it; but, at the same time, he maintains that the devil's mastery over us was unjust*—that his rule was that of an apostate and a robber.† Further, although God permitted the devil to invade a territory in which he had no right, God never abandoned the world to him. He was ever present with His creatures; from time to time He sent His divine Word to visit them, and, above all, when the fulness of time came, He discomfited the devil and put him to open shame. "The whole economy of man's salvation was effected according to the decree of the Father, in order that God might not be overcome, nor His workmanship impaired."‡ This economy was contrived in such a way that God's power and majesty were fully vindicated on the one hand, and the just degree of shame and discomfiture measured out to the devil upon the other. God's power was vindicated, because man, His workmanship, was renewed after God's likeness, "gathered into that man who at the first was made after the image of God."§ The devil received the just measure of discomfiture, for he was worsted utterly through the very means by which he had gained an apparent victory. "Through a woman he had exercised his tyranny over man from the beginning"; through the seed of the woman his head was crushed; || so that, "as by a man death won the palm of victory over us, so by a man we in our turn may win the palm of victory over death."¶

This last sentence contains the chief requisite in God's plan of redemption, as Irenæus views it. It was not enough that God should vindicate Himself; He had to vindicate His workmanship; it was necessary that man should return to the sanctity and obedience for which God had destined him, and overcome the devil as God had meant him to overcome. Yet this was a task for which fallen man was utterly unfit. "It was not possible for that man who had once been conquered

* "Injuste nobis dominabatur Apostasia."—Iren., v. 1, 1; and so v. 21, 3.

† Iren., v. 24, 4.

‡ Iren., iii. 23, 1.

§ We have substituted the verb for the verbal noun. The exact words are "our gathering into (recapitulationem) that man who at the beginning was made after the image of God."—Iren., v. 12, 4.

|| Iren., v. 21, 1.

¶ Ib.

and bruised by disobedience to be moulded afresh, and to obtain the prize of victory. Again, it was impossible for him, who had fallen under sin, to obtain salvation." "Each of these things," so Irenæus continues, "each of these things was wrought by the Son, who, being the Word of God, came down from the Father and took flesh, and lowered Himself even unto death, and perfected the economy of our salvation."* He, becoming man, overcame "the enemy of man"; and being the Son of God by nature, He became our brother, and so made us the Sons of God by adoption.†

At the moment of the Incarnation the drama of Paradise was acted over again. Once more Adam stood in his innocence and integrity as the representative of mankind. This time, indeed, it was the second Adam, the "Lord from heaven"; but then the second Adam had the same nature as the first, and sprang from Him. Nay, the very fact that He had no man for His Father, but was born by the power of God from a virgin, in order to recall the creation of Adam from the "unwrought" or virgin "earth."‡ It must be observed, moreover, that Irenæus considered this close connection between the first and second Adam a matter of necessity. "If," Irenæus says, "he (i.e. the first Adam) was taken from the earth, and God moulded him, it was necessary (ἔδει) that He who gathered up into Himself (the) man moulded by God should have a birth exactly like his. Why, then, did not God take earth, instead of moulding (our Lord's human nature) from Mary? In order that it might not be a different formation, in order that it might not be something different which was saved, in order that that very man (the first Adam) might be gathered up, by preserving the resemblance" (between the two). §

Christ then "recapitulated" or "gathered up" into Himself the first Adam; and, having done so, He, the new repre-

* Iren., iii. 18, 2. We read replasmari for replasmare. The sense is the same in either case.

† εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὸν ἀντίπαλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐνίκηθῃ ὁ ἐχθρός. . . . "Qua enim ratione filiorum adoptionis ejus participes esse possemus, nisi per filium eam, quæ est ad ipsum, recepissemus ab eo communionem; nisi Verbum ejus communicasset nobis, caro factum?"—Iren., iii. 18, 7.

‡ Iren., Frag. 32, ἐκ γῆς ἀνεργάστον.

§ Iren., iii. 21, 10. In the words ἰδεὶ καὶ τὸν ἀνακεφαλαιοῦμενον εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλασμένον ἄνθρωπον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνῃ τῆς γεννήσεως ἔχειν ὁμοίότητα, the absence of the article makes the construction difficult, though the substance of the sentence is quite clear. Mr. Keble's translation differs slightly from ours. We think the Latin version makes it likely that the article before ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, has fallen out by a mistake of the scribe.

sentative of our race, exactly reversed all that the first Adam had done, and became our salvation, as Adam had been our ruin. As Adam had brought sin on his whole race, so "Christ passed through every age, restoring communion with God to each."* By His fast of forty days, He atoned for Adam's intemperance in eating the forbidden fruit.† In His temptation He "gathered up into Himself that ancient and original enmity against the serpent." He refuted him by the words of the law, and thus, "through the precept of the law, Adam's transgression against the precept of God was undone."‡ Finally, He died upon the sixth day of the week, and offered His atoning sacrifice, because on that very day, the day of His creation, the first Adam had incurred the sentence of death, and had died the death of sin. Thus "gathering up into Himself the whole of man (recapitulans in se universum hominem) from the beginning to the end, He gathered up into Himself His death also. And so it is plain that on that day our Lord suffered death, in obedience to the Father, on which Adam died (spiritually) by disobedience to God."§ Then when the Atonement was complete He descended, as the first Adam had done, into Hades, and rose upon the third day, "the first-begotten of the dead."|| He had done His work as the second Adam, as the new representative of mankind. He had opened heaven to all men who were to come after Him. And not only so, His satisfaction had a retrospective efficacy. Even the first Adam shared in the salvation which the second Adam wrought.¶ "For He was the man who strove for the fathers, and by obedience atoned for disobedience; since He bound the strong man and unbound the weak, and brought salvation to His creatures, destroying sin."**

This is the point of view which Irenæus maintains throughout the whole of his work against the Gnostics; and wherever he treats of the Incarnation, this idea is present to his mind. Hence, when Irenæus, after portraying Christ as the second Adam, goes on to speak of His blessed mother as the second Eve, when he connects Mary's office as the second Eve with her Son's as the second Adam, when he treats Mary's place and Mary's co-operation as essential to that restoration of Paradise which was effected by Christ's incarnation, it is plain that he is not following a fanciful analogy, or indulging in

* Iren., iii. 18, 7. As is well known, Irenæus held (erroneously, of course) that when our Lord began to teach He was already over forty, and so declaims "jam in ætatem seniores" (ii. 22, 5).

† Iren., v. 21, 2.

‡ Iren., v. 21, 2.

§ Iren., v. 23, 2.

|| Iren., v. 31, 1 et 2.

¶ Iren., iii. 23, 8.

** Iren., iii. 18, 6.

poetical metaphor. He is stating an integral part of his theology; he is using terms deliberately chosen, and replete with theological meaning. We have good reason for weighing his words well, and considering carefully the conclusion which may be deduced from them. Nor is this all which justifies us in attaching a high importance, and interpreting in its strict sense the doctrine of Irenæus, that Mary is the second Eve. For, first, he states it twice over, each time at considerable length, and in the most emphatic and explicit language. Next, the doctrine is in no way peculiar to him. It appears in S. Justin, who was his earlier, in Tertullian, who was his later contemporary; and we are entitled to consider it as the universal doctrine of the early Church. His opinion on our Lord's age is a private notion of his own, unsupported by any other authority, and in no way a necessary or important part of his theology. His doctrine on the second Eve is the doctrine of the Church in his day. It belongs to primitive tradition.

Let us analyze as briefly as possible the teaching of S. Irenæus on this head. We have seen that he insists on the exact resemblance between Adam and our Lord. In the same way he urges the parallel between Eve and Mary. Just as Eve "had Adam for a husband, and was yet a virgin . . . so Mary, having an appointed husband, was yet a virgin." As Eve listened to the "words of an angel," so also Mary.* Again, according to Irenæus, when Christ had taken the place of Adam, He did well what Adam did ill, and having, as man, paid the obedience which God expected from man, He saved us, as Adam ruined us. He makes the same contrast between Eve and Mary. As Eve, he says, "being disobedient, became the cause of death both to herself and to all mankind, . . . so also Mary, . . . being obedient, became both to herself and to all mankind the cause of salvation. . . . The knot of Eve's disobedience was loosed by Mary's obedience. For what the virgin Eve bound by unbelief, this the virgin Mary unbound by faith." "As by a virgin the human race had been given over to death, by a virgin it is saved."† Once more, Irenæus ascribed to the merits of Christ an efficacy at once retrospective and prospective. He "received into His bosom the primitive fathers; He bore them again to the life of God."‡ And He is the salvation of all the elect to the end of time. So it was in her measure and degree with Mary. "She was drawn to obey God, that of the virgin Eve the virgin Mary

* Iren., iii. 22, 4; v. 19, 1. † Iren., iii. 22, 4; v. 19, 1.

‡ Iren., iii. 22, 4.

might become the advocate"; * and again, when she uttered her Magnificat, "she cried out prophesying for the Church."† She became the example and the type of all who were to be formed like after the pattern of the new creation.‡

No further proof is required that S. Irenæus looked on our blessed Lady as the second Eve, and upon her prerogative as an essential part of Christian doctrine. But it may be said, there is an evident and serious flaw in our argument. Eve, of course, was made immaculate. Yet this is just the point where Irenæus fails to draw the parallel between Eve and Mary. To this we answer: First, that this omission need not surprise us. There is no explicit statement of the doctrine of original sin in Irenæus, or, as we suppose, in any ante-Nicene father; so that we cannot fairly expect an explicit statement that Mary was exempt from it.§ Secondly, there is a strong presumption that if Irenæus could have had the question, Was Mary conceived in sin? presented to him, he would have answered it in the negative, and for this reason: His whole theology on the Incarnation turns upon the proposition, man could not break the bonds of sin, because he was already bound fast by them. He, in Adam, had been already worsted by the devil. When, therefore, he tells us that Mary untied the knot of Eve's disobedience, we may infer that she had never been bound by it in her own person. Lastly, we do not pretend that the Apostolic origin of the belief in the Immaculate Conception can be demonstrated from history. What we do say is this: History does not run counter to the Church's belief. The Catholic faith teaches that our Lady was conceived without the stain of original sin. And there is no shadow of proof in history that the tradition of the Apostles contained anything to the contrary. And we are able to go further. We find a doctrine held universally in the Church shortly after the time of the Apostles, and received apparently from them, that Mary is the second Eve. This doctrine may

* Iren., v. 19, 1.

† Iren., v. 19, 1.

‡ The blessed Virgin was frequently taken as a type of the Church. The "Virgin Mother" is a title given to the Church in the letters written in 177 by the Churches of Vienne and Lyons (apud Euseb., v. 1, 45); by Clem. Al. *Pæd.* 1, 6. And this language was adopted even by Marcus the Gnostic, who, as Irenæus says, made the Virgin hold the place of the Church in his symbolical system (Iren., i. 15, 3). This ought to be remembered in the interpretation of Apoc. xii. 1.

§ Tertullian comes nearer an explicit statement of the doctrine of original sin than Irenæus. Thus we read in the former: "Homo . . . in mortem datus exinde totum genus de suo semine infectum suæ etiam damnationis traducem fecit." (*Testimon. Anim.*, iii.) Still, even Tertullian is thinking not so much of a sin as of a monstrous proclivity to sin which we inherit from Adam. Cf. *De Pudic.* vi.; *De Jejun.* iii.

involve the Immaculate Conception, nay, it seems most naturally to do so. And now that the Church's decision has come, now that we know the Immaculate Conception to be a dogma of the faith once delivered, the language of Irenæus on the second Eve makes it easy for us to justify our belief, because it saves us from the historical difficulty of supposing that a portion of the Apostolic doctrine vanished after the death of the Apostles without leaving a trace behind. It is quite conceivable that the Apostles taught Mary's place as the "second Eve," and left it for the Church of later times to interpret the truth which these words contained.

We have been speaking of the double efficacy which Irenæus ascribes to the Incarnation. On the one hand, our Lord, by becoming man, rendered to God the service which He required from man; on the other, by taking our nature, He sanctified it and bound us to Himself. This sanctification and this union begins with the blessed Virgin, but it extends to all the members of His mystical body; and the great means by which it is effected is the holy Eucharist. We began this article with the doctrine of S. Irenæus on the eternal Word; then we passed naturally to his doctrine on the Word made flesh; and now, just as naturally, we conclude with the blessed Sacrament, which perpetuates the presence of our incarnate Lord, and is the complement to the mystery of the Incarnation. Such was the way, the only way, in which Christians for fifteen centuries regarded the mystery of the altar; and it is an easy matter to exhibit the faith of S. Irenæus on this point. His testimony bears a striking resemblance to that which S. Ignatius gave shortly after the death of S. John. Like S. Ignatius, S. Irenæus shows how undoubting and how universal the belief in Transubstantiation was within the pale of the Church; and like him he shows how closely the belief in it was connected with the mere profession of Christianity. For he never attempts to prove the doctrine; he assumes it and makes it a basis of argument against the Gnostics.* In fact, even these heretics did not dare openly and utterly to break with the traditional belief in the mystery of the blessed Sacrament, though they did profane and pervert it. Irenæus tells us that Marcus, who had a great name among the Valentinian Gnostics, used to take a cup of

* There is only this difference between Ignatius ad Smyrn. 7 and Irenæus: the former reproaches the Gnostics with actually abstaining from the Eucharist because they did not believe in the true humanity of Christ, and so could not believe that humanity to be present on the altar. Irenæus, on the contrary, speaks as if the Gnostics did not venture upon an open denial of the Catholic doctrine on the Eucharist.

wine and pretend to change it visibly into the blood of Charis, one of the Gnostic æons;* thus mimicking the Catholic Mass, just as his sect also mimicked baptism† and confirmation.‡ Irenæus then takes advantage of the timidity which some of the Gnostics felt in denying openly the presence of Christ's body and blood in the blessed Sacrament; and assuming that our Lord gives us His real body and blood in the Holy Communion, he builds upon this three arguments against the Gnostics.

The first refers to the Gnostic error, that a lower God made the material world, while Christ came as the emissary of a Supreme Being who did not degrade himself by any contact with matter. Irenæus replies, that if Christ had come from another God than the Creator of the material world, He would not have made bread and wine into His own body and blood. "How," he asks, "how can they hold for certain that that bread, over which thanks are given (i.e., of course, the Eucharist)§ is the body of their Lord, and [the chalice] the chalice of His blood, if they do not confess that He is the very Son or Word of Him who made the world—the Word through whom the tree bears fruit, and the springs flow, and the earth produces first the blade, then the ear, then the full wheat in the ear?"|| In another place he states more clearly the premise which underlies this argument, viz., that our Lord would have acted unjustly had He appropriated the creatures of another God and changed them into His own flesh. "If the Lord," he argues, "came from another father, how did He act justly when taking the bread of this creation which lies around us, He confessed that it was His own body, and affirmed that the mixture of the chalice (i.e. the wine mixed with water), was His blood?"¶ Let the reader observe that in the first of these passages he shows his belief that the bread and wine are changed physically into the body and blood of Christ by the parallel between this and other changes evidently physical. The same Lord, he argues, who makes the earth bring forth the blade, the blade produce the ear, and the ear the corn, makes the bread His body. And in the passage which follows, the words "confessed," "affirmed," that it was

* Iren., i. 13, 2.

† Iren., i. 21, 3.

‡ Iren., ib. It is worth noticing that they made oil the matter of this mock sacrament.

§ *τὸν εὐχαριστήριον ἄρον*, the bread which is made into the Eucharist. The Greek of this sentence has been given by Stieren from Miletius Syrigus. The Latin words, *panem in quo gratiæ actæ sint* is a barbarous version of the Greek words.

|| Iren., iv. 18, 4

¶ Iren., iv. 33, 2.

His body and blood, are the sign that S. Irenæus was speaking of a mystery which needed the solemn assurance of our Lord to make it credible.

In his second argument Irenæus applies the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist to refute a Gnostic error, kindred to that which we have just mentioned, viz., that the bodies of Christians would not enter heaven, because the flesh is incapable of salvation. His answer is, that if so, Christ would not have redeemed us with His blood, nor have sanctified our bodies by His own body and blood in the Eucharist.* His words are these: "Altogether vain are they who despise all the dispensation of God, denying the salvation of the flesh, and contemning its regeneration, on the ground that it is incapable of becoming incorruptible. But if this flesh of ours is not saved, then clearly the Lord did not redeem us with His blood, nor is the chalice of the Eucharist the communication of His blood, nor the bread which we break the communication of His body. For there is no blood except that which comes from veins and flesh, and the rest of man's substance, which human substance the Word of God truly became. He redeemed us with His blood as the Apostle says, 'in whom we have redemption by His blood, the remission of sins.' And since we are His members and are nourished through His creatures, and since He Himself bestows His creatures on us, making His sun rise and rain fall, as He wills, (therefore) He confessed that the chalice (taken) from the creature was His proper blood, with which He bedews our blood, and the bread (taken) from the creature he affirmed with a strong affirmation (*διεβεβαιώσατο*) to be His proper body, from which He nourishes our bodies."† We wish that our space allowed us to carry the quotation further. But what we have given is surely enough to manifest the faith of S. Irenæus in the real presence of our Lord's body and blood upon the altar. He says that our bodies are nourished, or, as the word is literally, "made to grow" (*αὔξει*) to the life of heaven by the body and blood of Christ, an effect which he could not have attributed to bread and wine. He puts the blood of Christ in the same category with that shed on the cross; as the latter was real, so is the former. He states that by blood he means literal blood, taken from human veins. And he intimates that he is speaking of a stupendous mystery, for he tells us that our Lord "solemnly or strongly"

* There is a very beautiful and profound passage in Tertullian, *Resurrect. Carnis* viii., in which the same argument is used.

† Iren., v. 2, 2.

affirmed that the bread was His body, the wine was His blood. It is a strengthened form of the very word, which, as Döllinger has pointed out, S. Cyril of Jerusalem,* uses in describing this ineffable mystery; and even the learned Protestant Grabe admits that the latter taught Transubstantiation. Several varieties of Protestant error on the Eucharist are excluded here. No Protestant, so far as we know, who has written specially on S. Irenæus, pretends to make that father a supporter of the Zuinglian theory, that the Eucharist is a mere symbol of the body and blood of Christ. But this passage is equally decisive against those Protestant writers who have interpreted him to mean that the bread and wine are mere channels conveying the virtue and power of Christ's body and blood; or, again, that the Word, in His Divine nature, unites Himself to the bread and wine.

The third argument which Irenæus bases upon the Eucharist is the most interesting of all, because it establishes his belief, not in the Real Presence only, but in Transubstantiation, taken in the strictest sense. We have brought evidence enough to show that he believed in the literal presence of our Lord's body and blood upon the altar; and this amounts to a refutation of two different interpretations which Protestants have put upon his words: one that Irenæus taught a union between the Word in His divine nature with the elements of bread and wine: the other, that, according to him, the virtue and power of our Lord's humanity is communicated to the bread and wine. However, some Lutheran and Anglican scholars have acknowledged readily the belief of Irenæus in the Real Presence: only by the Real Presence they have understood a presence of Christ's body and blood under or beneath the symbols of bread and wine, which remain even after consecration in their natural substance. It is the last Protestant theory to which we would direct attention, in giving the third argument against the Gnostics which Irenæus deduces from the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist.

Like his second argument, it is intended to support the belief in the resurrection of the body. He proves its possibility from the analogy of the Holy Eucharist. The same God, he argues, who changes the dead grain into living wheat, and bread made from wheat into His body, can change

* "Since He then has declared and said of the bread, This is My body, who, after that, will venture to doubt? And seeing that He has affirmed (*Ἐβραϊσάμηνον*) and said, This is My blood, who will raise a question and say it is not His blood?"—Cyril. Hierosol., Cat. xxii. Mystag. 4, quoted by Döllinger, *Lehre der Eucharistie*, p. 36.

our dust into glorified bodies at the resurrection. But we must allow the saint to speak for himself: "In the same way that the wood of the vine being placed in the earth, bears fruit in its season, and the grain of wheat, when it has fallen into the earth and been dissolved, rises manifold through the Spirit of God, which holds all things together, which (wheat and grape-juice) afterwards, when, through the wisdom of God, they have passed into the use of men (i.e. when they have been made into bread and wine), and receive the Word of God, become the Eucharist, which is the body and blood of Christ; even so our bodies, when they have been nourished by the Eucharist and placed in the earth and dissolved in it, will rise again in their own season."* It would be waste of words to demonstrate that this argument implies belief in the Real Presence. To argue, God can change our dust into a glorified body (a work of stupendous power) because He changes bread and wine into the figure of His body (a work of no power at all) would be sheer nonsense. But we contend that nothing short of Transubstantiation will satisfy the requirements of the argument. On the Lutheran and Anglican theory of Consubstantiation there is no change in the bread and wine; and yet it is precisely upon this change that the whole argument turns. God, Irenæus argues, can change our dust into a glorified body. Why? Because He changes dead grain, and the moisture which the vine draws from the earth, into wheat and grape-juice, these into bread and wine—nay, bread and wine into His body and blood. If He can effect such changes as these, He can change our dust into living bodies. Moreover, Irenæus shows the kind of change which, as he believed, took place at the moment of consecration. He mentions the Eucharistic change at the end of several other changes, all of them substantial changes, changes, in other words, of substance into substance. His doctrine corresponds completely with the language of the Council of Trent: "The whole substance of the bread is changed into the substance of Christ's body, the whole substance of the wine into His blood, which change, the Holy Catholic Church calls by the suitable and accurate name of Transubstantiation."†

We have now given every passage in which Irenæus treats of the Blessed Sacrament, excepting one which we omit here, on account of its extreme obscurity. Catholics and Protestants alike are divided about its meaning; and in such division of opinion we cannot pretend to be confident about our own interpretation, nor have we space here to defend it at length.

* Iren., v. 2. 3.

† Concil. Tridentin., Sess. xiii. c. 4.

There is nothing, however, in the passage which tells, ever so slightly, against the demonstrable fact that Irenæus believed and affirmed the doctrine of Transubstantiation; and of this we shall give the best proof by placing the whole passage at length in an appendix to this article. Meantime, let us remind our readers of the result we have obtained. Irenæus speaks so distinctly on the Blessed Sacrament, that even Protestants and infidels have shrunk from the impossible task of making him a Zuinglian. True, they have tried to make his words mean something less than Transubstantiation; though as to what that "something" is they cannot agree.* The various theories which they have forced upon the plain words of S. Irenæus need no answer except that which we have given, viz., the words of Irenæus himself. It would have been impossible—we say it with caution and deliberation—it would have been impossible for Irenæus, had he believed in Transubstantiation, to have written more clearly than he actually does. He could not have spoken more expressly, unless he had seen the rise of the Protestant heresy in vision, and cursed it twelve centuries before its birth.

We have deferred speaking of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, because, as we shall proceed to show, the belief of Irenæus in the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice follows as a matter of necessity from his belief in transubstantiation. For it is certain, and admitted by all, that he believed the Eucharist to be a sacrifice of some sort. In his fourth book he refutes the Gnostic error, that the God of the New Testament must be a different being from that of the Old, because the latter delighted in sacrifices, and he replies, that "our Lord Himself, counselling His disciples to offer to God the first-fruits from His creatures, . . . took that bread which come from the created world (*ex creatura*, or *ἐκ τῆς κτίσεως*, as the Greek would be), and gave thanks, saying, This is my

* The following are the Protestant theories on this part of the doctrine of S. Irenæus with which we are acquainted: (1) That the bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ in virtue and effect. So Grabe, in his notes on Iren. v. 2, when he says that the bread and wine are by no means mere symbols, but "that the Holy Spirit, and the plenitude of divine grace and virtue which belongs to the body and blood of Christ, descend from heaven upon the symbols, sanctify them entirely, and through them all who communicate worthily." (2) The Word in His divine nature only unites Himself to the consecrated bread and wine. So Ziegler, p. 278. (3) That the bread and wine remaining what they were, are united after consecration to the real body and blood of Christ. So Pfaffius, in his note on two fragments of Irenæus, reprinted in Stieren's edition. (4) Dörner, "*Lehre der Person Christi*," p. 496, denies that Irenæus held any of the three previous views, and gives an interpretation of his own, which we have read and re-read, but are still unable to understand.

body. The chalice, likewise, which comes from this created world of ours, He confessed to be His blood, and taught the new oblation of the New Testament, which (oblation) the Church, receiving it from the Apostles, offers in the whole world to God." Then he quotes the prophecy of Malachy,* "I will not receive a sacrifice at your hands. Since from the rising of the sun even to its setting my name is glorified among the Gentiles, and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure sacrifice; since my name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Almighty Lord"; and he sees its fulfilment in the sacrifice of the Christian altar. The prophet, he tells us, signifies most plainly, "that the former people (i.e. the Jews) will cease to offer to God, but that in every place sacrifice will be offered to Him,—and this a pure sacrifice. . . . Therefore the oblation of the Church, which our Lord taught to be offered in the whole world, is counted a pure sacrifice before God." †

The fact, then, that S. Irenæus believed in the sacrifice of the new law is undoubted, and it is really just as certain, that he believed this sacrifice to consist in the offering of Christ's body and blood. Protestant writers have contested this latter point, and endeavoured to limit the sacrifice in which he believed, to an oblation of bread and wine made to God. Such an explanation of his meaning is incredible on the very face of it. For, first, as we have established above, Irenæus believed the bread and wine to be changed into the body and blood of Christ. If so, he could not have supposed that the Church, with the Lamb of God in her hands, contented herself with offering the "poor elements," to borrow S. Paul's language on another subject, of "bread and wine." Next, in a passage which we have cited, S. Irenæus puts the change of the elements into Christ's body and blood in direct connection with the sacrifice. Besides, he goes on to point out that the sacrifice of the Church exceeds the sacrifice of the old law in dignity and importance. "Sacrifices, as such," he says (*genus oblationum*), "were not repudiated; there were oblations there, and we have oblations here; there were sacrifices in the (Jewish) people, there are sacrifices in the Church; it is the

* The early Fathers, like modern Catholics, see allusions to the holy Eucharist in passages of Scripture where an ordinary Protestant would fail to see any reference to it. Thus, Justin, *Dial.* 41, agrees with Irenæus, in understanding the words of Malachy, as a prophecy of the Eucharist. Clem. *Al. Strom.* iv. 25, sees the same reference in Melchisedec's offering of bread and wine: and Tertull. *Pud.* 9, in the fattened calf prepared for the prodigal son. Lastly, Irenæus, iii. 11, 5, like Cyril of Jerusalem after him, seems to consider the miracle of changing water into wine a type of the Eucharist.

† Iren., iv. 17, 5; 18, 1.

kind (species) (of sacrifices) only which is altered, since now it is offered, no longer by servants but by children." And in illustration of this superiority, he adds, that whereas the Jews gave tithes, Christians give their all to God. It is obvious that a sacrifice of bread and wine would not have been superior to the sacrifice of the Jews. Lastly, he proves that Catholics alone have the right to offer the unbloody sacrifice, in words which amount to an explicit statement that the divine victim who shed His blood for our redemption, applies to us the merits of His Passion by offering Himself continually upon the altar. Heretics, he argues, cannot offer it, because they cannot be certain, on their theory, that the bread over which thanks have been given is the body of the Lord, and the chalice the chalice of His blood. The Jews cannot offer it, "since their hands are full of blood, for they have not received the Word, which is offered to God."* It was the incarnate Word whom the Jews rejected. It is, therefore, the incarnate Word which is offered to God on the Christian altar.

Here we close our remarks on the doctrine of S. Irenæus. We have been dealing with the father who is the first to mention the four Gospels by name; the first who gives any systematic account of Christian doctrine, and the importance of the subject may be some excuse for the length at which we have treated it. Forty years ago the minds of English Protestants were drawn to the study of the fathers, and how fruitful this study proved, how many souls it led directly and indirectly to the Church of God, is now matter of history. There are many signs which make us think that this study is likely to receive a fresh impetus, although this time the impetus will come from a different quarter. Every one is becoming familiar with the attacks which are made by modern criticism upon the books of the New Testament. These attacks come almost exclusively from Protestant divines, from the successors of the very men who revolted against tradition and the Church, on the pretext of reverence of Scripture. Scripture itself, as every Protestant with any pretensions to theological knowledge is aware, rests upon nothing but tradition; nor is there any rational means of defending the authenticity of the New Testament apart from the historical

* "*Verbum quod offertur Deo*" (iv. 18, 4). This is the reading of the three best MSS. (Codd. Clarom., Vet. et Voss.), except that the two latter omit the unimportant word *Deo*. This the Protestant editor Stieren fully acknowledges. Harvey, *ad loc.*, and Neander (*Kirchen Geschichte*, i. p. 424), prefer the reading, "*per quod offertur Deo*." It is admitted that this reading rests upon very inferior authority.

evidence contained in the writings of the fathers. There is no doubt, a candid and honest inquirer will find the evidence for the divine authority of Scripture which he requires. But, unfortunately for Protestantism, he will find much more than this. Side by side with the proofs for the authority of Scripture lies the evidence for the authority of the Church; side by side with the testimonies to the belief of the first Christians in the divinity of Christ, are the testimonies to their belief in the adorable mystery of the altar. Catholics have known this all along, and almost every great work which has been done for the illustration of Christian antiquity has been done by Catholic hands. We can only hope that this study may not flag, or be neglected among us now. Never was a time when it was needed more by those who would live for the one cause worth living and fighting for—the defence and propagation of the Catholic faith.

APPENDIX.

The passages on the Holy Eucharist which we have given are clear and plain, and they put the doctrine of Irenæus on this mystery beyond reasonable doubt. One passage, and only one of any importance, we have omitted in the text of our article, and we proceed to consider it here. It is extremely difficult, and that for two reasons: First, it is hard to say what are the exact words which Irenæus wrote; for the Latin text differs from the original Greek, as given by S. John of Damascus; and of the best editors, some suppose that the Latin translator omitted some words by an oversight, others that S. John Damascene quoted loosely and added something of his own. Next, whether we follow the Greek or the Latin text, the meaning is obscure. However, among the large number of interpretations advanced by Catholic and Protestant scholars, the choice, as it seems to us, lies between two, either of which is perfectly consistent with the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation.

The passage in question occurs in the fourth book (xviii. 5). S. Irenæus is speaking of two Gnostic errors: (1) That Christ is not the Son of the God who made the world; (2) that the body will not rise again. Each error, he maintains, is refuted by the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. The former, because, if Christ were the Son of a God hostile to the material world, He would not take bread and wine in the Holy Eucharist and make them His body and blood. The second, because, if the body were not to rise again, it would not "be nourished with the body and blood of the

Lord." Then he continues: "But our doctrine agrees with the Eucharist, and the Eucharist again confirms our opinion. For we offer to Him things which are His own, proclaiming participation and union, and professing a resurrection of flesh and spirit. For as bread from the earth, receiving the invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting of two things, a heavenly and an earthly, so also our bodies, partaking of the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the eternal resurrection."

The chief point to be determined is, What does Irenæus mean by saying that the Eucharist "is composed of two things, a heavenly and an earthly"?

Many Catholic scholars* have answered, the glorified body of Christ is the "heavenly thing," the accidents or appearances of bread and wine which remain, even after consecration, are the "earthly thing." According to this interpretation, which is, perhaps, better suited than any other to the words of S. Irenæus, as we have them in Greek, the argument would run thus: On the one hand, we believe that Christ is the Son of the God who made the world, and, consistently with this belief, we confess that He changes the bread and wine of this material world into His body and blood, so that the bread is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, i.e. the heavenly body of Christ under earthly accidents. On the other hand, proclaiming a union of our bodies with the body of Christ in the blessed Sacrament, we hold consistently that these bodies will rise again.

Others have understood by the "heavenly and earthly" things,† the divine and human natures of Christ, both of which are truly given and received in the sacrament of the altar. According to this interpretation, Irenæus argues: As in the Eucharist there are two things, the human nature of Christ, and the divinity which is united to it, and which deifies it; so in our bodies, after communion, there are two elements, viz., their own nature, which is of itself corruptible, and the new life they have received from the Holy Communion.

We have hesitated for a long time between these two explanations, without being able to reach a definite conclusion. But the reader will see that, in any case, the passage contains nothing which is opposed to the account given above of the saint's teaching on the Holy Eucharist.

* For a collection of the various interpretations, Catholic and Protestant, see Hopfenmüller, p. 52.

† An interpretation which the words in themselves will bear very easily. Thus Irenæus says: "Quid est ergo terrenum? Plasma" (v. 9, 3). Plasma is an ordinary word in Irenæus, and the writers of his day, for human nature.

We ought to add that Pfaffius published from a MS. in the library of Turin, now missing, a few sentences on the Holy Eucharist, supposed to come from a lost work of S. Irenæus. We have abstained from quoting this fragment because we believe that the balance of evidence is against its authenticity. Those who are interested in the matter will find a series of tracts upon this fragment, reprinted in the second volume of Stieren's Irenæus.

ART. VI.—MR. ALFRED AUSTIN'S HUMAN TRAGEDY.

The Human Tragedy. By ALFRED AUSTIN. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1876.

THE name of this poem is one of the author's happiest inspirations. It is simple, in pleasing contrast to many modern titles, yet it has in itself a subtle recommendation. *Tragedy* indicates the conflict of the great passions of the soul, ended by an inevitable fate inspiring horror, pity, or awe. *Human* touches the heart's centre. It is a word which, like an electric bond of brotherhood, brings home to us the sorrows, the affections, even the weakness of others, as worthy of our sympathy if we are not unworthy to be human too. We shall see, in examining the work, whether it merits so noble a name or disappoints our expectations.

The "*Human Tragedy*" is enacted in our own time in the quiet home life of England; on the Italian shore in "a silent little city by the sea"; again, in Italy when Garibaldi was out with his Redshirts, and the cry was "Rome or Death!"; and in Paris, during the brief rule of the Commune, when the luxurious capital had become a city of fire and blood. There is here, without going further back than the last few years, a fruitful field, not only for the poet but for the historian and philosopher; and, to some extent, this triple character must be found combined in the man who essays to write a truly great poem based on the life of such a period. As an historian, the author before us is scarcely reliable. He is prejudiced by a certain amount of hero-worship, and a too fervid admiration of those who have held his own views; and we shall have, later on, the unpleasant task of pointing out some of his grave mistakes. As a philosopher his line of thought diverges from ours. As a poet he has by this work established a fame which was already widely spread.

Mr. Austin has attained a complete success in his idea of placing the "Human Tragedy" in our own time. He does not avoid the incidents and surroundings of ordinary life, and for the most part his actors are men and women and not ideal beings. An opinion prevails that the nineteenth century is a prosaic, matter-of-fact century of business, when the one cry of the nation is "progress!" and of the individual "money!" But were the mediæval or even the heroic ages less prosaic to those who lived in them? Perhaps later generations will see lying far back this eventful time of ours, and be able to take in its fulness and to understand it. A fine prospect can only be seen from a distance; a nearer view distracts the eye with details, and hides the bold outlines from sight. So it is with these days. The grand features of modern life are as well fitted for poetry as those of any other time, but familiar sights lose their loveliness, and trivialities check our vision. If, then, there is a man who can look with the eyes of a poet not only on the classical and the early ages, or on men and women transformed into ideal beings; if there is one who has sufficient courage and feeling, as well as the gift of language, to show us the value and beauty of what lies near at hand, by all means let us have epics and idylls of modern life.

The present poem has been termed a tragedy, and accordingly it is divided, not into books, but into acts; and as Protagonists, Love, Religion, Country, and Mankind are brought successively upon the stage. But these, instead of moving in concord for the happiness of men, are shown as conflicting elements, tearing human hearts asunder, raising the tempests of the world, when whole nations are roused for good or evil, making life a tumult of vain desires, short-lived joy, misfortune, mischance and sorrow. Love is the sole Protagonist of the First Act, but the struggle is no less hard because it is one of love alone. In the Second another power is at work—Religion. Then follows a part full of the cry of "Rome or Death!" Country being represented in the strife by the mistaken patriots of united Italy. The scene of the Fourth Act is laid in the Paris of the Commune. Mankind, under a dark and lurid aspect, joins in the contest; and thus, having dropped in one by one during the course of the story, the four Protagonists are at its close united in the death-struggle,—the

fatal four, which by the dark decree
Of Heaven evolve the Human Tragedy.

The irresistible working of Fate, which gave such an awful power to the Greek tragedy, is here at the outset indicated by

those words "the dark decree of Heaven," and may be traced throughout the poem. It is especially noticeable in the first act. The sonnet of dedication, which is lofty, and at the same time tender in feeling, claims a passing word of praise.

The "Human Tragedy" opens with an address to Love, which might have been written in the days of the old Roman Republic; but, as the work progresses, we are given so many other glimpses of fate and "the gods," that their appearance in a tale of modern life must be ascribed by the lenient critic to the author's classical spirit, although it must be said that the poem does not bear obtrusively the mark of being written by a lover of the classics. The opening invocation is addressed by the poet to the eternal star of undying Love that burns "on high, fixed where the immortals are," to the influence of whose light he owes all his thoughts, prayers, gifts, as well as the inspiration of his present labour, long brooded over since it was planned "in youth's warm days."

But thee, O Love !

I with bowed head and reverent heart invoke.

The patriot pulse mayhap shall throb no more,

Altars no more with rival incense smoke,

No more too sanguine souls deaf doom implore

To spare Humanity life's good, death's yoke ;

Thou, though the spell of shrine, shore, world, should fade,

Thou wilt shine on, undimmed and undecayed !

Godfrid, who is the central figure of the tragedy, is of high lineage, but without fortune. At his mother's knee he was taught the ancient Faith, but he has thrown it aside as something that the world has left behind in its advance. He "possessed his soul in peace"; that is, believing that nothing is certain and nothing can be known, he has plunged into the great void of infidelity. But of his aspect as regards religion more will be developed in the second act. At present he is in heart a worshipper of beauty, whether in his fellow-beings or in nature, keenly alive to its impressions, young, impulsive, with a contempt for the drones of the world, who rest idly on their riches, and a vague yearning to achieve something great with his own empty hands, or to support some noble cause for the common good of mankind. In the June of 1857 he spends two days at an English country house—memorable days for him and for the daughter of his host. A description of the late English spring leads up gracefully to the story. Our author shows a wonderful felicity in painting the details of nature in all their richness and colour, and it is evidently done by one who has been a long and close observer, and whose

work is a labour of love. The first stanza we quote contains a grand and elaborate metaphor, and one which in most years is true in our northern climate :—

Rude Winter, violating neutral plain
Of March, through April's territory sallied,
Scoured with his snowy plumes May's smooth domain,
Then, down encamping, made his daring valid.
Nor till June, mustering all her gallant train
Of glittering spears, Spring's flying legions rallied,
Did the usurper from the realms of sleet
Fold his white tents and shriek a wild retreat.

Then, all at once, the land laughed into bloom,
Feeling its alien fetters were undone ;
Rushed into frolic ecstasies ; the plume
The courtly lilac tosses i' the sun,
Laburnum tassels dripping faint perfume,
White thorn, pink blossoms, showed, not one by one,
But all in rival pomp and joint array,
Blent with green leaves as long delayed as they.

A subtle glory crept from mead to mead,
Till they were burnished saffron to behold,
And from their wintry byres and dark sheds freed,
The musing kine lay couched on cloth of gold.
Abetted by the Spring, the humblest weed
Wore its own coronal, and gaily bold
Waved jewelled sceptre. Stirred by some strange power
The very walls seemed breaking into flower.

And all throughout the air there reigned the sense
Of waking dream with luscious thoughts o'erladen,
Of joy too conscious made and too intense
By the swift advent of excessive Aiden :
Bewilderment of beauty's affluence,
Such as delights, though dangerous, man and maiden.
And then it was, by Heaven's despotic grace,
Godfrid first gazed on Olive's form and face.

Olive has been brought up among gentle influences, and the sketch of this maiden, still in the Eden of her home, is beautifully drawn in verse. Translated into prose it describes a warm-hearted, graceful girl, whose amiability is recognized by every one, even by dumb animals. She knows evil and good, as it is in the outer world, only through the medium of her reading. She has bent over the page, and thought "how sweet for others it must be to love," but her own heart is still untouched. We hope the poet whose recital of the old,

old story made her tremble with secret sympathy was Tennyson, or some such lofty songster; but we suppose her partiality for "the rainbow tale which tearful fancy weaves" means that she was given to reading three-volume novels down from Mudie's. The character is natural enough. There are plenty of Olives in the world, but let us trust that their fate is happier, that they have a stronger will and hearts better schooled than hers. Unfortunately for this poor Olive, when the hour of trial comes, the wisdom of the three-volume novels cannot help her; more likely it robs her of her strength at the very time when she needs it most.

Godfrid and Olive have only been two days together, when they are attracted to each other. Without word or sign each has enthralled the other. It is all the work of Fate, reasons the poet. We are swayed by the influence of Nature, and reply to every change of the seasons. It was the luxuriant bloom and beauty of all things round them that wrought upon these susceptible hearts. Had Godfrid come in winter, neither of them would have been stirred. He would have gone away as an ordinary visitor; but now in their last moment alone he parts from Olive with an embrace. He travels across the country at railway speed, and only then calls reason into council and considers his position. He is poor. He must not ask for Olive's hand, and he smothers his remorse in leaving her by bringing himself to believe that there could be no real affection for such as he on Olive's side. Her parents, after Godfrid is gone, suspect that he may have made some impression upon her, and to put an end to it, win her reluctant consent to an engagement with Sir Gilbert, a rich man, but of somewhat narrow mind. He prefers a day's sport to "a whole year of stagnant southern weather," and all his ideas centre round shooting, fishing, and the excellence of the British State, while he seems incapable of enjoying anything higher. Godfrid is told of the engagement, and congratulates Olive by letter, his joy on this occasion showing clearly what a burden the news had lifted from his mind. Soon after he meets the young lady and her mother coming out of a shop in London,—even such things are capable of being moulded into verse. The mother, having no longer ground for fears, invites him to renew his visit. In a moment of haste he complies, and says yes, he will go on Friday. And accordingly he goes. Fate seems here to be at work again. Godfrid might not have gone if he had taken time to think; but the meeting was sudden, the invitation was unexpected, and its frankness won a ready and unguarded consent. We wonder was there any purpose in choosing Friday? We

hope it was a chance choice, for fatalism in poetry is certainly a step higher than superstition.

There is here, at first sight, a departure from the probabilities. The evening after his arrival Godfrid goes out at sunset with Olive. But we have two things to consider, which tone down the improbability, and in fact remove it, except in so far as it is unlikely that they would have had such an opportunity, or could avail themselves of it without remark. In the first place, Olive has had reason to believe that Godfrid's affection, if there was any, has died out; and, on the other hand, he thinks that she regards him only at the safe cold distance of ordinary friendship. The second fact which softens the improbability is this—that, if human nature possesses anything bordering on the infinite, it is its capacity of trusting itself. Olive sits down by a river-side. He sees tears upon her face. She has unconsciously revealed her secret. Just beyond her the waters are rushing down in a cataract, perhaps to her an emblem of her inevitable and dreaded future. Godfrid has been strong hitherto. "Artist!" the poet exclaims,

"amend thy craft. With shield nor spears
Mould me thy Venus Victrix, but—in tears!"

Now all his strength is gone like a shadow. He is likened to one, who, having overstepped the edge of a precipice, finds that with every struggle his foothold is only slipping more and more. She resists but a moment, reminding him of her pledge, her sacred pledge; and then her strength too is gone. The smouldering fire within both bursts out with a despairing ardour. They manifest an affection, which is bitter because hopeless, and in Olive's case disloyal; and for her at least it brings its own retribution—a marriage dower of secret repining misery that can only end with life itself. For the Catholic mind, there are deep meanings in this short passionate episode; for others (and of course, as Mr. Austin's readers, they will immeasurably outnumber our co-religionists), there are simply deep feelings, and these perhaps not of the wisest. We shall consider it under the two aspects, and contrast them. First, the Godfrids and the Olives of the world will look with unmingled pity upon the actors here. Godfrid they will regard as a young and ardent man, in whom they admire strong affections and a sublime appreciation of Nature's language, and of all things of beauty that touch the heart. If he made mistakes, they were scarcely culpable, he was so much the victim of circumstances. From the beginning they were against him, and ensnared him. There was the subtle influence of summer and reviving nature to make him unconsciously susceptible to

Olive's charms, until he had gone almost too far to stand still. Then he would not have rashly returned to her presence had not the invitation taken him by surprise; when he ventured out with her, how could he have known the state of her mind? and then any man of flesh and blood would have acted under the circumstances as he did. Then what a fine sense of duty he had. In the first place, it was duty that made him run counter to his affections and resign all thought of winning her. Now they obey stern duty and return to the house, and she goes with a steadfast will to the fate before her, and gives her hand to Sir Gilbert, and becomes his faithful wife. It is a sad story—a sad world. There is many a human tragedy enacted around us.

We see with other eyes than these, thanks to the Faith that is in us and in so many thousands of young hot hearts to-day. To us this first Act is a mere portrayal of human weakness. It is an apology for it, yea, an exaltation of it, showing it in its most touching and most fascinating aspect. We can sympathize with human frailty struggling yet aspiring, hoping for higher, better things, but as yet only striving to rise; but with this weakness we cannot sympathize, because it is the weakness of guilt. The poet has made a mistake in holding it up clothed in beauty and pathos to excite the pity of his readers—perhaps of those who would be quick in blind sympathy, and frail themselves in the day of trial. Godfrid does not know his own heart; he has but little control over his actions, not even when Olive's happiness depends on his holding himself resolutely aloof from that centre of his weakness. As for Olive, she seems made up of weakness. She gives the pledge that binds her life against her will, and then has not the courage to keep it. She will give away at the altar a heart now dead to conjugal love. That night will be as a thorn in her bosom, which her husband's embrace will only drive deeper; and later on the end will come, with the betrayal of her secret two years after,—bitterness, death. This is what Godfrid has done that night. It leaves him no sense of guilt, but little remorse; only regret for having lost her. And so they part. With these thoughts there stands out before us the vast difference between the world's opinion of these things and that high standard of unswerving virtue which the Church holds up to her children. Where religion is present, not as a thing assumed or as an occasional habit of thought, but as the very breath of life, no shadow can creep over the soul but it reveals itself, no force of circumstances can lead into inevitable evil. For the weakest there is ever abundance of that grace which is always sufficient for us; for

the frail and imperilled there is heavenly guidance, tenderly dispensed through those who are human even as ourselves; for all, there is the great truth, which has made among the multitude countless heroes and heroines numbered only by God. It is the maxim for which the Spartans fell and were glorified by the world, and which in a far higher sense must be the motto of our battle-days—Better to die than yield.

Godfrid has gone, and Olive is married towards the close of the year. The bridal day dawns "through low dun clouds," and the bride, in her resigned despair, makes a poor mockery of mirth:—

They said she looked like a white shut-up rose
That chance hath burgeoned in a time forlorn,
When she stood veiled, and that she walked the nave
As straight and cold as coffin goes to grave.

The next stanza, ending Act I., full of a sense of melancholy and impending doom, seems to make Nature herself take the place of the chorus of the tragedy, and at the close dies down from wild grandeur into a dirge-like wail:—

Then autumn fired the woods, and crimson glowed,
Fringed bole and feathered bough, and topmost spray,
Which, as fell in the shrivelled foliage, showed
Roofless and bare, that late shut out the day:
While hurrying Winter's drifting storm-showers flowed
From hissing heavens, and slowly died away
The colour from drenched Nature's face. And then?
Black trunks, and dirgeful winds, and dripping fen.

The next Act, both as regards its versification and its story, is incomparably the best of the four. The first publication of this part, under the name of *Madonna's Child*, ended with stanza clxxxiv., "Ah! Life is sad, and scarcely worth the pain!" and so far it is complete in itself. The two characters, which confront each other in this hard struggle between Love and Religion, are drawn with power and truth. It may be said to be Catholic in sentiment, and a reader might go through much of it without discovering that the author's sympathies are with Godfrid, who, as far as belief (or unbelief) goes, may perhaps be taken as a type of his own mind. We are the more strengthened in this opinion by the fact that the Catholic allusions, the descriptions of ritual, and the general spirit in which these things are introduced, lead us to believe that the mind which evolved them so truly must have learned them by experience, as Godfrid had imbibed the spirit of the Faith with the air of his childhood. We have to thank him for

the portrait of Olympia. Even as the beauty of truth in our religion wins a reluctant homage from the unbelieving world, so does the loveliness of Olympia's secluded life at Mary's feet captivate and draw the mind to itself. The picture of this "daughter of the sunlight and the shrine" is simply exquisite. Godfrid, who has wandered to an Italian seaside town, is fascinated by the beauty of her holiness, her purity and simplicity. He is now actuated by a higher and more lasting because a spiritual feeling, and the whole atmosphere of the story rises with it, as if we too had exchanged dull skies and heavy air for the clear Italian sunshine. At Spiaggiascura there is a beautiful little chapel dedicated to Maria Stella Maris. There Olympia dwells. A window overlooking the sea shows the chamber that is her home, if one might not rather say that her home is the church, where she tends the lamp, and her resting-place at Madonna's feet surrounded with the flowers her own hands have gathered. Godfrid sees her first in the church, where he at once becomes a constant attendant; and she, noticing a strange face,

gave thanks, one callous bosom less
Should mitigate the Sacred Heart's distress.

He never tired of being present, but she knew not why.

When transubstantiated wine and bread
In mystic mass renewed the gainful loss
Of cruel Calvary, or tonsured head
O'er carven pulpit bann'd as worthless dross
All that the flesh can win, or doleful tread
Followed the tearful Stations of the Cross,
At Vespers' chant, at Benediction's prayer,
At Quarant Ore, was the stranger there.

It would be useless to follow step by step the beautiful points of their intercourse; we should have to quote it all. On his side it is marked by respect amounting to reverence; on hers by guileless simplicity. That passage is very fine where in the midst of the storm in the night Godfrid for the first time pours out his soul to Olympia. She has asked him to pray for those that are at sea, and he who believed he "possessed his soul in peace" gives vent to its restless yearning:—

"She hear!" he pleaded, "hearken rather thou!"
And clutched her robe, and crouched low at her feet;
"For never storm broke over failing prow,
As on my breast life's stifling billows beat.
A long-tossed mariner I, behold me now
Straining to shore, craving for haven meet.

Oh, lift me, feeble, from these fearful waves,
And fold me, shipwrecked, to the heart that saves ! ”

“ Mine a deeper woe,
Than bead, or prayer, or psalm can hope to probe.
I at my mother's knee was taught to throw
Myself on Heaven, and cling to Mary's robe ;
But, like yon waves that wander to and fro,
Homeless and aimless through the whirling globe,
I flow now where Fate bids me, nor demand
Why there I ebb, or here I hug the strand.”

He will not pray to Mary now, but he will “ seek one intermediary more.” Olympia will pray to her, he to Olympia. This is anguish to the child of Madonna ; the veil is torn away from the mind which she believed to be perfect, and she can only say that she belongs to Mary—not to him ; still she yearns for Godfrid, and will watch and weep, and plead that he yet may pray even as he prayed in his childhood. How true to nature is this incident. There are men who seem different beings by day and by night. It is in the night all Godfrid's woes break from him unrestrained. There is something in the rest after the day, the standing still as it were of time and of existence, which urges the soul to manifest its inner workings, and to reveal itself till it shows the yearning for spirit intercourse by the vain effort to formulate such thoughts in language. Olympia has a last hope left. They journey together to Milan, where she knows one of the canons of the cathedral, who she trusts will convince Godfrid that he has abandoned the truth. The story of their pilgrimage is accompanied by a changing picture of Italian scenery. Once when they are taking their mid-day repast with the sea before them “ flashing like burnished steel,” and the mountains “ gray and calm ” behind, the key-note of the whole work seems to be struck. It is certainly the feeling which intentionally or not seems to pervade the book :—

And Godfrid's lips could scarce the thought conceal,
How blest 'twould be each alien faith to smother,
And worship only Nature and each other.

To the author, Love and Nature seem to be the only two enduring powers. Witness how, after describing the dawn by a classical metaphor, he runs on in an excellent stanza, the meaning of which is, however, carried too far when, in the next one, he speculates on the possibility of Christianity following Paganism, and consoles us by an assurance that it will not drop into oblivion, the saints will still have a sort of

poetical fame to prevent them from being forgotten altogether:—

You cannot kill the Gods. Their shadows still
The cherished rites of Pagan eld renew,
Haunt the cool grot, or scour the thymy hill,
And in the woods their wanton sports pursue.
This very morn I heard Pan's pastoral quill
And tracked Diana's sandals o'er the dew,
Caught dimpled Venus veiled in feathery foam,
And Faunus scampering to his sylvan home.

And if Jove prove not the last god dethroned,
But Heaven at length Olympus' fate should feel,
Deem not, withal, its choirs shall be disowned,
Or dumb oblivion o'er its seraphs steal.
Still shall calm Stephen smile on martyrs stoned,
Fair sinners still to Magdalen appeal ;
Cecilia's touch still wake the sacred lyre,
And lamblike Agnes spotless loves inspire.

These thoughts are attributed to Godfrid, and, in charity, we trace them no further than that imaginary character, since the mind from which they spring has fallen to immeasurable depths beneath the true conception of Him with whom there is "no vicissitude nor shadow of change."

It is pleasant to turn from such verses to the true idea of the Madonna as it appears in the poem. How beautifully it shines out through the description of her statue, though to quote it now is a retrospect:—

On the right the mild Madonna stood,
Down from her flowing hair to sandal shoon
The mystic type of maiden motherhood.
Below her feet there curved a crescent moon,
And all the golden planets were her hood ;
In comely folds her queenly garb was moulded,
And over her pure breast her hands were folded.

She looked the most immortal mortal being
That ever yet descended from the skies,
As one who seemed to see all, without seeing,
And without ears to hear man's smothered sighs ;
With all earth's discords the one note agreeing,
'Mid death and hate, a love that never dies ;
A tranquil silence amid fretful din,
And still the sinless confidant of sin.

It is the Catholic spirit that gives life to the allusions to her. In the mountain hymn, a paraphrase of the Litany of

Loretto, she is addressed as "the sinner's last and best retreat,"—"To whom no outcast turns too late, even when thy Son is deaf to prayer." Again, speaking of Olympia:—

Hers was a heart that knew not to deny,
Like the benign Madonna she adored.

But we have left the travellers on their way to Milan. The description of the cathedral there, when a solemn procession is moving through the kneeling multitude, is marvellous in the power with which its language calls up the scene. All is vividly present—the crowd bent down in prayer and adoration. The long procession with white-robed choristers, lights, flowers, and gorgeous vestments. There is the grave, yet joyous, singing; the incense from the silver censers, the organ music rolling and swelling, till the whole pageant of worship and triumphant gladness sweeps on "round arch and column old," and away to the far-off chancel, where "with one acclaim they praise the Lord."

Then on the dense mass sudden silence fell,
Each knee was bent, each reverent skull-cap doffed,
Held was each breath, and, touched by unseen spell,
The organ flutes piped silvery and soft.
Then came the tinkle of a little bell,
And, all heads low, the Host was held aloft;
While glinted through warm panes day's dying gleam,
And the rapt soul touched Heaven in a dream.
Then once again the organ thundered loud.

When all the multitude has dispersed and the vast cathedral is empty in the half-darkness, Olympia leads Godfrid to the sacristy, where she leaves him for the conversation with the priest, which was the object of their journey. She goes back through the "long, dense-columned aisles," and, lying prostrate before the altar, pours out the agony and longing that rend her soul:—

But, rising thence at last, her body first,
She lifted, then her hands, and last her eyes;
And floods of passionate supplication burst
Through lips long sealed from breast o'ercharged with sighs.
She called on Christ, on Her who bore and nursed,
On every Saint and Seraph in the skies,
And vowed herself to pain, if Heaven would save
From death the dear imperilled soul it gave.
"Oh, by Thine agony and bloody sweat,
Deliver him, O Lord!" she wildly cried;
"By Thy keen Cross and Passion save him yet!
Save by Thy crown of thorns and bleeding side!

Why did Gethsemane Thy teardrops wet ?
Why wert Thou scourged, why scorned, why crucified ?
Why didst Thou die, why gloriously ascend,
Why send the Comforter, be this the end ?”

Then in a tempest of hot tears her cries
Were drenched and drowned, her wild words wash;
Her tears were choked with sobs, sobs swooned to
Then sighs to silence, and there mute she lay.
Oh, if there be a Heaven beyond the skies,
A Heaven to hear, why was it deaf that day ?
For since time's dawn into the realms of air,
No purer heart e'er breathed a purer prayer.

“ Rise, my dear child,” a mild voice gravely said,
“ Rise, and accept your doom : ” whereat she rose.
In vain is Reason's dew when Faith is dead,
And meek Grace sleeps 'neath Doubt's unmelting snows.
I can no more. The Paraclete hath fled ;
Through his parched heart e'en prayer no longer flows.
By Heaven may yet the miracle be wrought ;
But human ways are weak, and words are nought.”

It is not Heaven that has been deaf to Olympia's prayer, but Godfrid's heart that is deaf to Heaven. The last stanza is full of the Catholic doctrines of the blindness of reason rejecting, and therefore unaided by grace, and the necessity of the gift of faith for conversion, a doctrine which precludes the possibility of conversion by mere controversy, though it is often the channel through which the gift is bestowed. Godfrid takes Olympia back to the seashore near Spiaggiascura, and there his entreaties are vain. He swears that he will reverence her faith even as her soul. But Olympia, the gentle and childlike, is strong in grace. She crushes her own heart with all its blighted desires, and says farewell :—

“ No, Godfrid, no ! Farewell, farewell ! You might
Have been my star ; a star once fell by pride ;
But since you furl your wings and veil your light,
I cling to Mary and Christ crucified.
Leave me, nay, leave me, ere it be too late !
Better part here than part at Heaven's gate ! ”

For Godfrid the image of Olive is obliterated, but his love for Olympia, more elevated, more spiritual, cannot die out, and the memory of the days at Spiaggiascura is to follow him through life. His mind is as turbulent as the sea. Materialism, utter scepticism, chafe against the spirit's innate knowledge, and the mind cannot rest. There is something beyond, something hidden. The world is not wide enough to

satisfy its aspirations ; all the earth's wisdom is too shallow when that higher wisdom is denied to it for which its very nature thirsts. It is again at night that Godfrid's soul reveals its disquietude, rendered more earnest now by the keen disappointment that has seared his life.

O night upon the waters ! In the hush
Of all except our hearts. . . .
We pray the Invisible to let us rush
Into its arms and tear away the shroud
That balks our sense, or likewise hide the veil.
Then comes the dawn and all again is pale.

Why these brief interviews with things supernal,
Which vex the flesh, then leave it just as carnal ;
Dissatisfy our souls for the diurnal
Foul irksome tasks within their earthly charnel ?
Hear we the music of a real Eternal,
Or nothing but the fancy-wafted far knell,
Such as tossed mariners conceive they hear
When seas and skies grow treacherously clear ?

O, give us spirits' wings, or kindly leave
Us clay alone ! Or pinions, or repose !
More light ! more light ! we cry, and sob, and grieve ;
More light ! more light ! and still it dimmer grows !

When some months have passed he returns to the "little city by the sea." But Olympia is there no longer. She has gone to become a Sister of Charity, and "Christ hath got her virgin vow." Godfrid hastens to Milan, trusting to see her friend of the cathedral, but the old man is dead, and he returns to Florence, "seeing sadly life and death conspired against him." So Madonna's child is lost to sight. We have said there are many Olives in the world. There are many Olympias too, without Olympia's romance, clinging to Mary's robe through the cares and the routine of every-day life, and unconsciously manifesting to unbelievers their mother's glory and the beauty of holiness. There is never a time when all that we admire in the mountain maiden of Spiaggiasecura cannot be found in those from whose young hearts false teaching has not shut out the love of Mary. God multiply these children of hers, whether they spend their days tending the cloistral lamp in charity and contemplation, or with spotless life drift on from maidenhood into motherhood, freighted with the hopes of the Church !

At the close of this second act we see again Olive and Sir Gilbert. The secret of the shadow that lay on her life and came between them is discovered, and the husband, whom

Godfrid in the hour of sickness has brought back from the gates of death, only recovers to withdraw mute into "hollow woe"; while the unhappy wife dies silent and heart-broken. The manner in which this part of the story is told differs essentially from the corresponding passage in the first edition of this act, which, called the "*Human Tragedy*," was published by itself in 1862. The story, as it appears now, is a vast improvement on the other. The style of the versification has been changed throughout, and the serious tone, the excisions, and additions are the evidence of a now mature mind, which can weigh wisely its own work. It is, above all, for the changes in the latter part that we are grateful to the author. Speaking not of the versification but of the incidents of the tale, as it stood, it was not worthy of being transferred to its place in the complete work, but now the refinement which remoulded the whole story is especially shown in the skilful contrivance and delicate treatment of this part.

We pass on to the next Act. It appeared in 1870 as *Rome or Death!* and now with some wise alterations forms the third Act of the tragedy. The mustering of the Garibaldians is described in the language of an ardent sympathizer with the cause. In the preface published at its first appearance, the author affirms (what the verse itself, without his statement, would have led us to believe) that he writes of war "not at second hand, but as one who has followed it with his own steps." He goes on to say, "I trust no one will suppose that my love for Italy is either prompted or accompanied by any vulgar hatred of the Church of Rome, or that I have intended, by a single line or word in the following pages, to inflame religious prejudice and rancour against a Creed for which, as having satisfied the acutest intellects, inspired the noblest actions, and been illustrated by the most perfect piety, I entertain a profound respect." We readily grant the sincerity of these words, and therefore there is all the more reason to regret the covert insults offered to the Church, most of all in the beginning of the fourth canto, where he strikes that stumbling-block to the blind or prejudiced, the Temporal Power. In the third act, with which we have for the present to deal, Garibaldi and his followers take to themselves so much of the author's admiration that it is no wonder there is no esteem left for the Church of Rome. The red-shirted adventurer is here the presiding genius. The point of view is at his side. We see a great deal of the courage and enterprise that made him notorious, and we are expected to close our eyes to the fact—now widely and unmistakably known—that mere daring and unscrupulous persistence would have

been worth very little to him, had he not been supported at every turn by the secret help and sympathy of a treacherous and hypocritical state. We have now the actual telegrams of the Minister of the Interior, which were read in the Chamber at Florence by the Opposition in the following year, and which show that in 1867 the Government gave arms, recruits, and organization to the Garibaldians. The aid of Italy is even to be inferred from Mr. Austin's own confession, that after the storming of Monte Rotondo the Garibaldians sent their prisoners across the frontier. This in itself is conclusive proof. If, during the present insurrection, the insurgents in the Herzegovina were to send their Turkish prisoners across the Austrian frontier, would not all Europe take it as a proof that Austria was promoting the insurrection?

According to the poetic narrative, the Italian people rush to arms, and flow like an irresistible tide towards Rome; and in the Roman States the oppressed and discontented inhabitants are only waiting for the coming of the insurgents to rise with them in arms. We shall now give two extracts, which will show in plain prose what the condition and spirit of the people were at the time. When the Garibaldians were advancing upon the Pontifical territory a correspondent of the *Standard* wrote the following remarks from Rome:—

Although there is not a chance of any revolt being brought about by the Romans themselves, there is no saying what may be done by the numberless foreign agents who are pouring in under cover of affairs of various kinds, and whose evident resolve is to force an insurrection at any cost. If the news reaches you some morning that the barricades are raised in the streets of Rome, be sure beforehand that no Roman hand will have added a barrowful of earth. The disposition of the people is clear. They are contented with their rulers and with their lot; and though there are grumblers here, as everywhere, there is no misery, no real discontent; abundance of work, high wages, and general prosperity. The Romans occupy at the present moment a precisely similar position to the immortal knife-grinder; and while foreigners are trying to persuade them that they are slaves, and victims, and hereditary bondsmen, they seem little inclined to strike the blow that would give the inevitable signal for an Italian intervention.

On October 17th, a few days later than the date of this letter, the *Moniteur* published a Reuter's telegram, which ran thus:—

In several towns in the provinces of Viterbo and Frosinone the inhabitants are calling for arms to aid the gendarmes in repelling the insurgent bands. . . . Throughout the whole extent of the Pontifical States the population not only remains calm, but is pronouncing more and more strongly against the invaders.

Much more evidence to the same effect might be given, but this is sufficient to show that there is another aspect of the question beside that which we find so highly coloured in *Rome or Death!*

Sir Gilbert and Godfrid are now in the ranks of the Garibaldians. The storming of Monte Rotondo is a scene after Mr. Austin's own heart. We hear of the bravery of the besiegers fighting against men under cover, until we are tempted to think the Papalini in their fortified stronghold were taking a mean advantage over the valiant assailants. But, when we come to Mentana, it is amusing to see how quickly the tables are turned. The heroic chieftain has then an excellent position for his troops, and it is grand to watch him hiding them in the vineyards, and getting them out of sight in the wooded country. We are not told how the Zouaves, charging up the ravine between those wooded heights, pressed on despite a deadly fire from either side; but the inspiration of the poet at the moment may not have permitted him to mention such a trifling incident. Again, to return to Monte Rotondo, we are reminded that "no Vulcan's limping thunderbolts delayed" them "with cumbrous help." They had "no ponderous bolts of dead destruction." Nor had the defenders. When the place was taken, only two old cannon were captured, and these were not on the walls but in a courtyard within. So far the absence of shot and shell was not a one-sided disadvantage. When the repeated charge has been baffled and night comes on, there is an unconscious air of keen relish about the description of the burning of the gates. The kegs of pitch, the straw, and faggots are paraded before us in the pleasantest manner possible, until the long details of this clever little *coup de guerre* bring to our mind the manner in which a Frenchman of delicate palate is said to turn his sip of absinthe round and round in his mouth before he swallows it. At last the Garibaldians force an entrance. The "routed hirelings" are dislodged from their "central air"; that is in prose and fact the Palace of the Prince of Piombino which the "hirelings," a mere handful, defended gallantly story by story, till the building was set on fire. They are here termed "the cowering foe," a name which cannot stand for a moment against the recollection of their desperate resistance. The epithet, "hirelings," is equally unmerited. It is unworthy of a free-minded writer who, doubtless, would not be classed for a moment with those who raised a vulgar and feeble outcry of contempt against men of acknowledged valour and stainless honour, merely because they were soldiers of the Pope. The defenders of Monte

Rotondo were two companies of the *Légion d'Antibes*. As for the Zouaves, to whom from various quarters we have before now heard the words "hireling" and "mercenary" applied, they served for something like twopence a day and a ration of bread, soup, and coffee. Hundreds of these men had left luxurious homes, more still had given up the work by which they were earning their daily bread in comfort, because their religion impelled them to serve God, His Church, and His Vicar, "not in word and in tongue, but in deed and in truth." Yet there are writers who talk of freedom of conscience, and believe in generosity and self-sacrifice, and after all stigmatize such men as these by the name of hirelings. If it be applied to the Papal army because its ranks were made up of French, Swiss, Canadian, Irish, English, Dutch, Flemish—men of every country where faith flourishes, the term is still less appropriate. Is not Rome the city of all nations? The representative of Jesus Christ is the Father of all the multitude of the redeemed wherever they are spread throughout the world, and those will be ever found the best patriots at home, whom the most patriotic of all impulses brought in the hour of danger to Pius IX. and to the universal *patria*—Rome. The French Zouaves proved it on the Loire.

According to Mr. Austin, the people of Monte Rotondo were hearty sympathizers with the Garibaldians. Thus he describes their entrance :—

And still as they advanced, from thresholds freed
 Came forth the exultant populace, and blessed
 The arms that brought salvation to its need.
 Their blackened hands the trembling grandsire pressed ;
 The tearful matron brought the welcome meed
 Of mother's kiss ; the soft-eyed maid caressed ;
 Whose brothers swelled their ranks.

We have now to contrast with this a few words of unpoetical fact, showing that, whatever were the feelings of the "exultant populace" when the Garibaldians entered, they were remarkably glad to see them going out. There is something unaccountable in the change. The only explanation is that there exists such a thing as poetic licence. Our extract is from the correspondence of one of the leading London daily papers at the time. "The inhabitants of Monte Rotondo hailed the arrival of General Kanzler as that of a deliverer. They had been pillaged by the Garibaldians in every way, and the insults to the women of the city had more especially

exasperated them."* In fact, these Garibaldian heroes acted in a manner which outraged every feeling of the people upon whom they forced themselves. The cathedral was sacked, the sacred vessels were stolen, and sacrileges were committed, from the very thought of which the mind recoils if it be not dead to faith.

The lapse of time between Monte Rotondo and Mentana, which, in reality, was a full week, is much too short in the poetic narrative. This, however, the author acknowledges in his preface to *Rome or Death!* therefore we pass on. Nothing is said about the surprise given to the Garibaldian force at Mentana, though this was acknowledged by themselves, and even in Ricciotti Garibaldi's account of the battle. Mr. Austin represents them calmly watching the advance of the Pontifical army. The solitary rifle-shot, which many who were present will remember was the herald of the engagement, is not omitted here.

Hark ! the sharp challenge of a rifle rings
Shrill through the air ! then all again is still.

The description of the battle is poetically fine, but prosaically unjust. The glory of the day is awarded to the Garibaldians, the victory to the French ; while the author stoops to speak of the Zouaves under the imagery of "base mongrels." Now, the fact stands, that at the time France, ever thirsty for military glory, did not for several days speak of her own share in the battle, and never after had the conscience to assume the whole honour of it. There was doubtless bravery on the side of the Garibaldians, but why has Mr. Austin no word except a vulgar term of disgust for the men who left home and country to pour out their blood as a witness to the faith that was in them—men who in youth, some of them almost in boyhood, would have fought as determinedly if there was no French uniform on the field. The glory of the day was not exclusively theirs, but the Zouaves and the rest of the Papal army shared it with the proudest military power of the time, and that nation herself, we repeat, did not think of appropriating the honour, or at first of publishing the fact that she had even had a large part in the victory. From the poem we should infer that the Garibaldians were at a disadvantage in point of numbers. The worthlessness of the popular opinion on this matter was well shown by an English military periodical at the time :—

Of course (it said) the Garibaldians, we are assured, were outnumbered

* *Standard*, Nov. 16th, 1867.

four to one ; but as we know from official records that the assailants were less than 3,000 all told, it is hard to understand where the 1,700 prisoners now in Rome came from, saying nothing of the 900 who are allowed to have escaped behind the Italian lines, or of the 600 left dead on the field. The fact is the Garibaldini were much the strongest. The heat and burden of the day had been manfully borne by the Papalini, and to ascribe the victory to the French alone is merely to reproduce the old fable about the Prussians at Waterloo.*

The account of the engagement given by Mr. Austin is that the Papal army was totally routed. The French turned the tide of battle and won the victory, the defeated Papalini reappearing on the field when they saw the day would be theirs. Now we learn from the report of General Polhes, that towards the end of the fight, late in the afternoon, he sent his French troops to form on both flanks of the Zouaves, lest they might be outflanked by the Garibaldian lines. This shows that the Garibaldians were in immense numbers, since there was a chance of their lines turning those of the Papal army on either hand. Again, it proves that the Zouaves were not routed in hopeless flight when the French came up, but were holding their ground. The report of General Polhes also tells that at General Kanzler's request the Zouaves were allowed to go into battle first. This testifies that they were not inferior troops ; if they were, no French general would have let them take their place as the van of the army.

Before turning to another aspect of this Third Act,—the story of individuals woven through it,—we must pause to recommend to the reader's attention two very happy remarks made by the poet, one in the description of Mentana, the other long before. We point them out more readily as the extreme felicity of the language has perhaps not struck even the author himself. Here is a suggestive metaphor :—

The dense ranks that fenced the Triple Crown
And, too unmindful of rebuke divine,
Drew Peter's sword afresh. . . .

Let the figure of speech pass, and then we may ask, against whom did Peter draw his sword ? The assailants of Christ's Vicar are immediately—and how truly !—placed in the position of that other band, who, with Judas for their leader, stood long ago in the darkness of Gethsemane.

The other passage is a gem. In a stanza lauding Victor Emmanuel, he is described figuratively coming from the midst of war,

His kingly breast bestarred with gory mud.

* *United Service Magazine*, Dec. 1867.

From first to last Victor Emmanuel has shown himself worthy of this decoration, in building up United Italy by force, bloodshed, and robbery, over a misgoverned, overtaxed, and misrepresented people.

In this act a new character is brought before us, Miriam, an Italian girl, whose affection is destined to fill the void in Gilbert's heart, and to build up again the happiness that had been shattered at Florence. The picture of Miriam is very richly coloured, and though the conversations with her are somewhat high-flown, we can more easily imagine them under an Italian sun than we can reconcile ourselves with some of the poetical dialogue of Olive and Godfrid in the first act. Miriam brings forcibly to our mind the Theodora of *Lothair*. She accompanies the Garibaldians, sings war songs and hymns of liberty, and pours forth curses on France. When Gilbert is wounded and apparently dying, she gives him her marriage vows in one of the churches that has been turned into a temporary hospital. Godfrid also is wounded, and his meeting with Olympia as a Sister of Charity is eloquently told. It is refreshing to turn from the hot atmosphere of battle, smoke, and tumultuous passion that surrounds the Garibaldian heroine to the recollection of those heroines of the Papal army whose work was not to raise their voices or to frame maledictions but to comfort the dying and soothe the wounded. Far happier than that of the imagined Miriam or Theodora was their true womanly task of helping back to repentance many of those who at the last hour craved the divine mercy through the religion they had once rejected, fearing, when the veil would be torn away by death, to stand as renegades before the Judgment Seat.

Godfrid's slow recovery from his wounds in a Roman convent is gracefully told in the Fourth Act. There are some exquisite passages regarding his sad and reverent search for Olympia, and her own narrative of the manner in which she had him conveyed from the battle-field to Rome hidden in the cart of a *contadino* is a pretty idyl in itself. But now we come to sterner scenes. Godfrid has long ago roused Gilbert to large ideas and wider views. The pupil outsteps his mentor, and while Godfrid stands aloof, he plunges into the strife of the Commune, desiring that altar and throne should be levelled together, and advocating the rights of man and universal equality. Miriam had sustained him in his new creed, and accompanied him to France in Garibaldi's corps, and afterwards to Paris, where he had joined the ranks of the insurgents. Meanwhile another traveller is destined to go to Paris on a far different errand. It is

Olympia, and Godfrid obtains leave to be her escort. Mr. Austin's convent scenes are particularly interesting, and have about them the true convent air. We are therefore all the more surprised to see him join the links of his story with this huge improbability. The superior of the convent freely tells him that she knows it is for him all Olympia's prayers are offered, yet she readily consents to his accompanying the nun to the scene of her next works of charity; and in Paris, where he becomes one of the wearers of the red cross, it is an every-day thing for him to call at the convent and aid the nuns in their labours for the wounded, and frequently he and Olympia are to be found pursuing the work of compassion alone. This part has more of an air of romance than of reality. To those who are aware of the ordinary prudence of religious superiors, and of the habits of those nuns who, as S. Vincent de Paul said, have to walk through the world with only their veil for a cloister, the journey of the two former lovers to Paris is so improbable that it descends to the absurd. However, there are some beautiful points of description on the way—for instance, the sight of the scene of their first meeting and of her early days at Madonna's shrine, when they gaze across the water at "the little city by the sea," while Olympia, blinded by her tears, kneels "mute and motionless" on the vessel's deck, till the old place fading fainter,

Slow dwindled to a speck, then quick to view
Was lost behind a seaward-jutting hill.

War, fire, and death, mingling with the horrors of the Commune, throw a lurid light on the closing scenes. Godfrid cannot for a moment sympathize with the rabble who are up in arms. Despite Gilbert's entreaties, he stands neutral, wearing the red cross of mercy, till one day he takes it from his arm, and gives it to Gilbert to enable him to save himself and his wife. Then the story comes to its tragic close, and Godfrid and Olympia at the same moment are struck down by chance shots, and are taken back to be laid in one grave by the Italian seashore. "So ye," says the poet,—

who go, half-guided by my song,
To Spiaggiascura, there a grave will find,
To which the waves make music all day long,
And wherein sleep the gentlest of their kind,
Sheltered for ever now from hap of wrong.
And, can it be our mortal causes find
Immortal consequence beyond the tomb,
He either shares her bliss or she his doom.

To our mind the character of Olympia changes during the

progress of the story. At Spiaggiascura she was gentle, warm-hearted, but positively uncompromising. Now, when she took the veil and some years elapsed, while her heart remained as human as ever, the uncompromising spirit would have grown strong instead of decaying; and though her life, with all its prayer and sacrifice, might be offered for Godfrid, she would shrink from intercourse with him, and the spirit which prompted her to crush her own heart when she bade him farewell on the seashore, would urge her, not to more self-indulgence but to still greater sacrifices as life went on, sacrifices which would be offered for him, perhaps, in the firm hope that in the next life the desolation of this would be repaid to both. Gilbert's character is well drawn. The man, who is ignorant and narrow-minded, enters another world when sorrow comes upon him and leaves his life void. He is driven out of selfishness because there is no longer repose in the thought of self, but he speeds madly on without clear judgment to guide him, and he is deluded by broad views and high-sounding theories.

But it is Godfrid's mind that deserves special study. When we look back to the opening act, we cannot believe that he is the man who is there weak, irresolute, worshipping beauty, and swayed by a passion that, though it is refined, has nothing about it either lofty or spiritual. In the second act we see another man, or perhaps an older man though but a short time has elapsed—one who holds determinedly to his own views, and believing them, has sufficient strength of mind to resist every allurement towards his life's happiness rather than stoop to insincerity. We do not hesitate in saying that the Godfrid of the first act is scarcely to be recognized in this character, and that it would be hardly possible for the weakness of the first Godfrid to ripen, in a few months, into the strength of that noble but misguided man who, in the second, places conscience before all things, and conceives for Madonna's Child a devotion which is constant, though hopeless, and which is of such an ennobling nature that it precludes ever after the possibility of mere sensual affection and of the worship of outward beauty. When we lay down the book, the feeling which prevails is an excessive sadness at the thought of so many souls of which Godfrid's is a true picture—noble souls, capable of doing great things had they been faithful to grace and humble enough not to throw themselves into the darkness and misery of scepticism. The shadow of paganism has fallen on him; he speaks of Fate and of the God of Love, and looks only to a doubtful possibility of another life beyond the grim certainty of death. At

times, when the world wearies him, and his pride ebbs for the hour and lets him feel the aching void in his own heart, he remembers his mother's teaching, and the Faith of his first years :—

The tenderness which drenches the lone mind,
Insensibly as dew distilled at night,
Made him, of late, cast many a look behind
Of fondness towards a Creed abandoned quite.
He felt his hands clasped by a parent kind
In infant prayer ; he saw each dear old rite ;
He heard the hymns of childhood, and he breathed
The scent of flowers, with sacred incense wreathed.

For not in scorn, but he, bowed down and blenched,
Had passed out from the Temple. Ere he went,
With secret tears the altar-steps he drenched,
Aware he sped to utter banishment.
From home, hearth, Heaven, reluctant heart he wrenched,
The stern exiler of his past content ;
Bidding adieu to Faiths which, well he knew,
Cease not to comfort, ceasing to be true.

He will ever revere the ancient Faith, remembering its white-robed virgins and its army of saints, the wise and the holy of the earth. He remembers, too, that "Rome's hoary Creed" was the great trunk from which sects but branched off and died. But for him it is obsolete. He sees none truer, fitter, but it is all gone. The world has passed it long ago—a world "where Christ's meek banner longwhile hath been furled." One day he ascends the Esquiline Hill, and with the shrine of Our Lady on one hand, and ruins of pagan Rome on the other, pours out the lament of his despair :—

"Mankind ! Faith ! Future !" mournfully he cried,
Folding the letter ; "Who shall build new faith
Mid ruins such as these ! The Gods have died,
The beautiful grand Gods, and but their wraith
Haunts the forsaken spots they sanctified.
Empire, Religion, Truth—all perisheth.
Cæsar hath gone, and Christ seems following fast ;
Only our wants and weak deceptions last."

He sees people coming out of the Church :—

Happier that they before the Babe who cried
In Bethlehem had laid life's heavy pack ;
Monk, peasant, mendicant, the halt, the hale,
But all-sad burthened with some human tale,

"I, too, must go," he murmured; "Unlike those
Who have passed onwards, I can nowhere cast
The burden of my weakness and my woes,
Which I, unhelped, must carry to the last."

What a wail of long-enduring anguish is breathed out in those words. He has gone out from God. He is too proud to turn back from his path of self-reliance, and the wilderness stretches before him. All is doubt. He has not one single inch of reposeful certainty on which to rest and gather strength. But the worst of all is that his misery is self-inflicted, and still grace wages the long war. The spirit will not tolerate within its immortal self the belief that it can perish; and there is no peace. We can conceive no depth of sorrow which calls so loudly for pity as his. Imagine a man of talent, great aspirations, and youthful vigour who is suddenly paralyzed and has to wear out his long life in living death. His state is not so worthy of compassion as that of the soul that in an hour of rash pride and self-confidence takes its own life, and, still existing, dwells in what is but death. It can, but will not, return to light and life. It knows but half its own wretchedness, and the everlasting spirit is every day stifling the yearning of its true self for the spiritual and eternal. We cannot imagine the world without God's Revelation and His Church. Scepticism is a man's own doing if he abandons that Church as Godfrid did. We were not created to endure the torments—often felt, slowly, silently, trampled on and unrecognized by men themselves—of that hell on earth through which the sceptic passes before he is lost in the unfathomable abyss of unbelief, where there is no doubt, no question, but a delusive peace, until the awful advent of eternity.

It is no wonder that Godfrid looks for his heaven to human love, "beacon and bourne of us wayfaring ones." In the language of the author there is nothing else which man is sure of having through the ages to solace his existence. Whether the day of peace, liberty, light, that he looks for, dawns, or whether the world remains in so-called darkness; whether nations fall or creeds die out, love will stand as of old; therefore he clings in his shipwreck to this one plank of happiness, and deifies that which is but a gift of Him whom the Evangelist tells us is Himself Love, *Caritas*. But even human love, let it be the greatest, strongest, purest that ever was, leaves something wanting yet. Or even if it seems to satisfy the heart entirely, it is but for a time, and who shall sustain us when the inevitable end comes, and either we are helplessly drifting away from those we love alone into the

unknown future, or when they precede us, and death has snatched from our arms all that we cherished and fondly believed to be imperishable. No, though love may be our beacon, as it has been to many, it can never be our bourne; and however blessed it may be, the shadow of coming grief lies deepening upon it, if we have closed our eyes to the gloom of Calvary and the glory of the Resurrection.

Godfrid's nature is generous; his instincts are those of the old days of chivalry. In his eyes the wealthy at home possess stagnant worthless lives when they exist only for their own ease and enjoyment. He is fired with the desire of taking some active part in the world. Therefore, when his own vision of happiness has vanished, he throws himself heart and soul into the cause of United Italy, but without wishing to raise his hand against the altar before which he once knelt. He professes to seek, not to destroy the Tiara, but to strike down "one story of the too proud edifice." He regards the authority of the throne as sacred, and his quasi-conservative views on this point ought to have kept him and many of similar opinions out of the Garibaldian ranks. Despite his impartial professions, the doctrine he really holds is that the throne of Italy is the one to be upheld on the old principle of *Might is Right*; and as for the Papal throne, with its centuries of venerable age and its immemorial traditions, the fact that it belongs to a priestly monarchy makes it at once an exception, and sets it outside the bounds of fairness in words and justice in deeds.

To the cause he espouses he brings no half-hearted devotion. His own self is blotted out at need in the warm impulse of his generosity. He is stubborn, but at the same time impressionable; brave, but full of thoughtful tenderness. There is nothing small in Godfrid; every quality or power he has is great. But there is in him nothing that an estimable Pagan might not have possessed unless it be his esteem for the Christian religion; and doubtless there were Pagans who had that too. We look in vain for supernatural virtue, for one trace of the humble spirit that is most exalted when it stoops lowest, for the spirit of prayer, the spirit of worship. This large heart, this great mind can best be likened to a rich tract of country, which might have produced a glorious harvest that would excite joyful admiration, and give wealth out of its fruitfulness, but which the owner in culpable neglect has left to itself, till its luxuriance, though beautiful to the sight of the passer-by, is in reality as fruitless as the sea, and in the harvester's eyes as barren as the desert.

It is this perversion by man of the best gifts of God that

gives the "Human Tragedy" its scope, and affords the author a foundation for his plan. Why should Love, Religion, Country, Mankind, be called Protagonists, if it be not because man makes them such in the perversity of his fallen nature? What is the first, whether it be that love round which a halo is thrown from Heaven itself by the nuptial benediction, or the father's, brother's love, the mother's more than earthly tenderness, the strong fealty of the friend; what is it all but a gift for our happiness and well-being sent from Him who bade us love one another even as He loved us, who poured out His life like water for our sake? Again, what is Country, patriotism, but one of the noblest emotions of which we are capable? It raises the mind above itself and its own small interests; it enlarges our range of vision, and gives men a common cause in which they may unite. Still wider the mind is opened when it takes mankind into its large embrace; and Religion, that has blessed the affections of home, and fostered our love of country, comes here as the greatest and first of all the four to make our hearts more tender and sympathetic in their human brotherhood. Who shall say that Religion, the sunshine and life of the soul, was not to be aided by the other three in working out man's happiness in the designs of God? And here, whether they affect individuals or whole peoples, these powers do not make up the human tragedy or fill life with storms and blighted hope and woe. They do not evolve the tale of man's misery, unless he himself misuses them and bends them to his own false views and selfish ends. Love, in the first Act, is only the effect of weak impulse on undisciplined hearts. It is a different thing from the love of Godfrid and Olympia, which of itself would never have led to a struggle. Religion does not become a Protagonist till doubt usurps its rights; and it would have been a truer inspiration to make scepticism the struggler with love, that blighted two lives in the second part. The cause of Country comes before us upheld by the Garibaldians, who were fighting for a false idea, wronging their own nation and obstinately contending for States where the very people begged to take up arms against them, and vindicate their right to peace and legitimate rule. Lastly, the cause of the Commune of Paris was as far from being the cause of mankind as that blood-thirsty and ambitious rabble was from representing the needs or desires of the human race. So it is that, from the first incident to the last, it is not the four powers sanctified by Heaven that evolve the "Human Tragedy"; but the Protagonists are rather the craving of the flesh, the self-inflicted blindness of the intellect, zeal without guidance, and revolt

against authority. These are the four that are every day assailing home, country, and religion, and that come one by one upon the scene of the story to struggle with truth and goodness, to destroy peace, and to embitter life.

ART. VII.—A FEW MORE WORDS ON FESSLER.

Letters to the TABLET *on* Mgr. Fessler's *Treatise*: by "H. I. D. R."

BY way of introduction to the ensuing correspondence, one or two facts must be recalled to the memory of our readers.

Bishop Fessler, in his treatise on infallibility, says that "many theologians think it may be assumed as doubtful" whether the Syllabus was issued *ex cathedrâ*, "until some fresh declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See" (English Translation, p. 92, 3).

The French and afterwards the English translators of his treatise stated, on the authority of an anonymous correspondent in the "*Germania*," that this treatise had received very especial sanction at Rome.

The Pope had directed a translation of it to be made into Italian, and instructed a Commission of learned theologians of different nationalities to examine it and report on it. Both of these commands were put into execution without delay. The Pope made himself thoroughly acquainted with the contents of Bishop Fessler's work; and as his own judgment of it fully corresponded with the judgment of the Commission, he wrote a letter with his own hand to the Bishop of St. Polten, praising him for this highly valuable work, and begging him to persevere in the laborious task he had undertaken of correcting the erroneous opinions which had been spread abroad in various directions ("*Introduction*," p. ix.).

When we wrote on the treatise in April, 1875, the notion had not occurred to us that a statement, confidently put forth with so much particularity of detail, could be unfounded. Accordingly, in a discussion on the "*Unam sanctam*" (p. 491), we wrote as follows: "Considering that Mgr. Fessler's treatise on infallibility has been passed by a committee of theologians and complimented by the Holy Father—we may not suppose that any position, prominently advocated in his volume, violates any existing Catholic obligation." And in

an earlier page (p. 346) we made a similar remark with reference to the Syllabus :—

In terminating our remarks on the Syllabus, we willingly make one admission. In doing so, we have to retract an opinion which we have often expressed ; but we think we are obliged to retract it, by the dicta of various considerable Catholic authorities both at home and abroad. Our admission is, that no Catholic as such can as yet be under an *obligation* of accepting the Syllabus, in any more stringent way than as Mgr. Fessler accepts it. According to his doctrine (as has been shown above) "a Catholic is bound to pay obedience and submission to the Syllabus"; he is required, in virtue of the "obedience" which he "owes the Pope," to take for granted that the eighty propositions have been justly condemned ; but he is not required to regard them as *infallibly* condemned, or condemned at all in any such sense as that their contradictories, if understood according to the ordinary use of language, are thereby necessarily ruled to be true.

Various circumstances induced us to write a second article on Bishop Fessler's treatise in our following number. By the time we wrote that article, we had come to suspect the complete accuracy of the story about the report of the Commission ; and we so expressed ourselves in pp. 103, 4. At a later period of the quarter, and just before our number appeared, we had heard of information from Rome, which led us to hold with much confidence that the whole statement "was entirely unfounded" (p. 219). And now, even since the issue of our last number, M. Cosquin, the French translator, writes to the "*Etudes*" of May, admitting that the Pope's Brief to Mgr. Fessler was not based on any translation of the treatise into Italian,* nor on the appointment of any Commission, nor (of course) on any *report* of such Commission.

In our last number (p. 372, note) we wrote as follows :—

Last April we "retracted an opinion which we had once expressed" concerning the obligation incumbent on Catholics of accepting the Syllabus-teaching as infallible. We must now retract that retraction. It was mainly based on the credence which we then gave to the story about Mgr. Fessler's treatise having been approved by a theological Commission of different nationalities, to which the Pope was supposed to have referred it. As we pointed out however in July, there can now be no doubt that this whole story is the purest fable.

On this, the following correspondence appeared in the "*Tablet*" :—

I.

SIR,—In the number of the DUBLIN REVIEW just come out (April 1876),

* Is there up to this moment any translation of the treatise into Latin or Italian ? We ask for information.

p. 372, the Editor solemnly retracts a retraction made in April, 1875, of his assertion, many times repeated, that Catholics are obliged to accept the Syllabus as infallible. He does this because he thinks he has discovered that his Holiness did not approve Mgr. Fessler's book—"The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes," in which the infallibility of the Syllabus is maintained to be an open question—in the formal manner stated on the authority of the "Germania," in the preface to the English translation.

The following information may be of interest to some of your readers. In a private letter of Mgr. Fessler's—an extract from which lies before me—dated April 21, 1871, that is to say six days before the issue of the Pope's Brief containing the approval of his book—the Bishop informs his correspondent that he has received sure proofs that his work has been favourably received in Rome, and that he has been indirectly encouraged by the Pope to continue his defence of the Council. He supposes his correspondent to ask why this encouragement is only *indirect*, and he answers that he is given to understand that this is because he did not send his book *directly* to the Pope with a letter, but through others. He adds that he communicated to Cardinal Bilio as early as the 3rd of April, Mgr. Hefele's desire that the book should be approved. We find then that on the 27th of April the Pope, contrary to the Bishop's expectation, goes out of his way to express to him *directly* the strongest approval of what he has done in his book on the infallibility, mere etiquette not requiring him to notice it directly at all. In the words of the Brief, what Mgr. Fessler has done is "very opportune and most useful," inasmuch as "a luminous exposition of the truth" is of the supremest advantage, and if the Bishop perseveres in such efforts he "will deserve exceedingly well of our most holy religion, and the Christian people which, like a good shepherd, he will withdraw from poisonous pastures."

Now I am far from maintaining that this is at all equivalent to an official authorization of everything in Mgr. Fessler's book; but I venture to insist that such language could never have been used if, in the opinion of the Pope and his advisers, the Bishop was transgressing a *certain* truth, and absolving the faithful from a *certain* obligation. Although a formal commission of theologians may not have examined the work, we learn at least from Mgr. Fessler's letter, that its significance and importance had been thoroughly impressed upon the Roman authorities. And so, perhaps, we can afford to bear almost unmoved the dogmatic utterances of the DUBLIN REVIEW, whether these take the form of assertion, retraction, or retraction of retraction.

"Nescire velle quæ magister maximus
Docere non vult erudita inscitia est."

—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

H. I. D. R.

II.

SIR,—I will take care that the letter of your correspondent, "H. I. D. R.," shall be inserted in our next number.

As to the due authority of the Syllabus, no good Catholic can have any other wish, except that the whole truth on the matter shall be generally known; and "H. I. D. R." will always do good service by publishing

any facts which can tend to throw light on it. But it seems to me that those as yet adduced by him are very far from sufficing to establish his own conclusion.

Mgr. Fessler's doctrine on the Syllabus occupies a very subordinate position indeed in his treatise, as any one will see who looks at that treatise. The relevant question is, whether the Holy Father, when he commended the treatise, was aware that it advocated that particular doctrine. The Bishop's volume was published in Germany in German, I believe, in the course of February, 1871; and the Pope's Brief is dated on April 27th of the same year. I cannot doubt that the treatise, as regards its main and pervading course of argument, was greatly admired by the Roman theologians, in proportion as (by means of translations or otherwise) they became acquainted with its contents; for that course of argument (as I have more than once said in the DUBLIN REVIEW) seems to me an inestimably important one. It is, I suppose, by no means improbable (though the Pope himself implies nothing of the kind) that the Holy Father when he wrote his Brief—in addition to having received the Bishop's own report on the purport of the treatise—had also heard a very favourable rumour on its general value. But your correspondent surely does not give any reason whatever for his assumption, that the Pope was at that time in the slightest degree acquainted with the Bishop's few and subordinate statements concerning the Syllabus. If, however, it could be hereafter shown that the Pope *was* acquainted with those statements, and nevertheless pronounced an official eulogy of the treatise—I should be the last man to deny the great significance of such a circumstance.

If your correspondent then knows, or comes to know, any further facts throwing light on this issue, I trust he will at once publish them. Meanwhile what is certain is, that the Brief does not make the most distant reference to the Syllabus, nor at all imply (but quite the reverse) that the Pope had either himself read one word of the treatise or received any official report whatever on its contents.

Your correspondent criticises the vacillation of what he calls my "dogmatical utterances." Yet surely in this case what I have said is most intelligible. For reasons which I have more than once given, I think that Catholics are under an obligation of accepting the teachings of the Syllabus as infallible. In the early part of last year however, I found it stated with considerable confidence and widely believed, that the Pope had referred Mgr. Fessler's treatise to a theological Commission, and acting on its report had officially expressed unqualified eulogy of that treatise. In the presence of such a judgment, I abandoned, as a matter of course, my confidence in my own theological reasonings. Now however it appears that this whole statement was unfounded. I can no longer therefore yield deference to a certain supposed decision which never existed, of a certain supposed Commission which was never appointed.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

THE DUBLIN REVIEWER.

III.

SIR,—The Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, in his letter of last week, has, I

think, failed to see the point of my strictures. I am anxious that, whether these be just or not, at least no false issue should be raised before the public.

My point then is this. Here is a secular Review, which for a number of years has been forcing upon us a certain view of Catholic obligation, in spite of a variety of protests, as the only view consistent with Catholicism. A translation appeared last year of a work by Mgr. Fessler, the Secretary of the Vatican Council, in which the obligation which this secular Review has been trying to force upon our consciences is most unequivocally denied. The work was put into the Pope's hands, and Mgr. Hefele's strong desire that it might be approved by Rome made known to the Roman authorities. That is to say, their attention is directed in a most emphatic way to what the DUBLIN REVIEW would call the minimistic teaching of the book, amongst which the statement about the Syllabus is conspicuous, and the Pope goes out of his way to express his approval. It was moreover very generally believed that a formal commission of theologians had previously examined the book and sent in their report to the Pope. When this account of the matter was presented to the English public last year, the DUBLIN REVIEW, to the relief of some and to the amusement of others, came solemnly forward and released Catholics from the obligation of believing that the Syllabus was infallible. It now appears that there is no sufficient ground for the statement about the theological commission, and again the DUBLIN REVIEW steps forward and refastens the collar about our necks. We had escaped, it seems, under false pretences. I wrote to urge that, anyhow, the certain facts of the case constitute a solid plea for liberty, even if undisproved liberty should be thought to need a plea.

I cannot pretend to be amused at what the DUBLIN REVIEW is doing. I have laughed at it in my day, but this thing grows monotonous.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

H. I. D. R.

IV.

SIR,—It will be far more convenient if I reserve further reply to your correspondent, "H. I. D. R.," for our next number; and I will here, therefore, confine myself to rectifying a misconception of my opinions, into which he has fallen. I should certainly not call the general drift of Mgr. Fessler's "teaching" "minimistic," but, on the contrary, as I said in my last letter, "inestimably important." The particulars, on which I am not myself able to follow the Bishop, are very few and subordinate; nor am I aware of any reason whatever for thinking that the "attention" of "the Roman authorities" was called to those particulars, either "most emphatically" or at all. I may refer on this point to my criticisms of the treatise in April and July of last year.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

THE "DUBLIN" REVIEWER.

We must commence our comments on this correspondence, by expressing our sincere regret that we are brought into antagonism with one, for whom we entertain the sincerest respect, and from whom very important service of many kinds to the Church's cause may be expected with much confidence.

However, as he has felt it his duty to assail us and has failed to convince us, it is of course *our* duty to repel his assault. But before proceeding to the points directly at issue, his letters call for a brief reference to certain preliminary questions.

Thus (1) does he intend to represent it as an improper course for a Catholic Review, to express a conviction that the Syllabus is cognisable as having certainly* been issued *ex cathedrâ*? The "*Civiltà*" may be taken as in some sense the authorized model of a Catholic Review; and what is its language about the Syllabus? "The truth of God cannot be half accepted and half repudiated. [A man must] either be a Catholic with the Vatican Council, the Pope, his Syllabus and Encyclicals,—or a liberal with the creed and syllabus of Freemasonry."† This is much stronger language than we have ever used.

(2) But our critic twice mentions the fact, that ours is a

* It will be more satisfactory to explain, that the word "certain" is not here used in precisely the same sense, as in many theological and philosophical discussions. Moral theologians call an obligation "certain"—i. e. "morally certain" in the wider sense of that word—if the opinion which denies the existence of that obligation be entirely destitute of solid probability. In this sense (if we rightly understand him) "H. I. D. R." denies that the obligation is "certain," of accepting the Syllabus teachings as infallible. In the same sense of the word, we maintain on our side that the *ex cathedrâ* character of the Syllabus is cognisable as "certain."

† Oct. 2, 1875, p. 14. In a note the writer thus proceeds:—Certain "singular Catholics, in order to assail the Syllabus's authority, rest on we know not what supposed defects in its publication. But it suffices to observe: (1) that the Syllabus is certainly and notoriously a Pontifical Act, recognized as such by the Holy Father in other public acts of his: (2) that it contains a doctrinal rule in the matter of morals and faith: (3) that by the Pope's order it was transmitted by his Cardinal Secretary of State to all Catholic Bishops, with a circular letter from the aforesaid Cardinal: (4) that the whole Episcopate received the Syllabus as a doctrinal Act emanating from the Pope as Head of the Church, and published and explained it to the faithful as such: (5) that all the true faithful accepted it with religious submission, considering it (after the example and teaching of the Bishops and priests) as an Act of the Holy See.

"These matters of fact being incontestable, we ask what more is wanted, that the Syllabus be recognized as in itself authoritative, and as imposing on Catholics the obligation of submission? Is it certain customary formalities, which the Holy Father Pius IX. did not account necessary for the promulgation of that particular Act? But these formalities could only be required, in so far as their absence might call into question the authenticity of the Act. Now this is not so in the present case. The identical and official letter addressed by the Cardinal Secretary to each and all the Bishops of the Church, wherewith by the Pope's order he transmitted the Act, suffices to prove its authentic origin: and it is well known that the Cardinal Secretary is one of the organs commonly employed by the Holy See, even for the transaction of matters purely ecclesiastical."

"secular review." Does he mean then to represent it as an improper course for a Review,—which is edited indeed by a layman but published under ecclesiastical censorship,—to express a conviction, that the Syllabus is cognisable as having certainly been issued *ex cathedrâ*? He does not give reasons for such an opinion, nor can we conjecture any.

Then (3), he speaks of our "utterances" as "dogmatic": by which he evidently does not mean that they relate to dogma, but that they are self-opinionated. Yet his very complaint is virtually, that they are *not* self-opinionated; that we alternate between "assertion, retraction, and retraction of retraction"; or, in other words, that we entirely distrust our own theological reasoning, when it seems to bring us into conflict with the voice of authority. We retracted a certain previous assertion, in deference to what seemed such a voice; and, we retracted the retraction, when we found that the voice had not spoken.

But (4), he considers us to have maintained for a number of years, that "a certain view of Catholic obligation" concerning the Syllabus is "the only view consistent with Catholicism"; or, in other words (so far as we can make out what he means) to have maintained that any one who departs from this view is no Catholic. But so far from this having been our position—in the very article which provoked this assault, we said (p. 371) that the difference between Mgr. Fessler and ourselves concerning the Syllabus is to our mind "a matter of very small practical importance." The difference is merely this. He accounts it part of the "*true obedience*" which "the faithful owe to the Pope," that they regard every proposition contained in the Syllabus as having been *justly* censured; while on our view they are bound by *divine faith* ("*fides mediata*") to regard those propositions as *infallibly* censured. On either view Catholics are under an obligation of interiorly renouncing the errors catalogued by the Syllabus, in the sense in which the Pope has condemned them.

We now come to the substance of our critic's argument. As we implied in our first letter to the "Tablet,"—we entirely accept his proposition, that Pius IX. could not have addressed Mgr. Fessler with a Letter of gratulation, "if in the opinion of the Pope and his advisers the Bishop was absolving the faithful from a *certain* obligation." Consequently, if the Pope and his advisers, on April 27th, 1871, knew of those few and subordinate statements concerning the Syllabus, which the Bishop had published in Germany in German during the previous February, a Catholic might thence reasonably infer, that those statements did not absolve the faithful from a

certain obligation. Consequently again, if our critic could now show that the Pope and his advisers knew of those statements—and if we had nothing further to rejoin—we should feel no blush of shame whatever, in retracting the retraction of our retraction. God forbid we should ever be indocile to any intimation of the Holy See, on any ground of private argument and judgment!

At the same time we must point out, that even if our critic did prove his allegation, a further question would have to be considered. Mgr. Fessler said in 1871 that the *ex cathedrâ* character of the Syllabus was by many considered doubtful, "until a fresh declaration should be made by the Holy See." But then there have been several such declarations since February, 1871.

However we admit that "H. I. D. R." would make an important point for his purpose, if he could show that in April, 1871, "the Pope and his advisers" were acquainted with the Bishop's statements concerning the Syllabus. In our first letter therefore to the "Tablet," we begged that he will at once publish every fact bearing on this issue, which he knows or may come to know. One would think that such facts might easily be discovered. For instance. It is certain from the Pope's Brief, that the Bishop accompanied his gift of the treatise by a letter addressed to the Holy Father. A copy of that letter must be easily accessible to "H. I. D. R."; and to our mind a great deal would turn on the question, whether the Bishop gave therein any hint of his doctrine on the Syllabus. If he did, we will at once accept the inference, that on April 27th, 1871, that doctrine did not contravene any certain Catholic obligation. If he did not, it is clear that the Bishop himself did not seek to obtain any sanction from the Pope for that particular doctrine.

Our critic, in his reply, adduced no further facts, but enlarged the scope of his argument. In this second letter he lays stress on the circumstance, that "Mgr. Hefele's strong desire that the treatise might be approved at Rome, was made known to the Roman authorities." This circumstance, he considers, shows that "their attention was directed in a most emphatic way to what the DUBLIN REVIEW would call the minimistic teaching of the book." Now this allegation seems to us very far more serious than the former; because it implies that what the Pope approved, was not merely an incidental statement concerning the Syllabus,—a statement which at last is of no very appreciable practical importance—but a certain general "minimistic" tone. We must maintain, however, that nothing can be more demonstrably unfounded

than any such allegation. We reply to it (1) that we never called the "teaching" of the treatise "minimistic," but emphatically the reverse; (2) that its general drift is in fact widely removed, from what we have ever called "minimistic"; and (3) that Mgr. Hefele's earnest desire of its being approved does not afford the slightest presumption against the truth of our present representation.

Firstly then, did we ever describe the Bishop's teaching as "minimistic"? In April, 1875, we said (p. 323) that he had "performed with triumphant success a work which urgently needed doing"; that (p. 340) he had "justly earned imperishable gratitude from children of the Church, and hearty gratulation from the common Father of all the faithful." In July we "once more expressed our sense of the invaluable service rendered in Germany by the treatise" (p. 105).

Nor (2) is the general doctrine of the treatise a doctrine, which we should at any time have dreamed of calling "minimistic." Our critic will at once see this, if he will but accept the Bishop's own statement of "the question at issue." The Bishop inscribes in his title-page, that what he intends is "a controversial reply to Dr. Schulte." When Schulte's pamphlet appeared, it was received by anti-Catholics throughout Germany with enthusiastic acclamation (see English Translation p. xiii); and it became a matter of extreme moment, that the "blows of Dr. Schulte's mace" should be parried. To parry them was the Bishop's main purpose, and all the rest was subordinate. Now what was Schulte's position? "The question at issue," says Mgr. Fessler himself, "is whether the" Vatican "Definition extends to *all the different expressions which a Pope may ever have casually uttered*, and even to *acts of the Popes*; or whether it extends solely to those utterances wherein" certain "notes prescribed" by the Council itself "combine" (pp. 3, 4). According to Schulte (Fessler, p. 119), laws against heretics are definitions *ex cathedra*; "every expression" in Pontifical laws, "even merely introductory"; "even the motives leading to the issuing of such laws" (p. 127); nay the Papal decision on "marriage questions, patronage questions, church-building questions" (p. 43); all fall under the claim of infallibility. The Bishop in reply points out that, according to Catholic doctrine, "the Pope is not infallible as a man, or a theologian, or a bishop, or a temporal prince, or a judge, or a legislator, or in his political views, or even in his government of the Church." The Pope never speaks *ex cathedra*, unless where the conditions are united, mentioned in the Vatican Decree. Nay, adds Mgr. Fessler, even when the Pope does issue an ex

cathedrâ Act, it is the doctrine defined and that alone which Catholics are obliged to accept: preambles, arguments, obiter dicta, and the like being external to the defining intention, and external therefore to the obligation of belief. This is the "true" Catholic "infallibility," which the Bishop opposes against Schulte's "false" infallibility: to establish this contrast, and apply it in detail to the facts alleged by Schulte—this is the one pervasive purpose of the whole treatise, and is performed with signal completeness and success. The few particulars on which we are ourselves unable to follow the Bishop, are really of not more than infinitesimal importance, in comparison with that great central argument for which we so heartily thank him. We need hardly say that with this argument our own humble judgment is in profoundest accord.

We do not deny, that here and there we observe in the treatise a certain tone of what we may call minimizing rhetoric, which to us is distasteful; and which indeed may give a false impression of the tendency of the treatise, to those who look at it superficially, and who fail to bear in mind the circumstances under which it was written. But such a tone arose very naturally and almost inevitably from the fact, that the Bishop's attention was wholly fixed on the unscrupulous opponents of the Church; on those, who so monstrously and outrageously—we cannot say exaggerated the Vatican Definition,—but rather forged a spurious Vatican Definition of their own. We may also add that,—as we said in April, 1875 (p. 340),—he does not impress us as having examined with any care such points of difference as exist among Catholics; contending as he was on a far larger scale in defence of what is common Catholic ground. And in consequence of this defect—as we pointed out in detail—some of his expressions may at first blush be taken in a sense, in which no doubt we should earnestly deplore them, but which other parts of the treatise show to have been utterly and absolutely alien from his intention.

But (3) our critic,—in support of his allegation that the Bishop's general teaching is what we should call "minimistic,"—appeals to Mgr. Hefele's strongly expressed desire, that the treatise might receive Papal approbation. We reply that, on our view of the case no less than on our critic's, it would have been strange indeed if Mgr. Hefele had *not* strongly desired such approbation. The monstrous and impudent falsification which Döllingerites perpetrated of the Vatican doctrine, was obtaining large credence throughout Germany, and doing incalculable harm. The Bishop's treatise was a crushing refutation of these unprincipled falsehoods; and of course it was

of great importance, that the Pope himself should emphatically disavow the extraordinary prerogatives, which he was misrepresented as claiming.

"H. I. D. R.'s" argument apparently proceeds on the assumption—an assumption made both by the French and the English translator—that the Bishop's purpose was to vindicate some interpretation of the Vatican Decree, less stringent than that which he knew to be held by certain contemporary Catholics. To our mind, this is not only a fundamental misconception, but an unaccountable one. It was the direct purpose of our July article to rectify it; and we concluded that article by expressing our conviction (p. 105), that "there is nothing in Gulliver's Travels more simply fictitious," than this "pseudo-Fesslerian tradition." Our critic relies on the name of Mgr. Hefele: we will meet it by another name equally illustrious. Mgr. Fessler refers (p. 5) with unqualified sympathy to Mgr. Martin, "the learned Bishop of Paderborn," and to that Prelate's work on "The True Meaning of the Vatican Definition." Now we need hardly say that there is no Catholic in all Europe, who would be more assuredly called "extreme" and "ultramontane" by those who rejoice in using such expressions, than Bishop Martin of Paderborn. Yet Mgr. Fessler writes as being entirely accordant with that Prelate, on "the true meaning of the Vatican Definition."*

So much on the treatise itself. We must next consider what happened in regard to it, between February 1871 when it was published, and April 27th of the same year when the Pope issued his Brief of gratulation. The original romance about the International Commission is now abandoned; but what account of facts shall be substituted in its place? "H. I. D. R." furnishes some information on this subject, which we most unhesitatingly accept. M. Cosquin's letter,

* We may take this opportunity of speaking on a small matter, and one which has very little connection with our present controversy. In July 1875 (p. 95) we represented Bishop Fessler as saying, that "in a hundred cases the question is one of real difficulty whether some given Act be *ex cathedra*." These are his words (p. 5): "I find that in this case [of the Syllabus] as in a hundred others, we can fully rely on the notes which have been given [by the Vatican Definition] . . . but yet, notwithstanding this, the application of the notes to particular cases may have its difficulties." It has been privately suggested to us, that these "hundred cases" are not cases in which "the question has its difficulties," but cases in which "we can fully rely on the notes" assigned. But surely a moment's consideration will show that this cannot be the Bishop's meaning. He could not possibly say, that only in a *hundred* cases may we fully rely on the notes assigned; because of course he held that these notes may be fully relied on in all cases without exception, nay in all possible cases.

published in the "Etudes" of May, gives further details, which we are not however so prepared to account certainly true. We are not aware of sufficient grounds for placing unreserved confidence in that writer's critical discernment; nor has he given any proof of his new statements, beyond a general affirmation, that they are based on "written documents, and on information derived from most sure sources in Rome." However we do not see that they contain anything intrinsically improbable; and by combining them with "H. I. D. R.'s," we arrive at the following result. It would appear then, that the Bishop sent the Holy Father his treatise, accompanied by a letter; but did so through the intermediation of a third party. The Holy Father, who does not himself read German, referred the treatise to some Cardinal not named: perhaps Cardinal Bilio. No hint is given that the treatise was submitted to any theological censorship; and the obvious supposition is, that this Cardinal was to inform the Holy Father, whether on a general inspection the treatise appeared substantially to correspond with the account given by its author in the accompanying letter. On receiving the Cardinal's report,—and hearing also of Mgr. Hefele's strong desire that the book should be approved,—the Pope at once decided, that on so important an occasion he would transgress the limits of ordinary etiquette; and would write accordingly, exhorting the Bishop to continue further his most opportune and crushing refutation of Schulte. Meanwhile another letter arrived from the Bishop—and this time *without* any one's intermediation—concerned exclusively with the practical affairs of his diocese; and the Holy Father took the opportunity of incorporating, in his answer to that letter, that eulogy of Mgr. Fessler's treatise, which he had resolved to pronounce. The eulogy ran as follows:—

"We esteem it a very opportune and useful thing to have beaten back the audacity of Professor Schulte, inciting as he does the secular powers against the dogma of Papal Infallibility, as defined by the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. For it is a matter, the true meaning of which not all men, and especially not all laymen, have a thoroughly clear understanding of, and the truth, when lucidly set forth, is wont to expel from properly constituted minds opinions which men perhaps have drunk in with their mother's milk, to confirm others in a right mind, and fortify them against insidious attacks. Wherefore, if you continue to refute figments of this kind, you will deserve well of our most holy religion, and of all Christian people, in that, like a good pastor, you withdraw them from poisoned pastures. We make known to you, then, the great

pleasure you have given Us, both by reason of the book which you have presented to Us, as well as by reason of your most affectionate letter ;* and We pray that you may receive a rich reward for your deference to Our authority and devotion towards Ourselves."

Now our critic's allegation (if we rightly understand him) is, that the Pope intended, by these words, to approve as permissible a certain method of interpreting the Vatican Definition, less stringent than that adopted by certain more extreme Catholics: a method of interpretation, which we of the DUBLIN REVIEW would stigmatize as "minimistic." After our preceding remarks, it would surely be slaying the slain to argue further in detail against an allegation so simply paradoxical. Yet there is one comment which ought not to be omitted. It is the Holy Father's habit, when he praises a work, to mention the particular *feature* in it which he specially intends to praise; and nothing would have been easier than to say, that certain well-intentioned Catholics interpret the Vatican Definition in an unnecessarily stringent sense. As a matter of fact however,—precisely in accordance with what we have ourselves urged on the scope of the treatise,—the Pope does not even glance at any opponent of Mgr. Fessler's, except the "audacious" Schülte.

The only contention of "H. I. D. R." then on which it can be worth while to spend another word, is that which concerns the Syllabus. He infers from the Pope's Brief that, up to April 27th, 1871, no Catholic violated a certain obligation, by holding with Mgr. Fessler in regard to that particular pronouncement. Let us begin then by apprehending the point at issue. As a matter of theological argument, few conclusions to our mind are more irrefragably established, than that the Syllabus is cognisable as having certainly been issued *ex cathedrâ*; insomuch that it is to us a matter of ever increasing wonder, how well-intentioned Catholics can doubt this fact. "H. I. D. R." however does not now enter on the theological argument—though we are well aware that on occasion he would be prepared to do so—but on the argument derivable from the dicta of authority: and for our own part also (as we have more than once implied) we regard this argument as more satisfactory, than any derivable from abstract theological disquisition. Now (as we pointed out in an earlier

* This clause in the Brief makes it certain (as we have more than once said) that the Bishop's gift to the Pope of his treatise was accompanied by a letter: because the letter is mentioned in that particular paragraph of the Brief, which is exclusively concerned with the treatise.

part of this article) the "Civiltà" says, that on several different occasions Pius IX. has recognized the Syllabus as having been issued by him *ex cathedrâ*; and we will here select one of those utterances in particular, because it so happens that we have before us the original Latin, which we can append therefore in a note.* F. At, of the Congregation of the Sacred Heart, drew attention to the question by publishing a work, to which he gave the name: "Truth and Falsehood in the Matter of [political] Authority and Liberty, according to the Doctrine of the Syllabus." He sent a copy of this work to Pius IX., who replied by a very hearty Letter of gratulation. In the course of that Letter the Holy Father pronounced, that the Syllabus had been issued by *himself* (*à nobis editi*), and therefore not merely by some subordinate authority; that the Syllabus was a teaching of Peter's Chair (*Petri Cathedræ documentum*); and that it claimed therefore "firm and faithful adherence." This was in 1874, long after the phrase "*ex cathedrâ*" had authoritatively received its technical sense. Nor do we understand what distinction can even be suggested by our critic, between the Pope's saying that the Syllabus is a "teaching of the Petri Cathedra," and his saying that the teaching of the Syllabus is *ex cathedrâ*. For our own part we have no doubt whatever that, had Mgr. Fessler seen this Letter, he would at once, in accordance with his own expressed state-

* *Dilecto filio A. At, Presbytero Congregationis Missionariorum Sacri Cordis, Montem Albanum.*

Pius PP. IX.

Dilecte fili, salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. Licet, curis distenti nostris, nequiverimus hactenus, dilecte fili, versare volumina a te inscripta: "*Le Vrai et le Faux en Matière d'Autorité et de Liberté*," quæ nobis obtulisti, nihilo tamen minus, cum ex eodem titulo didicerimus ipsa te exigere proposuisse ad "*Syllabi*" errorum a nobis editi "*doctrinam*," munus tuum habuimus acceptissimum. Gratulamur autem tibi, quod theologus libri tui censor existimaverit, hoc te sedulo præstitisse in totâ lucubratione tuâ, et ita per ipsum profigasse liberalismi errores et ambages toties a nobis proscriptas, ut nondum quidquam prodiisse duxerit in lucem quod plenius et solidius id fuerit assecutum.

Quæ sane, cum ostendant te et congregationem tuam, quam totam plenissime tecum consentire asseveras, adherere reapse firmiter et fideliter hujus Petri Cathedræ documentis, et non per solum Evangelicum ministerium operam navare salutis animarum, sed per pia quoque elaborata et utilissima scripta, propensioem omnino faciunt in vos voluntatem nostram. Uberem idcirco fructum ominamur laboribus vestris, ac Deum rogamus ut quæ fûsius et explicatius contra vulgatissimum et perniciosissimum errorem protulisti, multos illustrent incautos et deceptos. Interim vero divini favoris auspiciem et paternæ nostræ Benevolentia testem Apostolicam Benedictionem tibi, dilecte fili, sodalibusque tuis peramanter impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum die 20 Aprilis anno 1874, Pontificatûs nostri anno vicesimo octavo,

Pius, PP. IX.

ment, have regarded the Syllabus's *ex cathedrâ* character as definitively established.

Now "H. I. D. R." has to meet this apparently decisive fact, by opposite inferences derived from Mgr. Fessler's case. And certainly these inferences need to be very pressing and irrefragable, if they are to tell against such singularly unmistakable language as we have just cited. Firstly then we must ask, how much there *is* concerning the Syllabus, in the Bishop's volume as presented to the Pope. We consult, for an answer, the Index appended to the English translation.

In the middle of his treatise (pp. 92, 93) Mgr. Fessler says, that "many theologians think it may be assumed as doubtful" whether the Syllabus was issued *ex cathedrâ*, "until some fresh declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See"; and proceeds to give their reasons for so thinking. In p. 60 he had made a passing reference to the Syllabus. In p. 61, note, he explains (as we pointed out in April, 1875, pp. 330-332) that "*even if*" the Syllabus be not "a doctrinal definition," nevertheless "the true obedience" which "the faithful owe to the Pope," requires that they shall hold every proposition therein cited to have been justly censured. Lastly in p. 94 he himself acts on this principle. For Schulte having cited against him the Syllabus-censure of a certain proposition, the Bishop protests that this proposition "is most justly condemned as erroneous"; adding however, that its condemnation by no means implies the doctrine which Schulte supposes. There are absolutely no other references whatever to the Syllabus: for the paragraphs in pp. 5-7—which, as occurring so early in the volume, might be thought likely to have arrested the Cardinal's attention—were first added in the third edition, and never came before the Pope at all. Most certainly, as we said in our first letter to the "Tablet," Mgr. Fessler's statements concerning the Syllabus are extremely "few and subordinate."

Now if it can be testified that the Bishop himself in his letter drew Pius IX.'s attention to his doctrine concerning the Syllabus, our critic will doubtless have proved his conclusion; and we will at once make every necessary admission. But if he does not even profess this,—then before he can show that Mgr. Fessler's case may legitimately even be taken into account, he must prove the three following propositions:—

I. He must prove, that the Pope did not merely take the Bishop's letter as sufficient voucher for what was contained in the volume, but also referred that volume to the unnamed Cardinal. The statement is by no means improbable; but as yet we have no guarantee for it, except the judgment

formed by M. Cosquin on certain data which he does not mention.

II. "H. I. D. R." must prove, that Pius IX. placed the volume in this Cardinal's hands, not for the purpose of mere general inspection—such as the Pope might himself have given if he knew German—but for the purpose of a strict theological examination from cover to cover. And this, though the Pope in his Brief does not give the slightest hint of the treatise having been subjected to any theological examination whatever.

III. "H. I. D. R." must prove that the unnamed Cardinal discerned the importance of Mgr. Fessler's slight and incidental propositions concerning the Syllabus, and pressed them expressly on the Holy Father's attention. And this, though the Holy Father does not in his Brief express the most distant reference to the Syllabus.

It would surely be trifling with our readers' patience to contend further against this shadow: though we will not absolutely deny the possibility, that at some future time "H. I. D. R." may be able to exhibit something more substantial.

And now one parting word of remonstrance. We cannot doubt that our critic,—by adopting the tone and language which our readers will have observed in his second letter,—desired to influence our future conduct. But we would ask him with sincerest respect, (1) how he can hope to influence our future conduct, except by influencing our conviction; and (2) how he can hope to influence our conviction, by mere expressions of reproof? It is our sincere conviction, that the authoritative teaching of the Holy See is in various ways more extensive than some Catholics think; and that it is of vital importance for the Church's highest interests, that this teaching be accepted in its entire fulness. We have more than once given reasons for this conviction; and what we desiderate is, that dispassionate argument be met by dispassionate argument. We cannot change our conviction, merely because our present critic disapproves it; heartily as we recognize the very large extent of his theological ability and acquirements. And so long as our conviction remains unchanged, it is our duty to act in accordance therewith; even though by doing so we incur the censure of persons, whose approval would be to us among the highest of earthly gratifications.

ART. VIII.—THE REPUBLICAN VICTORY IN FRANCE.

Où Allons-nous ? Par Mgr. DUPANLOUP, Évêque d'Orléans. Paris. 1876.

THE events which have occurred in the East during the last three months have been of such all-absorbing interest, that few men have followed the current of affairs in France as closely as they would have done at another time. Yet it is long since the state of France called so imperatively for the earnest consideration of all who have at heart the welfare and even the very existence of that nation which once worthily bore the proud title of the eldest daughter of the Church. We witness at this moment in France the uprising of the banded ranks of Liberalism, Socialism, and Infidelity, against Religion and Society. The change which has come over the face of French politics since this time last year is not the mere victory of one political party over another, not the mere preponderance of the Left over the various elements of the Right and Centre, it is the marshalling for deadly conflict of the anti-Christian revolution against Catholicity in France, and against social order and European civilization. This may perhaps seem to some not the calm utterance of unbiassed judgment, but the language of exaggeration, of panic, of political partisanship. But we believe that we shall be able to show that in our statement of the issue now to be decided in the broad arena of French politics, there is no word of exaggeration, and that so far as our judgment of events is concerned, we are neither influenced by any fear for the future, nor by any leaning towards one or other of the sections of the Conservative party in France.

In the Assembly which met at Bordeaux in 1871, and was dissolved early in the present year, the balance of political power was a very fluctuating one, and it witnessed the fall of several ministries brought about by widely different coalitions, yet the resultant of the various forces at work was Conservative, and this was proved by the final enactment of the law on Higher Education which gave to France the Free Catholic Universities. In this sense the present Senate is a very fair representative of the late Assembly, for though the Liberal element is stronger than it was in the Assembly, the Conservative senators are sufficiently numerous to be able to secure a victory on important questions; and indeed on

June 20th they reaffirmed the principle of the freedom of higher education by a small majority in the voting in the bureaux. But all this is reversed in the Chamber of Deputies. There the Liberals are practically in overwhelming strength, and can turn a division in a full house by a majority of no less than 260 votes.* To any party and in any country the possession of a majority such as this would probably be a source of temptation to a policy of violence against its adversaries, but to the French Liberals such a temptation is simply irresistible. They have never so much as dreamed of the necessity of forbearance, of respect for the rights of a minority on which the very principle of representative government must depend, if it is not to degenerate into the mere reign of brute force, under a many-headed despot; and the Chamber of Deputies had not been a single week constituted as a representative body when the Liberals gave unmistakable evidence that this was the spirit which animated them. The first act of a French legislative assembly is the *validation des pouvoirs*; the official act by which the deputies make good their title to a seat in the House, and upon which, where the legality of an election is suspected, a committee of inquiry is moved for to report to the House, in order that it may be in a position to confirm or annul the return. In England, if a return is disputed, the initiative towards an inquiry is taken by a number of electors filing a petition to that effect. The investigation is then committed to one of the judges of the land, and his report decides the question. Thus, though even this system has not always worked satisfactorily, we may say that in the vast majority of cases there is an impartial tribunal to which all matters of electoral law and practice are referred. But under the French law the majority in the Chamber is at once the accuser and the judge, and the sequel to the late elections gives us more than one flagrant example of the evil which may be worked by such a system in the hands of an intolerant and victorious political party. Upon the slightest pretexts objections were made against the returns of Legitimist and Bonapartist deputies. In self-defence some of the Conservatives ventured to lodge similar objections against certain Republican deputies whose return had been facilitated by practices which would assuredly have endangered the seat of an English Member of Parliament. In all cases committees of inquiry were appointed, but as their nomination was in the

* On June 7th, on the final reading of M. Waddington's University Bill, 516 members voted; 388 Liberals supported the bill, while the Catholics could only rally 128 deputies in opposition to it, and were thus defeated by a majority of 260.

hands of the majority, stanch Republicans were invariably selected for the important office of examining the electoral returns. As might have been expected from the very outset, they confirmed the Republican returns, and reported against those of Bonapartist and Legitimist candidates, although the evidence brought forward in support of the objections was often all but precisely the same in the case of a Republican whose seat was secured to him and a Legitimist whose election was quashed. One inquiry in particular excited more than ordinary attention in England, namely, that of which the election for Pontivy was the subject. The elected candidate was the Comte de Mun, the well-known organizer of the Catholic working men's clubs in Paris. It will be remembered that when first his election was called in question in the Chamber he defended it in a speech which called forth the general applause of the French press, and extorted from M. Gambetta the confession that in the eloquence of the young soldier-orator Montalembert had found a worthy successor. The Chamber nevertheless decided upon an inquiry, and in the report which M. Turquet, as secretary of the committee, laid before the Chamber of Deputies in June, it was recommended that M. de Mun's election should be annulled on the ground that it had been procured by a gross abuse of their influence on the part of the clergy. Mr. Justice Keogh's famous judgment on the Galway election would compare very favourably with M. Turquet's report upon that of Pontivy. The most manifestly absurd statements were put forward as evidence against the validity of M. de Mun's return. It was gravely alleged that the priests of the district had turned the confessional into an electioneering agency before the contest, and used it as a means of political inquisition after it; that they had refused absolution not only to the men who had failed to support the clerical candidate, but also to the women whose husbands had voted against M. de Mun, and that they would not allow their children to receive their first communion. In a word, M. Turquet succeeded in condensing into his report all the malice which the representative men of the Left entertain towards the priesthood. The Pontivy election was chosen as the first battle-ground, or rather as the first opportunity for a display of the force with which the Left could outnumber and crush its enemies. We do not, and we need not, stay to discuss the justice or injustice of the various reports upon the elections. The fact must be patent to all that M. Gambetta and his friends made use of the majority on their side to deliberately thin the ranks of their opponents by using against them the forms of electoral law; and even if

they had a good case in every instance, it would have been far more prudent for the Liberals to leave ten or twelve doubtful seats to their adversaries, for how could these votes turn a division? M. de Mun was of course to be feared, but only in a minor degree, for eloquent words rarely change a vote nowadays. But M. Gambetta and his friends were totally insensible to such considerations; however much he may affect at times in his speeches a moderation which his whole career contradicts, he cannot spare an adversary, and accordingly the first act of the Liberals on their accession to power proved to all Europe that there was to be only a new phase of the traditional policy of violence.

Nor has their subsequent action belied this ill-omened initiative. It has become every day more evident that the republic actually existing in France is very different from the ideal republic of amiable *doctrinaires* and philosophic professors of politics. That Utopian state of existence in which a government could be established which would direct a nation's destinies and foster its inner life by the dictates of its people, executed by the people's servants—in a word, the republic of the *philosophes*—is nowhere to be found on earth. We must judge of republics as we see them in practice, and not as we hear of them or imagine them in theory. We must look at Republics and Republicans actually existing, not at Republics and Republicans as they possibly might be. And here before us stands this concrete reality, the French Republic, established on the initiative of M. Wallon in 1875, and destined to last until the revision of the constitution in 1880, a revision which the Liberals insist can only be made in the Republican sense. And how are we to judge of it? Where are we to find something tangible that we can make the subject or the material of sound criticism upon it? We need not look for this in the brief series of resolutions adopted by the Assembly on its institution; nor shall we find anything to examine for this end in the guarded speeches and messages of the Marshal President, messages in which MacMahon does little more than pledge himself to maintain social order in the sense of internal peace. Shall we then base our judgment of the French Republic and French Republicanism on the speeches and writings of the Catholic party in France? But this would leave our conclusions open to challenge on the ground of party spirit, and wilful or unconscious misrepresentation on the part of those on whose testimony we relied. We shall therefore choose none of these alternatives, we shall take the French Republicans themselves, we shall examine their public acts, and the writings of their statesmen, their

publicists, and their journalists, and on these, and on these only, we shall base our judgment upon French Republicanism, and our forecast of its ultimate results and aims.

And here we must guard ourselves from misapprehension. We are well aware that men who live the lives of good Catholics are to be found in the Republican ranks, that they are neither contemptible in point of numbers, obscure in station, nor devoid of talent and of influence. Yet there they are, not on the Extreme Left indeed, but in the Left Centre, and though they form a portion of the Moderate wing of the party, still none the less Republicans. We do not wish to condemn them as individuals, for we know not what influences of birth, of education, of personal friendship and association have placed them in this false position. They are blind to the logical consequences of the principles which they have adopted. They fail to see the practical results of the avowed policy of Republicanism in France; they believe that by hovering on the edge of the hostile crowd they can better guard the interests of the Church than by taking their stand full front against her foes. We can no more realize their individual position, than we can picture to ourselves the conception which a man born blind forms to himself of the world and all that is in it; but we know where lies the source of all their errors, and it is to be found in that pest of our time, Liberal Catholicism, now happily rapidly dying out in France, and destined, without doubt, to receive its death-blow from the state patronage and protection which a certain section of the Republican party seems anxious to extend to it.

There is the less reason too for our doing more than referring to the Catholics who are to be found in the Republican party, because no one regards any of them as among its representative men; and indeed the late elections have brought to the front men to whom M. Jean Brunet and M. Wallon are stanch Conservatives and Clericals, and of these the mass of the Republican party is composed. It is by the acts of the recognized leaders of the Republicans that we must judge of the republic, not by the fact that a few men who would at once refuse to have any share in such acts, have given their support to it at times because they believed it would be a République Conservatrice, or because perhaps, in their bewilderment at the general disorganization of French politics, they hoped to find a moment's rest under a temporary republic. Not such are the men who listen to M. Gambetta's harangues, read the "*République Française*," and applaud the report of M. Turquet.

What, then, is the true character of French Republicanism?

We can best judge it by taking a glance at its policy since it attained to power in France by the late elections. These elections were won by the cry that the republic was in danger, that it was menaced by clerical, monarchical, Orleanist, or Bonapartist intrigues. That there was a real reaction we do not for a moment believe. We hold that the Catholic revival in France is still making as steady progress as it was a year ago, and we have evidence of this in the continued increase of Catholic works, the repeated subscriptions for the Free Catholic Universities, and the appearance of new and ably-written journals in the Catholic press. But the Republicans seem to have gathered new adherents to their ranks because the Liberals and Radicals were alarmed by the action of the Catholics, and united in an unanimous effort to regain the upper hand in politics, an effort in which the common peril drew together M. Thiers, M. Gambetta, M. Naquet—in a word, men of every shade of Republican opinion into one heterogeneous alliance. To their standard they rallied a large mass of that inert body which always votes with the most active party; but it is a significant fact, that at the supplementary elections the judgment of the constituencies was in several places reversed, and a Bonapartist or a Legitimist was returned in place of a Republican, showing that the Liberal victory has already roused the Conservatives to more united and earnest action. Another fact worthy of attention as one of the most marked signs of the times, is the unanimous support given by the whole Catholic and Conservative press to M. Buffet's candidature for the Senate. Even the "Union" and the "Univers," while frankly confessing that they would have preferred a man who would take his place further from the Centre and nearer the Extreme Right, nevertheless proclaimed that it was the duty of every Catholic to support his candidature. The fury of the Radical press at this action of the Legitimists is shown by the wretched attempt of the "*Droits de l'Homme*" (a journal inspired by M. Rochefort) to misrepresent their attitude, by pretending that the "Union" had condemned M. Buffet. These prudent tactics on the part of the Catholics secured a Conservative success, and a severe defeat was inflicted on the Left by M. Buffet's election, which at the same time showed that the Catholic and the Liberal parties were much more evenly balanced than most men would have been inclined to believe, immediately after the general elections. Their union, then, in defence of the Republic, which they supposed to be menaced with a speedy overthrow, gave victory to the Republicans; but once they were victorious their party was in serious danger of

being rapidly broken up into cliques and sections. While M. Thiers and the Moderates of the Centre endeavoured to fix the Proteus of Republicanism in the form of that Conservative Republic of which we have heard so much and seen so little, M. Gambetta would have been trying with equal energy to gather all true Republicans to the standard of a more Progressist form of government, and meanwhile he would have to watch the intrigues of MM. Naquet, Clemenceau, and all the ultra-Radical wing of the party, whose policy would be gradually reddening into the baleful glow of a new Commune. But the Republican party has, thanks to M. Gambetta's leadership, escaped this disintegration. In his electoral canvass in the South he sounded the key-note of a new Liberal policy. The Clericals, he said, had found means to establish free universities under the new law on higher education, but it mattered very little, for all that would be changed when once the elections were over. The cry was eagerly taken up along the whole Republican line. Yes, here was a new rallying point. How could the party assembled to guard the Republic better fulfil its task than by assailing the Church in France? The Revolution is essentially a destructive power, it has never yet succeeded in building up a system of lasting institutions in any country in Europe, nor will it be able to do so till it has accomplished its first object, the permanent disintegration of Christian society, a triumph which we believe and trust it will never obtain. Meanwhile it concentrates all its destructive energies against God's Church, which is the one great sustaining power of law, order, and civilization in Europe, and consequently the one great obstacle to the progress of the revolution. What wonder, then, that the Revolutionary party unite as one man in assailing it? It is thus they have united in France; and as to the direction of their efforts, we have evidence first in the series of bills, or *projets de loi*, of a distinctly anti-Catholic and anti-social tendency, which have been introduced in the new Chamber of Deputies; and, secondly, in the popular literature and the journals of the Liberal party, the latter forming an instructive commentary on its legislative policy, and a remarkably outspoken programme of its ultimate aims.

The principal *projets de loi* introduced in the Chamber of Deputies by the victorious Liberals are as follows:—

1. A bill for the suppression of the French Embassy at the Vatican; the effect of which is to proclaim to the Catholic world that official France has definitively abandoned the cause of the Holy Father for that of the enemies of the Church.

2. A bill to abolish the freedom of higher education; thereby

restoring the monopoly of the Liberal University of Paris, and breaking up the newly-established Catholic Universities.

3. Bills for compulsory secular* education, the expulsion of the religious orders from the schools, and the suppression of all religious teaching in them.

4. Bills for the separation of Church and State, and the suppression of that portion of the Budget which is devoted to the expenses of religious worship; a measure which, if passed, would deprive the fifteen thousand priests, who compose the clergy of France, of their means of livelihood.

5. A bill for extending compulsory military service to the clergy, the seminarists, and the religious orders of men.

6. Bills for removing certain restrictions on political clubs.

7. Bills for removing all restrictions on the system of *colportage*; a method at present largely used for the diffusion of infidel literature in a popular form, and by means of which the Liberals hope to still further extend their propaganda against the Church.

We do not say that all these bills will become law, many of them, doubtless, will be enacted, and one, that upon higher education, has already passed the Chamber of Deputies and is now before the Senate. In the selection of the committee of initiative upon this bill the Conservative senators were victorious by a small majority. There were, however, numerous abstentions, and it is very difficult to say how the votes will be divided upon the various readings of the bill.† Meanwhile the Republican press warns the Senate that if it does not register the decree of the more popular assembly by promptly passing the bill, it will incur the indignation of all France; and, if we are to believe some of the best informed journals of all parties, M. Waddington himself, in speaking before the Senate Committee on the bill, gave a more practical and definite form to the Republican menace by threatening that, if the bill is not passed by the Senate, the Liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies will refuse to vote the *budget des cultes*. This was first reported by M. About's journal, the "*XIX^{me} Siècle*;" it has been repeated by almost every paper from the "*Univers*" to the "*Droits de l'Homme*": so far as we are aware there has been no contradiction, official or non-official, published. We therefore conclude that M. Waddington's words were correctly reported. They confirm all that we have said of the policy of violence pursued by the Liberals; they are using their majority as a standing menace

* That is, as we shall show later on, atheistical education.

† Since this was in print, the Senate has rejected the bill, but by a very small majority.

to the Senate, and thereby violating the first principles of constitutional government, which can now be said to exist in France only in the name. We fear, then, that there is but little hope of the anti-Christian policy of the victorious party receiving an immediate check. That it is essentially anti-Christian and anti-social is shown by the character of the measures now before the Legislature, and if further proof is wanting, we have it in the anti-Catholic, Atheistical, and Socialistic popular literature of the party.

In France the atheistical propaganda is not carried on only by professors of the University and rationalists of the type of Littré and Rénan, Comte and Michelet, the Republican press opens its columns to writers of the infidel school, and there are thousands of little pamphlets published every week in Paris and Lyons, and spread all over France by local news-agents and by the *colporteurs* or hawkers, whose stock consists chiefly or entirely of cheap books, ranging in price from a few centimes to a franc. Mgr. Dupanloup, in his recently published brochure, "*Où-allons Nous ?*" has collected a catena of extracts from this popular literature of infidelity and revolution; like many of his former pamphlets, the work contains but little in the way of commentary; he leaves the Liberals to speak for themselves—the facts to teach their own lesson. As probably few of our readers will see this masterly brochure of the Bishop of Orleans, we shall endeavour to reproduce, in so far as our necessarily limited space will permit, the leading points of the evidence collected by Mgr. Dupanloup, as to the doctrines set forth in the popular literature of French Liberalism, and endorsed by the utterances of its acknowledged leaders in the world of politics.

There is a little encyclopedia of Liberalism published at Paris in the form of a series of cheap pamphlets, and known as the "*Bibliothèque Démocratique*." The 24th number of this series is a work on "*La Science et la Conscience*," by M. Louis Viardot, in which we find the following passages:—

In our days, by the continual progress of science, which brings the human mind face to face with concrete realities and facts ascertained by experience, the idea of God is beginning to disappear, and already religions like kings are becoming things of the past. . . . Let us, then, resolutely reject all that is Divine. We are on the earth, let us not aspire to heaven. . . . Let us not seek in heaven (which is a meaningless word) the reason of what we see on earth. Nowadays let us say:—"Take care of yourself, for Heaven will not help you. . . . Just as so long as we have gravitation, there is no need of a God who, as Creator, originates and maintains the motions of the stars, in the same way, if we have justice among us, there is no more need of Providence. . . . I have denied the Creation, and given direct proof for

my denial ; I deny the existence of Providence, and I give direct proof in support of my denial ; and on the ground of direct proofs, I shall deny the existence of the soul. . . . The soul is the aggregate of the functions of the animated being, the resultant of the organism ; just as God is only the resultant of the natural laws of the universe. . . . What I call spirit is matter organized and capable of life and thought as opposed to inorganic matter.

We see, of course, the absurdity of all this, but what will the ignorant peasants and workmen think of it when they are told that in these few pages they have the results of modern thought upon God and the soul, and that these are the doctrines held by all the enlightened men of the day ? Then we have a catechism of infidelity to oppose to the catechisms of the Catholic schools. Mgr. Dupanloup quotes largely from it ; let us take a few of the questions and answers. It teaches a kind of popular agnosticism :—

Q. Is there a God ?

A. The negative and affirmative reply are alike mere suppositions, and therefore worthless.

Q. What is man ?

A. What matters it whence man comes ? Whether he is from God or from an ape, what influence has it on his state of being ?

Q. Has man a soul ?

A. Like all other animals, man has a brain, and the brain is organized for thought as the stomach is for digestion.*

This is only a popular digest of doctrines taught by men of science, by so-called philosophers, by leading reviews, and by elaborate works which purport to represent the culture and learning of the nineteenth century ; but these reviews and these books would never reach the hands of the working man, and if they did he would not understand them, and so their conclusions are reproduced in the journal that can be bought for a sou and the *brochure* that is sold for half a franc, and the working man learns that if he is to take his true place amongst the men of his time he must deny his God, or doubt of His existence, believe that he has no soul, no life to come, that there is no Providence to watch over him here, no Judge to call him to account for his acts hereafter ; that he must help himself, for assuredly there is no God to help him. And there is but one step from the negation of the doctrines of faith to the denial of the sanctions of morality, and that step the popular exponents of Liberalism have already taken. One of the journals of the Extreme Left thus formulates what it styles the "Irresponsibility of Criminals" :—

* "Petit Catéchisme du libre Penseur," pp. 1, 4, 5, & 6.

We will not waste time (it says) in once more refuting the incomprehensible theory of Free Will. We believe, with scientific men, that the will of man depends upon a multitude of external causes ; that a man is not guilty when he commits an act with which our conscience finds fault, but which his physical or moral organization renders inevitable, and we proclaim that that man should not be punished for his act, that there are no guilty men, that there are only the ignorant or the weak.*

But it will be said this is one of the journals of the lowest class, a paper inspired by Rochefort. Nevertheless it only represents the consensus of Liberal opinion. What says M. Gambetta's own special organ, owned and edited by himself? —

We delude ourselves when we suppose that we think or act according to the determination of our will. The truth is that we cannot direct our ideas in a certain sense or call them up when we wish. And it is needless to say that the mechanism of the will excludes as absolutely contradictory to reason the puerile notion that we possess free will. If the direction of our thoughts is beyond our power, we have still stronger reason for predicating the same thing of our actions.†

On the 2nd of May the same journal informed its readers that morality was essentially relative, and therefore variable. Probably the men who write thus do not weigh their words or for a moment contemplate the inevitable results of their theories being adopted as the basis of popular practice, but (as we believe M. Félix Pyat once remarked) the people are very practically logical, and work out the doctrines they are taught very willingly to their legitimate consequences, especially, we may add, when their natural inclinations and passions tend in the same direction. The Liberal propaganda, then, is anti-Christian when it is not atheistical, and very naturally it regards Christian education as its greatest foe. This is why we see the Liberals straining every nerve to destroy the Catholic universities, and agitating for the closing of the Jesuit colleges and the expulsion of the religious orders from the schools. Amongst the bills which we enumerated as having been introduced by the Liberals in the first session of the new Chamber of Deputies we mentioned a *projet de loi* for the establishment of compulsory secular education. The promoter of the bill introduced a clause into it providing that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul should be taught in the schools. The Radical press was indignant. Is this, they asked, secular education? If this is to be the

* "Droits de l'Homme," April, 1876.

† "République française," quoted by "Le Français," April 6th, 1876.

programme of the schools, why turn the nuns and monks out of them? Had not the atheist and materialist a right to protest against their conscientious convictions being violated in the education of their children? And if the children were to be taught about a God, what God should it be? Was it to be Allah, or Jesus Christ, or Jehovah, or Vishnu, or the Grand Manitou? In a word, by secular education the French Radicals mean nothing less than atheistical teaching.

Education is, then, for the moment, the main battle-ground in France. The Catholic universities are already assailed, the attack upon the primary schools will follow. The Liberals will not be content with any mere partial success. They openly avow their desire to destroy the Church in France. M. Gambetta, indeed, in his speech at Lille, proclaimed his respect for all religions alike. M. Brisson, replying to the Comte de Mun in the Chamber of Deputies, said that the Republicans had no idea of threatening religion in France; but such disclaimers are of little weight in the presence of the multitude of angry threats against Christianity in France collected by Mgr. Dupanloup from the writings and speeches of prominent men of the Republican party. The young orator who spoke in the name of the students of the Liberal University of Paris at the civil burial of Michelet, aptly summed up the life of the man beside whose grave he stood when he said that his one great object had been "the dechristianization of the Latin races." And what said another man, whom Republican Paris delighted to honour in precisely the same way, Edgar Quinet, the friend and colleague of Michelet?—

Catholicism must fall! (he exclaimed) that is the cry that is now beginning to go up alike from the old world and the new.*

What says M. Gambetta's paper?—

The peasant need only open his eyes to see that clericalism is the source of every evil project, the centre of every conspiracy.

The clericals mourn over the condition of the working man. They have a paternal desire to give him back all the chains and fetters that he enjoyed in the Middle Ages, and from which the deeds of 1789 so harshly liberated him. They wish to restore to him all the beneficent tyranny and tutelary subjection that used to bow him down.

And the same language has been heard in the Chamber. The Republican deputy who introduced the bill for abolishing the chapter of the budget which is allotted to public worship (*budget des cultes*) urged as the chief reason for such legislative action, that the Catholic Church was a hotbed of rebellion

* See the Introduction to his "Œuvres de Marnix.

against the existing form of government and against modern society. The cry is taken up by all the recognized leaders of the party. "To-day," says M. Louis Blanc, "clericalism is, as it ever was, the great obstacle, the supreme source of peril." "In the name of patriotism," says M. Madier de Montjau, "stamp out Ultramontanism." "Wherever we look," says M. Challemel-Lacour, who was M. Gambetta's proconsul at Lyons in 1870, "wherever we look we see this huge spider at work."

As it bears indirectly upon our subject, we may be permitted to take a passing glance at the Liberal press of Belgium. There the Catholics have a majority in the legislature, but their opponents, the Liberals, are singularly active and outspoken. The "*Ami du Peuple*" of Liège tells its readers:—

Christianity should be blotted out of the civilized world. It has had its time and done its work of blood. Citizens, be serious, and do not believe in supernatural beings. The priests tell you that vengeance belongs to God alone. *They lie.* Vengeance belongs to him who suffers, and if you will it, we are the instruments of vengeance.

And speaking of the Commune of Paris, this infamous journal coolly calculated that to execute an adequate revenge upon the men of Versailles the Communists would want 230,000 heads. Nor does the "*Ami du Peuple*" stand alone.

Let others (says the "*Organe de Namur*"*) let others, who think themselves more clever than we are, veil their real thoughts, and protest that they do not wish to attack the "holy religion of our fathers." We say plainly with Voltaire: "*Il faut écraser l'infame.*" Away with all these absurd and worn-out beliefs.

The duty of every true Liberal (says the "*Flandre Libérale*"†) is to snatch away souls from the Church.

And the "*Gazette de Liège*"‡ points to churches, convents, Catholic schools and colleges, presbyteries, and seminaries as so many fortresses of obscurantism and superstition,—"*dens of theocracy,*" that ought to be swept away at the first opportunity; and then the writer coolly describes the method of setting fire to a large building by the use of straw and petroleum, and bids his readers profit by the instruction whenever they have a chance. This, and the cry of the "*Ami du Peuple*," sound like the language of madness, the empty threats of a fool. But many a Communist refugee is a writer in the Belgian press, and these wild words assume an ominous aspect when we think of the murderous volleys that strewed the

* September, 1875.

† June, 1876.

‡ February, 1876.

courtyard of La Roquette with the corpses of the hostages, and the red flames that were devouring all central Paris on that terrible May evening only five years ago.

No less ominous are the words of M. de Levaeye, a leading Professor of the University of Liège, whose writings are not unknown to the readers of the "Fortnightly Review" and the "Revue des Deux Mondes," and whose essay on the causes of war in Europe made him the beloved of Peace Societies. This scientific exponent of Liberal politics edits a review under the title of the "Revue de Belgique," and on the occasion of the late elections it thus sketched out the future policy of Belgian and of European Liberalism :—

To think that free discussion will suffice to give us victory is a dangerous and fatal chimera. Therefore let us not waste time in endeavouring to convince our adversaries. We know we are right : that is enough for us. And indeed this tendency to cast aside liberty as an auxiliary in the social conflict is daily making more and more progress. No ! if the Belgian Liberals wish to save their country and their ideas they must have recourse to more vigorous means. Of course we do not want to make martyrs : but imprisonment, fines, and banishment are legal weapons, and why not adopt them ? We repeat it : liberty, tolerance, free discussion, and all the harmless jests of the Voltairians will not enable us to gain one inch of ground in this struggle. We must be able to bring some pressure to bear. It is we who create truth, it is we who define social necessities. And how ? By force. It is that which fixes social necessities and the rules of right. *For a right without might is only an empty word ; and, whatever men may say, not only might takes precedence of right (which after all means very little) but might is right.*"*

Is not this the real keystone of the policy of Liberalism, in assailing the Church all over Europe by means of the machinery which persecuting cabinets place at its disposal, and is there not too much reason to believe that in France the victorious Liberals will not hesitate to adopt the watchword of the "Revue de Belgique," *La force c'est le droit* ? Nay, have they not done so already ? On what else but its mere numerical force does the Republican majority rely when it assails Christian education, and proposes the wholesale spoliation of the Church ? In the van of the Republican army, indeed, we see M. Thiers protesting that the Republic is "surtout conservatrice," and M. Gambetta declaring that he respects all religions. But what say the ranks behind ? There is citizen and deputy Clemenceau, who was *maire* of Montmartre,

* Quoiqu'on en dise non seulement la force prime le droit—ce qui du reste ne signifie pas grand-chose—mais la force c'est le droit.

when the 200 guns of the Federated National Guard were on the hill just before the Commune. He speaks in the name of the vast majority of the Left, and he tells us that:—

The Conservative Republicans want the Republic at its minimum, but we want the *maximum*. We, the Radical Republicans, as we have already said, want the Republic, for the sake of its natural consequences, for the sake of the great social reforms which must result from it.*

And what are these reforms?—the destruction of Christianity in France; for what else is meant by the secularization of the education of the young from the universities down to the primary schools, the spoliation of the Church, the expulsion of the religious orders?—the destruction of society; for what but this would result from the disappearance of religion, and the substitution of a code of ethics which preaches the *Irrésponsabilité des Criminels*, the necessity of individual acts of crime, and destroys at once the bond of the family and the right of property? If Liberalism really obtains a lasting triumph in France, this must be the inevitable result. M. Pyat was quite right when he said "*Le peuple c'est un grand logicien qui ne manque jamais de conclure.*" Between France and this hideous chaos stands the Catholic party, now happily at once united and energetic, and not without leaders worthy of more auspicious and more illustrious days. Never could it be said with greater truth than now, that the Catholics of France in defending their religion are at the same time battling in defence of their country and their God, the hearth and the altar, the nation and the family, society and civilization, and the legitimate rights and the property of every Frenchman, from the Marshal President down to the poorest mechanic at the looms of Lyons or in the ateliers of Paris, the poorest peasant that reaps the Norman harvest or gathers the vintage in Languedoc or Champagne. The Republicans have thrown off the mask, and their words and deeds cannot fail to swell the ranks of the Catholic party by startling into action men who stood in silent apathy when the danger seemed a remote or a doubtful one. Already the Liberals of France are preparing for the centenary, or, as they call it, the "apotheosis," of Voltaire and Rousseau. Their busts are being erected in numbers of the communes of France, with *fêtes* which recall the days of the first Republic. Thus, in Vaucluse, the busts of the two patriarchs of the Revolution were solemnly unveiled, the newly-appointed *maire* presiding over the proceed-

* "*Le Rappel*," 16 pluviöse, an 84 (1876).

ings, while the rabble sang a hideous song, of which the burden was:—

J'arracherai plutôt les entrailles d'un prêtre
À défaut de cordon pour étrangler un roi.

This chorus was heard in Paris in the days of 1793, its reappearance is a sign of the times that men should note, who think that the leopard can change his spots, that the Liberalism and Republicanism of 1876 are essentially different from that of eighty years ago. And what will be the end of all this? Who can say? Would it not be presumptuous to assume a foresight which we cannot possess? We only know that God will draw forth from this wild confusion a glorious resurrection for the Church of France, how we know not; but that it will be so who can doubt? The Catholics have not really lost anything. The solid rock is there, though the waves are rising fast around it, and it will be still standing there when they subside. The peaceful convent of Paray, the hill of La Salette, the Grotto of Lourdes, the love of the Sacred Heart, the favours of the Immaculate Mother of God, these are our hopes for France. Dark and stormy, and hopeless indeed, her future seems to human sight, but the eye of faith can see glimmering through the darkness the faint light of a not far-distant dawn.

NOTE TO THE APRIL NUMBER.

DURING the last quarter, the following letters have appeared in the "Tablet," which tell their own story:—

THE "SATURDAY REVIEW."

SIR,—I have doubted whether it can be worth my while to notice so wild a statement as has been made about me in the current "Saturday Review," but on the whole perhaps I had better do so. It is there said (p. 674) that "the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW must be considered in a peculiar sense the authorized though unofficial spokesman of the Holy See in this country."

I know of no fact which can by possibility have been so distorted, as to give the slightest even apparent vestige of foundation for so astounding an affirmation. Certainly it is my highest ambition, that the REVIEW should be carried on in profound submission to the teaching and intimations of the Holy See. But all good Catholics have a similar ambition, when they write on matters directly or indirectly connected with religion; and they are not

on that account regarded as "in a peculiar sense official spokesmen of the Holy See."

It may be as well to add, that I am writing this without hint or suggestion from any one whomsoever.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

THE EDITOR OF THE "DUBLIN REVIEW."

THE PROTAGORAS OF PLATO.

SIR,—I am sorry to see that a mistake, which first appeared in the "Month" for January, has found its way into the "Short Notices" of the DUBLIN REVIEW. An essay on the Protagoras of Plato, by the Rev. G. T. Kingdon, has been spoken of by both periodicals as if written by a "Father Kingdon." Indeed, the DUBLIN prints S.J. after the name of the author. I believe I am the only one of the name to whom such a description can apply. That I may not, therefore, seem to arrogate to myself the credit that belongs to another, I ask room in your journal to say that I am not the author of the essay. I imagine the author to be a clergyman of the Anglican Church, resident in Cambridge.—Yours truly,

G. R. KINGDON, S.J.

SIR,—I must apologise to F. Kingdon for confusing him with a Protestant author, and I will take care to correct the mistake in our next number. I was misled by the notice in the "Month" to which he refers. That periodical is in general singularly accurate on matters of fact; and least of all was I likely to question its accuracy, when it mentioned a certain author as a member of the Society.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

THE EDITOR OF THE "DUBLIN REVIEW."

MR. OXENHAM AND "JANUS."

SIR,—... Will you kindly allow me to take this opportunity of correcting an unaccountable mis-statement, which has only just come under my notice at p. 295 of the April No. of the DUBLIN REVIEW, to the effect that I have "advertised myself as the translator of 'Janus.'" I have never done so, though I wrote a review of "Janus" for the "Academy" (before the appearance of the English translation), which the writer was possibly thinking of.—I remain, Sir, yours, &c.,

H. N. OXENHAM.

May 29th, 1876.

SIR,—I owe Mr. Oxenham a sincere apology for the circumstance that, writing from memory, I made an entirely mistaken statement concerning him. It is quite true, as he points out, that he did not advertise himself as the translator of "Janus," but only contributed to the "Academy" a review of that work; which, however, on the whole was very sympathetic. I will take care to correct my mistake in our next number, and must once more express my regret for having inadvertently fallen into it.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

THE "DUBLIN" REVIEWER.

RELIGIOUS UNITY AND TOLERATION.

BY F. RAMIÈRE.

[As our readers are well aware, there are some Catholics who, in opposition to the teaching of the Holy See, regard the modern "liberties"—not as calamities necessitated by deplorable circumstances and involving grievous social degradation—but as actual blessings, and as constituting a true advancement in the path of political progress. That admirable writer, M. Le Play, who in many ways has done such signal service, has shown himself nevertheless somewhat infected with this error; though (as F. Ramière points out) it has now much less hold on him than it once had. F. Ramière is perhaps at this moment the most powerful and successful of the Catholic combatants against "Liberal Catholicism"; and having been engaged in a short series of articles on "the conditions of social regeneration," his subject has naturally brought him into contact with M. Le Play. The following paper appeared in the "*Études*" of last April; and we feel we shall do good service by translating it. Some parts will remind our readers of the article in our present number on "The United States"; and others of that on "The Rights of Conscience." But its general scope is sufficiently distinct from the argument pursued in either of those articles.]

OUR readers will have doubtless understood, that over and above the peculiar theory which is its immediate object, the present discussion relates to one of the most vast and difficult problems now discussed in modern society; a problem which liberalism has professed to solve by the liberty of conscience and of worships. But by avoiding these revolutionary formulæ, M. Le Play has divested the system which they express of that which is most opposed to orthodoxy and sound reason. Between liberty of worships and toleration there is the difference, which separates an absolute principle from an expedient suggested by prudence; an acknowledged right from a free concession. The assertion of the liberty of worships supposes a negation of all revealed doctrine, and even of all religious truth: toleration, on the contrary, restricted to just limits, may be united with a very firm faith; and the Church has sanctioned it even at Rome, by her invariable treatment of the Jews. But if this derogation from the principle of religious unity may be justified under certain special circumstances, it may not be raised into a general principle. For in that case, the exception, ceasing to be an exception, would, so far from confirming the rule, destroy it. This is just what some excellent Catholics will not see. Dazzled by certain accidental advantages of toleration, they make it a general principle; and they thus ally themselves with liberalism in denying the essential rights of truth.

Our preceding article seems to us useful for disabusing this class of

adversaries ; who, in combating religious unity, believe that they are serving the interests of religion and society. We showed them that the liberty of error is equally destructive to both these orders of interests ; that by permitting irreligion to excite against the divine laws all the irregular instincts of the human heart, it gives it full scope to shake to the foundation the essential basis of social order. Unless they deny that influence necessarily exercised by the intellect over the will, which is one of the fundamental laws of human nature, they cannot doubt that diversity of creeds would inevitably produce opposition of tendencies, and thus tend to the disruption of society.

We should have the right to confine ourselves to these arguments, founded on the nature of things, and confirmed by the concessions of those political writers who are least open to suspicion. But though they suffice to convince men accustomed to reflect, they will, nevertheless, be probably powerless to convince those men, so numerous in our day, who seek truth by means of observation rather than of reasoning. In truth we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact, that at first blush experience seems here to contradict theory. In proportion as principles are decisive in favour of doctrinal unity, facts, on the contrary, seem favourable to toleration. And this appearance must have had much resemblance to reality, when it could have obtained the adhesion of so impartial and enlightened an observer as M. Le Play. But so far from finding in this circumstance a reason for rejecting the method adopted by the author of "*La Réforme Sociale*," we shall see that a more careful use of this method gradually diminished the divergence which existed between his too hasty conclusions and the orthodox doctrine. No one has certainly made a better defence for religious liberty on the ground of experimental evidence, than did M. Le Play in the first editions of his great work. When then we find, in the subsequent editions and in other books written under his inspiration, a reply to those arguments,—nothing seems wanting for a refutation of that system, which we had previously shown to be false on the ground of principle.

I.

We have already cited the arguments with which the history of the three last centuries furnished M. Le Play, for showing that the régime of liberty is preferable to the régime of what he calls "constraint." The study of the present state of society in its diverse aspects confirmed him in this view. His sojourn in countries ruled on opposite principles had enabled him to testify that "the salutary emulation, with which the different clergies are inspired by the vicinity of several communions, gives to the various branches of Christianity an energy worthy of the great centuries in which the Church struggled against paganism. This is different, especially in wealthy States, where one of these communions, being made a State religion, is defended by the political power against the rivalry of other communions. This rivalry does not of course add to the intrinsic truth of the principles in question ; but it singularly elevates the character of those who profess them. And it is only through the co-operation of men that

moral law and divine grace act on humanity."* To this passage M. Le Play adds the following note, in his edition of 1872 :—

"A French cleric of the so-called ultramontane school absolutely rejects these conclusions, in a general criticism from which I have derived much instruction. He denies that the contact of dissentients would usefully react on the learning and virtue of a Catholic clergy; so that this contact, condemnable on the ground of principle, would not have in fact the result which I suggested. To this assertion I oppose the following facts, which I shall prove by evidence. The corruption of the Catholic clergy is conspicuously apparent in wealthy countries where other worships are forbidden; whereas there does not exist any example of these scandals in those countries where dissent is tolerated or (still better) dominant."

Although ourselves belonging to the so-called ultramontane school, we do not see any difficulty in admitting the facts, which seem to have so strangely embarrassed the cleric in question. M. Le Play seems to us to have perfectly portrayed the nature of the advantages which would result for the true Church from her juxtaposition with heretical sects, when he compared them with the advantages produced by persecution. In fact, the attacks of speculative error are as dangerous a persecution against the truth as are those of the sword. The sophisms, the calumnies, the sarcasms, which are used by such enemies as Luther, Calvin, and Voltaire, certainly do as much harm as the sword and stake of the Neros and Diocletians. These two methods of attack have the same object and the same result; viz., to oppress liberty of conscience, by rousing the passions against it. To attain this object, tyrants have depended on man's dread of torment, and sophists on the allurements of licentiousness. These are intrinsically the two weak sides of human nature; by which she is diverted from the way of duty, if she does not react energetically against herself.

What will happen then if this internal weakness be aggravated by external influences? Whether it be persecution which excites fear, or sophistry which stimulates concupiscence,—the same result will be infallibly produced: souls too weak to resist will succumb, but souls strong enough to resist will gain most happy fruit from the contest. The soldier when in presence of the enemy is more vigilant, and more on the alert. Knowing that the least omission of duty on his part may be fatal, he has his arms continually in his hand, and yields no step to the aggressor. Every new attack which he successfully repels increases his courage, together with his merit; and he gains glory from the war, in proportion to the number of his own party who are lying victims around him. We acknowledge then most readily, that the liberty granted to opposing religions may offer to the Catholic Church some of those advantages, which made the eras of persecution so glorious to her. But could we thence conclude that this régime is preferable? To arrive at such a conclusion, one must forget the nature of the Church. Suppose that she ceased to be the mother of souls and of all souls, nothing would then prevent her from sacrificing to the interest of her glory the salvation of all those, whom the persecution of the sword or the seductions of error have led to apostatize. But as God has confided

* "*La Réforme Sociale*," liv. i. ch. xii. p. 163.

these to her care, He does not permit her to consider the attacks to which they have yielded as anything but deplorable misfortunes.

Let us attentively examine the exaggerated praises which some Catholics give to the liberal régime; we shall then see that these praises imply a forgetfulness of the mission confided by Jesus Christ to His Church. They see in her only an army; whereas in truth she is also a family. If she were simply an army, she might congratulate herself on the trials, which expel from her ranks all her bad soldiers, and leave only the valiant around her flag. The sacerdotal ministry is in happier condition in countries, where one can only remain a Catholic by being seriously attached to one's religion, and ready to support real sacrifices for its sake. This is the condition to which the persecution inflicted by liberalism, and the application in other countries of the measures attempted in Switzerland, will soon bring her. The Church will undoubtedly thence derive great profit, as regards her interior discipline and her external power of action. Delivered from cowards and traitors, from bad priests and bad Christians, she will proceed with greater confidence to the struggle, and will fight with more energy. The Church then has no fear for herself, either from the attacks of error or from violent persecution; the Divine promises assure her of that victory in the first of these issues, which she had already achieved in the second. She trembles only for that mass of weak souls who cannot resist social influences, and for society, which condemns itself to death by depriving itself of the vital element of truth.

Indeed the free attacks of error tend by their nature to produce a more fatal result to society, than does a bloody persecution: they tend to produce indifference. After a shorter or longer period of severe struggles between the partisans of opposite creeds, minds become fatigued; men become gradually accustomed to see the opposing parties living side by side, enjoying equal rights; kindly intercourse between men of opposing creeds softens the edge of these contradictory beliefs; and, at length, religious truth is considered as but an accessory element of human perfection. In the eyes of many people, this state of things is the perfection of society; in reality it is its ruin. What is it, indeed, but practical scepticism, the necessary precursor of speculative scepticism, if not its result? This toleration, then, could not be considered an element of social perfection by men, who have learned from M. Le Play that scepticism is the most certain symptom and the most active principle of decay. The illustrious writer opens the first book of his "*Réforme Sociale*" with this remarkable statement:—"The methodical study of European society has taught me, that individual happiness and public prosperity exist in proportion to the purity and energy of religious convictions." This sentence expresses the fundamental thought, of which the whole book is but the development and demonstration. The author then will coincide with us in considering the juxtaposition of contrary creeds as a social danger, if it be proved to him that such juxtaposition must inevitably alloy the purity and energy of religious convictions. Now this is the conclusion, which (as we shall presently see) results from the facts alleged by M. Le Play, and which seems indeed

self-evident. For the energy of belief is necessarily proportioned to the repulsion inspired by contrary creeds. Now this repulsion cannot fail to become ever gradually weaker in the majority of men who are incapable of sifting things to the bottom,—when they see error exteriorly established on the same footing as truth, enjoying equal rights and receiving from public opinion the same homage. This régime, by destroying the energy of convictions, tends by its very nature to shake the essential foundations of social order.

II.

We must now apply these general considerations to individual cases, and examine the experience of the past and present as to the social results of toleration.

Firstly, is it true that the evidence of history demonstrates the superiority of this régime over that of religious unity? By no means. It does not follow that the moral splendour of the reign of Louis XIII., after the proclamation of the Edict of Nantes, was the *fruit* of that measure; any more than the simple succession of time is sufficient to prove, that the scandals of the Regency were the fruit of the revocation of the same edict by Louis XIV. To establish the connection of cause and effect between two successive epochs, one of two things is required: either to show directly in the events themselves the trace of this connection or indirectly to prove that the second had the same cause as the first. Now it is impossible to apply to the present case either of these demonstrations. That regeneration of the morals of the clergy, that magnificent efflorescence of sanctity, which was developed in France at the beginning of the 17th century, and which extended its fruitful influence to every class in the nation, and to every branch of social activity, is the direct and manifest effect of a well-known cause: viz., the true Christian Reformation which took place in the Catholic Church, while Luther and Calvin, under the pretext of Reform, gave reins to all the licentiousness of intellect and senses. An analogous and equally remarkable movement had already taken place in Italy and Spain, where, however, no edict similar to that of Nantes had been promulgated. S. Francis de Sales, S. Vincent de Paul, S. Jane Frances de Chantal, and the other holy personages mentioned by M. Le Play, were produced by the same influences which had produced virtues equally admirable in other countries. We should never finish, if we attempted to enumerate all the heroic acts of charity and zeal, which Spain offered to the admiration of the world during this period. For it is very remarkable, that at the very time that France was cast into an abyss of evils by religious divisions, the energetic reaction of Spain against the novel heresies raised Spain to a degree of splendour and prosperity which she had never before attained. How conciliate these results with the theory, that social well-being is derived from toleration? How could the same régime, which raised Spain to so high a pitch under Charles V., be the cause of her decay under the successors of Philip II.?

Portugal, without changing its régime, also went through this double phase; and none will venture to say that she was less indebted for her

greatness to the zeal of John III. than for her humiliation to the intolerance of his heirs. The conclusions adduced against religious unity from the history of France are not better founded. M. Le Play has elsewhere* taught us, that the reign of S. Louis was the most brilliant and prosperous period of our national existence. Now, who does not know that that great prince, full of self-denial as regarded his personal interests, was utterly intolerant as regarded attacks against Christianity, and violations of the laws of God? It was certainly not from having imitated him too faithfully on this point, that the last of the Valois surrendered France to the twofold scourge of religious dissension and civil discord. Was it not on the contrary the weakness and duplicity of their policy, which bequeathed to France the crimes and horrors justly deplored by M. Le Play, from which the Christian policy of St. Louis would have delivered her? We do not certainly pretend to justify the excesses of the League; but we do not understand how we are to be as severe against it as M. Le Play is, when we, like him, praise the splendours that accompanied the religious restoration in France. Would this restoration have been possible, if Protestantism had been triumphant, and if the League had not prevented it from consummating the ruin of France? Would Henry IV. have been a Catholic without the League? and if he had not been converted, would not the rich development of Catholic France under Louis XIII. have been stifled?

What was this marvellous burst? It was the natural result of the liberty and security assured at last to the Catholic Faith after a period of sanguinary struggles. This result would have been absolutely the same, if the Edict of Nantes had not been promulgated. We do not, in truth, see by what right one can credit the reign of toleration inaugurated by that act with the virtues of S. Francis de Sales,† who,—born long before the promulgation of the Edict,—lived in a country subject to the opposite régime, and not only approved of such régime, but sued for its more vigorous application. Neither logic nor history warrant our asserting, that the moral and intellectual corruption of the eighteenth century proceeded from the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.‡ Whatever one

* “*L’Organisation du Travail*,” ch. i. s. 14.

† It was not only by his birth and education, but also by his convictions and his practice, that the gentle S. Francis de Sales was utterly alien to the system of the State’s practical indifference on matters of religion. Of this we have an irrefutable proof, in the Memorial published by the Holy Bishop to the Duke of Savoy, for the maintenance of the Catholic Faith in the Chablais (*Opuscules*, p. 108, quoted by M. Hamon, i. p. 507). It will be seen that, after having employed methods of persuasion for reclaiming the heretics, S. Francis de Sales did not think the intervention of the civil power, in order to prevent their falling back into heresy, either illegitimate or useless.

‡ The Edict of Nantes was revoked in 1685. In 1683 Fénelon noted a falling off from the practice of Christian virtue, as having proceeded during the previous forty years. At the same time La Bruyère wrote his chapter on “*Les Esprits Forts*”; and Bossuet, in his “*Oraison Funèbre d’Anne de Gonzague*,” and in his sermon, “*Sur la divinité de la religion*,” thundered in his loudest tone against the advance of unbelief; nay, glancing beyond the eighteenth century, he foresaw

may think of that act—which was certainly rather political than religious—one cannot attribute to it the slightest influence over minds, to whom the errors of Calvinism were as indifferent as the Truth itself. M. Le Play himself accounts for the disorders of this period by alleging other far more powerful causes, whose effect would have been equally fatal at that time, even had the Protestants continued to enjoy their full liberty.

III.

But let us leave past events; and, in order to be convinced of the dangers resulting from even the pacific struggle of religious doctrines, let us confine ourselves to the present. Let us fix our attention on peoples whose prosperity has been brought forward as an evident proof of the excellence of the régime under which they live. "Public opinion," says M. Le Play, "is unanimous in acknowledging that Russia, England, and the United States are the nations in which prosperity has most rapidly increased during the last two centuries, notwithstanding the diversity of their constitution and other social data. This superiority is at once shown by the social harmony and the stability of these States; it is made clear to the least observant minds, by the rapid enlargement of the territories occupied by these races or subject to their rule."*

modern indifference; the fatal termination in which, after a sanguinary struggle, error would issue. The Abbé Maynard, who relates these incidents in his "*Histoire de S. Vincent de Paul*," p. 376, very justly attributes to Jansenism the deplorable change which religion underwent in France at the beginning and end of the eighteenth century. The scandalous lives of the royal family certainly contributed to this decay; but while violating law, these scandals still left the authority intact which was commissioned to establish its observation. Jansenism overthrew this authority; and deprived it of the power which it had used under so many circumstances, to repair the gravest infractions of the Moral Law. M. Le Play then is misinformed when he names the Jansenist cabal, in common with S. Vincent de Paul, as the promoters of the religious restoration of the seventeenth century. Their talents and their virtues called on them to take a considerable share in this noble work; but their contempt of authority made them dangerous revolutionists.

While the Jansenists, depending on the aid of the Parliament, discredited the authority of the Church, the infidels attacked her doctrine by sophisms and ridicule, and her morality by their licentious writings. It was not then the excessive vigour of authority, but its criminal weakness during the whole course of this unfortunate epoch, which gave strength to impiety. Far from furnishing arguments in favour of toleration, the history of the eighteenth century plainly witnesses against it; and compels us to attribute to it, in great part, the disasters of the Revolution, and consequently, the religious, moral, and political decay of France.

As to the immediate effects of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, to judge of it in a rational manner, we should read what the Duc de Noailles says in his "*Histoire de Madame de Maintenon*," and what is said by Bossuet, Fénelon, and other celebrated bishops of this century, either in their own history or in Michaud's "*Biographie Universelle*." See, for example, the notices on Joly, Bishop of Agen; Le Camus, of Grenoble; Flechier, of Nîmes; Fromentières, of Aire.

* "*Réforme Sociale*," liv. i, ch. ix. § 6, p. 154.

We admit the fact : but far from finding in it any proof of the advantages ascribed to toleration,—by the irrefutable evidence of M. Le Play, we will prove the precisely contrary thesis. Clearly we cannot attribute the prosperity of *Russia* to her toleration ; since, notwithstanding the liberalism which lately induced her to abolish serfdom, she maintains her ancient laws of proscription against dissentient worships. M. Le Play even leads us to see in this intolerance the great guarantee for that stability and harmony which he admires in Muscovite society : for on one hand he affirms, that “her firmness of religious belief is, by the concession of all those who have carefully studied this country, the chief source of her success for so many ages” ; and on the other hand he says, that “the Russian religion would with great difficulty resist the contact of dissentient worships, and especially the assaults of scepticism.” She is then obliged, if she is not to lose that influence whose happy effects have just been pointed out, “to appeal to the secular arm, and to impose on her citizens by formal ordinances the practice of the official religion.” This is certainly, in every sense of the word, a régime of “constraint” : whatever may be the cause of the stability and prosperity which *Russia* enjoys, these advantages cannot be attributed to religious liberty.

We know what the partisans of this régime will reply. They admit that societies still in their infancy cannot be submitted to it without danger ; but they say that adult societies naturally find in the very conflict which it causes an occasion for displaying their noblest energies. Such is the situation of England and of the United States ; and it is in these countries that M. Le Play calls on us to admire the salutary results of the juxtaposition of several rival worships. “The English,” he says, “although acknowledging in religion the foundation of their nationality, rate at a high value the resources which are assured to the people by the knowledge of scientific truth, and the free discussion of principles. They understand that the strength of a society does not depend solely on the energy of its beliefs, since inferior nationalities are placed, under this head, in the first rank. They especially measure this strength by the proportion of liberty which its beliefs can support without being enervated. The inspiration of faith, united with the continuous exercise of reason, habituates the mind to make a distinction between what may and what may not be usefully discussed. The citizen, who has no doubts respecting the commandments of God and the social duties emanating from them, naturally conciliates the desire of amelioration with the respect due to tradition. He is able to use all the strength of his mind to shake off the yoke of routine, in all that refers to secondary interests and to the ordinary wants of society.”*

The influence of religious liberty is no less beneficial, according to M. Le Play, in the United States, to the development of social energy and the progress of religion itself. “One has at first some little trouble in discovering the principle of authority in a society apparently so little governed ; but it is soon perceived that the universally accepted sovereignty is that of Chris-

* “*Réforme Sociale*,” liv. i. ch. xi. § 7, p. 155.

tianity. Religion supplements the action of repressive law, and of the secular arm, because the citizens are obliged by their conscience to conquer their evil inclinations. Each head of a family, finding his chief guarantees of security in the religious character of his neighbours, requires that these shall, in every case, show their respect for religion. Each citizen then voluntarily fulfils those duties, which are imposed on the Russian by his sovereign supported by his soldiery. Never do they think, in the United States, of bringing religion into their political struggles, much less of claiming in its name the help of the civil power. The ministers of religion habitually use a means of success which has no limits: they stimulate by their preaching and example the religious zeal of their flocks. It is thus that the Catholics, weakened and sometimes degraded by the protection of government in the old Spanish and Portuguese colonies of America, attain in a few years in the United States to a great position, as is proved by the remarkable testimony of many. As for myself, it is through the conversation and writings of the Catholics of North America that I cherish the hope of seeing speedily accomplished, under the influence of religion, the social reform of the Latin populations of the South-west of Europe.”*

The reader who, in the first editions of the work of M. Le Play, met with such significant pronouncements in favour of religious liberty, might have experienced serious difficulty in reconciling the results adduced by that sagacious observer, with the laws of human nature, and with the indications furnished by experience in our own country. How does it happen that liberty of discussion, which has been productive among us of scepticism and immorality, has in England and America strengthened religious belief and the empire of morality? There is doubtless a remarkable difference in the character of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon races, which would partly explain the different influences exercised by the same régime on each. Less excitable than the Latin-Celt, the Anglo-Saxon is more calculating, and practical considerations influence him more than abstract doctrines. While the former is easily impassioned for an idea, and deduces from it, even to his own detriment, the most extreme consequences,—the latter, more cool, stops voluntarily half-way, in the path of error as well as in that of truth, when he finds it too inconvenient and embarrassing to carry it out to its legitimate result. But if this peculiar disposition of the two great Anglo-Saxon nations has retarded in them the disintegrating action of free examination, it has not completely sheltered them from the dangers which we have seen to inevitably emanate from the conflict of contradictory doctrines. Sooner or later, the absence of all dogmatic authority must cause, even in these nations also, a frightful intellectual and moral anarchy, instead of that semblance of harmony which different accidental causes maintained for some time after the destruction of the principle of unity. Is not this in fact what has happened? A century and a half had not elapsed since the Reformation, before Bossuet proved that it had not left intact in England a single stone of the

* “*Réforme Sociale*,” liv. i. ch. xii. § 3, pp. 163-164.

doctrinal edifice built by the Son of God. "All that religion deemed most holy has been destroyed. England has so changed, that she does not herself know to what she shall cling; and more agitated within her lands and within her harbours than is the very ocean by which she is surrounded, she finds herself inundated by the formidable deluge of a thousand extravagant sects."*

When Bossuet pronounced these words, the movement of doctrinal decay stamped on England by Protestantism had not attained its ultimate limits: it was to go on for another century; and finish by destroying, in the mind of a people naturally so religious, the very basis of natural religion. Did not the inaugurators of French philosophy borrow their most corrupting sophisms and their most dangerous attacks on Christianity from Bolingbroke and other English writers of the eighteenth century? A remarkable reaction took place at the end of the last and beginning of the present century; but what was the cause of it? Was it not, on the one hand, the feelings of horror inspired in all by the frightful consequences which the revolutionary logic deduced from the principles of impiety? On the other hand, was it not owing to the happy influence produced in England by the virtues of our clergy, to whom she had given a generous hospitality? It was then that she relaxed, in her own bosom, the fetters which had weighed down the Catholics; and we can come to no conclusion in favour of the liberty claimed for error, from the happy fruits which resulted from liberty at length being conceded to Catholic truth.

But the deleterious action of free inquiry, momentarily arrested by this reaction, is again manifesting itself with greater violence than ever; and obliges M. Le Play, in the later editions of his work, to retract a great portion of the praises he had bestowed on English toleration. He thus expresses himself in a note added to the last edition:—

"The facts mentioned in this chapter were collected during my frequent visits to England since 1836. They were noted on the spot, in 1851, in accordance with the text which I have reproduced. In 1862, when I last visited England, the condition of things was tending to a change, and since then recent intelligence has informed me that the evil has been aggravated. Certain literary celebrities have adopted the ideas which the savans of Germany, rather than those of France, are propagating in the cities and manufacturing towns of the West. They desire to destroy that work of reparation, which was accomplished in England under George III., and which, since our misfortunes, has inspired in France great devotion in the sphere of our agriculture, our arms, and our fleet."†

The evidence on which this note rests is only too undeniable; and it considerably weakens the testimony given in the text to the religious prosperity of England. It is no longer true to say that in that country "a writer who desires the esteem of his fellow-citizens" "dares not deny that Christianity is the principle of her prosperity and her liberty"; that "those who venture to spread the paradoxes accepted among ourselves would be spontaneously excluded from every respectable society." Those

* Bossuet, "Oraison funèbre de la Reine d'Angleterre."

† "Réforme Sociale," liv. i. ch. xii. p. 156, note g.

who have read our preceding numbers can convince themselves, that the most pernicious of these paradoxes have been supported in public gatherings; and the slight degree of repulsion which they have encountered shows that Christianity is far from having that influence over the mind of the nation which was supposed. The venerable University of Oxford, so long the bulwark of Anglican orthodoxy, has not been able to shield herself from the invasion of German rationalism; and, once established in that citadel, nothing can prevent its undermining the faith of the clergy and of the educated classes. There is every reason to believe that the evil, which is externally manifested by such frightful symptoms has long since been imperceptibly gnawing the entrails of English society. The posthumous autobiography of Stuart Mill reveals to us, in this leader of the school, the art reduced to system of concealing an absolute scepticism under a respectable exterior. Let us acknowledge that the practice of this art is not so difficult in Protestant society. The heretical sects not imposing on their members, as the Catholic Church does, any acts which imply an energetic profession of faith,—incredulity makes serious ravages among them without any exterior display. But if we may judge from the tone of their more popular journals, there is a double movement in English society; while the minority are influenced by the Ritualistic reaction,—the spirit of Christianity and the idea of the supernatural are weakened, and are tending to disappear completely, from among the masses of the nation.

As much may be said of the United States. And here also the candour of M. Le Play obliges him to admit the truth of what we say. "One recognizes," he says, "by a number of symptoms, that a change is taking place in the ideas and morals of this great nation." What is this change? It is the very change which we pointed out as the necessary result of free discussion.

"Daily do we see new sects appear in the United States, who are only nominally attached to the Christian dogma. Some of them even abandon themselves to the practice of illuminism and polygamy. It seems also that scepticism and materialism are openly professed in some of the large cities. American travellers assure me that in New York, for example, religious belief is corrupted in proportion to the propagation of those deplorable morals which have made some European cities true nurseries of contagion. These tendencies, which no positive institution represses, are being rapidly developed. The habitual symptoms of decay are everywhere showing themselves: luxury disorganizes the domestic hearth, family ties are relaxed, and under this influence women take upon themselves habits of independence, and so give scandal to Europeans. The civilized world, which, since the time of Washington, had received only a good example from the Americans, is now surprised to see them follow a retrograde path."*

These words were written in 1874, the date of the latest edition of the "Réforme Sociale." Even at that time the results of religious liberty in the United States were regarded in a less favourable light by M. Le Play

* "Réforme Sociale," liv. i. ch. xiii. p. 166.

than they had been. But the judicious observer must not stop here ; and, in a short time, the application of M. Le Play's own method proceeded to display new light, and finally dissipate every illusion. One of the most distinguished members of the "Union de la Paix Sociale," M. Claudio Jannet, has just published a work, by which we may appreciate at its just value that American democracy, for which M. de Tocqueville had inspired us with such an unreasoning admiration.* M. Jannet does not grudge his admiration and praises of the excellent institutions which, united to exceptionally favourable material conditions, gained for the United States their unexampled prosperity and their immense development. But side by side with these elements of progress, whose action was especially shown during the first half of this century, we see, during the last thirty-five years, a movement of moral and even material decay, continually increasing. To trace these two contrary influences to their true principles, M. Jannet has patiently analyzed them. The result of this conscientious inquiry has been formulated by M. Le Play himself, in a letter printed at the beginning of the book. He says :—

"In portraying in a faithful picture the moral decay of the United States, you have led us back to one of the causes of our own ruin. You point out to us the error which caused our delusion, respecting the origin of that prosperity, which we so much admire in this nation under the descendants of Washington."

This is, in fact, the conclusion clearly resulting from M. Jannet's book : that what has been alleged as the origin of the greatness of the United States is, on the contrary, the cause of their decay. It is generally supposed that this society is founded on liberty of worships and democratic equality. Nothing is more false. Every state of which the Union was composed at the beginning had a religious basis, and several of them made the enjoyment of political rights dependent on ecclesiastical position. All had a state religion except one, which from the first unfurled the standard of toleration : and this exception was the only Catholic State, that of Maryland. Hence it resulted, that by means of this toleration, the Puritans of New England established themselves in large numbers in the country, seized the reins of government in 1648, and excluded the Catholics. If, to obtain the aid of France in the struggle against England, they relaxed the rigour with which they had treated the true religion, they did not on that account proclaim dogmatic indifference. Each state preserved its religious autonomy, as well as its political sovereignty ; and it was to save the former, that they decided to leave religion outside of the federal constitution. At the same time Christianity was recognized as the law of the entire nation. In all the States blasphemy and the violation of the Sunday rest were severely punished ; and nowhere would the negation of Christ's divinity have been tolerated. Every great act of public life began with prayer, and Government was never backward in decreeing religious services, either of expiation or thanksgiving, to ward

* "Les Etats-Unis contemporains," by Claudio Jannet.

off menacing perils, or to celebrate national successes. As long as the mass of the nation was imbued with this religious spirit, the disintegrating influence of the democratic principle could be neutralized. But after 1830, when the founders of the Union were all in the grave, respect for the old traditions was impaired, and free inquiry soon bore its natural fruit. The clash of different creeds, the ever-increasing licentiousness of the press, the immigration en masse of German colonists infected with scepticism, completely demolished the edifice of American Protestantism ; and while Catholicity was acquiring fresh vigour from attacks, which deprived it however of a large number of its weaker members, the Puritanism of New England, but lately ardent to fanaticism, rapidly divested itself of every positive creed, and gave way to the vague Deism of the Unitarians. It was the same in the other States ; and three-fourths of the Protestants now no longer acknowledge Jesus Christ as their God. They are still Christian by name, but in reality they have no creed ; and those who are stung by the desire to believe something, if they do not enter the Catholic Church, throw themselves into the absurdities of Mormonism or the superstitious practices of Spiritism. This new religion, the diabolical counterfeit of the Divine supernatural, boasts of having three millions of followers. Altogether there is no limit to the religious disintegration of the United States. Every day the principle of private inspiration produces some new sect, which offers a more gross allurement to the passions under a more mendacious appellation : there are the partisans of *free love*, whose name sufficiently indicates their principal dogma ; *perfectionists*, who have perfected marriage by substituting for it a brutal promiscuity.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that with this religious disorganization there necessarily corresponds an ever-increasing social decomposition. The *mob*, whom universal suffrage invests with the sovereignty, who are not guided in the exercise of this sovereignty by any principle of religion or morality, only make it an object of speculation and a protection for license. As all officers, even the magistrates, are elected, the most capable are not chosen, but those who are best able to flatter the passions of the electors. According to this principle that "the spoils are for the victors," the party who succeeds to power at each new election makes a clean sweep of the officers appointed by the preceding government. The electoral agents dispose of the offices in advance, receiving a premium for themselves. The malversations of each functionary, in endeavouring to pay this tax and also to make his fortune during his very brief tenure of office, may be easily understood. Impunity is secured to him, since he can only be punished by his own party, who are quite as greedy as himself. So the peculations which are practised under the eyes and with the knowledge of all, in all branches of the public service, surpass everything that we could believe possible in Europe. In the Custom-house alone the State loses every year, according to official reports, from 60 to 125 millions of dollars. The duty on whisky, which should amount to 400 millions, was returned, in 1867 as only 65 millions. The offices in the Senate are publicly sold ; and the most lucrative profession in the United States is not that of the stockbroker, but of the broker of offices.

Can we then be astonished that, recruited in this manner, the magistracy is venal, and that the greatest criminal is almost sure to escape prosecution if he has sufficient money to corrupt his judges? What guarantee, then, is there for justice against crime, and for public interests against individual covetousness? What can honest men do, under such a régime, except keep themselves aloof from public life, and confine themselves as much as possible within their own families? Outside of that circle, there is only shameless license and indescribable tyranny. No Christian king, during the period of absolute monarchies, would have dared to permit to himself the acts of oppression and the denial of justice, of which the unfortunate planters of the South were the victims at the end of the war of secession, on the part of President Grant and his employees. And even now we see a new enlargement begin to open, upon this already intolerable tyranny. It had, until now, generally respected religious liberty, and the poor Indians had been the sole victims of the masonic fanaticism of Mr. Grant. But very recently he has thrown off his last mask of liberalism, of which he was the worthy representative in America; and denying with unparalleled impudence the traditions which had been the glory of his country, he has published a programme of politics very similar to that of the great Prussian liberal, Prince Bismarck.

IV.

Experience is, then, decisive. The logic of facts is perfectly in accordance with that of ideas. The liberty of error, more complete in America than even in England, has there developed on even a larger scale the consequences which we had seen contained in its principles:—absolute unbelief, unbridled licentiousness, the hatred of truth and of Christian morality. There is but one step from thence to a bloody persecution; and in the interval, until the threats already uttered are realized, the one object, which Freemasonry proposes in preaching toleration, is carried out by yet more efficacious means. The triumph of the sect being certain in both hemispheres, nothing can prevent its placing its last hand on its work, which is the radical destruction of Christianity and of all the religious bases of society. This they reckon that they can certainly do, by removing religion from the schools. Washington, when dying, said: "Never permit education to be separated from religion." This was because he understood that,—as education forms men and consequently society,—an atheistical education, by corrupting at its source the morality of individuals, annihilates the most essential element of social life. The connection is rigorous: no society without morality; no morality without religion; no religion without religious education. Well! we see in those countries in which M. Le Play loved to show us that Christianity was so respected and so fruitful, that a party already powerful, and becoming daily more so, openly labours to destroy all religion at its very basis. Let us acknowledge the fact: this party only pushes liberal doctrines to their extreme consequences; and applies to one of the social institutions—viz. education—that indifference as regards religious truth, which is the logical basis of toleration raised to the dignity

of a principle. But, on the other hand, let us understand that, if this party succeeds, social reform is at an end. When the Revolution shall have succeeded in exterminating from the souls of the rising generation all respect for the divine law,—those practices, which constitute the prosperity of nations, and which M. Le Play has judiciously analyzed, will have no more power to resist it, than a straw to oppose a hurricane which uproots the oak. This, then, is the great enemy of social reform, against which all who desire the success of that work must unite. The revolutionary plot has become too evident to be overlooked. Attributing to others his own straightforwardness, M. Le Play refuses to admit the existence of this great anti-christian conspiracy; and he does not desire that we should, with Joseph de Maistre and Balmez, find in it the explanation of those religious and political revolutions which have accumulated so many ruins in Europe. Rather he sees, in the corruption of the Catholic clergy, whether at the time of the Reformation or in the eighteenth century, the chief cause of that revolt, which at those two epochs detached from the Church a considerable portion of Christian society.

We will oppose this view by one solitary argument; but it is a decisive one. If the Protestant movement had had as its motive, and not merely as its pretext, the corruption more or less great of the Catholic clergy,—it would have produced a certain reformation among those who took part in it; and the movement would have stopped, when the regeneration of which the Council of Trent gave the signal had been consummated in the Church. But we all know that the pretended Lutheran Reformation produced amongst its adherents, and especially among its clerical adherents, a demoralization of which Protestants themselves were ashamed.* Who does not know that the disciplinary measures of the Council of Trent were as violently rejected by the soi-disant reformers as its dogmatic decrees? Finally, who is not aware that, instead of being disgusted by the scandals of the clergy, the philosophers of the eighteenth century openly applauded the said scandals, and preferred to take their auxiliaries from the ranks of those licentious abbés, who were ecclesiastics only in name? We do not, certainly, pretend to deny the relaxed state into which too large a number of clerics and religious had fallen, at those sorrowful epochs. While not forgetting the great exaggeration of certain writers, prompted by their hostility to the Church, we must concede that this evil was great; the Church has never attempted to hide this

* It was not only in Germany and France that the Protestant clergy showed themselves the faithful imitators of the married monk of Wittemberg and the licentious nun of Noyon. The Anglican Church itself, which has ever been the most respected of all Protestant communions and which at first refused to authorize the marriage of the clergy, could not preserve its founders from the ignominious stigma, which should alone have discredited their pretended mission. Cecil, the confidential adviser of Queen Elizabeth, wrote to his friend Parker, Archbishop of Canterbury, that the Queen was *utterly disgusted* with the conduct of the new clergy; and that he, Cecil, was seriously compromised, in consequence of the disgrace which they had brought on religion." ("Correspondence," p. 148.)

fact. The language of St. Bernard, which is quoted by M. Le Play, is still ours, when we address those who are called to be the salt of the earth. *As against our accusers*, we have a right to use the same defence as that adopted by Our Lord when censuring the hypocritical severity of the Pharisees. But we know that *in the sight of God* this excuse does not justify us. Thus we do not wait to strike our breasts until we are reminded from without of our obligations.

A popular preacher lately at Rome exhorted the Christians of that city to blame themselves for the calamities from which they were suffering; and taking upon himself and his brethren in the priesthood the largest share of the responsibility, he said to the faithful:—"While in the public confession of your faults you will say, '*Meâ culpâ*,' we, the priests, will say, '*Meâ maximâ culpâ*.'" On this point, then, we agree with M. Le Play; but after having admitted to the utmost the part played by the irregularities of the clergy in the revolt of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, there still remains the fact, that at those two periods the chief motive of the rebels was their desire to throw off all supernatural authority: first, that of the Church, and then that of God Himself. Toleration was but a mask, to conceal their hatred against the truth, and to procure for themselves the means of becoming intolerant thereof.* Their true object was, not to gain toleration for irreligion, but to annihilate all belief. Created only to attain this object, freemasonry preserved for a long time its secret for the benefit of its principal disciples: but they are now less cautious; and the conspiracy is so manifest, its influence so extended, its means of action so efficacious, and its success so alarming, that any illusion on the subject would be inexcusable.

V.

What then is to be done? What, in the presence of this formidable danger, are the duties of Catholics, and of all interested in social reform? Has the evil no remedy, and do we pronounce the sentence of death on our society? If on the one hand toleration is a social necessity, and if on the other it necessarily adduces the destruction of belief and the rupture of every social tie, how can we escape the ruin with which we are threatened? Is not despair the only practical conclusion at which we can arrive?

God forbid! The ever-increasing ravages of scepticism, and the full liberty with which the great anti-Christian conspiracy is developed, prepare for us new catastrophes. This is what we fear, and what minds the

* In "*Les Doctrines Romaines sur le Libéralisme*," we have quoted from De Maistre the saying of Grimm, who clearly explains the tactics of sordid philosophical anti-Christianity: "All great men have been intolerant; and they are obliged to be so. If we encounter by chance an over-zealous prince, we are obliged to preach to him toleration, in order that he may fall into the net, and then the crushed party may have time to rise by his toleration and crush its adversary in its turn. So the sermon of Voltaire, which harps on tolerance, is a sermon for fools, or dupes, or men who care nothing about the matter."

least inclined to pessimism also dread. But we may hope from the Divine goodness that Christian society will not perish in that deluge ; and it is our duty to prepare at once the elements of its future regeneration.

We should especially follow the excellent counsel given us by M. Le Play, and should reform *ourselves*, in order to contribute more efficaciously to social reform. The conversion of the modern world, become pagan, is not a less difficult work, than was the destruction of ancient paganism ; and to surmount its difficulties, we cannot, any more than the first Apostles could, depend on the aid of human governments ; for those have become universally hostile to us. Their protection, indeed, any how would not suffice to save us. If they can do much for the *maintenance* of religious unity, they are powerless in restoring it. We are only armed with the weapons which the Apostles used with so much success ; the principal being charity and the example of an irreproachable life. We do not suppose that the great importance, or we should rather say the indispensable necessity, of the first weapon, can be a subject of doubt. Every Catholic will cordially agree with M. Le Play when he says,—“ To save the last great Catholic nation, we must adopt the maxim of S. Vincent de Paul. We must excel dissentients and sceptics in talent and in virtue.” *

But if S. Vincent de Paul were to return among us, and if he could be invited to draw up rules for social reform, he would certainly not restrict himself to this counsel. He would show us that true virtue can only be maintained among individuals, can only be re-established in society, so far as it is based on a true creed. He would exhort us to imitate his zeal, which never relaxed during his life, in defending the unity of faith. While recommending an affectionate charity towards the victims of error, he would nevertheless urge us never to come to terms with error itself. Such was his line of conduct regarding the most specious of all heresies, Jansenism ; a heresy at that time defended by those celebrated writers—Pascal, Antoine, Arnaud, and a great many others, whose exemplary virtues are lauded by M. Le Play. As soon as he saw these men, remarkable though they were for the austerity of their lives and their great virtues, refuse to submit to the authority of the Pope, S. Vincent de Paul had no further relations with them. He well knew that, by undermining this key of the arch of Christianity, they were labouring, notwithstanding their virtue and even by the aid of their virtue, to overthrow religion and society.†

There is then no doubt that, in the opinion of the Apostles of every age, unity of faith has been the first condition of all effective social reform. If then we wish to continue the work, we must strive as far as we can to give Christians that essential guarantee for its harmony and stability. The experience of wise men unites with the example of the Saints to show us the necessity of this duty ; and if there were anything wanting in the evidence afforded by those considerations which we have already deve-

* “*Réforme Sociale*,” liv. i. ch. ix. § 2, p. 110.

† If proofs be required of this most inflexible firmness of doctrine, united with the most indulgent charity, practised by S. Vincent de Paul, as by other saints, they will be found in the Fifth Book of his history by Abbé V. Maynard.

loped, it is from the method of M. Le Play that we should borrow the indication of our line of conduct. Let us apply to the first of all social necessities,—that is, to religion,—the very wise rules with which M. Le Play's method furnishes us, regarding institutions of less importance. What does it prescribe to us, for the peace and well-being of families, workpeople, and civil society? *A return to traditional practices*: for, in the moral order, the spirit of innovation necessarily introduces decay, and true progress can only result from respect to tradition. But how are we to restore these healthy practices so strongly recommended by M. Le Play? Are they to be imposed by violence? By no means; for they would not produce their effect, unless voluntarily accepted. But must we then approve the contrary practices, or at least exhibit indifference to them? If we did so, we should fall into another excess as injurious to reform as the former; for if reform be compromised by violence, it is rendered *impossible* by indifference. M. Le Play appeals then to all who are interested in the well-being of their fellow-citizens; and he implores them to use every means of persuasion to dissipate the prejudices which would be an obstacle to reformation, to combat modern errors, and to prepare, by a new direction given to ideas, a change of morals and institutions in the sense pointed out by the experience of ages.

These rules are dictated by wisdom itself; and we only ask one thing for the assured success of social reform—viz., that they be applied to the relations of man with God, as well as to the relations of a father with his children, and the master with his workmen. During long ages the relation of individuals, families, and societies with the Creator was founded, in Christian Europe, on a basis accepted by all, and the more sacred as it had been erected by the hand of God Himself. The firmness of this foundation gave to the entire social edifice a solidity, which the violence of passion and the barbarism of manners never succeeded in destroying. So, notwithstanding the imperfection of other social institutions, Christian Europe was indebted to this religious régime for a stability and prosperity, which have not been known since the period when the most audacious of innovations substituted the anarchy of opinion for the unity of faith.

What is now to be done? We must evidently return to Tradition; restore what has been so foolishly destroyed; place unity of faith and submission to the authority of the Church at the head of those practices, the restoration of which should constitute the social mould of society.

But how to restore this unity? Must we appeal to violence? God forbid; but in proportion to the folly of such an appeal, so would be that of indifference in regard to the opinions at variance with Catholic Tradition, to which the innovating spirit daily gives birth in the bosom of Protestantism. In vain could we hope to bring back to religion the populations which have been seduced by scepticism, as long as we shall present to them an uncertain and contradictory form of Christianity, of which every constituent dogma is contested by one party or other of its followers. Christians will not be able successfully to cope with infidelity, until they recover their ancient unity, by reuniting those links which a criminal schism had broken in sunder, with the centre of Christian unity. Clear

as it is that social reform is impossible without Christian restoration, it is no less clear that Christian restoration can only be Catholic.

Such are the principles which direct the conduct of those Catholics whom M. Le Play calls Ultramontane, and whose excessive zeal he seems to fear. They only differ from Liberal Catholics, inasmuch as they apply to religious innovations the very same rule, of which M. Le Play so well shows the necessity when applied to other social innovations. While Liberal Catholics are content to resign themselves to the destruction of the Christian order, and do not any longer speak of winning to religion those new societies which have for a century proclaimed their independence,—true Catholics, regarding this pretended emancipation as contrary both to the interests of society and to the traditions of the human race, see in this infatuation for it one more reason for pointing out its dangers. Nothing is more certain than this, that liberalism is as opposed to social Tradition as to Catholic. The separation of the temporal from the spiritual order, which it lays down as its first principle, is the most unheard-of and disastrous of those innovations, by which the modern world has broken with the wisdom of ages, and has condemned itself to a fearful decay. If this be true, we can only regard Catholic Liberalism as an error and a danger, which makes a compromise with this [evil] principle, and divides those forces whose union alone can save society.

By reproving this illusion we take the only means of re-establishing unity. We do not oppose one party against the other; we are not more ultramontane than *citramontane*; we are Catholics as Catholics are everywhere, and as our fathers were; Catholics, like the Pope, who is more energetic than we in the condemnation of Liberalism; in a word, traditional Catholics. Consequently we ought to be supported by every man who understands and proclaims the indispensable necessity of returning to Tradition.

H. RAMIERE.

Notices of Books.

The Glories of the Sacred Heart. By HENRY EDWARD, Cardinal Archbishop. London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

WE do not think that his Eminence the Cardinal has given the Church any work that will prove so valuable as this volume on the "Glories of the Sacred Heart," unless it be the "Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost." It is dedicated to the Students of the Seminary of S. Thomas of Canterbury, and is, we believe, in great part the expansion of notes already dictated to them. The ten sermons contained in the volume seem to have been preached in two series. Perhaps the best notice we can give of them will be in the form of a general description of the subject-matter.

The first sermon opens with the consideration of the doctrine of Incarnation as "the true test of the disciples of Jesus Christ," and advances by clearly-stated propositions to the truth, that "the humanity of Jesus, being the humanity of God, was thereby *ipso facto, eo ipso*, in the very moment of the Incarnation, by necessity, deified, for it became the flesh, or the humanity, of God." Many truths depend on this fundamental dogma, and are, each one, a test of true faith in it. Error about the Divine Maternity, or the efficacy of the Precious Blood, or the worship due to the Sacred Heart, is conviction of heresy on the truth of the Incarnation. The transition to the Catholic doctrine of the Sacred Heart is plain. It is not so much an inference from the doctrine as a part of it, for as the humanity of Jesus being the humanity of God, was in the very moment of the Incarnation deified, so the Sacred Heart was in that moment deified, and became the Heart of God. That is the Divine glory of the Sacred Heart, the justification of the truth, that "as the doctrine of the Incarnation is the true test of the disciples of Jesus Christ, so the Divine glory of the Sacred Heart is the true test of the doctrine of the Incarnation." The second sermon outlines the arguments of the rest of the series, and then proves, as its special thesis, the fitness (*congruitas*) of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is the means to the creature of the greatest knowledge, and therefore of the greatest love, of God. The mystery, it is ably shown, brings God within the apprehension of human intelligence "with a fulness and precision which was not possible before." They who looked upon Jesus Christ looked upon God. In Him was all the fulness of the Godhead, and even in His finite and visible nature He was the clearest expression of the Divine perfections. "The Infinite

Image of God clothed in our humanity united both the original and the likeness in one Person; and thereby the conception of God became to man more intimate, more facile, more intelligible, more within the sphere of human reason." Thus came a greater knowledge of the moral attributes of God, above all of His love; and, as a consequence, a greater sympathy with them was excited in the hearts of men. Another result was the creation of a moral body on earth of which He is the Head, and this also brings man nearer to God. And, lastly, it makes possible that Sacramental Presence by which the consciousness of His nearness and watchfulness is strongly increased and sustained in the hearts of believers. Therefore we may see in the mystery a fitness and a Divine adaptation of ways and means to increase the knowledge and the love of God in man. But as "the Incarnation is God's Book of Life, the knowledge of His Sacred Heart is the interpretation and the unfolding of that Book." "Dogma, the Source of Devotion," scatters the misrepresentations that hide the true meaning of the word "dogma," and very plainly shows that supernatural "knowledge is the first and vital condition of all true worship." This sermon, even taken by itself, is of exceptional value and complete in its argument, but its place in the series has reference to that which follows—"The Science of the Sacred Heart." In five ways we learn this science, or by five degrees ascend, "going from step to step upwards into the light, the knowledge, and the love of the Sacred Heart." The first way of learning is that of the intellect illuminated by faith. Love follows, and superadds a yet more intimate knowledge, by assimilating the heart of man with the Sacred Heart. The third way is experience—a personal trial that every soul must make for itself—a spiritual tasting that opens the eyes, and intensifies the vision of those who already see by faith. For the rest the sermon follows unusual ways, and treats very beautifully of the infused light of the Holy Ghost, that is, the knowledge which is "the theology of the Saints," whether learned or unlearned, and which sometimes, expressed from the lips of the humble and uneducated, outstrips the slow and scientific work of the school in shedding light "even upon dogmas of faith." Our Lord's miraculous manifestations of Himself constitute the fifth way of knowledge. The last sermon is supplementary, and portrays "the character of our Divine Lord as it is manifested in the Sacred Heart." It is entitled "The Last Will of the Sacred Heart," and dwells upon the institution of the Blessed Sacrament as the supreme manifestation of Divine love.

The second course of sermons is more explicitly of a devotional kind than the first, and may be more briefly summarized. "The Temporal Glory of the Sacred Heart" is its influence in the world. It has been spreading ever since the revelation of the mystery. A vision of beauty—the beauty of the Eternal Son of God as seen in Bethlehem, in Nazareth, and in Jerusalem—has entered into the world, displacing the hideous and perverted conceptions of many gods, and still lives, drawing to itself the intelligence and heart of mankind. And it is more than a vision. It is a power impressing its own character upon the whole race of mankind that lives by faith. Lastly, the Incarnate Word reigns in the world and wit-

nesses to His own supreme power by His Vicar, "whom He has appointed to reign in His stead, to speak in His name, and to exercise His superior jurisdiction." "The Transforming Power of the Sacred Heart" shows the ways in which It assimilates human hearts to Itself. It is able *deformata reformare, reformatam transformare, transformata conformare*. The next sermon, "The Sure Way of Likeness to the Sacred Heart," continues the same subject—the conformity of human hearts to the Sacred Heart, which is the perfection of man—under the aspect of that co-operation which is within the power, and therefore within the duty, of man. "The Signs of Likeness to the Sacred Heart" are five—self-denial, charity to others, severity to ourselves, self-mistrust, and the spirit of praise; "where these are there is, at least, a faint outline of our Divine Master." The last sermon of the volume is "The Eternal Glory of the Sacred Heart." "In what will this glory consist? So far as we can understand, it will be revealed in three ways—first, in Itself; secondly, in Its relations to the Ever-blessed Trinity; and lastly, in Its relations to us" (p. 280). We need hardly say that on these lines a sermon of wonderful elevation is constructed. It worthily closes the work, and especially crowns the argument of the preceding discourses on the ways and signs of likeness to the Sacred Heart, inasmuch as it contemplates the Eternal Glory of the Sacred Heart throned in the centre of all hearts that have ever been conformed to It.

"Tremunt videntes Angeli
Versam vicem mortalium;
Peccat Caro, mundat Caro,
Regnat Deus, Dei Caro."

For many reasons we have judged it well to give a notice of the sermons in the way we have done. There is only one point on which we desire to make any remark. The first sermon, which is a clear and able exposition of the theology of the Sacred Heart, and therefore, on the principle developed in the third sermon, of the source of sound devotion to It, was the subject of an article in January, 1874. Besides its permanent value, it had then a passing interest. It drew forth an impetuous attack from a Protestant clergyman, and thereby a striking confirmation of the fact stated in the sermon, that outside the Church the doctrine of the Incarnation was fast fading away from the minds of men. At the same time there appeared, under the signature of "Catholicus," a pamphlet of exceptional ability. A great part of it is added, by way of notes and appendix, to the sermon in this volume, and the fact at once increases its value, and points to the authorship of the pamphlet. What we would wish now to see clearly, is the precise point where the Protestant mind loses itself in its belief in the mystery of the Incarnation. As the Cardinal remarks, "The Church which is established by law in England . . . retains the creeds, in which the true and proper doctrine of the Incarnation is fully enunciated" (p. 6), yet we have seen the hopeless feebleness of even clerical Protestantism to grasp the nearest conclusions to the doctrine. We do not remember under what form of heresy precisely the views held by the Protestant controversialist would range them-

selves—perhaps they were too vague and confused to take any definite shape—but his difficulty against Catholic teaching, as expressed by the Cardinal, was first that it “declared the Sacred Humanity to be deified, *i.e.* changed into God, or made ‘God’; and then, by a strange contradiction, he asserted that the teaching of the Cardinal “separated it from the Divinity, and set it up as a deified object of separate worship.”

But we must close our notice of the Cardinal’s able work, and the reflections it has suggested. It is full of eloquence and learning from cover to cover.

The Sermon on the Mount. By H. J. COLERIDGE, S.J.
London : Burns & Oates.

IT is just a year since we drew attention as best we could, to the special character of this commentary; and expressed our sense of the singular benefits which F. Coleridge is therein conferring, on English Catholics primarily, but ultimately on the whole Christian world. The work has now reached its third volume, which lies before us. We can hardly say more of it in the way of notice, than emphatically to repeat what we said last July on the general character and value of the commentary; and to testify that the two subsequent volumes have even surpassed our expectation, in what seems to us the completeness and general excellence of their execution.

We cannot doubt that the effect produced by the work is already considerable: but its publication is peculiarly the kind of enterprise, in which the ultimate results are out of all proportion to the initial movement. Those who are *at once* most deeply impressed by it, are precisely those who are most likely to influence the mind of others, and who are most sure to do so in due course. F. Coleridge begins (if we may so express ourselves) by generating the atmosphere itself, in which his utterances will at a later period sound forth with a distinctness and emphasis that must arrest the attention of all.

If the volume before us were simply an ascetical treatise,—every thoughtful reader would be profoundly impressed by its fulness, depth, and perspicacity; by its subtlety in setting forth the adaptation of Christian doctrine for the loftiest needs of human nature. In this respect, however, the volume essentially differs from an ascetical treatise, that the writer is not pursuing a plan and purpose of his own, but illustrating in pregnant and unforced comment the successive words of God Incarnate. The reader is not mastering some scheme of ascetic theology, but learning to “live on every word which proceedeth from the mouth of God.” It is easy enough doubtless to make our Lord’s words texts as it were to a series of sermons; but there is not a sentence of F. Coleridge’s which can fairly be called digressive; not a sentence which does not assist in apprehending more fully and precisely what it is which our Blessed Lord is saying. The effect of such a study on the whole interior life is a theme

which we cannot help suggesting, for the consideration of those who are more competent than ourselves to do it justice.

If any readers are disappointed—we have not heard of any being so—at the complete absence of *narrative* in this particular volume, we would remind them that the author cannot of course choose his own order of arrangement. If it pleased our Blessed Lord—as indeed was evidently most suitable—to preface the chief part of His active ministry by a detailed exposition of the Evangelical Law, His dutiful disciple must adopt the same order in a systematic comment. But as there are several of F. Coleridge's characteristics which show to especial advantage in his treatment of our Lord's discourses,—so there are others, perhaps, equally important, which will be more prominently exhibited in the future volumes, concerned as these will mainly be with the miracles and other acts of our Lord's public life.

We may mention one feature of this commentary as very characteristically Catholic. The author draws attention to what Protestant expositors of course fail to discern: the constant references to His *Church*, which underlie our Lord's teaching in the Sermon on the Mount. These references sometimes need a little care to be distinctly seen; but (when pointed out) they carry with them their own evidence of having been really intended.

An Agnostic's Apology. By LESLIE STEPHEN. ("Fortnightly Review" for June).

WE would press this essay on the particular notice of those Catholics who are called to the noble work of opposing, on the field of philosophy, the infidelity now so fearfully prevalent and increasing. It is of the utmost importance, that these Catholics take a correct measure of the enemy whom they are to encounter. And our own strong impression is, that the kind of thoughts now simultaneously fermenting in many minds—the thoughts which issue more and more in a repudiation of Theism—are much more truly represented by Mr. Leslie Stephen, than e.g. they are in Mr. Mill's "Essays on Religion." By studying then this "Agnostic's Apology," the champions of religion will best understand the kind of difficulty, which pre-eminently and predominantly needs their attention. But we think Mr. Stephen has by no means drawn out his points with the full force and plausibility of which they are susceptible. One misconception especially surprises us, from one who is generally so well up in the history of philosophy. He represents (p. 848) the advocates of free-will as maintaining, that causation is not universal throughout the phenomenal world; or (in other words) as maintaining, that the will's self-determining power is not a power of true causation. Mr. Stephen has evidently not the least inkling what such writers e.g. as Mr. Martineau mean, when they use the word "causation." Still more amazingly he says (p. 849) that, according to their doctrine and Father Newman's doctrine, the whole moral evil of the world "results from *accident*."

Sancta Sophia, or Directions for the Prayer of Contemplation, &c. Extracted out of more than Forty Treatises written by the late Ven. Father AUGUSTINE BAKER, a Monk of the English Congregation of the Holy Order of S. Benedict, and methodically digested by the Rev. Father SERANUS CRESSY, of the same Order and Congregation. Now Edited by the Very Rev. Dom NORBERT SWEENEY, D.D., of the same Order and Congregation. London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

S. Gertrudis Magnæ, Virginis Ordinis S. Benedicti, Legatus Divinæ Pietatis. Accedunt ejusdem Exercitia Spiritualia, Opus ad codicum fidem nunc primum integre editum SOLISMENSIIUM O. S. B. monachorum curâ et operâ. Pictavii et Parisiis. H. Oudin. 1876.

THESE two remarkable books belong to the same grand division of books. They are very unlike each other, inwardly and outwardly; but they both treat of the very highest Contemplative Prayer, and each bears the stamp of the cloister of S. Benedict. The new edition of S. Gertrude by the Monks of Solesme, is a work of original research, and will be the standard for many years to come. The works of the great contemplative virgin had been often printed in one form or another. But the editions were till now difficult to meet, and some of them, to say the truth, were by no means satisfactory. Abbot Guéranger was anxious, therefore, to bring out a careful edition, and, if possible, a new and trustworthy life of the saint herself. His many labours prevented him from personally contributing to the work; but he committed it to one or more of those zealous and capable men who surrounded him at Solesmes. He died before the present volume saw the light; but his faithful children carried on the undertaking which he had charged them with. Their directions and their wishes were to go to the fountain-head, and to take nothing at second-hand. The first library they explored was that of S. Gall, now no longer in the hands of the monks who gathered it together slowly through so many generations. Mabillon has stated that there was a MS. of S. Gertrude's works at S. Gall. The Solesmes fathers, however, could not find one; but, instead, they alighted upon a printed edition of S. Mechtildis, not without value. In the German libraries, as at Magdeburg and Leipsic, they found many interesting details about the monastery of Helfta or Helpede, near Eisleben, in which S. Gertrude and S. Mechtildis lived. But in all their explorations they found no MSS. of the writings of the more celebrated saint, except one in the Imperial Library of Vienna, and an imperfect one in the library at Mainz. The present edition is a reproduction of the Vienna MS., amended, though very rarely, by the light of the Mainz codex. S. Gertrude, according to all appearance, wrote her mystical works in the Latin language. It is curious that the present edition is the only one which has ever been prepared from a complete Latin MS. The standard edition, up to the present time, had been that of the Cologne Carthusian, John Lanspergius. It appeared at Cologne in 1536. But Lanspergius had no complete Latin codex. After the most careful search he could find only one Latin MS., and in that the first book, which con-

tains the valuable autobiographical notes, was so mutilated that it could not be used. A German MS. had to be employed instead, and retranslated into Latin. Considering that the text of Lanspergius has been used by nearly every editor of S. Gertrude for more than 300 years, it is easy to see of what value is this Latin MS. which the editors have had the satisfaction of finding at Vienna. It would require a minute comparison of editions to enable the reader to understand how much the Solesmes fathers have done for the genuine text of S. Gertrude. In the first place they have restored the Prologue (often omitted), printing it for the first time from the genuine Latin original. Then they have restored to S. Gertrude's great work its real title. She called it herself "*Legatus Divinæ Pietatis*"—the "*Messenger of Divine Love*." Why Lanspergius, in his second edition, called it "*Insinuationes Divinæ Pietatis*," it is difficult to conjecture; but we know that it is the practice of Lanspergius to correct freely, and to substitute what he considers more telling or elegant words and phrases for the original. Succeeding editors and translators have copied him and improved upon him, until we find one or two very recent versions giving such wide and imaginative reproductions of the extremely peculiar phraseology of the saint that many readers have turned away from them with aversion. The new editors have, finally, made a most important correction in the accepted history of S. Gertrude's own life. She never was Abbess, either of Helpede or of any other monastery; and Mechtildis of Hackeborn was not her sister. The present edition is to consist of two volumes, of which one is already out. It contains the "*Legatus*" and the "*Exercitia Spiritualia*," together with an editorial preface of some sixty pages, and the prefaces of Lanspergius. In the second volume we are promised the "*Liber Specialis Gratiae*" of S. Mechtildis, and a considerable mass of additional critical matter.

Dr. Sweeney's new edition of "*Sancta Sophia*" is extremely welcome. The American reprint was unsightly and unsatisfactory; and the old edition of 1657 was scarce, and difficult to read. What was wanted was a carefully printed reproduction of the original issue, sufficiently modernized to make it easily intelligible, and unencumbered by mere literary matter. Dr. Sweeney has given us this. He saw that, however great the temptation might be, it would be a mistake to write historical notes and to load with critical apparatus a book which, if it is to be useful, must lie in the oratory of the devout, and pass from hand to hand among the inmates of the cloister. All he has done, therefore, has been to add an interesting preface and a few notes. The preface contains a short notice of the Ven. Father Augustine Baker, and of Father Serenus Cressy, and a few remarks on the teaching and method of the work itself. Of the notes the longest is that which accompanies chapter vii. section iii., and warns the reader against certain language of the venerable author which is liable to be misunderstood—a warning which is, no doubt, necessary, but on which Dr. Sweeney wastes no more words than are required. As to the rest, the book is almost as it came from the printers' hands at "Douay," two hundred and twenty years ago, when Louis XIV. was young, whilst Mazarin governed France, and when Vincent de Paul was

within a few years of his crown. It contains the complete unabridged text, including even the chapter on the prayer of "Interior Silence," in which the author quotes a mystic whose work has since been condemned ; it gives the valuable preface of Father Cressy, and all the original headings and analysis of each chapter. It contains, in addition, an admirable index, for which we have to thank Dr. Sweeney himself.

In our October number we propose to return to these two great books, and to endeavour to give some account of their matter and teaching.

Ignatius—His Testimony to Primitive Conception of the Christian Religion. ("British Quarterly Review," April, 1876.) Hodder & Stoughton.

THE title of this article is not happily chosen. It contains scarcely anything about any testimony which S. Ignatius gives, for it is occupied almost exclusively in an attempt to prove that he does not testify to the antiquity of the Catholic faith. In fact it is the DUBLIN REVIEW rather than S. Ignatius which is the immediate subject-matter of the article ; for by far the greater part of it is in reply to an essay on the Ignatian epistles, which appeared in our own pages so long ago as October, 1873.

Our own essay consisted of two parts. In the former, we exhibited the striking agreement of these epistles with Catholic doctrine. In the second, we gave what the writer in the "British Quarterly" is good enough to describe as a "very interesting and valuable sketch of the evidence in favour of the genuineness of the Ignatian epistles." What is more important, he appears to be himself fully convinced of their authenticity, and we cannot but welcome this admission, coming as it does from one who belongs to a school of Protestants where the spuriousness of these same epistles was long an accepted tradition. The former part, however, of our essay has not pleased him so well. He speaks of us as "catching at slight hints and fancied rudiments of subsequently developed doctrines" ; of putting "a meaning on words which only a wilful perversion, or the tendency to see in the words of another, whose authority cannot be denied, the meaning that only exists in one's own mind, could ever make them seem to bear ; and then by paraphrastic representations and an ingenious summing up of such fancied and overstrained testimonies, to produce an impression on the minds of those who have not the documents themselves in their hands" (p. 343).

Now the space at our command will not allow us to follow our critic through the whole of his objections. In any case this would be wearisome to our readers, and, we may add, most wearisome to ourselves ; for his objections are either the merest cavils, or else they are founded upon some misapprehension evident to any one tolerably familiar with patristic literature. We will give one instance, and that taken from an attack

which he makes not upon us, but a person no less illustrious than Father Newman. S. Ignatius says, that our Lord "was born in the womb by Mary, according to the dispensation of God" *κατ' οἰκονομίαν θεοῦ* (Eph. 18). On this Father Newman ("Theology of the Seven Epistles of S. Ignatius," p. 200) remarks, "Here is an additional word (*viz. οἰκονομία*), which afterwards is known to have a technical meaning." One would have thought the sense of this comment obvious enough. Every tyro in patristic theology is aware that *οἰκονομία* is used by later Fathers for the Incarnation,* and here in S. Ignatius we find the beginning of this technical use. But the writer in the "British Quarterly" thinks Father Newman is alluding to another sense of *οἰκονομία*, *viz. "secrecy,"* and having attributed this absurdity to him, he goes on to assure us that the passage in S. Ignatius lends "no countenance to the phenacism or economy afterwards practised by some of the early Christians, and recommended by men of Dr. Newman's school." We need only say Father Newman was speaking of the Incarnation, and not of concealment, and that he was writing for persons sufficiently at home in the Fathers not to misunderstand his meaning.

We might easily multiply instances of a like nature. But instead we prefer to take the arguments which the writer in the "British Quarterly" brings to disprove the belief of S. Ignatius in the blessed sacrament. We could not give a more favourable specimen of his article, for it is almost the only particular to which he addresses himself seriously, without entirely neglecting the main point in dispute. In our own article we considered the Eucharist both as a sacrifice and a sacrament. The former point we may dismiss briefly. We drew attention to the fact that S. Ignatius again and again speaks of the *Θυσιαστήριον* or altar in the Christian Church. The fact cannot be denied. Nor can it be explained by reminding us, as the reviewer does, that Clement of Alexandria used the word in a mystical or metaphorical sense; because the way in which S. Ignatius connects the word with the holy Eucharist proves that he cannot always have used the word in this sense, while there is no conceivable reason for supposing that he ever did so. It is just as much beside the mark to tell us that the Greek liturgies include under the word "altar" the space round the altar as well as the altar itself. Let us suppose that S. Ignatius believed in a *Θυσιαστήριον*, or altar in the strict sense, and that even in his time the word, already ancient and familiar, had come to be applied loosely to the whole of the sanctuary. There is, indeed, no ground for the hypothesis, but if there was, what has our opponent gained? What have we lost?

But we proceed to the holy Eucharist as a sacrament. Even the writer in the "British Quarterly" admits "the high sense" S. Ignatius "had of the benefits of the holy Communion,"—a sense, we venture to add, higher than any Zuinglian ever had of it. For what Zuinglian, who

* If the reviewer wishes for references, he will find them to abundance in the Thesaurus of the Protestant Suicer, under the word *οἰκονομία*.

believed in justification by faith alone, would describe the holy Communion as "an antidote against death"?* (Eph, 20).

But there is, as our reviewer says, one passage on which we relied as a crucial test of the saint's belief in the Real Presence. The great heresy with which S. Irenæus had to contend was that of the Docetæ, who denied that our Lord took a real body. And among other charges which he brings against these heretics, he declares that "they abstain from Eucharist and prayer, because they do not confess that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins, which the Father in His goodness raised."† This passage ought to be decisive. Had the Eucharist been a mere symbol, it would have presented no difficulty to the Docetæ. As it was, it conveyed, according to Catholic belief, the true body and blood of Christ. From this they must needs abstain, because they did not confess that our Lord took a true body at all, much less that He raised it again and makes it present on the altar.

To this argument our reviewer has a twofold answer. First, on the ground that "the word for Eucharist at the commencement wants the article," he affirms it to be, "in the highest degree probable," that S. Ignatius "is not speaking specially of the sacramental Eucharist at all." Accordingly, he translates: they abstain from thanksgiving and prayer because they do not confess that thanksgiving (*την εὐχαριστιαν*) is the flesh of Christ" (!!) This version implies an imperfect knowledge of grammar. It is incorrect to say that there is anything remarkable in the use of *εὐχαριστία* without the article for "Eucharist." *Εὐχαριστία* in this sense is definite in itself. It belongs, therefore, to the class of nouns which may be used without the article,‡ and we give in a note distinct proof that it is so used in fact. But, apart from this, even supposing that S. Ignatius could in some extremely mystical sense have called "thanksgiving" the flesh of Christ, he could not have expected others as a matter of course to confess that thanksgiving is the flesh of Christ which suffered for our sakes, unless he had taken leave of

* Or if the reviewer insists upon the most literal translation: An antidote in order not to die, but to live for ever, &c.

† It is perhaps scarcely worth noticing that the reviewer objects to our having inserted two words in this passage, to make the construction clear, although we indicated most carefully by the use of brackets, and the absence of inverted commas, that the words were ours, and not those of S. Ignatius. He follows up this hypercriticism by quoting the passage himself, and in doing so omits several words without mark or sign of omission (p. 372).

‡ See Winer, "New Testament Grammar" (Masson's translation), section xix., and compare the following words from Justin. He is describing the ritual and distribution of the Eucharist, and, he adds, *ἡ τροφή αὕτη καλεῖται παρ' ἡμῶν εὐχαριστία*. (Apol. i. 66.) Clem. Al. Strom. iv. 25, says, Melchisedec's offering of bread and wine was *εἰς τύπον εὐχαριστίας*, a type of the Eucharist. Like other anarthrous words *εὐχαριστία* is employed with or without the article. Irenæus, v. 3, has *γίνεται ἡ εὐχαριστία* and *γίνεται εὐχαριστία* in the same chapter.

his senses. Such a confession no human being, so far as we know, ever made.

Secondly, our reviewer replies that, even supposing *εὐχαριστία* means Eucharist, no Protestant need object to calling the Eucharist, in devotional and figurative language, the body and blood of Christ. He actually quotes triumphantly two verses of a hymn, written as it seems by some "Nonconformist" divine, in which the holy Communion is spoken of as a banquet of Christ's flesh and blood. Granted. But S. Ignatius is not using devotional language. He is giving the plain reason why the Docetæ abstained from the holy Eucharist. The reviewer has not even attempted to show how the Eucharist could present any difficulty to the Docetæ if it was merely a commemorative rite. Consequently he has not even touched the problem which calls so obviously and imperatively for solution.

Here we must take leave of our critic, and we do so with all goodwill. He has undertaken a difficult task, and no doubt he has done what he can to show that S. Ignatius was not, what he certainly was, a Father of the Catholic Church. And though he has failed, he may take comfort from the thought that abler men than he have made similar attempts, and have failed likewise.

Eight Months at Rome during the Vatican Council. Impressions of a Contemporary. By POMONIO LETO. Translated from the Original. London. 1876.

THE contributor, to whom the criticism of this book had been intrusted, has been prevented by the pressure of other occupation from finishing his paper in time for the present number. It shall appear without fail in our next.

Article on Miracles in the "Church Quarterly Review" for April, 1876.

THE following comments on this article appeared in the "Tablet" of June 24th; and should be read in connection with our own articles in April, 1875, and January, 1876.

A remarkable article in the "Church Quarterly Review" has produced a considerable sensation in the literary world. A writer in the "Saturday Review" evidently thinks that its appearance forms an era in the controversy on miracles. Whilst cordially acknowledging its very excellent intention and the conspicuous ability with which it has developed a very important feature in the rationale of miracles, we are inclined to think that its exhibition of that rationale is incomplete, and incomplete precisely because its writer has allowed

himself too much license in rejecting the work of its predecessors in the same field.

He addresses himself to refute the first part of "Supernatural Religion," which consists of an attack upon the rationale of miracles. He begins by meeting the argument—miracles being the one guarantee for revelation, and, Satan being capable of working miracles, the one guarantee is no guarantee—successfully certainly, but with a needless depreciation of the evidential function of miracles. Thus we fully accept the following as a statement of the actual facts (p. 14). "The miracle is only one element towards the solution of the question. In order to determine whether Christianity is really from God, we must take it into consideration as a whole in all its manifold aspects. Nor is there any difficulty when the matter is so viewed. Christianity so completely opposes the work of the devil, and is so identified with God's providential working both before and since its promulgation, that the author's (S. R.s') objection—the possibility that its miracles might have been worked by Satanic agency—is simply absurd." But when he goes on to insist that the real end of miracles, "their *raison d'être*, so to speak, is not evidence, but high purposes of God's providence," such as the relief of human suffering, for instance; that the resurrection was not wrought to prove the truth of Christ's words, but "plainly for quite a different end, the redemption of the world"; again, that all that our Lord's miracles guarantee is "that He was not talking at random when He professed to be the Son of God, come into the world to redeem the world," he lays himself open to serious objection. Our Lord constantly appeals to His miracles as proof of something more than that He is not speaking at random. If they are not God's testimony that Christ is of God, and, therefore, that He is nothing less than He says He is, viz., the Redeemer of the world, the most splendid amongst them do not appreciably approximate to be a verification of those tremendous claims. If the *raison d'être* of our Lord's miracles was beneficence, and not self-manifestation, they might as well have been wrought in secret. The same may be said of the Resurrection, the manifestation of which was certainly not necessary to the work of redemption, except as a miraculous pledge that the atonement had been accepted. No doubt there was a propriety in our Lord's working the kind of miracles He did, as our author says, and a sort of necessity that having claimed the power of working miracles He should work them, as a man who has professed to have thousands at his bankers would be required sometimes to draw a cheque; but such propriety or necessity is quite insufficient to justify his other assertion, that the absence of miracles would "be perfectly fatal to our Lord's pretensions," seeing they could do no more than guarantee "that He was not talking at random." Such language shows at least that our author has sometimes been run away with by his over-anxiety to fight with perfectly clean decks. Evidence enters into the *raison d'être* of miracles, evidence, at least, that God is with those by whom, or in behalf of whom, they are wrought.

He meets "Supernatural Religion's" attack upon the possibility of miracles as interruptions or suspensions of the order of nature, by boldly

throwing over all such formulæ as "*contra*," or "*supra naturam*," "a suspension of order of nature," &c., and substituting the following definition: Miracles are "events impressed with a visible purpose lying outside the sphere of man's activity." Now, the originality of this definition does not lie so much in what it contains as in what it rejects. The notes of design and of superhuman power have been strongly insisted on by Professor Mozley and Dean Mansell, to say nothing of other writers. But no apologist for miracles has hitherto ventured so cleanly to rid himself of what is supposed to form the scandal of the scientific man, the non-naturalness of miracles. These are as natural, our author is quite ready to admit, as anything else.

In these unscholastic days a definition seldom pretends to absolute precision, and frequently is little better than an epigrammatic summary of a view. But its form is at least a profession of exceptional accuracy and a challenge to exceptional criticism. Admitting then that the impression of a purpose is necessary to a miracle, and that its sphere must be superhuman, the definition is clearly obvious to the objection that many ordinary events without the sphere of human activity, such for instance as the succession of the seasons, are impressed with a purpose, or what comes of the argument from design? It is only fair to add that elsewhere our author insists upon the design in nature as "a presupposition for miracles," but this is no excuse for a faulty definition. Secondly, we object that "outside the sphere of man's activity" is hardly distinct enough for a note. We desiderate some indication of what is "outside the sphere of man's activity," and this was precisely what the formula "*contra naturam*," which our author discards, was meant to supply. By "*contra naturam*" it was intended to express an interruption of the order of nature, *i.e.* of the normal interaction of the natural forces in possession, man included. The question is whether this formula does not express an important truth essential to the rationale of miracles, and which therefore must be maintained in spite of its liability to misconstruction. We think it does; for what is the necessary condition of all human action upon nature? Is it not an initial submission in order to gain its ends? Its action is never "*contra naturam*." It serves that it may control; it invokes one force to balance, to counteract another; it is a government by parties. Our author ventures to put the invention of the submarine telegraph and the raising of Lazarus in the same category as regards the forces directly employed. They are both, he considers, results of the adaptation of natural laws, the combination of natural forces, although the one has lately been found to be within the sphere of man's activity, the other is certainly without that sphere. On the contrary, we should insist that the first is an adaptation, the second an act of absolute control involving the immediate subjugation of the whole assemblage of the natural forces in possession, not merely a fresh combination of them. Unless we can say this, what is to prevent an adversary maintaining that we may find out some day the art of raising the dead, just as we found out the other day the art of submarine telegraphing, which a hundred and fifty years ago would have looked so beyond us? Such an idea is quite alien from our

author's intention, but by getting rid of the precise note which stereotypes, so to speak, the sphere of man's activity, he has made it hard to show why the conception of this sphere should not expand with the experience of miracles.

Again, exceptionality, contrariety is necessary in order to mark this very purpose or design upon which our author lays such stress. For surely, abstracting from this exceptionality, the phenomenon of the miracle is anything but a conspicuous example of design, a bending of means to an end; such intelligent adaptation is precisely what is wanting. We have indeed the earnest expression of a wish, but the achievement is unconnected with it by any intelligent process. We require the note of contrariety to the order of nature, of abnormal exceptionality, in order to mark out the particular purpose as distinct from the general purposes of the order of nature. We should be inclined then to substitute for our author's definition one that shall combine the note of purpose with the note of "*contra naturam*," thus: a miracle is "an act of absolute control with a manifestly intelligent purpose, of the natural forces in possession," on behalf of certain individuals. The exceptional character, the exemption for the nonce of an individual, or collection of individuals, from the operation of a general rule we regard as essential to the idea of a miracle. The great First Cause has created and preserves in being a vast system of causalia—that is to say, of beings distinct from, and having a causative power distinct from, although in intimate dependence upon, their Creator. The interaction of these beings, man included, is in strict subordination to the natures of the whole collection of agents. This great system is impressed throughout with the Creator's purpose. Through it in many ways God speaks to the understanding: but it is of law, of necessary sequence, that He speaks; of man in his eternal relations, as an assemblage of certain qualities developing thus and thus under certain circumstances. On the other hand God speaks to the individual soul in the consciousness of freedom, in the voice of conscience, in the communion of grace, of a system of spiritual relations between the Creator and the individual in which none other partakes. The miracle holds, in a certain sense, an intermediate position between the general and the individual, the sensible and the spiritual. In the miracle the Author of both systems vindicates on the field of sense the superiority of spirit, and subordinates the sensible determinations of law to the higher, because spiritual, relations of the individual. Where there is a revelation the miracle performs the twofold function of confirming the faith of the recipient of the revelation and of promulgating the revelation; but even as the subject-matter of the miracle is individual, so is its evidential action individual also. It does not turn a private and individual relation into a public and general one, but it is an instrument for increasing the number of individuals partaking in the revelation made to one.

A miracle is the impression of a fresh purpose, but it is also an interference so far as the established order is concerned, even although it is itself a manifestation of a higher order, in which God does not merely speak by general laws to the race, but by exceptions to certain favoured

persons. Man, who possesses the largest share of originating power in nature, cannot do more than, as it were, set the sail of his intent at different angles, so as to catch and use the prevailing force. A boat floats down the stream a passive victim to the general laws of nature; a second boat moves up the stream by means of machinery intelligently adapted to set the resistance of the water against the action of the current. It has the impress of man's purpose; the law of the current's action is not suspended, its force is not directly coerced, it is counterbalanced and overbalanced. A third boat laden with bread, unmanned, without machinery, moves up the stream to a famine-stricken village in deference to a whispered prayer; an intelligent superhuman force is exerted on it *pro hac vice* for a distinct purpose. What is it that puts this last phenomenon outside the sphere of man's activity? Is it not in the initial non-submission to the forces in possession involved in the neglect of adequate means? No one can deny that such contrariety does in fact form part of the phenomenon of a miracle, and it is surely gratuitous to suppose that our Lord, for instance, was not doing what He seemed to be doing when He raised Lazarus with the cry of "Lazarus, come forth," that instead of exercising an *altum dominium* over the forces in possession He was only enacting the part of a subtle chemist, and combining them afresh. In one sense, of course, nothing that God does can be "contra naturam," because no created nature has any wall of separation in respect to its Creator. On the other hand, God may act "contra naturam" as originally constituted by making any given nature for the nonce do something more than it was originally qualified to do.

We hardly think men of science will be in any degree conciliated by the line our author has taken. What offends them is precisely the *phenomenal* non-naturalness which remains just where it was. Again, to make a miracle the immediate result of a combination of existent natural forces, to which, however, natural science cannot attain, has the effect of obtruding the miracle further into the domain of science without lessening its antagonism.

We think then this rejection of the "contra naturam" a failure as a reconciliation with science, and as at least suggesting very imperfect ideas of God's relations to His creatures. For man indeed certain paths are traced amongst the forces of nature outside which he cannot move a step, but to God the whole of nature is pervious.

We have felt ourselves obliged to dwell at considerable length upon these important points of disagreement, but we cannot close our eyes to much that is exceedingly good in this essay. Nothing, for instance, can be better than the very complete and clever exposure of the way in which the scientific opponents of miracles—*nominatim* Professor Tyndall and the author of *Supernatural Religion*—play fast and loose with the *a priori* and "sense" philosophies. They oppose, he points out (p. 38), the inference as to the existence of God by dis severing the tie between cause and effect, whereas in dealing with miracles they have "tightened the tie to such a degree as to render miracles impossible."

Although we can trace the depreciatory view of the evidential office of

miracles in the formation of the definition, we are disposed to think that an acceptance of the latter might be combined with the common view of the office of miracles. We regard the definition—always excepting the accidental non-exclusion of natural design—as a true presentation, as far as it goes, of the miracle, *i.e.*, as a description answering to the miracle and to nothing else, and so as affording a useful controversial platform. What we have wished to insist upon is that the rejection of the note “*contra naturam*” at least involves an acquiescence in a so far imperfect presentation of the rationale of the miracle.

The Relations of the Church to Society. By F. O'REILLY, S. J., Nos. xxii. xxiii. xxiv. (“*Irish Monthly Magazine*” for March, May, and June, 1876).

THE March and May numbers of this admirable series are occupied with the Council of Constance. Nothing can be more interesting and more clearly drawn out than F. O'Reilly's view of that much discussed Council, nor more conclusive as against Mr. Gladstone; though it is not in all respects the one which to us appears more probable. The bias of our own view was sufficiently set forth in April, 1875, pp. 469—477; but our present concern is of course with F. O'Reilly's. He considers that John XXIII. was almost certainly the true Pontiff; nor does any part of his argument turn on a denial, that the Council was ecumenical throughout its celebration. He holds as more probable, that the famous Decrees of the Fourth and Fifth Sessions were never intended as dogmatic definitions, but only as “a declaration such as assemblies and committees and courts make as to their own completeness and authority and jurisdiction”; and he further maintains as completely certain, that even had they been intended as definitions, they were not confirmed by Martin V. In considering that utterance of the latter Pontiff which has been *claimed* as their confirmation, he lays little stress on the word “*conciliariter*”; but dwells much more emphatically on the “*in materiâ fidei*.” He points out that during the whole Council this phrase was consistently used, in relation to matters connected with the then prevalent heresy of Huss and Wickliff, as *opposed* to matters connected with the prevalent schism. Considering the triteness of the whole theme, it is very remarkable with how much freshness and life he treats it.

The following paragraph (p. 234) extends over much wider ground, and is worthy of most attentive consideration.

“The great schism of the West suggests to me a reflection which I take the liberty of expressing here. If this schism had not occurred, the hypothesis of such a thing happening would appear to many chimerical. They would say it could not be; God would not permit His Church to come into so unhappy a situation. Heresies might spring up and spread and last painfully long, through the fault and to the perdition of their authors and abettors, to the great distress too of the faithful, increased by

actual persecution in many places where the heretics were dominant. But that Catholics should be divided on the question of who was Pontiff, that the true Church should remain between thirty and forty years without a thoroughly ascertained Head and representative of Christ on earth, this could not be. Yet *it has been*, and we have no guarantee that it will not be again, though we may fervently hope otherwise. What I would infer is, that we must not be too ready to pronounce on what God may permit. We know with absolute certainty that He will fulfil His promises; that He will not allow anything to occur at variance with them; that He will sustain His Church and enable her to triumph over all enemies and all difficulties; that He will give to each of the faithful those graces which are needed for each one's service of Him and attainment of salvation, as He did during the great schism we have been considering, and in all the sufferings and trials which the Church has passed through from the beginning. We may also trust that He will do a great deal more than what He has bound Himself to by His promises. We may look forward with a cheering probability to exemption for the future from some of the troubles and misfortunes that have befallen in the past. But we, or our successors in future generations of Christians, shall perhaps see stranger evils than have yet been experienced, even before the immediate approach of that great winding up of all things on earth that will precede the Day of Judgment. I am not setting up for a prophet, nor pretending to foresee unhappy wonders, of which I have no knowledge whatever. All I mean to convey is, that contingencies regarding the Church, not excluded by the Divine promises, cannot be regarded as practically impossible, because they would be terrible and distressing in a very high degree."

In the June number, F. O'Reilly discusses some of the questions about marriage which Mr. Gladstone raised; and throws a flood of new light on them. Our only doubt on the perfect success of his paper would be, whether he did not sketch for himself at starting a somewhat larger outline, than it was possible within his limits to fill in quite satisfactorily.

Short Sermons preached in the Chapel of S. Mary's College, Oscott.
London: Burns & Oates.

IT is now pretty generally understood, that to write effective sermons for young men, requires ability of no common kind. In the first place, "goodyism" or pious platitudes must before all things be carefully avoided; and then, further, one hardly knows whether more harm would be done by placing the standard at an unduly high point, or on the other hand by giving undue toleration to the worldly and heathenish principles with which the mind of young men is sure to be largely infected. Perhaps Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, was the first Christian preacher who took a right measure of what was wanted; and his successor, Dr. Temple, has reaped no contemptible harvest in a similar field.

While the present volume impresses us as bearing unmistakable traces of Dr. Arnold's influence, we need hardly say that its writers have had a singular advantage over him, in the fact of their addressing youths imbued

with Catholic doctrine and placed under Catholic discipline. For our own part we can hardly fancy a more complete success than for the most part they impress us as achieving. One thing in particular strikes us: viz. the great unity of practical thought and principle which the divers preachers represent. We may fairly say that the two funeral sermons, with which the volume concludes, commemorate the very kind of character, which one would expect to be formed by such practical teaching as is contained in the earlier sermons.

Where so much is excellent, it is difficult to make selections. The subjects seem to us on the whole admirably chosen: comprising not merely matters of practical piety (though there is abundance also of this), but the Catholic view of such speculative questions as will certainly present themselves to the mind of contemporary youths.

Take e.g. the seventeenth—"Nature the servant of God." We never met with a more satisfactory statement than the following, on the rationale of prayer for change of weather, good harvest, and the like. "Though there be," says the preacher, "not ten but ten thousand links of cause and effect between the emission of the ray from the sun and the ripe grain in the ear of corn, still He, the First Cause, has only to will, and *His divine power moves along the whole chain*" (p. 183). But if this be so intelligible, why is it that those most given to physical studies are often most bold in denying His Providence? Because "God becomes known to the external world in each soul, only so far as He is known to it in its own inner self." Man must *begin* by knowing God "as He reveals Himself in the conscience." "If we withdraw ourselves in our inmost souls from God, it is in vain to seek Him elsewhere" (pp. 184-5).

In a different line, the sixteenth, on "England and Rome," will well repay attentive study; and as Catholic youths go out into the world, they cannot but exhibit (one would think) the beneficial effects produced by such instruction.

At last, however, every thing else is insignificant, as compared with the great question, whether youths are really making it the main work of their life to obey and please their Creator. Or rather, the importance of other questions depends on their bearing on this all-important foundation. We are extremely impressed by the thoroughness with which this foundation is laid down, from the beginning to the end of the volume before us.

Rome and Italy. A letter to the Duke of Norfolk, by the Right
Rev. Monsignore PATTERSON. London: Longman.

Mgr. Patterson's admirable letter reaches us only on the eve of publication; and we must content ourselves, therefore, with one extract (pp. 51, 2), on the proceedings of Victor Emmanuel's Government:—

"Let me then briefly recite a few particulars, not mere aspirations or declamations in the Chambers, but legislative enactments and changes

made in the constitution of the country. They may be called anti-clerical, but in truth they are simply anti-Christian.

"1. They have introduced civil registration of birth as an equivalent and alternative for Christian baptism.

"2. They have permitted and encouraged civil interment, instead of Christian burial.

"3. They have abolished oaths in courts of law.

"4. They have systematically encouraged the profanation of the Sunday and great Christian festivals of Christmas, Easter, &c. &c., by ordering the prosecution of the Government buildings and other public works on Sundays; by ostentatiously holding their sessions on those days; by ordering public lectures in the universities and higher schools on the Sundays as on week days, &c. &c.

"5. They have established civil marriage as an equivalent before the law for Christian marriage, and as necessary in all cases besides the religious ceremony.

"6. They have established a recognised system of public immorality, with a code of remunerations and rewards, holding out a premium for immorality by indemnities, and deriving from this shameful source a revenue applied to augment the secret service funds.

"These laws are not only an outrage on the conscience of the Italian people, they are an attack on Christianity in its first principles and its hold on human society; nay, on the very sanctions of the natural order which bind men together and make them superior to a horde of savages. In every one of these provisions there is a *direct* attack upon religion and morals; and still people ask, Why does not the Pope reconcile himself with the system of which they are a part and parcel? Why does not fire reconcile itself with water; why does not day reconcile itself with night, light with darkness, Christ with Belial?"

Five Lectures on the City of Ancient Rome and her Empire over the Nations, the Divinely-sent Pioneer of the Way for the Catholic Church. By the Rev. HENRY FORMBY. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1876.

MR. FORMBY seldom writes anything that is not full of thought and originality; and even when we cannot entirely accept his views, his exposition of them is always eminently suggestive, and sure to instruct as well as interest. We well remember the pleasure with which, now many years ago, we read his essays on the Holy Roman (or Germanic) Empire, in whose history of a thousand years he traced the fulfilment of apocalyptic prophecy. We have here another contribution to the Christian philosophy of history. The idea that ancient Rome was in many ways the pioneer of the Church is a familiar one, but Mr. Formby, in his thesis, gives it a more than usually wide extension; and, assuming the historic truth of what we are told of "peaceful Numa's reign," would have us regard the second of the seven kings as the founder at Rome of a theistic national religion, whose ultimate source was the Mosaic revelation, this religion further being the actual basis of all the institutions and relations of the State. He then endeavours to show how Rome, with this constitution, prepared the nations for the reception of Christianity. Were

we reviewing the book at length, we should have to take exception to some points in the argument; but this does not prevent us from saying that, in every way, the pamphlet is one of great interest, from which any one who can read it in a thoughtful, critical mood will draw much valuable information on the relations between the Rome of the Republic and the Empire, and the Rome of the Popes. We need not, however, enter here at any length on Mr. Formby's argument, as in two early numbers of this REVIEW he will himself draw it out in full detail, and place it before our readers.

S. Thomas of Canterbury. A Dramatic Poem. By AUBREY DE VERE, Author of "Alexander the Great." London: Henry S. King & Co.

MR. AUBREY DE VERE'S dramatic poem reaches us too late to enable us to do justice to its merits in our current number. In the DUBLIN REVIEW for October we hope to comment at length upon a work, which from every point of view is remarkable, and which most ably and amply sustains the fame of its predecessor, "Alexander the Great," while it possesses the additional interest for us that its subject is, a saint, an Englishman, and a patriot.

Letters and Social Aims. By R. W. EMERSON. Second Edition. London: Chatto & Windus, 1876.

MR. EMERSON has written no book which may not defy the edge of anatomical criticism. He is not to be cut up into paragraphs, or exhibited in specimen passages; and though it is possible to quote from him most pregnant and weighty aphorisms, there lurks a spirit in the whole, a penetrating aroma of exceedingly fine thought, the influence of which must be felt as we read in his pages to be properly estimated. There, indeed, is matter for reflection. The persuasiveness of his manner has something like a charm in it: we resist in vain. After rejecting many principles of his, or combating the entire view which it has pleased him to take of society, nature, and letters, suddenly we are vanquished by a happy phrase, a turn or a touch revealing some fragment of truth as under a powerful lens. He has spent a lifetime amongst the cultured of all ages. With the sagacity of genius, he has put aside multifarious authors, and selected his company, not from chance and doubtful acquaintances, but from the aristocracy of mind. The names that are oftenest on his lips are known to all; but their thoughts are not, and in this he has found his reckoning. People who admire the philosophers, poets, lawgivers, at the distance from them of fashionable life, do not refuse to hear an internuntius, a messenger from the gods in their serene but perhaps too rarefied atmosphere. Such Mr. Emerson has always approved himself, and his volume on "Letters and Social Aims" holds within it certain divine revelations for the benefit of spiritual temperaments.

It deals with some large provinces of knowledge, and tries in a mood of delicate humour the answers to a crowd of newly-arisen questions which the conditions of modern times and thoughts have originated. Between the first essay on "Poetry and Imagination" and the last on "Immortality," nine others are interposed. They do not succeed in any very evident order, as neither do the outward expressions of thought in several of them, but the apparent irregularity may be due to the swiftness and the wide associations of a subtle mind. Whatever be the explanation, it is a fact that this artistic want of finish gives a zest to the whole book: it leaves the reader keen at the end as at the beginning. It suggests, as few other contrivances might do, the wonderful complexity of present society, and how all the world is drawing together as to the founding of that imagined federation of mankind which is a growing ideal.

But the first essay gives an insight into the whole, which is, of course, no strange apparition of unfamiliar thought in Mr. Emerson—for this we do not suppose his lovers would be grateful—but like the expected conversation of an old and gifted friend. The author has long since held up to honour that philosophy which makes the spiritual true, and matter and the world false in comparison with the unseen. He went early to Swedenborg for the sacramental principle which, had he been more graced, would have dawned upon him out of Catholicity without the grotesque and pernicious mysticism which accompany it in the writings of that enthusiast. But he has gained it, and it is to him the interpretation of old and new. He refutes, we may say even, he annihilates, the vulgar superstition of materialists, by pouring out upon their crude, gross, too palpable substance a jet of aquafortis, a dissolving stream of thought. Not that he denies matter, on the contrary, belief in its reality he would attribute to "the restraining grace of common sense"; but matter is the servant of spirit, and, though useful, is dumb. Speech flows into it from the spirit, and flows out of it as imagination, poetry, eloquence. The end of all things is poetical expression. The grandeur of life is all in thought making itself equal to the universe. The misery of society now is that men do not choose to be transcendent. Nature is the true idealist and the only truth, but creeds and conventionality have drawn us into the narrowness of formalism. Or, even when some escape into the open air, they do not find capacity in themselves to see and to relate the glory of a boundless world. Hence, there are poets many, but we wait, and shall wait long, for the heavenly singer who will chant to us the poem which comprises all.

This is very original, inspiring, and suggestive. A balanced judgment and the light of Catholic tradition would enable any one to use for his own needs almost all that Emerson has here collected. But the dedication is not to Catholics. It bespeaks the attention of multitudes, every day more numerous, who experience the necessity of smoothing and reconciling to their sense of fitness the uneven surface presented by social phenomena. As they do not understand Christianity, yet are furnished with instincts and surroundings favourable to the higher law of life and con-

science, they listen to any voice which promises to them evangelic nobleness apart from dogma and authority. To establish religion, without belief in God, on some deep conviction of the "demonic," to profess morality and not care whether the "personal" in each man is likely or not to endure hereafter, to be unassuming and frugal in enjoyment, though to lose any good of earth may be to lose for ever, is a kind of forlorn hope, unmanned by the prevision that the battle must go against it. No modern religion, whether of culture, luxury, or conscience, will satisfy in the end. We cannot dispense with the religion of God. The Pantheism, negative as it seems, of Emerson and his contemporaries in Europe, works forcibly on those whose tradition of divine things has not come from the Church. But it is ever deficient, and in this stage of humanity is subversive and anarchical. The required interpretation of social growths and decays it is not possible for natural intellect to give. It belongs to the supernatural order of grace and Providence, which, strangely and sadly enough, even the prophets of non-Catholic society have ceased to acknowledge. Mr. Emerson, despite his contemplative genius and his learning, the latter at once so profuse and so gracefully bestowed, has but a tangled web for our perusal, and knows not where the threads have got ravelled. His books design to lift the world for a moment, at least, into the sphere of antitypes and spiritual patterns, but he has never gone up into the mountain, nor seen the temple of God in vision. He may have the capacity, he seldom has the light of prophetic guidance.

So much passes before the eye of a common reader and makes no impression, that we dare say there are Christians who might study this volume, and, thanks to their obtuseness, receive no harm. But we would recommend, so far as we may, unusual caution in handling all books of this description. They are the spiritual reading of thousands who know little or nothing of ascetic theology, who seldom read the Bible, and, when they do, are inclined to read into it their own "transcendent" principles. Catholics, we believe, could not study Mr. Emerson, for the most part, without a good supply of spiritual antidotes. And if they made use of these, they would be more vexed at the author's shortcomings than pleased to occasionally be reminded of Christian maxims which they have known ever since they were children. There is a shrewd saying of the Latins which might serve as a motto for Emerson, George Eliot, and Carlyle, "*Beatus monoculus in terra cecorum*"—We prefer companions whose sight is more perfect.

Considered as materials to be used under correction from theology and faith, the most valuable essays after the first seem to be those on "Resources," "Quotation and Originality," on "Social Aims" and on "Inspiration." We need not subjoin that every sentence in them is characteristic of Emerson. And yet they are not reprints of what he has said previously, but come from a strong, tender, refined nature which has learned to be itself.

Sermons on the Sacraments. By THOMAS WATSON, Master of S. John's College, Cambridge, Dean of Durham, and the last Catholic Bishop of Lincoln. With a Preface and Biographical Notice of the author. By the Rev. T. E. BRIDGETT, of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

WE must credit Father Bridgett with always giving us a valuable book, which is a great matter. Nothing could be better thought of, or better executed, than his previous works on the "Ritual of the New Testament," and "Our Lady's Dowry"; and we are glad to see in a current advertisement the promise of an historical investigation on "The Discipline of Drink"—a work that is really needed, and will, we trust, do something to settle a question that now occupies many minds, and is, we respectfully submit, debated with more fervour than learning. But the present work claims our attention. It is valuable enough on account of its intrinsic worth as a collection of learned discourses on the Sacraments; it is remarkable by reason of the circumstances which occasioned its composition; and it is certainly interesting for several reasons that have occurred to us while reading it. We do not suppose that its intrinsic value, which was of course its chief importance at one time, will be so extensively appreciated as to put out of the field modern catechetical works; yet we may here mention that no one will be disappointed, who consults it for a sound and clear exposition of Catholic teaching on the Sacraments. With some omissions and the exaction of an occasional "&c." on the imagination of our readers, we shall be able to give in a brief space the greater part of the first sermon as a specimen of the bishop's familiar style:—

"And, whereas (good people), the Scriptures in many places compare man's life to a war, we may well, by that same similitude, understand the number and division of God's Sacraments, and the true effect of the same. For Christ our Lord and King laboureth to make us all to be His soldiers, and by His power and help to fight against the said enemies, &c.

"The first thing that a worldly prince doth, intending to make war against his enemy, is to muster and choose out his soldiers, and to take their names, and to apparel them with his livery, that they may be known from the soldiers of his adversary. Even so, Christ, our chief captain, by baptism, hath called and chosen out of all the people of this world, certain to be his soldiers to fight, &c. The second thing that a worldly prince doth, in his war, is to provide that every soldier be able to fight, and have harness and weapons meet for his body, both to bear off the assaults of his enemies, and also to invade them as cause shall require. Even so Christ, our heavenly Prince, hath ordained the Sacrament of Confirmation, to make us strong and able to fight with our ghostly enemies, &c. The third thing a worldly prince doth, in war, is to see and provide that his whole army be furnished with plenty of wholesome meat and drink, lest they famish and die. Even so Christ, our spiritual captain, hath provided victuals for us, His soldiers, both good and plenty of it; not meat that will perish, but meat that will nourish to everlasting life; that is to say, His own natural flesh and blood, &c. The fourth thing that a worldly prince doth, in his war, is to ordain over his whole army one chief lieutenant (if he be absent himself from the field), and under him officers and captains, who can instruct the rest, and can set the whole army

in good array, and also can by the law-martial correct and punish all traitors and offenders. Even so Christ, our Lord and King being absent, by His visible presence hath ordained the Sacrament of Order, and by that Sacrament hath elected and chosen out certain expert and cunning men, &c. The fifth thing that a worldly prince doth, in his war, is, when his army is assembled, well armed, well victualled, and well ordered by good captains, to march forward and join in battle with his enemies; in which conflict if any of his soldiers chance to be hurt, then to cause a surgeon to search his wounds, &c. Even so doth our Saviour Christ with us. If any of us be overcome, our merciful Lord will not see us utterly trodden under foot and slain, but if we love to be healed, He hath prepared a present medicine, which the spiritual surgeon layeth and bindeth to our sore by the Sacrament of Penance, and so restoring us to perfect health, &c. The sixth thing that a worldly prince doth, in his war, is, when any of his soldiers waxeth aged and feeble, then specially to comfort him, and to set a watch that his enemies steal not privily upon him and kill him, when he is not able to defend himself. And if the same soldier hath lightly offended in any small matter, yet, then gently to forgive him, &c. Even so, our Saviour Christ, by the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, doth inwardly anoint the sick soldier, whereby he doth replenish him with grace, comfort, and strength; and if he hath lightly offended in any venial sin, He pardoneth him, &c. The seventh and last thing that a worldly prince doth, is, if the time of war be prolonged, and many of his soldiers be slain or departed, then to provide that his army be fully restored again with some new and fresh solders. Even so doth our Saviour Christ: He hath ordained the Sacrament of Matrimony," &c. &c.

Our summary will give the reader a fair notion of the plain and practical style in which the discourses are written, but not of the felicitous power of amplification displayed in them. The second part of the same discourse explains in an exceptionally able way the difference between the *matter* and the *form* of the Sacraments. The first sentences will show the line of illustration: "Furthermore, ye shall understand, that like as in man, there be two things, a body and a soul, so is every Sacrament there be two things, one that is outwardly seen, another that is inwardly perceived and believed. The outward thing is the element or matter of the Sacrament, the inward invisible and spiritual thing in the grace and virtue of the Sacrament." The sermons will leave in the reader's mind a high opinion of the theological learning of the age in which they were written. There is no reason, apart from the literary style—which, however, is not bad, but only antiquated—why they might not have been written at the present day, and only in one instance has the editor found it necessary to correct the bishop's theology, and that in a mere *obiter dictum*. A keen reader may perhaps discern—from the want which is in them—what the influence of the Council of Trent has been on Catholic teaching in the past three centuries; and equally well—from the fulness and clearness of doctrine which is them—what that influence has not been. Of course a distinction must be made between Catholic doctrine and the cultivation of it in a particular place. The circumstances from which these sermons arose show to what a low ebb the teaching power of the Church in England had fallen, for the editor judges it to be certain that they were written in compliance with the instructions of the Synod held under Cardinal Pole for the restoration of religion, and directing that

homilies should be prepared for the use of the rectors and vicars, who might be unequal to the task of preaching to the people. But that was twenty years after the beginning of the schism, and the wonder is that under such unfavourable circumstances the age could have produced a writer who was not only well versed in the theology of the schools, but whose acquaintance with the Fathers is best seen from a passage in the preface, which also shows the careful research of the Editor:—"His sermons are eminently patristic. I have counted more than four hundred marginal references to the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers."

We will not part with the volume without reference to the interesting "Biographical Notice" prefixed. It occupies about sixty pages, and will be of value to any one who wishes to gain a clearer insight into the origin and progress of the Protestant schism. We have always felt that there was something beyond our powers of detection in the miserable catastrophe—a quietness and rapidity, all things considered, out of harmony with the most terrible revolution that could happen to a nation. If it cannot be said that England went to sleep one night Catholic, and woke up the next morning and found itself Protestant, it can be said that there was a little superficial tumult and confusion which soon cleared away, and revealed the evil accomplished. We look in vain for those mortal throes that would speak of a nation smitten to its innermost heart, and deprived of the life of its life. The fact is not explained by the tyranny of a despotic king, though backed up by a corrupt and rapacious nobility, nor by the harangues of a few fanatics who, be it remembered, had little freedom of action during the earlier progress of the schism. We are inclined to give the Universities a large responsibility for the mischief. The Universities were corrupted to a degree that is not usually known, and from such sources the evil would be naturally diffused through every artery of the religious body. In no other way can we understand the feebleness of a Church that died almost without a struggle, and has left for our veneration the name of one martyr alone out of its whole episcopacy. Our readers will find in a work which we also notice in the present number ("The Glories of the Sacred Heart") the statement which the eminent author has often made in similar words—"The English never rejected the Catholic faith; they were robbed of it." We would accuse the teachers of the nation of that robbery. There is another point on which stress may be laid. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the English mind was not familiar with heresy. Men did not realize, as we do now, the blessing of Catholic unity, for they had never had experience of its want, and perhaps never seriously contemplated the possibility of its definite and prolonged loss. With nine out of ten who helped in one way or another to bring about the crisis, the result was unforeseen; they drifted through a fog into it; they were as children with a parent engaged in a domestic conflict, which, as they supposed, would pass away and be forgotten in a short time. But the conflict was continued, and in the meanwhile another generation grew up, educated without the faith, or with a bitter prejudice against it. We refer our readers to the "Biographical Notice" (pp. xx.-xxvi.), as bearing specially upon what we have

written ; and also to the conclusion of the eighth sermon (pp. 85, 86), as showing the deep consciousness of the grace of Catholic unity and the authority of the Holy See that had come into men's minds from the experience of the evils that heresy had brought with it.

We suspect that Father Bridgett has felt some disappointment in the direct result of his labour in searching for the materials of the biography. He has frequently come upon the traces of Bishop Watson in the records of the time, but the traces are in most instances very faint. But it may be an encouragement for him to know that his careful researches have opened up much useful information respecting events of great though painful interest. We hope that this volume will be followed by the publication of the other works to which the editor refers. Even though their place will be in the bookcase rather than on the table, their value for Catholic purposes is beyond question.

Confidence in the Mercy of God. By Monseigneur LANGUET, Archbishop of Sens and Member of the French Academy. Translated by the Right Reverend Abbot BURDER, Order of Cistercians. London : R. Washbourne. 1876.

THIS is a good book of the solid kind, to which men were accustomed a century or two ago. It was written early in the eighteenth century, in a style far above that which is usually found in spiritual works ; and the present translation, if it does not exhibit any exceptional excellence, is well done, and, as we imagine, is a faithful rendering of the original. Most priests know persons for whom this volume will be useful,—timid, scrupulous souls, who, above others, tax a priest's time and patience, and yet are objects of the greatest pity. We know not how true it is, that we owe "to the sombre character of the English people, to the nature of the climate, or to the continual inhaling of a saddening Protestant and unbelieving atmosphere," the fact of a great number of cases of despair among us. The notion seems to us translated from the French, and we should have said so, were it found in the body of the work and not in the preface. However, we suspect the spiritual evil is common enough to make acceptable everywhere, and without an apology, this little treatise on "Confidence in the Mercy of God."

In the first part of the work the author lays down on a well-planned and clearly-traced outline "the Foundations of the Confidence we ought to have in the Mercy of God." In the second "the Objections suggested to the Timid by Fear are answered." It is simple truth to say, that this part of the subject is treated with singular piety and learning, and the depth of the author's view into his subject is more realized as his words are more carefully read. From time to time a suspicion may arise in the reader's mind, that there is some pious and kindly exaggeration, as he witnesses the very difficulties against the argument of the book turned into proofs

for it; e.g., "It is precisely because (God) is so just, that we ought to hope in Him" (p. 112); yet a little reflection makes it plain, that the theology is as sound as the purpose is sympathetic. For if scruples and harassing fears are evil, and, being evil, are repugnant to any of the Divine perfections—say, to love and mercy—they must be repugnant to all, even to Divine justice. The harmony of the Divine perfections exacts it. It is not, therefore, piety sympathetic at the expense of truth, but the consistency of theological teaching, that lays down the thesis we have noticed, or this one akin to it, "Even His threats in calling the sinner should excite confidence"; or again, that "the Afflictions suffered by them who are tempted to despair are a mark of the predestination which excites their fear" (p. 207). It is bold writing that thus deals with difficulties, changing into motives of Confidence the views of revealed truth by which timid souls are oppressed. And our readers may judge from it, the able manner in which the whole subject is treated.

Questiones Philosophicæ, autore SILVESTRO MAURO, olim in Collegio Romano Theol. et Phil. Professore. Cenomani. 1875.

THE name of Maurus will not evoke an association of ideas in the mind of a general reader. Likely enough it is unknown to most students of philosophy. Hundreds, who have given their days and nights to the logic of Mr. Mill, would be surprised at being even asked to examine the pages of a Scholastic and a Jesuit.

An account of his life, composed after the Latin of Tacitus, has been prefixed to this re-issue of the Questions. From it we learn that he was as devout to the study of holiness as to the pursuit of knowledge. In the seventeenth century the Gregorian University at Rome produced its most remarkable men. They are still famous who taught there. And Maurus, though he yields the palm, was not unworthy to succeed in the place of Suarez and Bellarmine. Holding the chair of philosophy, and after, that of dogmatic theology, he found it his daily task to construct these sciences line by line, to view and view again his own statements, and submit them to a dialectic which could have been surpassed nowhere, or in the schools of S. Dominic alone. What he adopted as his final sentence was held on its own merits, and with a degree of reflexive tenaciousness that came out of tried and tested argument. In this way he wrote his "Opus Theologicum," his "Commentary on the whole of Aristotle," described as a marvel of erudition, which spread his fame throughout Europe, and, lastly, the "Questions or Institutes of Philosophy," now to be republished. Learning often makes a man disagreeable and forbidding, but not Catholic learning, except when it is much abused. Maurus knew that "divine philosophy" is not "harsh or crabbed." His personal qualities were of the highest. His temperament combined sweetness and strength in one, and his manner carried with it the grace of an unusual refinement. However, for those who have seen the type, there is no need

to describe it afresh. They will remember the unobtrusive gentleness, the Socratic humour, the gravity, with no mixture of dulness in it or embarrassment, which are an heirloom to the lovers of Christian wisdom.

Authors recommend their books. If Maurus had a character of such beauty, it should draw the world to listen when he cares to teach. Unhappily, goodness and wisdom are not the chief passports to fame. Since the Reformation they have often proved a hindrance. The study of metaphysics, to judge by certain of our text-books, can bear but little on the consequences of life. Logic, especially, has been called a barren study. The Questions of Maurus are not, indeed, confined to logic, but include an entire course of philosophy. When the present issue is complete, there will be offered to the public three large volumes in octavo, running to nearly two thousand pages, and furnishing an introduction to the metaphysical sciences in general. Still, this is but a third edition in a period of more than two centuries. The first was printed at Rome in 1658, the second in 1670, the third comes in 1873. All this while, mediocrities, from Locke to Whately, were enjoying the honour of reiterated editions. Their logic had shrunk to the thinness of an automatic calculus, and either the world was satisfied or it took no heed, for the true science of logic was hidden away in libraries. Thanks to the genius of F. Kleutgen, we have again taken possession of a long neglected, but wholly excellent author. To his esteem for Maurus we owe the present edition.

It is a well-executed performance, which causes us the more to regret that the editor remains anonymous. The custom is French we believe, and may be a reminiscence of mediæval humility. But for all that, a name has its value, and we experience disappointment in its omission. Perhaps the encouraging letters which accompany the book, may make amends. One was written at the command of the Holy Father, the rest are from various Bishops, from F. Kleutgen, and F. Liberatore. Bishop Martin, of Paderborn, writes from Wesel, the place of his imprisonment last year, and has a remark which deserves quoting. He says:—"These Questions are a help to the restoration of S. Thomas's philosophy, which, I am inwardly convinced, will pave the way admirably to that divine faith on the reception of which the salvation of modern society depends. To this philosophy, and, in my judgment, to this alone, can the words of the great Vatican Council be applied, that there is no contradiction between faith and reason, and that they are an aid one to the other."

Volume the first divides into a preliminary sketch or summula of logic, being pretty nearly what is now called formal logic, and into the Questions proper. The former part is concluded in somewhat more than a hundred pages, the latter extends to five hundred. Three chapters or tractates on the term, the proposition, and the syllogism afford what the author conceives to be a rude but necessary outline of logic, after the manner of Aristotle. It is well and clearly done. We noticed, with pleasure, the minute care bestowed on the supposition, distribution and ampliation of terms, but could find nothing in this part on induction. The Questions are sixty-nine in number, and fall into six divisions, con-

nected throughout with that wonderful attention to sequence of thought and reasoning which builds up a treatise in metaphysics as it would the demonstrations of algebra. If logic is the organon,—and it certainly is, whatever else it may be,—then the first inquiry must ask what it proposes to achieve. The answer is “science,” and this comes to be established by considering the problem on all sides, defining the number and nature of the primary sciences, the virtues or intellectual habits corresponding to them, and then reflecting the gathered light on the functions of logic itself. Every science meets with the right kind and the right amount of treatment, none is isolated or handled piecemeal, and the investigation passes on of itself to a connected view of all the sciences gained by the virtue of intellectual wisdom. There we perceive the worth of true subordination, of system and proportion. Incidental observations likely to be of permanent service to students, are on every page. There is an affinity between the spirit of Maurus and that of another most commendable writer, the Dominican F. Lepidi, whom we noticed some time ago. Logic in them ceases to be disputatious. Both, even when they argue, are contemplative.

Speaking of the intellect, the faculty by which we learn self-evident truths, Maurus points out what we have always taken to be a fact of importance. The discovery of first principles he gives to induction, thereby putting into our hands the clue which Mr. Mill always lost, even when closest upon it. Of course this is not the induction which enumerates various singulars under a delusion that the sum is the essence. It is rather the unveiling of a pattern or species from its folds in the singular. But, Maurus goes on to say, there is excessive difficulty in obtaining the first principles. Those who learn them without a master (he is touching the principles which come below the very first axioms of all) have enjoyed the gift of genius. Hence it is that S. Thomas and Aristotle have called some propositions evident which others would deny. The denial only shows a want of insight, pardonable in second-rate men. We are sure this is a key to much undeserved criticism of the Scholastics.

Maurus concludes that logic may be practical as well as speculative, and an art no less than a science. As we could not indicate our own opinion very briefly, we make no comment upon this.

Granting science, we next inquire its object, which is the universal, the *unum quod aptum est inesse multis*. Fully to discuss it, we must know the meaning of unity, identity, distinction. Judgment is given finally in favour of S. Thomas and the Universal by abstraction; not, however, until the very subtlest examination has been held over the “virtual intrinsic distinction,” its possibility and reality. This is pure metaphysics, where the author’s skill, calmness, and power of stating a case appear at their best. We do not lean to this view, but should have attended his lectures upon it with the keenest feelings of pleasure. He is a man whom you can safely disagree with, for it does not even occur to him to get angry.

The Universal may be predicated of its subjects in more ways than one.

The third division recounts them, and, whilst it approves the five "predicables" of Aristotle (genus, species, difference, property, and accident), it does not exclude other attempts at reckoning them differently. In fact, Maurus himself adverts to the reduction, which, if we follow the tradition of the School, becomes necessary, for instance, of Being to genus. But he upholds very confidently the opinion of S. Thomas that, in the pure intelligences, there must be as many species as there are individuals. (Our readers will think this a needless inquiry, we fear.) The view is very grand in its admission of intellectual distinctness, "the idiosyncrasy of genius," but we do not altogether go with the reasoning. Another time it may be possible to illustrate the question and its bearings, which are numerous.

Then we have the categories or classes of real being. All is explained that a beginner could desire on this subject, and questions arise which immediately concern the present day. We can mention only three; the analogy of being; the application of this doctrine to the being of God; and the far-reaching question whether all categories and realities are, of necessity, relative. Without pretending that Maurus foresaw all the consequences of mistake on these points, we may claim for him the sagacity, almost instinctive, of a wise mind. He drew out a theory which, as to spirit and letter, is the antagonist of Oriental and modern Pantheism. The being of God is known to us analogically, but analogy is true and real knowledge. Every creature has its relations to God and to other creatures, even to those which are merely possible, but it is first and before all something absolute. He will not concede on the one hand that there is only one absolute. On the other hand, he has already denied the flux of Heraclitus. All that he could add, if he were revising his book now, would be a set of corollaries to deal with the contemporaneous errors in Germany and England. He need not retract nor erase a syllable.

So far he has dwelt upon the thoughts in the mind. Logic takes account also of their expression. This is handled in a sort of commentary upon Aristotle's introduction to the use of language, the slight treatise "De Interpretatione." The last division returns to the Logic proper, but has many things to say which before could not have been understood. It is a searching analysis into the syllogism, the relation between premises and conclusion, and the possibility (which Plato denied) of acquiring really new science.

So much for the matter. The style is fluent, easy, and correct. The questions are stated and arranged so as to remove obscurity and prevent any loss of time. Everywhere the doctrines of the Church are made to contribute illustrations, and to suggest amendments, especially in the pages on unity and distinction. These we would recommend to Germans of the school of Fichte, if any still survive. They might learn more in a few days on the nature of the Ego, than their master came upon in a lifetime of searching.

Preludes. By A. C. THOMPSON.

WE are bound to confess that, when a volume of poems by a new writer is put into our hands, we usually take it listlessly, and with the secret wish that the poet's dreams, hopes, joys, griefs, and loves (all of which we feel pretty certain to be by no means new or original experiences), had remained for ever locked in the sanctuary of his own breast. It was not, therefore, with any pleasureable sense of expectation that we began to turn the leaves of Miss Thompson's "Preludes"; but our attention was soon arrested, and by the time we closed the book, we felt certain that much at any rate of the contents of this volume are a gain to the world. They are a gain, insomuch as they are real poems, not mere prettinesses of idea strung together with a certain facility of expression and musical rhythm, such as frequently do duty for poetry, but the actual creation of a mind which, naturally imaginative and introspective, has evidently been strengthened and matured by much labour and cultivation, and by that reverent and patient study of great poets, the need of which is so grievously felt among our young song-writers, and which accounts for so much of their thinness of thought and general want of finish and completeness. Not that we mean to accuse Miss Thompson of plagiarism or imitation; on the contrary, we have rarely come across a volume by any one of the minor poets now living so free from this defect; and we see in her what should be always the effect of high cultivation and of a wide and sympathetic knowledge of other writers, her originality is not crushed or overlaid, but strengthened and invigorated thereby. Miss Thompson has done wisely in choosing, as she frequently does, the sonnet form as her medium of poetical expression, for in some of these compositions she may take rank amongst the finest sonnet-writers of the century—with Wordsworth and Mrs. Browning and Charles Turner. We will quote as an example the sonnet which has for its motto Petrarch's words, "Senza te son nulla" ("Nought am I, of thee bereft").

"I touched the heart that loved me as a player
Touches a lyre; content with my poor skill.
No touch save mine knew my beloved; (and still
I thought at times: Is there no sweet lost air
Old love could wake in him, I cannot share)?
Oh, he alone, alone could so fulfil
My thoughts in sound to the measure of my will.
He is dead, and silence takes me unaware.

"The songs I knew not he resumes, set free
From my constraining love, alas for me!
His part in our tune goes from him; my part
Is locked in me for ever; I stand as mute
As one with full strong music in his heart,
Whose fingers stray upon a shattered lute."

This appears to us to be a very perfect little poem. It is what a sonnet emphatically ought to be—a crystallization of one, or at most two, ideas,

completely and perfectly thought out, but separated from all the adjuncts—the preludes and sequences—which render thoughts so difficult to gather up one by one, and represent each one in its entirety. It is this *separation* of thoughts, be it said by the way, which makes the composition of sonnets so valuable a means of mental training, as it forces the mind to concentrate itself upon one idea and not to let it go until it has completely mastered it, and to free itself from the overcrowding of thought and of words (both in consequence apt to be crude and semi-articulate), which is the great bane of some inexperienced writers. The two ideas embodied in the sonnet we have given, though the comparison of the heart to a musical instrument is not perhaps a very original one, are both very striking, and, so far as we know, have not been worked before. It forms a sort of pendant to another sonnet equally beautiful, and with a very delicate aroma of the graceful Italian and mediæval *conceits*, very quaint and fresh in its modern English garb. Lorenzo de' Medici's line, "Questo ne' patti nostri, Amor, non era" (This was not in our pact, O Love"), is the motto of this sonnet.

"My heart shall be thy garden. Come, my own,
Into thy garden; thine be happy hours
Among my fairest thoughts, my tallest flowers,
From root to crowning petal, thine alone.

"Thine is the place from where the seeds are sown,
Up to the sky enclosed, with all its showers;
But, ah, the birds, the birds! who shall build bowers
To keep these thine? O friend, the birds have flown.

"For as these come and go, and quit our pine
To follow the sweet season; or, new comers,
Sing one song only from our alder trees,

"My heart has thoughts, which, though thine eyes hold mine,
Flit to the silent world and other summers,
With wings that dip beyond the silver seas."

Almost as successful as her sonnets are some of Miss Thompson's songs and shorter poems. The following very graceful and touching verses commemorate an incident in the life of San Lorenzo Giustiniani, one of those heroic acts of renunciation of self and of earthly ties which make the natural man within us shrink and shiver; for we cannot doubt that the mendicant friar whose features the poor mother could not certainly discern through her "mists of tears" was really her long-missed son:—

"I had not seen my son's dear face
(He chose the cloister by God's grace)
Since it had come to full-flower time.
I hardly guessed at its perfect prime,
That folded flower of his dear face.

"Mine eyes were veiled by mists of tears
When on a day in many years
One of his order came. I thrilled
Facing, I thought, that face fulfilled.
I doubted, for my mists of tears.

" His blessing be with me for ever !
 My hope and doubt were hard to sever.
 That altered face, those holy weeds.
 I filled his wallet, and kissed his beads,
 And lost his echoing feet for ever.

" If to my son my alms were given
 I know not, and I wait for heaven.
 He did not plead for child of mine,
 But for another Child divine,
 And unto Him it was surely given.

" There is one alone who cannot change,
 Dreams are we, shadows, visions strange,
 And all I give is given to one.
 I might mistake my dearest son,
 But never the Son who cannot change."

In this poem the extreme simplicity of the thought is a great contrast to the subtle and complex tone of mind which is generally a characteristic of Miss Thompson, and which we would recommend her to keep carefully within bounds, as in some cases it is apt to lead her into obscurity and uncertainty of idea, in other cases into a rather strained and morbid manner of forcing all natural objects to become as it were consecrated to the poet's state of feeling and need of expression, and thus to lose their own individuality, and the healthy and natural message which they ought to convey to all thoughtful minds. We remember that Miss Proctor says somewhere—

" Why turn each cool grey shadow
 Into a world of tears?
 Why say the winds are wailing?
 Why call the dewdrops tears."

And this verse was often in our mind whilst reading the "Preludes." The lines "In Autumn" are very characteristic of this weakness of the authoress. From time immemorial the fading leaves, the grey skies, and general decay of autumn have suggested images of death and disappointment and weariness of heart, but it is an over-strain of the feeling of autumnal sadness, which tells us that—

" The low winds moan for dead sweet years,
 The birds sing all for pain."

--And which addresses the yellow leaves as the "dying blisses of the year," with a passionate invocation to them to "kiss me again as I kiss you," whilst a few lines further on these "dying blisses" become "broken hearts," and elsewhere "dead delights," till after the confusion and variety of epithet, we feel quite relieved in the last verse of the poem at being told in plain words—

" There is an autumn yet to wane,
 There are leaves yet to fall."

Though the succeeding lines

" Which when I kiss may kiss again,
 And pitied, pity me for all,
 And love me in mist and rain,"

leave us strangely bewildered, and with a sense that if Miss Thompson's view of our relations with autumn and its leaves be the true one, the conditions of being become even more unmanageable and perplexing than we had previously imagined them to be! However, our recognition of the overstrained sentiment degenerating into mannerism or into silliness, which is occasionally to be met with in the course of this volume, does not detract from the full and free need of praise which we give to Miss Thompson's work. As we have before said, it is work of a very real and noble kind, and which bears the promise of greater things than she has yet accomplished. Her lays are chiefly "short swallow-flights of song," and judging from this volume, we think it probable that she is one of those who will find their best work their shortest; at the same time the only poem of considerable length, "A Study," though wanting somewhat in the dramatic movement and interest which the subject demands, is very well conceived and abounds in passages of great beauty. Take the following very tender and delicate bit of word-painting—

"Then in the ripe rays of the later day,
All, the small blades of thin grass one by one,
Looked through with sun, will make each a long shade,
And daisies' heads will bend with butterflies."

—or such lines as "I was not worthy to be comfortless," which bear a deep meaning and convey a very subtle lesson of spiritual training.

The illustrations which are scattered through the book appear to us poor, and unworthy of the hand that executed them. The prettiest of them is one belonging to a poem, so true in description, so fresh in sentiment, and pathetic in feeling, that we cannot do better than close with it our notice of what we hope may prove to be really but preludes:—

"A TRYST THAT FAILED."

"It was a time of wind and sun,
Morning day, and the Winter done,
Morning life, and the Spring begun.
"It was a place so dreamy and brown,
Pensive with sheep-bells under the down,
Scent-dreamy, wild, with a windy crown.
"You were coming, out of the spring,
Out of the sun-dream wandering,
Out of the wind-joy hastening.
"I did not see you, sweet; a flight
Of sea-birds only, pearly and white,
With a sudden shadow fled into the light.
"I never heard you call, my Fair;
O music up in the flickering air!
O voice my ears so ill could spare!
"And the wild, wild call my soul begot,
The long wild call, I know not what,—
We met not then, for it reached you not,

"And never again. But our hearts did greet.
 Whatever path misled your feet,
 Voices so true could not but meet.

"Though we have strayed from that place of heather,
 Your cry and mine speed on together
 Above the Spring and the Summer weather.

"Among the stars and in the blue,
 What words could never, my call may do,
 Speak my love and loss of you."

Poems. By Sir JOHN CROKER BARROW, Bart. Longmans. 1876.

SOME years since we had occasion to notice "The Valley of Tears," which, in a revised form, makes up part of the present volume; and we then expressed our opinion that the poem was remarkable for the quaint simplicity of its construction (justly likened by the "Spectator" to the metrical histories of the middle ages), and the full-hearted fervour with which it gives expression to feelings rarely put so candidly into words, and which, indeed, it is most difficult to put into words at all. We are glad to find a reprint of this poem in the volume before us, for it is not only full of deep, thoughtful beauty of no ordinary kind, but it also conveys to the reader the most singular impression of reality, and of its value as a series of soul-photographs. It runs so entire and consecutive a course, in fact, that it is not possible to convey any sense of its beauty by extracts: going through "Twilight," "Dreamland," "Legends" and "Traditions" to the final "fytte," "Mysteries," in which the narrating soul, purified and free, awaits the full glory of God's presence. This latter portion of "The Valley of Tears" is simply exquisite in its spiritual analysis. Some of the lesser poems of the volume also gleam with the same true poetic instinct of delicate analogies and the tenderest shades of spiritual colour; so much so, that we feel a regret that such fine instincts should be lavishly spent upon mere fragments and shreds of poems, instead of being gathered up into some volume, and enriched with more continual, serious study. Sir John Barrow's weakness, indeed, seems to lie in an exuberant facility in throwing off his impressions with too much slightness of rapid touch; and his fragments so sparkle and glow with thoughts, as the dust of Rome is rich with the fragments of the most precious marbles, that we long to see them matured to completeness. A little more care, also, would chasten the exclamatoriness of some of his verse, and lead him to prune that affluence of notes of admiration with which his volume absolutely bristles, and which must surely spring, in part, from the misapprehension of an uncorrected printer.

For instance:—

"More of the past, than present, was the Grange!
 One half, all ruin! and the other half,
 Half ruin, and half habitable!"

And again, where a single note of interrogation seems implied :

"Who else, in meditation, thought as deep !
Who else, in argument, discussed as clear !
Or read, or wrote, or spoke, as well as he !" (pp. 7-8.)

We mark these minor faults, both because there is such a variety of suggestive beauty in this volume of poems, that it is annoying to be irritated by its small, perfectly remediable blots, and because we hope to receive more and better work still from the same hand. Among the smaller poems, we should distinguish "Truth and Doubt," "Things Unseen," "Prepared to Die," and the "Prisoners of Death," as bearing the peculiar imprint of Sir John Barrow's mind. We should like to give entire five little poems, "Matins," "Lauds," "The Hours," "Vespers," and "Compline," through which runs the same golden thread of thought beautifully varied. But we have only space for "Matins," in which we take leave to omit the notes of admiration :—

I.

"A shadow wakes the earth in spring—
Who sings her Matins—though the night
Has scarcely vanished out of sight—
And twilight covers everything.

II.

"A smile, in Summer, wakes the Earth—
Who sings her matins—though the sun
Has scarce his life of light begun—
And daylight labours in its birth.

III.

"A sigh, in Autumn, passing by,
Awakes the earth—and, in the dark,
She sings her Matins—though the lark
Has not yet carolled in the sky.

IV.

"A frost, in Winter, cold and clear,
Awakes the Earth—and, in the night,
She sings her Matins—though the light,
As yet, at least, is nowhere near."

Songs in the Night and other Poems. By the Author of "Christian Schools and Scholars." London : Burns & Oates. 1876.

POETRY is a dangerous subject to handle, and has injured the reputation of critics more than all other forms of literature put together. Partial hands have oftentimes crowned a singer with bays that withered before a season closed, and contrariwise, the song has sometimes lived when the detractor has been forgotten. "This will never do," a giant among reviewers wrote of the "Excursion"; but, chancing to link the emphatic condemnation with an immortal poem, he immortalized his own dulness. We will be careful, therefore, to say, not the most we think, but, the least we can say of the beautiful poetry in this volume, and

accord our praise, for praise is due, in a subdued tone. The author revels in the beauty of nature, worships it with every sense and faculty, and, with a mental power analogous to physical vision, contemplates it at once minutely and comprehensively. Yet deeply as she loves it, and eloquently as she hymns its perfections, she finds life in it—if we rightly seize the spirit of her song—the night-time of faith and expectation. Her eyes are wide open to the loveliness that sparkles “in the rippling waters,” or blooms “on flowers of a thousand dyes,” or falls “in golden light and quivering shade,” beneath the rustling boughs, or shows dimly “through the mystic shadows of the night”; yet she sees in them all this supreme value, that they may be offered as gifts to Him whose perfections they declare. The earth is overflowing with beauty, yet it is imperfect, and, to the soul gifted with faith “and caring to behold but only One,” only a shadow of the Divine beauty which is sought, as the goal of a pilgrimage, “through the long night”—

“Yea, all the fairest forms that nature scatters,
And all melodious sounds that greet the ear,
The murmuring music of the running waters,
The golden harvest-fields that crown the year,
The crimson morn, the calm and dewy even,
The tranquil moonlight on a slumbering sea,—
All are but shadows, forms of beauty given
To tell what my beloved is to me!”

Besides the “Songs in the Night,” and equal to them in a literary point of view, the volume contains “Miscellaneous Poems,” and some curious and interesting “Imitations of Ancient English Poetry.” It is strange that the only flaw we have observed occurs twice in the same poem. “Gone” will not rhyme with “forlorn,” nor “dawn” with “borne” (p. 30), at least outside the range of Bow-bells. We do not wish to be hypercritical, but slight flaws show very plainly on work that is highly polished. The volume will be welcome to all who love thoughtful and graceful verse. Even the hasty reader will find much surface beauty in it; but for the cultivated mind that penetrates to the inner sense, there is reserved a revelation—a harmony of spiritual contemplation and poetic fancy—not frequently surpassed.

The Wyndham Family: A Story of Modern Life. By the Author of “Mount St. Lawrence.” In two vols. Burns & Oates. 1876.

THIS “story,” which should have been amply noticed in our April number, is from a pen well-known and heartily appreciated by all readers of this REVIEW; and we heartily welcome the writer’s reappearance among us as a caterer for the amusement as well as instruction of our Catholic youth. In the “Wyndham Family,” however, there are excellent lessons to be found for all ages, and we are glad to see the

honest, vigorous attacks made upon the worldliness, selfishness, and frivolity which are now eating so largely into Catholic society; and which, although they are habits of the most pernicious sort, are singularly ignored, merely because they may not amount to mortal sin. The Wyndhams are well drawn as a family of careless and lukewarm Catholics; preserving their faith and keeping within the letter of the commandments of the Church, while indulging in the most paltry ambitions of common society, and striving in all ways to secure as much pleasure at the smallest cost in this world, as any of their Protestant neighbours. The consequences turn out to be exactly such as might reasonably be expected. The eldest daughter, Emma, a clever, handsome girl, instead of marrying wisely and well, as her fond parents hoped, commits herself to great folly with a worthless suitor, a Captain Baines, whose sole aim is to pay his debts with her fortune. The son, Algernon, misses his alliance with a charming French family, through his want of religious principle and conscientious self-control. Mrs. Wyndham, the bustling, active mother, whose fortune had been good, while her standing in society, lower than her husband's, betrays her origin by being continually ashamed of it; and shows her folly the most egregiously of all in being also ashamed of her brother, John Sanders, settled in Sicily as a wine-merchant, whose rough-diamond character and peculiarities, combined with the highest religious principle, are admirably drawn. There is a second pretty daughter, Gertrude, full of natural piety and sweet gifts, who is much encumbered by the family traditions, and borne down by her more energetic sister's rule. It is pleasant to escape from the follies and scrapes of this nominally Catholic family to the house of Madame d'Héricourt, whose two daughters, Anne and Pauline, are brought up to lead an unworldly, girlish life, and to preserve their fresh, unspoilt youth as long as they can. In spite of all Madame d'Héricourt's precaution, however, Algernon Wyndham makes his way into her house, and into her eldest daughter's heart; so that the sweet, modest maiden, for a while, is led captive by the fluent, beguiling tongue of her handsome suitor, to the exclusion of a certain grave cousin, Eustace Rochfort, whom her mother had hoped would eventually be her choice. We cannot say that this is surprising, for Eustace certainly does himself anything but justice, and under Madame d'Héricourt's forbiddance of all approach to love-making, he behaves like nothing but a tortoise closely withdrawn into his shell. While things are thus going badly with the d'Héricourts—for Algernon was, in truth, scarcely even a nominal Catholic—Gertrude's weak concealment of her sister's entanglement with Captain Baines throws her mother off her guard, and the adventurer actually persuades Emma to go off with him to Lord Selden's villa on the Thames, where his doubtfully-principled friend, Lady Selden, has promised her aid in securing his marriage with his prize. This flight, and the successful pursuit and rescue of the runaway, by the despised uncle, John Sanders, is admirably told, and is the most spirited part of the book.

Leaving the obvious heroes and heroines, the Algernons, Eustaces, Annes, and Emmas, to the full unravelment of their loves and rivalries by

our readers, we must advert, for a few minutes, to the undercurrent of the story, in which we find the true heroine and the real cream of the "Wyndham Family." In the first chapter of the second volume, Mrs. Wyndham, on the eve of a rather anxious dinner-party, summons her cook, Tyrell, often before on the scene, to her aid; and in the course of the consultation, is much put out because Tyrell respectfully declines accompanying some of the younger maids to the play.

"I am much obliged to you, Ma'am," replied Tyrell, "for your kind thoughts of me, but I must beg you to excuse me. I do not wish to go to the play."

"Nonsense! You mean, I suppose, that the play does not amuse you."

"I do not wish to go to the play."

"But I wish you to go!" rejoined Mrs. Wyndham sharply. "How can I send those two girls by themselves? I know my duty better than that. . . . Ah! I guess what it is . . . you think you demean yourself."

"I had no such thought, ma'am," replied Mrs. Tyrell earnestly. "God forbid I should have such a thought, or esteem myself better than any one else! I am ready to go anywhere in Rachel's or Mary's company, but I do not wish to go to the play."

"And now," . . . said Mrs. Wyndham, . . . "I will just tell you what my opinion is on the subject: you think yourself humble because you are not fond of fine dress, . . . and have a way of talking small about yourself; but there are other ways of being proud. . . . Did it ever occur to you to suspect yourself of spiritual pride? My notion is that you are full of it, and this is a specimen. Now you know what I have to say on the subject."

"And for what you have said I owe you the warmest thanks, ma'am," replied Tyrell. "Few will speak as frankly as you have done, and warn others of the dangers which surround them within as well as without. No one needs this caution more than I do."

Tyrell, in fact, is the single pure grain of salt in the inconsistent household; and, holding on her way in modest silence, she spreads her influence, as far as possible, over the other servants, and over Gertrude Wyndham, to preserve them all from corruption. It will be eventually seen, by the many readers of this tale, that Tyrell proved to be of another position from that she had assumed; but there is so much that is possible of imitation in this beautiful character, and the way in which service is treated in its loftiest light as expiatory self-sacrifice, is so admirable, that we should heartily recommend the "Wyndham Family" to our readers solely on this account.

Linked Lives. By Lady GERTRUDE DOUGLAS. In 3 vols.

Hurst & Blackett. 1876.

WE heartily congratulate the author of this excellent novel on its complete success. As a rule, which seems hitherto to assert itself as being one without exceptions, the controversial novel has been a failure. It has attempted to mix together two very good things, and spoiled them both, so as to produce a sense of painful incompleteness in the mind. And this is more especially the case where the story has been a good one, and the characters have been drawn with distinctive interest, as in "Mrs. Gerald's Niece." The consequence, in a story of such exceeding beauty as in that instance, is, that the reader is overmuch tempted to hurry through or skip the controversy, to possess himself of the uninterrupted narrative. After all, though a great deal of religion comes into "Linked Lives," it is of an uncontroversial character, and in the two strong points dwelt upon, the necessity of one infallible Church as our guide, and the continual abidance of the corporal presence of Our Lord within it as our stay, comfort, and sustenance, the truths are set forth with a religious earnestness and certainty which are distinctly free of controversy. There are two separate currents of life linked together in this story, of which the upper is the best drawn. Mabel Forrester and her aunt, Miss Mackenzie, the Vaughans, and Hugh Fortescue, are admirably coloured; and the slighter sketches of Sir Guy Forrester and his wife, and the charming St. Laurent family, are no less distinctive, and touched with a masterly hand. Of the lower or under current, the interest centres in Katie Mackay, a Reformatory girl, whose final rescue is due to Mabel Forrester, and whose perils and temptations, though coloured [with a light brush, are evidently drawn from the life. For, in truth, the real character and tone of the dens of Glasgow and the closes of the Edinburgh Cowgate could scarcely be reproduced to the life. One of the chief merits of this novel, in fact, is, that it is perfect in its taste; and while indicating the perils of girls who are subjected to evil influences, there is no attempt to excite interest by shocking sensational realism. Very beautiful, indeed, and thoroughly true to reality, is the description of Mabel Forrester's mind, from her discipleship to "advanced" Ritualism, to her reception of the true faith. It is scarcely needful to say that under this discipleship to Mr. Vaughan, the Ritualist incumbent of Elvanlee, Mabel has already imbibed the chief doctrines of the Church, especially that of the Real Presence, which finally brings her into the Church. Her first recognition of the Blessed Sacrament was in the chapel of a convent of the Perpetual Adoration in Brittany.

"Mabel's eyes . . . had fixed themselves . . . upon a scroll, richly illuminated, which formed the bas-relief of the high altar, and upon which was inscribed the Latin text: 'Deliciæ mæne esse cum filiis hominum.'

"Two adoring angels placed on either side of the sanctuary held up a second scroll, which rose in a high arch over the altar, above the canopy

where the Bleseed Sacrament was exposed, and again Mabel read the words:—

‘Adoremus in æternum
Sanctissimum sacramentum.’

Mabel’s knowledge of Latin enabling her to understand the meaning of the sentence, her eyes followed immediately, and remained motionless in one long, imploring gaze upon the Sacred Host itself, around Whom the jewelled aureole of the monstrance flashed in the sunlight. Suddenly, calmly, accompanied by a rush of indescribable love, came the yearning wish that if indeed Jesus were present to her in His Sacred Humanity, she might at any cost be made to believe it; and a flash of unanswerable conviction followed the whispering of the Divine Voice: ‘He is there; He must be there; and where Jesus is, are rest and peace.’

“Mabel advanced a few steps, impelled by an attraction she had never before experienced; she longed to cast herself upon her knees, but wavered, resisting as a temptation the feeling she could not account for. It proved, however, too strong for her, and after a brief hesitation, she dropped down where she stood, bowing her head low between her clasped hands.

“Crowding thickly on her memory came the recollection of bygone days of fervour, seasons known only to herself and God, hallowed moments, when a far-away voice had spoken, but in faint accents, to her soul. In the dear old Elvanlee church she had often heard it, sometimes breaking through the half-open lips of the angel figures in the quaint stone carvings; again trilling forth from the tones of the pealing organ; oftener still whispered by the glory-crowned Saints, who gazed upon her with their solemn eyes from the deep-stained windows.

“She had listened to it in the early morning; it had soothed and comforted her dreams by night; full often it had wooed and won the reverent love of her child’s passionate heart, which had never failed to respond to its call. It had told her about the love, the deep human love, of a human God, making her yearn with unutterable longing for some visible or sensible manifestation of His Presence; and now, with the remembrance of those heaven-breathed whisperings in the past, there had come the low voice once more, but, oh! so much more real, so much more winning, in the sweetness of its tone. The shadows were rising, the veil was slowly withdrawn, the dream of Mabel’s young life was merging into reality. . . . No longer as in a glass, dimly foreshadowing the uncertain future, filling the soul with insatiable cravings, but instantly illuminating with a flood of light, and hushing into profound peace mind and body alike.”

At what anguish of suffering the sacrifice was finally made, and what was Mabel’s end, the readers of “Linked Lives”—and they will certainly be a multitude—must learn for themselves. It is a pity, we think, to have “piled on the agony” so thick and threefold as has been done, as it is a mistake in art that everybody worth caring for in the story should be converted. For although their conversion is in the strictest logical sequence, we do not, alas! find logic so carried to conclusion in real life with High Church, or even with very holy-living Anglican, rectors. There is also some sense of over-sweetness in the religious descriptions, which speak more to the imagination than the mind, and which we should like to see amended, because in the author’s future works, of which we hope to welcome many, an increase of strength on this point will immeasurably increase her power over non-Catholic readers. For our own Catholic public, we cannot but hope that that part of her beautiful story which

merely reproduces the daily and hourly dangers of life to thousands of our children, may stir up many among us to link their lives with at least a few out of these thousands, and so rescue from eternal loss a handful of souls.

Sanctuary Meditations for Priests and Frequent Communicants. Translated from the Original Spanish of Father Baltasar Gracian, of the Society of Jesus (1669), by MARIANA MONTEIRO. London: R. Washbourne, 18, Paternoster Row. 1876.

WE are thankful for every effort that helps to make known the valuable treasures still concealed in the Spanish literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The author of "Sanctuary Meditations" was Father Baltasar Gracian, of the Society of Jesus; and we cannot give a better notion of the high esteem which his numerous works gained among his contemporaries, than by quoting an extract or two from the licenses and approbations prefixed to this volume. F. Diego Carli, S.T.P. in the University of Barcelona (1668), writes:—"Having already acknowledged and approved the three parts of the 'Criticon' (as they have been, with high eulogiums, approved by the greatest lights of Spain), I declare that it all seems to me, and is, *valde bonum*." And another appointed censor does not hesitate to apply to him the words of praise:—

"Quo major nullus, quo non præstantior alter;
Cui nec prisca parem sæcla tulere virum."

We are not surprised that the work of a writer, who is introduced to us with such letters of commendation, should be of great worth, but we confess that the singular beauty and power of the meditations have caused unexpected pleasure. They are thoughtful applications of striking facts, miracles, and parables, recorded in Holy Scripture, to the Blessed Sacrament, and are arranged so as to suggest devout preparation for, worthy dispositions at the time of, and thanksgiving after, Holy Communion. There is a vigour and freshness in them that will interest, and at times electrify, the feeblest mind, and leave results deeply graven on memory and will. The meditation "On receiving the Blessed Sacrament as a Grain of Wheat sown in your Heart," is well worthy of being pointed out as a rare instance of the subtle power of piety to discern the mystical sense of Holy Scripture. It is a beautiful exposition, well sustained and happily applied to the subject from first to last, and with a little development would make an excellent discourse for Sexagesima Sunday.

It is evident that the work of translation has been carefully done. Besides the ordinary table of *contents*, there is an arrangement of the subjects according to the Sundays and Festivals of the year; a sketch of the author's life is given; a list of his works; and a summary of the approbations and licenses granted to them. But carefulness has not enabled the translator to overcome the difficulties of an unfamiliar lan-

guage and attain unqualified success. There are numberless inaccuracies of the kind we expect when a writer is translating *from*, and not *into* his or her own language; and it is a matter of regret that some English scholar had not revised the pages before publication, for many of the errors could have been removed by a stroke of the pen. "I propose," the translator writes, "confining myself to such writers *whose* works have been hitherto unknown." "So soon as she was made sensible that in her purest womb was enclosed her Son—God, *than* her soul," &c. ; and in the same way *passim*. In many places we suspect the vigour, and even the sense, of the original has vanished, on account of some peculiarity of language being lost or obscured in the translation. There is one meditation especially ("The Flight into Egypt," p. 177), which, although very good in its substance, will be more fruitful in surprise than profit. We read:—"How little profit did the *gipsies* derive during all that time?" "Reflect, how many there are who receive the Lord in this manner—as a *gipsy* and even more coldly"; and another passage that certainly exacts attention before the allusion to the Egyptians as *theophagi* is apprehended,—“Do not receive the Lord in the fashion of Egypt, though you might well receive Him after the fashion of a *gipsy*,—eating your God, and having for a God,” &c. Our English word *gipsy* has not retained its radical meaning sufficiently to bear the application that is given to the Spanish equivalent.

It is only fair to the translator, who has given us so much that is good in substance, that we should mark the blemishes, and prevent their recurrence in the future translations of which she gives us a promise.

PRONOUNCEMENT ON ROSMINI'S WORKS.

[Our readers will remember a letter addressed to us by F. Lockhart in our number for last October. In connection with the subject of that letter, he has forwarded to us the following for publication. All Catholic students of philosophy will at once recognize the authority and great significance of such a letter, from such an official as the Master of the Sacred Palace.]

The following weighty communication has appeared in the *Osservatore Romano* of June 20, 1876 :

[Translation.]

TO THE MARQUIS BAVIERA, EDITOR
OF THE "OSSERVATORE ROMANO."

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

In No. 136 of your esteemed journal, June 14, 1876, I have read with pain an article on a little work entitled : "Antonio Rosmini and the Civiltà Cattolica before the Sacred Congregation of the Index. By Giuseppe Buroni, Priest of the Mission."

You are well aware that the works of the distinguished philosopher Antonio Rosmini were made the subject of a most rigorous examination by the Sacred Congregation of the Index from 1851 to 1854, and that at the close of this examination, our Holy Father Pope Pius IX., still happily reigning, in the assembly of the Most Reverend Consultors, and the most Eminent Cardinals, whose votes he had heard, and over whom he deigned, with a condescension seldom shown, to preside in person. After invoking with fervent prayers the light and help of heaven, pronounced the following Decree : "All the works of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, concerning which investigation has been made of late, must be dismissed ; nor has this same investigation resulted in anything whatever derogatory to the name of the author, or to the praiseworthiness of life and the singular merits towards the Church, of the religious society founded by him."

[Original.]

ILLUSTRISSIMO SIG. MARCHESE
BAVIERA,—

Nel num. 136, giugno 1876, del pregiato Giornale l'*Osservatore Romano* dalla Signoria Vostra Illustrissima diretto, lessi con dispiacere un articolo sopra l'opuscolo intitolato : "Antonio Rosmini e la Civiltà Cattolica dinanzi la Sacra Congregazione dell' Indice. Per Giuseppe Buroni."

Ella ben sa che le Opere dell' insigne filosofo Antonio Rosmini furono oggetto di rigorosissimo esame della Sacra Congregazione dell' Indice dal 1851 al 1854 e che finito questo il Santo Padre Pio Papa IX. felicemente regnante nell' adunanza dei Rmi Consultori e degli Emi signori Cardinali, de' quali aveva sentito i voti ed a' quali con raro esempio degnossi personalmente presiedere, invocato con fervide preci lume e aiuto del cielo, pronunziò il seguente Decreto : "Antonii Rosmini Serbati opera omnia, de quibus novissime quæsitum est, esse dimittenda ; nihilque prorsus susceptæ istiusmodi disquisitionis causa auctoris nomini, nec institutæ ab eo religiosæ societatis de vitæ laudibus, et singularibus in Ecclesiam promeritis esse disreptum."

The author of the article referred to undertakes to discuss the meaning of the words *Dimittantur opera*; but while professing to admit their force, he reduces it well-nigh to nothing. For he says: "We do not deny that *Dimittatur* is, in a certain respect, equivalent to *permittatur*: but to permit that a work may be published and read without incurring ecclesiastical penalty, has nothing whatever to do with declaring the work itself uncensurable." Now by those words one is led to suppose that the Sacred Congregation, or rather the Holy Father, by pronouncing that judgment, did nothing more than permit that the works of Rosmini may be published and read without incurring a penalty.

But I ask: What penalty did the editor and readers of Rosmini's works incur before those works were subjected to so lengthened and accurate a scrutiny? None whatever. What, then, would the Sacred Congregation of the Index have done by such grave study and labours so protracted? Nothing whatever. And to what purpose would the judgment of the Holy Father have been given? To no purpose whatever. If, then, we do not wish to fall into these absurdities, we must say that the accusations brought against the works of Rosmini were false; that in these works nothing was found contrary to faith and morals; that their publication and perusal are not dangerous to the faithful. Who can ever suppose that the Holy Father has licensed for publication works containing erroneous doctrines? And liberated the readers of them from penalty? To liberate from penalty the readers of books infected with error would be an act productive of greater injury, than if a penalty were imposed or (assuming its previous existence) were maintained in full vigour.

I might touch on other points of the article in question, and show that its author has presumed to dive further than he ought into a matter which does not belong to him. But

L'autore dell' articolo suaccennato prende a discutere il senso delle parole *Dimittantur opera*; ma egli ne afferma di guisa la forza, che la riduce poco men che a nulla. Imperocchè dice: "Non neghiamo poi che il *Dimittatur* sotto un certo rispetto equivalga al *permittatur*: ma il permettere ch' un' opera si possa divulgare e leggere senza incorrere nella pena, non ha che far nulla col dichiarare l'opera stessa incensurabile." Or con queste parole viensi a far supporre che la Sacra Congregazione o meglio il Santo Padre col pronunziare quel giudizio non altro fece che permettere che le opere di Rosmini si possano divulgare e leggere senza incorrere nella pena.

Ma domando io: l'editore e li lettore delle opere di Rosmini innanzi ch' esse fossero sottoposte a sì lungo ed accurato esame, in qual pena incorrevano? In niuna. Che cosa avrebbe dunque fatto la sagra Congregazione dell' Indice con sì gravi studi e sì prolungate fatiche? Nulla. E a che giovato avrebbe il giudizio del Santo Padre? A nulla. Pertanto se non vuoi cadere in questi assurdi, fa duopo dire che dall' esame lungo e coscienzioso è risultato che le accuse mosse alle opere di Rosmini erano false: che in queste nulla fu trovata contro la fede e la morale: che l'edizione e la lettura di esse non sono pericolose ai fedeli. Chi mai può darsi a pensare che il Santo Padre abbia licenziato alla pubblica opera contenenti dottrine erronee? E abbia liberato dalla pena chi le legge? La liberazione dalla pena recherebbe maggior nocumento che se ve l'avesse posta o conservata, dato che per l'innanzi fosse stata.

Altri punti potrei toccare dell' articolo e mostrare che l'autore di esso volle addentrarsi troppo in una materia che non gli spetta. Ma basta il detto per dovere rivolgere

what I have said suffices to make it imperative on me to address this letter to you. As it may not be known to every one that the Master of the Sacred Palace does not, under existing circumstances, revise the journals, and as the character and fame of the *Osservatore Romano* might lead to a belief that he (the Master of the Sacred Palace) has approved of the article in question, I think it necessary to declare to you that I should never have given my consent to the publication of the same. Further, I have to request that you will not, in future, receive any articles either on the sense of the judgment *Dimittatur* or against the learned and pious Rosmini, or against his works, examined and dismissed.

I take this opportunity to remind all concerned, that the Holy Father, from the time of the issuing of the *Dimittantur opera*, enjoined silence: and this, in order that no new accusations should be put forward, nor, under any pretext, a way made for dissensions among Catholics: "That no new accusations and dissensions should arise and be disseminated in future, silence is now for the third time enjoined, on either party, by command of His Holiness."

Who does not see that the seeds of dissension are sown by traducing the works of Rosmini either as not being yet sufficiently examined, or as suspected of errors which were not seen either before or after so extraordinary an examination, or as dangerous; or by using expressions which take away all the value or diminish excessively the force and authority of a judgment pronounced with so much maturity and so much solemnity by the Supreme Pastor of the Church?

By this it is not meant to affirm that it is unlawful to dissent from the philosophical system of Rosmini, or from the manner in which he tries to explain some truths; and even to offer a confutation thereof in the schools: but if one does not agree with Rosmini in the manner of explaining certain truths, it is not on that account lawful to

questa mia alla Signoria Vostra. Siccome non a tutti può esser noto che il Maestro del sacro Palazzo non rivede nelle attuali circostanze i giornali; e la qualità e fama dell' *Osservatore Romano* potrebbe dar a credere ch' egli abbia approvato l'articolo in discorso; reputo necessario dichiarare a Vostra Signoria ch' io mai avrei acconsentito alla pubblicazione di esso. Anzi La prego di non ricevere in avvenire articoli nè sul senso del *Dimittatur*, nè contro il dotto e pio Rosmini, nè contro le opere di lui esaminate e dimesse.

Colgo qui l'occasione di ricordare che il Santo Padre fin dall' epoca del *Dimittantur opera* impose silenzio: e ciò affinché non si mettessero fuori nuove accuse, nè sotto qualsiasi pretesto si desse luogo a discordie fra cattolici. "*Ne vel novae imposterum, accusationes ac dissidia quovis demum obtentu suboriri ac disseminari possent, indicto jam tertio, de mandato ejusdem Ssmi, utrique parti silentio.*"

Chi non vede essere un gettare seme di discordia il tradurre le opere di Rosmini o come non ancor sufficientemente esaminate, o come sospette di errori non prima nè dopo sì straordinario esame veduti, o come pericolose; oppure usare espressioni, le quali tolgono ogni valore o attenuano soverchiamente la forza e l'autorità d'un giudizio emanato con tanta maturità e tanta solennità dal Supremo Pastore della Chiesa?

Non per questo vuolsi affermare, essere illecito il dissentire dal sistema filosofico di Rosmini o dal modo con cui egli tenta spiegare alcune verità, ed anche il darne nelle scuole la confutazione: ma dacchè non si conviene con essolui nel modo di spiegare certe verità, non è lecito concludere ch' egli abbia negato le stesse verità; nè è

conclude that Rosmini has denied these truths; nor is it lawful to inflict any theological censure on the doctrines maintained by him in those works, which the Sacred Congregation has examined and dismissed, and which the Holy Father has intended to protect from further accusations in the future.

Believe me, etc., etc.,

Your Most Obedient Servant,

FR. VINCENZO MARIA GATTI,

Of the Order of Preachers,
Master of the Sacred Apostolical
Palace.

June 16, 1876.

lecito infliggere censura teologica alle dottrine sostenute dal medesimo nelle opere dalla Sagra Congregazione dell' Indice esaminate e dimesse, e contro cui il Santo Padre intese impedire, si movessero in avvenire nuove accuse.

La riverisco e con distinta stima mi protesto, di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima,

Dev.mo Servo,

P. FR. VINCENZO MARIA
GATTI,

de' Pred.

Maestro del Sacro Pal. Ap.

16 Giugno, 1876.